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HISTORY 



OF THE 



Army OF THE Potomac. 



J. Hf'STINE, 

Historian of tti© First Army Corps. 




V V ■■ 



PHILADELPHIA: 

J. B. RODGERS PRINTING CO. , 54 N. SIXTH ST. 
1892. 






COPYRIGHTED, 1 892. 
BY J. H. STINE. 



Press of 

The Jas. B. Rodgers Printing Co., 

Philadelphia. 



/ /IL 



TD 

THDSE WHO FELL 

TD SAITE 

THE UNIDN. 



ir 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER t>AGB 

I. First Buli, Run i 

II. DranesvilivE. The First Victory 30 

III. Peninsular Campaign 42 

IV. From First to Second Buli. Run . 99 

V. Second Bvhh Run nS 

VI. South Mountain 154 

VII. Antietam 176 

VIII. From Antietam to Rectortown 221 

IX. Fredericksburg 244 

X. ChancellorsviIvLE 309 

XI. From Fredericksburg to Frederick 415 

XII. Gettysburg 447 

XIII. From Gettysburg to the Rappahannock 555 

XIV. Mine Run 581 

XV. The Wilderness 593 

XVI. Spottsylvania 613 

XVII. Sheridan's Great Raid from Spottsylvania to the 

James • 629 

V 



vi CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XVIII. Preparing to Move in the Direction of Richmond. 637 

XIX. Coi^D Harbor 645 

XX. Cavalry Transactions from the North Anna To 

the James 650 

XXI. The Siege of Petersburg 660 

XXII. Wilson's Raid on the South Side and Weldon Rail- 
roads AND Battle at Ream's Station 682 

XXIII. Deep Bottom and Weldon Railroad 689 

XXIV. Cavalry Operations of the Army of the Potomac . 693 

XXV. Five Forks 699 

XXVI. Lee's Final Struggle at Petersburg and Flight — 

Surrender at Appomattox 707 

XXVII. Miscellaneous 712 

Organization of the Society of the First Corps, 
Army of the Potomac 750 



ILLUSTRATIONS. 



Facing Page. 

J. H. Stine Frontispiece. 

Gen. John S. McCai.mont 32 

Col. John H. Taggart 40 

Gen. Darius N. Couch 95 

Gen. S. Van VweT 106 

Gen. W. S. Rosecrans 113 

Gen. Franz Sigei. 123 

Hon. A. R. BuSHNEiyi, 136 

Gen. RuFus King 140 

Gen. Louis Wagner 149 

Capt. James Thompson 184 

Gen. A. J. Warner 191 

Lieut. Col. E. S. Bragg 193 

Gen. Daniel Butterfielb 280 

Gen. Daniei, E- Sicki,es 332 

Gen. W1LI.IAM J. SEWEi,iy 365 

Gen. J. B. Carr 448 

Gen. Abner Doubleday 454 

Col. Lucius Fairchild 457 

Gen. R. R. Dawes 461 

Gen. J. V. Pierce 463 

Capt. L. E. Pond 464 

Col. George N. Reichard 468 

Gen. Judson Kii^patrick 472 

Gen. Adrian R. Root • • 474 

Gen. W. W. Dudley 480 

Lieut. Col. W. W. Grout 484 

Gen. John C. Robinson 488 

vii 



viii IL LUSTRATIONS. 

Facing Page. 

Brevet Col. A. J. SE1.1.ERS 500 

Maj. E. P. HAI.STEAD 504 

Gen. J. H. Kidd 509 

Col. R. Bruce Ricketts 518 

Gen. H. J. Hunt 523 

Col. John N. Craig 525 

Gen. George J. Stannard 529 

Gen. Alexander S. Webb 531 

Capt. MiCHAEi, Weidrich 536 

Gen. J. Irvin GrEGG 544 

Col. Redfield Proctor 550 

Col. C. M. CONYNGHAM 596 

Col. Jos. A. MoESCH 600 

Col. S. J. Williams 602 

Gen. Edwin S. Osborne 606 

Capt. P. De Lacy 608 

Gen. L. A. Grant 611 

Col. Charles E. Phelps 616 

Hon. W. H. Harries 623 

Gen. James A. Beaver 665 

Gen. G. T. Beauregard 667 

Gen. Joshua L. Chamberlain 668 

Gen. D. B. Birney 670 

Gen. H. G. Wright 672 

Gen. George H. Chapman 684 

Col. D. B. DailEy 692 

Gen. John A. Kellogg 702 

Col. Norm. G. Cooper 714 

Lieut. Abram J. Buckles 722 

Gen. Ebenezer Uumont 726 

Capt. J. V. HadlEY 72S 

Hon. C E. Coon 729 

Gen. Horatio C. King 736 



PREKACK. 



^ I ^HIS work is presented to the public with extreme diffi- 
dence, even under tlie circumstances which directed 
me to write it. The First Corps elected me as its historian 
without my solicitation, or knowledge thirty minutes before- 
hand, that such a position had been provided for by the 
Committee. Without time to consider its great responsibility 
in a session of the corps, and no opportunit}' to consult with 
friends, I accepted it with an inward feeling of mental reser- 
vation. I would have gladly nominated another. Then I 
began studying over the work before me, and decided to visit 
the battlefields in company with the prominent actors on 
both sides. Generals H. J. Hunt, John Newton, L. A. Grant, 
W. S. Rosecrans, J. C. Robinson, Abner Doubleday, E. B. 
Fowler, D. E. Sickles, Geo. J. Stannard, Lvicius Fairchild, 
E. S. Bragg, Slocum, Wright, Aj^res, and many other officers 
and soldiers on our side, including Hon. A. G. Curtin, 
Pennsylvania's war governor, gave me fully and freely what 
they knew of the movements on the different battlefields in 
which the Army of the Potomac was engaged. 

On the Confederate side L,ongstreet, Heth, Mahone, Fields. 
FitzhughXee, W. H. F. Lee, Eppa Hunton, Kemper, Hagood, 



X PREFACE. 

Beauregard, Wright, and numerous other officers and Con- 
federate veterans have assisted me. With the aid of those 
who were active participants in the two contending armies, 
and the guidance of the completed Rebellion Records, I have 
endeavored to submit a history free from bias, and as justly 
correct as I could. Where a point was in dispute, I have 
carefully weighed all the evidence, to give honor to whom 
honor was due. And in many cases I have given the different 
statements, so the readers can decide in their own judgments. 
With these frank statements, I have only to say that I 
have honestly performed my duty to the best of my ability, 
and if I have fallen short of what ought to have been 
expected of me, I have to beg an indulgent public to let me 
have the benefit of the ' ' mantle of charity ' ' which so 
frequently has to shield frail humanity. 

J. H. Stine. 



INTRODUCTORY. 



"T N writing this introduction to the History of the Army 
of the Potomac, the causes which led to the late war 
will merely be alluded to, as the people are fully conversant 
with them. 

When the colonies declared their independence and pre- 
pared for war to gain it, they laid the foundation of a new 
system of government in which the will of the people 
should be supreme. 

Although the colonies united in a common defense 
against England, yet in several instances they acted, in a 
certain sense, on an independent line, and some jealousies 
arose which caused bickerings. When their independence 
was achieved, delegates assembled to form a Constitution 
to govern as a whole. There were strong differences, which 
were hard to reconcile, but the steady hand of Washington, 
as President of the Convention, controlled, and a Constitu- 
tion was adopted which was finally ratified. Jealousy of the 
power of the monarchical governments of the Old World, 
perhaps, bred the doctrine of ' ' state rights, ' ' which has had 
a strong following in this country, and which had its effect 
in bringing on the war. 

Slaver^', countenanced by the Constitution in a limited 
form, proved the great barrier between the North and the 
South after it had ceased in the North. But a gradual 



xii INTRODUCTORY. 

emancipation could have set all the slaves free in due time, 
had ambitious men not used it as a pretext to increase their 
power and popularity in the South. 

That slavery was profitable and congenial to the south- 
ern climate is a fact beyond dispute. The escaping of 
enterprising slaves into the North to obtain their freedom 
wrougfht a bitter feeling between the two sections. But the 
great cause of the war was the ove.rvaulting ambition of 
John C. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis. Calhoun was greatly 
embittered against President Jackson because the latter 
would not allow him to be placed on the ticket with him 
the second time "Old Hickory" ran for President. Cal- 
houn knew full well that Jackson's second Vice-President 
would, in all probability, be his successor in the White 
House. Calhoun had no superior in ability, and wanted 
to be President. 

Then began a bitter war between Jackson and Calhoun, 
the latter springing his noted "nullification" doctrine, 
which, of itself, was poison to the Union of the States, and 
charged with danger. Jackson rigorously laid his heavy 
hand upon it, and threatened Calhoun. It, apparently, had 
no vital strength ; but the frequent presidential elections 
afforded fresh opportunities to increase the ill-feeling be- 
tween the sections. Washington was wise in declining a 
third term, and had the Constitution, at any period pre- 
vious to i860, been changed to one term of six years, the 
war might have been averted for a time ; but it was bound to 
come, for Jefferson Davis, ambitious, and voicing the dis- 
turbed feeling at the South, was fully resolved to establish a 
Southern Confederacy, based upon the corner stone of 
slavery. He left the Senate of the United States to put 
this resolution into effect. 



IN TRODUCTORY. xiii 

He was a graduate of West Point and had great influence 
over the army officers coming from that section. Up to 
this time the South had a large share of the officers of the 
army and the navy ; who, while they were officers of the 
General Government, were more in sympathy with the doc- 
trine of state rights, and held their duty to be, as between 
the two, first with the State. 

Had Jefferson Davis been merely a politician he could 
not have headed so formidable a rebellion as occurred from 
1 86 1 to 1865. His will was obeyed in the South, notwith- 
standing Virginia and North Carolina were opposed to 
secession. The momentum of its power coerced all into 
line, and in Virginia, which had cast a heavy vote against 
secession, was located his future Capital, and the State 
itself made the principal theater of war. Here his best 
equipped and best officered army met, and after four years 
was destroyed by, that of the Government, which had its 
base of operations on the Potomac, whence it derives its 
historic name, the Army of the Potomac, which will live in 
history until the end of time. 



THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



CHAPTER I. 
FIRST BULL RUN. 



-^"^HE history of the first battle of Bull Run naturally 
-^ belongs in the history of the First Corps, for various 
reasons ; although the corps were not distinctively arranged 
until some time after that. General McDowell was its first 
commander, and organized it, and the first battle of Bull 
Run was wholly his, so far as the Federal side was con- 
cerned. In fact, the names of IMcDowell and Beauregard 
will be known in history principally in connection with 
that battle. When Sumter was fired on, and war was a 
reality for the new administration to face, it was extremely 
difficult to find officers who had experience in handling 
large commands. 

General Scott was then too far advanced in years (nearly 
eighty) to take the field, but he well knew the great work 
to be performed. It had been given out by prominent men 
and officials that it would be a short war ; Secretary Seward 
placed its duration at sixty days, therefore the first volun- 
teers were called for ninety days only. The zeal of the 
Crusaders did not surpass the activity in both sections, and 
thousands enlisted through the recruiting officers, and regi- 
ment after regiment was formed, officered, equipped, and 
dispatched to the front with wonderful rapidity. 

Soon large armies were facing each other. Butler at 



2 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Fortress Monroe was met by Magruder ; at Harper's Ferry 
Patterson and Johnston were organizing large commands. 
In the mountainous region of West Virginia several com- 
mands were menacing each other for the mastery. The Con- 
federate forces were pressed to within a few miles of Wash- 
ino-ton. while Alexandria was a rendezvous — in fact, their 
rear guard was just leaving when Colonel Ellsworth's com- 
mand entered the city on the fatal morning when Jackson 
shot him dead for hauling down the Confederate flag. 

The work of receiving and assigning the regiments to 
their places around Washington was done, almost exclu- 
sively, by Major Irwin McDowell. 

In the mean time Congress had been convened by the 
President on the fourth of July. It was decidedly appro- 
priate for that body to meet on that day ; if there was any- 
thing that would warm them up in the South it was the 
remembrance of the day designated by an illustrious son of 
the South as Independence Day ; it was the olive branch 
kindly extended by President Lincoln. 

To meet the great emergency, a bill, providing for three 
major generals and additional brigadier generals, was 
passed and signed at once by the President. 

The first thing to be done was to select the major 
generals. 

Salmon P. Chase, who was Secretary of the Treasury, 
was the most active and, at that time, one of the most pow- 
erful members of the Cabinet. He not only controlled the 
finances, but he gave a large share of his time to military 
matters. 

When the Cabinet met to select the three major generals 
(I now repeat what General IMcDowell said to Major E. P. 
Halstead and myself, wliich fact will give one substantial 
witness to its correctness) Secretary Chase sent a letter to 
Major McDowell to come to the White House immediately. 
He was then absent assigning new troops to their temporary 
quarters. When he returned to the War Department, he 
found Secretarv Chase's note. He went at once to the 



FIRST BULL RUN. 3 

White House, and sent his card up to ]\Ir. Chase, who came 
down and told him that the Cabinet was then in session 
for the purpose of selecting the three major generals, and 
that he (Chase) intended to present his (McDowell's) name 
as one of them. 

To this proposition McDowell stoutly demurred, saying 
that it would create great jealousy, and that he feared it 
would be greatly against him. McDowell explained to us 
that he never had any hope of attaining a rank higher than 
colonel, and even that was beyond his expectation ; he said 
he was glad to start early in the war with the rank of brig- 
adier in the regular army, and, as he said to Chase, he pre- 
ferred that rank. 

He then suggested to Chase as the three major generals 
]\IcClellan, Halleck, and Fremont. But the evidence before 
me is quite clear that Chase did not select the major gen- 
erals, although it is said thatiie was strong enough afterwards 
to name Hooker as the commander of the Army of the Poto- 
mac. I am greatly indebted to General Schuyler Hamilton, 
who was General Scott's military secretary, and who 
saw Lincoln then, on official business, more than any other 
man in Washington, for valuable information, which is 
given in his exact language. He says : "In regard to the 
appointments of Fremont, Halleck, and ]\IcClellan, General 
Fremont as a defeated candidate for the Presidency, and a 
soldier b}' profession, did not need anybody to urge his claim 
to be major general. General Halleck owed his appointment 
as major general to a letter, written by him from San 
Francisco, setting forth the condition of affairs on the Pa- 
cific coast. This letter was laid before General Scott, and 
by him submitted to President Lincoln. It impressed both 
greatly. General Scott remarked that in thinking of men 
suitable for the position of major general, they had omitted 
one of the trump cards in the pack. Within twenty-four 
hours General Halleck was notified by telegraph of his ap- 
pointment as major general." He added: " IMcClellan 
was also selected by General Scott." When Colonel Schuy- 



4 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ler Hamilton took the news to the President of the great 
victory at Rich INIountain, he added a word in McClellan's 
favor. 

In the mean time the three months' volnnteers would 
soon be out of the service, and nothing really practical had 
been done — only a mere beginning. 

Butler was holding Fortress Monroe. His name was a 
tower of strength at that time to the Union cause, for the 
reason that in the Charleston convention he had voted 
(twenty-seven times) for Jefferson Davis as the nominee of 
the Democratic party for President. 

In answer to a question in regard to his vote he sent me 
the following : 

Boston, November 3, 1890. 

Dear Sir : — I have your letter in which yovi sa}' you have put 
into your book that I voted for Jefferson Davis twenty-seven times. 
You have made a mistake ; I voted for him fift3'-seven (57) times. 

Yours truly, Benj. F. ButlER. 

J. H. Stine, Esq., 323 C Street, S. E., Washington, D. C. 

But when Davis attempted to disrupt or destroy the 
Union, Butler marched at once to stamp out the treasonable 
action of the man who had had honor thrust upon him by 
the Nation, and who had taken an oath as an army officer, 
Secretary of War, and Senator that he would support the 
Constitution and obey the laws. His action at Baltimore 
gave additional value to his name. But the enemy was com- 
mitting heavy depredations all around him. The navy }'ard 
opposite Norfolk had been destroyed, and the enemy's flag 
floated triumphantly near him. But Butler was not sup- 
posed to conquer the enemy at once. At Harper's Ferry 
General Patterson, an oflScer of the Mexican War, was in 
command. Great deeds were prophesied of him, and 
it was said that he would soon advance on General John- 
ston and drive him from the valley. Every day added to the 
confidence of the South, as no battle was forced on them. 
Their old idea, that the true military men of the Nation 
were born in the South and that on th.e field of battle one 



FIRST BULL RUN. 5 

Southern man was eqnal to four Northern men, was begin- 
ning to be the settled opinion in their armies. 

Beauregard, with his headquarters in the Weir house, 
near Manassas Junction, was evidently aiming to repeat 
some of Napoleon's strategic moves, for he mapped out a plan 
by which he was to receive reenforcements enough to hurl 
the Union army back on Washington, then unite with John- 
ston, pounce on Patterson — merely lunch on him — rush on 
the Union forces in West Virginia, and drive them 
from the State. This programme was a nice one, and 
would have well-nigh freed the Confederacy ; but it 
was suddenly spoiled in West Virginia, very unexpectedly 
and unceremoniously, by an officer who had served sev- 
eral years as a professor at West Point, and was an able 
engineer. 

When the base of Rich Mountain was touched his 
eagle eye took in the situation, and he at once asked 
General McClellan to permit him to make a detour of 
the mountain which would place him in the rear of the 
enemy. 

General Rosecrans having obtained that permission from 
General McClellan, set out on his perilous march, following 
the guide who lived near the camp of the enemy. After a 
difficult march he finally reached the desired point and threw 
forward his biigade (the Nineteenth Ohio, and the Eighth, 
Tenth, and Thirteenth Indiana) in line of battle. The re- 
sult of that strategic move and bold assault was the first 
substantial victory of the war. The brilliant campaign of 
General Rosecrans, of only one day, had the effect of 
paralyzing the enemy in all that mountainous region. The 
news was hailed with delight and joy throughout the North, 
while the South adroitly concealed its mortification over 
the result. 

As the soldiers are dying off" so rapidly, and every day 
lessens the opportunity to secure and preserve valuable his- 
tory, the following letter, giving Scott's opinion of Rose- 
crans is here inserted : 



6 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The Arlington, 
"Washington, D. C, February 12, 1S87. 

Dear Sir: — About May 19-22, 1861, General Rosecrans called 
at the official headquarters of General Scott. He was m W ashing- 
ton to procure the money to pay for clothing, &c., for the Ohio three 
months' volunteers. We met ; he mentioned his object ; we con- 
versed awhile. I mentioned General Scott could not at that moment 
receive him, but begged him to wait for a .short time. Presently I 
informed him General Scott would be glad to see him. They had 
quite a detailed conversation. General Scott put to him many inci- 
sive questions, and gave his views about gunboats, and an armj^ of 
iron, &c., &c. Very shortly after General Rosecrans left President 
Lincoln entered. Presently General Scott repeated to President 
Lincoln the important points of General Rosecrans' information. 
He added, "Mr. President, he ought to be made a brigadier general 
of the regular army. He is a graduate of West Point, an accom- 
plished officer of engineers. He is full of the rough vigor we so much 
need. He is a rough diamond, sir, but a diamond all the same." 

General Rosecrans was very shortl}' afterwards appointed a 
brigadier general of the regular ami}' — viz, June 16, 1S61. 

Yours truly, Schuyler Hamilton, 

Major General. 
J. H. Stine, Esq. 

Immediately on the heels of that victory the Northern 
press, reflecting the excited and anxious feeling of the peo- 
ple, not only clamored, but virtually demanded that the 
army in front of Washington move forward to victory, and 
repeat the crtishing defeat of the enemy at Rich Mountain 
by Rosecrans. 

There were but two officers presented to command the 
army in front of Washington — INIcDowell and Mansfield. 
A choice must be made without dela)-. General Hamilton, 
who knows more about this than any man, said : "General 
Mansfield, when Jefferson Da\-is was vSecretary of War, had 
been preferred for inspector general of the army as against 
Henry L. Scott, General Scott's .son-in-law-, who was adju- 
tant general of the army under Scott in Mexico. Though 
there were the kindest relations between Generals Scott and 
Mansfield, that caused the weight of Scott's influence in 
favor of McDowell. 



FIRST BULL RUN. 7 

"McDowell had been on Scott's staff for several years 
in New York City. He was taken on Scott's staff as as- 
sistant adjutant general, which brought his wife near her 
kin, he having married the daughter of Mr. Borden, the 
great ironmaster of Troy, and therefore knew McDowell 
well." 

]\Iansfield was given the command of the troops in the 
city of Washington. IMcDowell entered on his new and 
responsible duties with great alacrity, working night and 
day to prepare his command for the approaching conflict. 
He realized the fact that his troops were not prepared for 
battle, and so stated, but he was met with the reply that the 
enem}' was equally as green. That statement was not true. 
Lincoln, who will live in history and in the hearts of the 
people perhaps next to Washington, was an eminent lawyer 
and statesman. Jefferson Davis was a military man, having 
served in the IVIexican War, and had been Secretary of 
War for four years under Pierce, which gave him great 
military advantages. Besides, almost every prominent 
man in the South possessed a military training, which, 
at that critical moment, was of great value, so that the 
retort that the South was as green as the North was not 
true in a military sense, and the fact that the bold Stone- 
wall Jackson wanted to invade the North immediately after 
the first Bull Run was a true gauge of their military 
training. 

McDowell was laboring at a great disadvantage — drilling 
and preparing his troops as best he could — under the heavy 
pressure from the North to deliver battle to the enemy in 
his front. 

Secretar\- Chase was the champion, in the Cabinet, of the 
intense feeling in the North that the war should be pushed 
at once, with a vigor that would end it soon ; that was a 
correct view if the army had been prepared to advance and 
hold its ground. 

There is no doubt that General Scott was weakened 
with the administration, for the reason that he did not be- 



8 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

lieve ill the prevailing opiuion that a few days would crush 
the rebellion ; and the more the old hero insisted, or faith- 
fully stood by his views, the more it antagonized the opinion 
of those Avho hoped and said it would end speedih*. 

At the Cabinet meeting a week before, General Hamil- 
ton says : " General Montgomery Blair said he would march 
to Richmond with ten thousand men, armed with lathes. ' ' 
' ' Yes, ' ' said General Scott, ' ' as prisoners of war. ' ' Con- 
tinuing General Hamilton's statement of the events which 
occurred prior to the battle and during its progress, he says : 
' ' On the Sunda)' preceding the battle of Bull Run, Scott 
directed me, his military secretary, to say to McDowell that 
he wished him to dine with him without fail. At the din- 
ner, at which General McDowell appeared^ General Scott 
used every possible argument to dissuade General McDowell 
from fighting the first battle of Bull Run under the then 
existing condition of public affairs. Reminding him even 
of the personal obligations he (General McDowell) was 
under to him (General Scott) in the matter of appointing 
him on his staff, previously referred to, he stated that it was 
his intention and wish that he (General McDowell) should 
organize in the vicinity of Xenia, Ohio, an army of iron of 
not less than one hundred thousand men, while in the 
mean time, iron gunboats were constructed suitable for the 
waters of the Ohio and the Mississippi, by combination of 
which land and naval forces the rebellion should be envel- 
oped on the one hand, by the iron serpent of gunboats, while 
the army of iron penetrated the interior. He then begged 
General McDowell to go to Secretary Chase, his kinsman, 
and aid him (General Scott) in preventing a forward move- 
ment at that moment ; one of the arguments used by Gen- 
eral Scott being that the Union sentiment of the South had 
been surprised by the suddenness and promptitude of the 
movement in favor of secession ; that he (General Scott) 
was well advised that the Union sentiment was recovering 
itself, and gaining head in the South ; that from the mo- 
ment blood was shed the South would be made a unit. 



/._ 



FIRST BULL RUN. 9 

General McDowell regretted that lie could not agree with 
General Scott in his views, and arose and retired. A few 
moments after his retirement General Scott said to me, 
' Did you ever see such a man of stone ? He was not moved 
by any of my appeals. ' He added : ' Put on your sword 
and follow General McDowell, and say to him, he must 
either go to Secretary Chase and do what I have urged, or 
he must report to me by midnight that he is at Arlington. 
I will not leave that army on the other side of the Potomac 
without a commander. General McDowell will say that he 
has no staff Tell him that I have ordered }-ou to accom- 
pany him to General Mansfield to supply him with as many 
young men who have just arrived from West Point as he 
may desire, as staff officers. And further, direct General 
Mansfield that he see that those young men are furnished 
with horses and all necessary equipments for the service. ' 

' ' I overtook General McDowell on Seventeenth Street, 
just near the old War Office, and commmiicated General 
Scott's orders. He declined to use his influence with Sec- 
retary Chase, as General Scott requested. He also declined, 
on some private misunderstandings between Mansfield and 
himself, to call upon General Mansfield as General Scott 
had directed he should. I urged upon him that private 
misunderstandings could not be allowed for a moment to 
interfere with great public interests ; that I knew my duty, 
and however painful it might be, I should be constrained to 
do it — that was, to order him (General McDowell) to report 
to General Scott in arrest, because of his positive refusal to 
obey General Scott's orders, communicated by me. On 
this presentation of the matter. General McDowell recon- 
sidered his determination, accompanied me to General 
Mansfield, and was furnished with the staff of }'Oung men 
from West Point indicated by General Scott. He reported 
by telegraph at midnight that he was at the Arlington 
House in command of that army. In the course of the 
succeeding week General McDowell reported to General 
Scott his proposed plan of battle. It was hung upon the 



10 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

wall, and I followed with a pointer the positions indicated 
by General McDowell as those he intended the forces under 
his command should occupy. After General McDowell had 
gone through a detailed statement of his plan, and had fin- 
ished, General Scott remarked, ' General McDowell, that is 
as good a plan of battle as I ever saw upon paper.' 

"General McDowell said in reply: 'General Scott, the 
success of this whole plan depends upon General Patterson 
holding General Johnston in check at Winchester.' Gen- 
eral Scott remarked that General Johnston was a ver\- able 
soldier, that he had a railroad at his command with which 
to move his troops, and if General McDowell's plan of 
battle, which had just been presented to him, depended 
upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check, 
his plan was not worth the paper it was drawn upon. ' ' 

That ended that interview. In regard to the condi- 
tion of the troops, as to the proximate determination of 
their enlistment, the following circumstances are men- 
tioned : 

"The time of the Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Cor- 
coran' s regiment, had actually expired, or was on the point 
of expiring, before the battle of Bull Run was fought, and 
it was so uncertain that they would move fonvard, that 
General Scott sent me to that regiment with the message 
that if the Sixty-ninth refused to move forward, it was the 
first time in history that Irishmen had ever been known to 
turn their backs on friend or foe. This determined that 
regiment to go forward. Other regiments, not remem- 
bered, were appealed to in a similar manner, and all went 
forward." 

General Hamilton is mistaken wherein he states that all 
the regiments appealed to, wliose time had expired, went 
forward. The Fourth Pennsylvania positively refused after 
an earnest appeal, and the Colonel, John F. Hartranft, re- 
fused to return home with his command, but volunteered 
as an aid and went into the battle. Afterwards he became 
major general, Governor of Pennsylvania for two terms, 



\ 



FIRST BULL RUN. 11 

and held many other high positions of honor and trust. It 
was the turning point in his life. 

McDowell considered that his chances were good to suc- 
ceed, and, if he did, the dazzling star of fame was rising 
near enough to him to be seen without a field glass. 

General Scott did his duty sternly, and General Schuyler 
Hamilton, the grandson of Alexander Hamilton, displayed 
an executive capacity and nerve that were worthy of his 
illustrious grandsire. 

The fiat had gone forth that the army must offer battle, 
and the order was issued to march. So, on the morning of 
the seventeenth of July the army left Arlington Heights, 
opposite Washington, for Bull Run. On the eighteenth the 
vanguard reached Centerville, from which place the enemy 
had retired, as Beauregard had selected Bull Run as his line 
of defense. ^IcDowell organized his army into four divi- 
sions, commanded respectively by Tyler, Hunter, Heintzel- 
man, and ]\Iiles. 

From Centerville there are three roads running in the 
direction of Bull Run ; that on the right hand crosses it at 
the famous Stone Bridge, the middle road at Blackburn's 
Ford, which leads direct to ]\Ianassas, and the left-hand 
road crosses some four miles lower down. 

It was the intention of McDowell to turn Beauregard's 
riofht flank and take him in reverse and rear. 

He sent Tyler forward to feel the enemy, and make a 
reconnoissauce, which was a fatal error, as that gave due 
warning to the enemy, though the right was already guarded 
with their best officers. 

But especially was that true of Tyler, for he was an am- 
bitious officer, without sufficient discretion. Instead of be- 
ing contented to obey orders, and merely reconnoiter, he 
advanced opposite Blackburn's Ford, and, after shelling the 
enemy, advanced his infantrv' to the edge of the stream and 
opened a fusilade, expecting to scare them, and declar- 
ing that he would go to Manassas that night. He was not 
aware that he was annoying General Longstreet, who proved 



12 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

to be the Ney of the Confederate army, as the war developed, 
and became interesting. Longstreet advanced his infantry 
and severely punished Tyler for his rashness. 

In fact his left, the Twelfth New York, was throwm into 
confusion by a force of the enemy crossing the stream lower 
down, and pouring in an enfilading fire. This compelled a 
hasty retreat, which had an exceedingly bad effect on our 
troops. They were surprised b}' the flank movement, and 
suffered from it. 

The news flew over the country, and Beauregard claimed 
a victory, declaring it was a battle. 

This reverse led McDowell to change his plans, and seek 
to turn the left flank, which it w^as decided by the engineers 
could be done. Therefore, on the morning of the twenty- 
first, at two o'clock, the order was given for the army to 
begin its circuitous march around the enemy's left, crossing 
Bull Run at Sudley's Ford, nearly a mile above the extreme 
left of the enemy. That was an admirable move, and took 
the enemy completely by surprise. At the ford is the 
Sudley Mill, antiquated in its appearance ; also a spring and 
church by the same name. The church stands in a little 
grove, quite a distance from the stream, near the edge of 
the brow of the hill. 

[It was at this place that the party lunched in October, 
1883, when we were reviewing the battlefield. Among 
those present were Generals Rosecrans, Longstreet, and 
Hunt ; Colonel Frey, the Swiss Minister ; Generals Fair- 
child and Dudley ; Colonel Wood, Hon. C. C. Matson, Mr. 
Becker, of Frank Leslie'' s Magasine^ and many other news- 
paper men, and veterans. This historical visit w'as made 
under the auspices of the Society of the First Corps, with 
General Rosecrans as president, in the interest of the pres- 
ent history.] 

Tlic Cou federate forces were drawn up along Bull Run 
as follows : Ewell's brigade was on the extreme right near 
Union Mills, with General Holmes' brigade in reserve. 
General Jones' was on the left of Ewell, with Early's bri- 



FIRST BULL RUN. 13 

gade as a support. Then came Longstreet, with Bee's and 
BartoUTs brigades in his rear, lapping over to McLean's 
Ford. Still farther in the rear was Barksdale's Mississippi 
regiment. Bfnham was supported by Jackson. Cocke's 
brigade was between B^nliam and Evans, with infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery in reserve. Evans held the extreme 
left of their line, coming down to the Stone bridge, and 
also covering a small ford some distance above, and farther 
up the stream. Hampton's legion of infantry had arrived 
on the twentieth, the day before the battle, and was sta- 
tioned near the Lewis House. Walton's and Pendleton's 
batteries were in rear of the center, or nearly so. It will be 
observed that General Johnston was already with Beaure- 
gard, and a part of his command had arrived before the 
battle, as Jackson's brigade was a part of it. General Pat- 
terson had been urged by General Scott to either engage 
Johnston, or to threaten him strongly enough to prevent, if 
possible, his reenforcing Beauregard. That could be done 
only by throwing his left well forward, and strongly feeling 
the position of the enemy ; then he could tell, perhaps, if 
troops were being sent away. Patterson's movement was 
more to the right, while Johnston moved all of his army 
away, but a mere skeleton, which was left as a blind to de- 
tain Patterson. McDowell had to contend with more than 
the combined forces of Beauregard and Johnston, as Holmes, 
who was supporting Ewell, had been ordered from Aquia 
Creek, thus stripping the Potomac, in response to the urgent 
requests of Beauregard, who had sent several staff officers 
to Richmond to explain the situation and urge that more 
troops be sent to him. 

The burden of McDowell's fears was that Johnston 
would detail a part of his command and reenforce Beaure- 
gard. 

On the morning of the twenty-first, at two o'clock, Tyler 
was to move his division forward to the Stone bridge, and 
earnestly engage the enemy, as if he intended to force a 
crossing there. He was placed in the advance to cover the 



14 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

movements of Hunter and Heintzelman, who were to take 
a blind country road which, in a circuitous way, finally 
crossed Bull Run at Sudley's Ford. At Cub Run Hunter 
left the main road, with Heintzelman closely following, and 
Miles, in reserve near Centerville, was, if possible, to en- 
gage the enemy's center and right to further shield the 
movements of Hunter and Heintzelman. Tyler behaved 
quite well that morning, for he made a vigorous attack at 
six o'clock, the time designated to begin, and which was the 
hour fixed for Hunter and Heintzelman to arrive at Sud- 
ley's Ford. Tyler's division was tardy in starting, how- 
ever, and that wasted much precious time, but the troops 
were new, and could not be handled like veterans ; and as 
T}'ler did such good work when he arrived in front of the 
enemy, it seems hardly fair to charge him with the delay 
during the night. He pounded the enemy hard, but it 
was a long time to keep up the deception, for the head of 
Hunter's column did not reach Sudley's Ford until half- 
past nine — three hours and a half of heavy strain on Tyler. 
It is now said Beauregard claims that he knew of 
McDowell's change, yet it was not until nearly ten o'clock 
that Evans changed his front to meet Hunter's forces, 
and dispatched an aid to Beauregard notifying him of the 
threatened danger on their left, and called for assistance 
that he might make disposition to meet the advance. 
There was not even a vedette at or near Sudley's Ford. 
Our troops crossed it as did Caesar the Rubicon, unopposed. 
Hunter was still marching in column, and, as he advanced, 
Evans placed batteries in position to enfilade him. Burn- 
side's brigade was heading the column, and was not de- 
ployed in line of battle until the open fields were gained, 
when it had to be done at great disadvantage and sacrifice. 
Colonel Porter's brigade deployed and formed on Burnside's 
right, with Sykes' regulars on his left. This was a splen- 
did line of battle, and the enemy, after an hour's hard 
fighting, was forced back across the Warrenton turnpike 
and Younof's Branch. 



FIRST BULL RUN. 15 

This movement uncovered the Stone bridge, and Tyler 
ordered Sherman's and Ke}'es' brigades to cross Bull Run, 
pass to the rear of Hunter, and form on his right. 

It was at this exciting moment that Sherman displayed 
the tact which made him a distinguished general afterwards. 
He had seen a horseman that morning cross the stream 
quite a distance above the Stone bridge, so when he received 
the order to advance, he took his brigade to that point and 
found a good ford, and at once rapidly advanced to the line 
of battle assigned to him. The Second Wisconsin was in 
his command there, and the boys are ver}' proud of their 
first brigade commander. That regiment won a position^ in 
history second to none in the army. Ricketts' battery was 
by that time in position on the right of Sudley's road 
(which crosses the Warrenton turnpike not far from the 
noted Henr}' House) and was doing splendid service. At 
noon ^McDowell was in possession of the plateau south of 
Young's Branch ; the central point on that plateau being 
the Henry House, which like the cluster of trees at Gettys- 
burg, was the prominent niark to be gained in the Pickett 
charge. 

The enemy had been forced back a mile and a half and 
was in great confusion. Bee's troops were in full retreat, 
when he, seeing Jackson's brigade of five regiments in line 
of battle, some distance back, in front of the pine woods, 
said, ' ' There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. ' ' 
Jackson came forward only to receive a ven- severe punish- 
ment, his brigade being badly cut up ; the Federal right 
swept around to the Henry House, and the batteries of 
Griffin and Ricketts were brought up near there. 

Then came a lull in the action on the part of the 
Federals ; the men were tired and thirsty, and they went 
back to the branch for water. This suspension proved 
fatal to the Union cause and to the star of McDowell. A 
little more orood work at that moment and the Confederate 
army would have been in full retreat toward Richmond, 
But now came one of the most unfortunate events of the 



16 THE ARMY QF THE POTOMAC. 

day. Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries were necessarily 
posted in close proximity. Griffin had two gnns on the 
right of Ricketts, and was playing on a battery not more 
than three hnndred yards away, when he saw a regiment 
come out of a piece of woods not very far from his right. 
He suspected it to be a Confederate regiment, and ordered 
his guns double-shotted to give them a volley, when IVIajor 
Barry rode up and said : " Captain, that is ^'our support." 
(He thought it was the Fourteenth Brooklyn.) Griffin 
insisted that it was the enemy. "But," said Major Barry, 
' ' I know. ' ' The commander of the regiment was appa- 
rently making a speech to his men. The regiment was 
then moved by the left flank along the edge of the woods, 
then advanced to within fifty }'ards of the batteries, where 
a murderous fire was opened, killing and disabling the 
horses of both batteries, and strewing the ground with the 
killed and wounded, not only of the batteries, but the 
supports ; it was a terrible disaster to our arms, and was 
never really recovered. 

Beauregard and Johnston had both arrived on the field, 
and were inspiring the men to hold their lines until fresh 
troops could arrive. The Fourteenth Brooklyn, which 
had been well on the right all day, had behaved with a 
gallantry worthy of the Old Guard of Napoleon. They 
had been attacked in a piece of woods by the Seventh and 
Eighth Georgia regiments, and had held their ground 
heroically. In supporting the batteries of Ricketts and 
Griffin, Colonel A. M. Wood was severely wounded ; it 
was thought mortally. Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. Fowler 
then assumed command, and was distinguished during the 
war as the commander of that gallant and heroic regiment. 

The Federal forces, after the loss of Ricketts' and Grif- 
fin's batteries, were driven back across Young's Branch and 
the turnpike, when they rallied and made a determined 
dash to retake the batteries ; again our flags were planted 
on the plateau. P>ut the battle had swayed to and fro with 
success first on one side, then on the other, until more of 



FIRST BULL RLN. 17 

Johnston's troops arrived, and, falling on the right flank 
of the Federals, decided the fate of the day. General 
Schenck's brigade had been ordered up, but did not 
reach the field in time to strike the enemy opposite the 
Stone bridge, which was his left engaged ; Schenck 
had been skirmishing during the forenoon across the 
stream. 

A squadron or so of their cavalry made a charge up the 
Sudley road, which did great damage, and won for them a 
wonderful name over the country as the Black Horse Cav- 
alry, which was a terror for a long time. Our troops re- 
treated mainly by Sudley' s Ford, some crossing above and 
some below. 

It was evidently Beauregard's intention to entirely de- 
stroy McDowell ; for in the morning he ordered his right, 
under Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet, to advance across Bull 
Run and proceed in the direction of Centerville, so as to 
intercept and cut off his retreat. It is claimed that the 
orderly sent with the order was killed ; at least, it was 
never received ; so the Confederate extreme right stood 
still all day, faced by Miles' division of perhaps equal 
numbers. 

There is no doubt, from all the evidence, that the Con- 
federates had more men engaged there than the Federals. 

On page 129 of Colonel Roman's Life of Beauregard, 
the following order will be found : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Manassas Junction, July 7, 1861. 
The General Commanding directs that you take prompt and 
effective measures to provide forthwith, at your depot near these 
headquarters, ample provisions, including cattle, for 25,000 men for 
two weeks, and that amount at least must be constantly main- 
tained on hand, subject to requisition, until otherwise ordered. 

Thomas Jourdan, A. A. G. 
Captain W. H. FowLEE. 

What was the necessity of this order if he had not about 
that number of men ? 



18 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Holmes' brigade from Aquia Creek, and the larger part 
of Johnston's army from the Shenandoah, added to his 
command, made Beauregard formidable enough to receive 
McDowell. 

For new troops our men performed herculean work. 

After the break came, and the Union line was driven 
back, the terrible enfilading fire poured in on our right 
flank by the fresh arrivals from Johnston's army made re- 
treat inevitable. The troops were mixed, and in great 
confusion. Many prisoners were captured at that time, 
the Second Wisconsin and Fifteenth Massachusetts suffer- 
ing heavily in that way. It seemed that the Fifteenth 
Massachusetts was doomed to bad luck early in the war ; 
the regiment was in the Ball's Bluff disaster later in the 
year. 

In the mean time Colonel Wood, of the 14th Brooklyn, 
was lying on the ground shot through the body. His faith- 
ful friend, H. L. Cranford, who afterwards distinguished 
himself as a staff officer, decided to take the colonel from 
the field, or remain with him and share his fate. He suc- 
ceeded in placing him in an ambulance. When they 
arrived at Bull Run, the driver was directed to cross and 
follow the regiment. Cranford, who was an officer of the 
Fourteenth Brooklyn, thought the colonel was entirely 
safe, and hastened forward to join his command, believing 
he might be needed. Suddenly there was a great jam at 
the ford, the ambulance was forced aside and Colonel Wood 
was captured. He was taken to Charlottesville, where the 
surgeon of the regiment attended him until he was re- 
moved to Richmond as a prisoner of war. 

The United States had captured the "Savannah," a pri- 
vateer, and Smith of that vessel was convicted and sentenced 
to death. In retaliation the Confederates prepared to select 
an officer to be executed. Others were also selected at the 
same time for other privateers, already captured by the 
United States, whom thcv feared would be similarly dealt 
with. On the loth of November, General Winder, accom- 



FIRST BULL RUN. 19 

panied by his staff, entered the officers' quarters, and tak- 
ing a central position, addressed them by stating that he 
had been directed to execute the order he held in his hand, 
which he then read. 

The order is as follows : 

C. S. A., War Department, 

Richmond, November 9, 1861. 

Sir :— You are hereby instructed to choose by lot from among 
the prisoners of war, of highest rank, one who is to be confined in 
a cell appropriated to convicted felons, and who is to be treated in 
all respects as if such convict, and to be held for execution of the 
prisoner of war Smith, recenil}- condemned to death in Philadelphia. 

You will also select thirteen other prisoners of war, the high- 
est in rank captured by our forces, to be confined in the cells re- 
served for prisoners accused of infamous crimes, and will treat them 
as such so long as the enemy shall continue so to treat the like n.um- 
ber of prisoners of war captured by them at sea, and now held for 
trial in New York as pirates. 

As these measures are intended to repress the infamous attempt 
now made by the enemy to commit judicial murder on prisoners of 
war, yovL will execute them strictly, as the mode best calculated 
to prevent the commission of so heinous a crime. 

Your obedient servant, J. P. Benjamin, 

Acting Secretary of War. 
To Brig. Gen. John H. Winder. 

After the order was read, he gave Colonel W. R. Lee, 
of the Twentieth Massachusetts, six slips of paper on 
which were written the names of the colonels. At first 
Colonel Lee declined, then took the slips and examined 
them. He then folded each one carefully, placed them in 
a tin box, about a foot in depth, and just large enough to 
admit a hand. After General Winder had shaken up the 
ballots well he requested the Hon. Alfred Ely, a member 
of Congress from New York, to draw the lots. Mr, Ely 
was captured near Center\dlle, while looking at the battle, 
and was taken to Richmond and confined in the officers' 
prison. This gave him great notoriety, North and South, 
at the time. Mr. Ely was loath to make the selection, but, 
being urged by the officers to do so, consented. Colonel 



20 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Michael Corcoran had been sent to Castle Pinckney, but, 
during his stay in Richmond he and Ely were messmates. 
The first slip drawn by Ely, when opened, was found to 
contain the name of Colonel Corcoran, who was thus 
selected for execution in retaliation for Smith of the "Sa- 
vannah." The other colonels drawn were Lee, Wilcox 
(afterwards General Wilcox), Cogswell, Wood (of the 
Fourteenth Brooklyn), and Woodruff. After Colonel Wood 
returned from imprisonment General McDowell said : 
*'A braver man never lived than Colonel Wood;" and 
he took him to the War Department and introduced 
him to Secretary Stanton, saying: "Mr. Secretary, if all 
my officers and men had fought as well as Colonel Wood 
and his men, the day at Bull Run would have been dif- 
ferent. ' ' 

The lieutenant colonels who were drawn were Bowman 
and Nefif. The majors were Potter, Revere, and Vogdes. 
The captains were Rockwood, Bowman, Kieffer, Roswell 
A. Fish, and Arthur. Captains Fish and Arthur were 
selected in retaliation for the execution of Mumford, who 
was hanged by Butler at New Orleans for hauling down 
the American flag. They were confined at Salisbur)'. 
Fish was on crutches ; he was wounded when captured. 
The time of their execution was fixed, and they had given 
all of their personal effects to their friends, as they fully 
expected to meet their fate, when the death sentence was 
countermanded just two hours before the time at which it 
was ordered to be executed. Our Government had noti- 
fied the Confederate authorities that for every Federal offi- 
cer executed in retaliation for the hanging of Mumford, 
ten Confederate officers in our hands would be similarly 
dealt with, and to this decisiv^e action our officers owed 
their lives. 

Each rank was drawn by itself. When the names of 
the captains were placed in the box, Mr. Ely drew Cap- 
tains J. B. Ricketts (afterwards General Ricketts), J. K. 
Rockwood, and H. W. McQuade. Ricketts was badlv 



FIRST BULL RUN. 21 

wounded when in command of his battery, and was then 
at the hospital, where his faithful wife was taking care of 
him, with little hope of his recovery. When Ricketts' 
name was announced, Captain Thomas Cox, of Ohio, 
stepped forward and asked that his name be put on the 
list, in place of Ricketts, as he was at the hospital, badly 
wounded. The next day General Winder came to the 
prison and said that he was directed by the Secretary- of 
War to exempt all wounded officers, so the names of Rick- 
etts and McQuade were stricken from the list, and the 
next drawing resulted in the selection of the officers pre- 
viously named. After the battle of Bull Run was over the 
news came that Captain Ricketts was severely wounded 
and a prisoner of war. 

His young wife, then only twenty-three years of age, 
went to General Scott and requested a pass through our 
lines to join her husband. The excitement was at such a 
high state, and the undertaking so great, that General 
Scott hesitated, but she pleaded so hard that the General 
said to her: "You are a woman of good judgment. I 
have known you from infancy, and held you in my arms 
when you were christened. I cannot well refuse you." 
The pass was soon made out, and she hastily bought a 
light double team, and started at once for the battlefield. 

In his article, in the Century Magazine^ General Beau- 
reo-ard claimed that when he learned that Ricketts was 
wounded he sent his chief of staff to him to see what could 
be done for him, and endeavored otherwise to assist him. 
The armies were commanded on both sides by graduates of 
W^est Point, and they were generally ready to extend broth- 
erly assistance, if an officer, whom they formerly knew in 
the regular service, fell into their hands wounded. 
Although Captain Ricketts was almost mortally wounded, 
he was in full possession of his mind, and he lay by the 
side of his guns — as fine a battery as was ever com- 
manded. He had a full right to the expectation that 
Beauregard would gladly befriend him in his helpless 



22 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

condition, as they knew each other well in the regular 
service. 

When Beauregard rode up to him, Ricketts asked him 
to protect him, as there was danger of his being pinioned 
to the ground by the soldiers, who were greatly infuriated 
because the battery had made sad havoc in their ranks, 
and the first families of the South had suffered. Beaure- 
gard replied : " You will receive the same treatment that 
our privateers in New York receive ;" and then ordered his 
men to put Captain Ricketts in an army wagon drawn by 
mules, in which was a Confederate soldier badly wounded 
in the head and delirious, who lolled and fought over 
Captain Ricketts in his dying agonies ; after being twice 
pitched out of the wagon Captain Ricketts was laid on the 
porch of the Weir House, surrounded by the dead and 
dying, and was there found the next morning by a volun- 
teer surgeon. Dr. Lewis, of Wisconsin, who carried him 
to the small room occupied by Colonel Wilcox, command- 
ing Michigan Volunteers, and five other officers who were 
wounded prisoners, where he remained until taken to 
Richmond, some weeks later. Both General and Mrs. 
Ricketts remember this incident distinctly, and were 
greatly astonished to see Beauregard's article appear with 
the statement " that he kindly cared for Ricketts." Mrs. 
Ricketts has a rare memory. She can call to mind inci- 
dents which occurred at that time as if they had happened 
but yesterday ; and she is positive about this matter. Cap- 
tain Ricketts was so badly wounded that when he arrived 
at Richmond he was taken to an almshouse used for a 
hospital. Mrs. Ricketts was given a cot by the side of her 
husband. The room was full of the wounded. There 
Mrs. Ricketts had to stay all day and sleep at night. The 
only protection given her was made by cutting down the 
legs of her cot, which made it lower and shielded her a 
little from view, which was done by the other prisoners, 
who highly esteemed her. There she remained for six 
months and a half, faithfully watching her husband. 



FIRST BULL RUN. 23 

Never did a wife's devotion shine with brighter luster. 
She washed her clothes in that room (what little she had, 
for she took no extra suits with her ; she thought only of 
her husband and his condition, ) and dried and ironed them 
on her bed by sleeping on them at night ; a rough experi- 
ence indeed. A channing-looking woman came in one day, 
and in a low, sweet voice asked Mrs. Ricketts if she was 
well supplied with clothing. Mrs. Ricketts replied that 
she had brought nothing extra, because she expected to 
return soon. Her visitor said that she was closely watched, 
but that she would bring her some ; in a few days she 
came with a small parcel, and silently dropped it on Mrs. 
Ricketts' bed. After awhile it was opened, and was found 
to contain a nice calico wrapper and other articles. 

The fare was pretty severe on the wounded, nothing but 
browned rice for coffee, and a scanty meal of bread and 
meat. For dinner rice soup and a piece of bread, with a 
very small piece of meat. For supper rice soup, a piece of 
bread, and a small piece of meat. 

The visitor referred to called one day, and said she had 
permission to bring something on Sunday mornings for 
their breakfast. Mrs. Ricketts thanked her, and divided it 
among all in the room, although it really was intended for 
herself. Every Sunday morning they looked anxiously 
for the welcome basket of good things, brought to them by 
a colored man. Months rolled away, but the constancy of 
this good Samaritan never flagged in the least ; every 
Sunday morning she sent the basket filled with the best in 
the land. Mrs. Ricketts said she never saw a handsomer 
woman or one with more channing ways. 

There was no exchange of prisoners, but Mrs. Jefferson 
Davis had a relative (Captain Lee Langel) who was cap- 
tured in West Virginia, and there was an imderstanding 
that Captain Ricketts and he were to be taken out into the 
middle of the James River, and be virtually exchanged, 
though it was not called that. In the mean time Mrs. 
Ricketts had had a faithful friend in the surareon of the 



24 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

hospital, Dr. Charles Gibbon, a son of the noted Dr. Gib- 
bon, whose works on snrgery are high authority. He was 
a Philadelphian, and knew Major Ricketts, her uncle. Mrs. 
Ricketts was a Miss Lawrence, but was related to the 
Ricketts family, and was a fourth cousin of her husband. 
Dr. Gibbon had quietly befriended her for his early as- 
sociations, and said nothing. 

As the time for their departure was drawing near he 
asked her to step into his office. In that farewell conversa- 
tion, among other things, he asked Mrs. Ricketts if she 
knew the person who had been so constant and faithful. 
Mrs. Ricketts said she did not. 

"Well," said the Doctor, "she is the mistress of a 
noted gambler in Richmond. The Sunday morning 
breakfast you receive is what is left Saturday night." 
He then added, ' ' That night the official cares are laid 
aside, and many high officials, among them Judah P. 
Benjamin, go down there, and during the evening have an 
elegant supper. The remnants are saved by that lady for 
you next morning." He added : " She was the wife of a 
prosperous man in the North. He took her and their 
little child to Cape May ; there she met Mr. T. , of 
Richmond, and fell desperately and blindly in love with 
him. She deserted her husband and child and eloped 
with him ; that was just before the war broke out." 

But this lady had another visit to pay to Mrs. Ricketts, 
and perhaps had the doctor break the ice for her. She 
wanted to send letters North by Mrs. Ricketts, to inquire 
after her child. 

When she came she fell on her knees, and was crawling 
toward Mrs. Ricketts, who sprang to help her up, but she 
would not rise ; hiding her face in the folds of Mrs. 
Ricketts' dress, she said she was unworthy to see her, but 
that she had endeavored to atone for all her sins by doing 
all she could for the wounded prisoners, and hoped that 
Mrs. Ricketts would go and try to find her child. 

Mrs. Ricketts said it was a new cup of sorrow filled to 



FIRST BULL RUN. 25 

overflowing ; her burden before had been heavy, she 
thought, but there before her was an object of unconsolable 
pity, as handsome and charming a woman as she had ever 
looked upon, inwardly dying with grief for her wa}'ward 
and misguided course. 

Mrs. Ricketts took the letters and promised to find her 
child, if possible. She brought her husband North, and 
then, after he was comfortably situated, she set out on her 
mission to find the deserted child. The family were readily 
found, for they were prominent people in a prosperous city. 
They were almost heart-broken over their relative's conduct, 
but were pleased to receive a visit from Mrs. Ricketts. 

Nothing more was heard of Mrs. Ricketts' prison visitor 
until the fall of Richmond. As the Sixth Corps entered 
that city a colored boy handed General Ricketts a note 
from a priest, from which he learned that this woman, 
deserted by every one, was in a dying condition. The 
General called immediately on the priest, and was taken to 
her bedside. As the Sixth Corps was ordered forward to 
Danville, and would march at daylight, the General could 
not remain, but he gave fifty dollars to the priest for the 
funeral expenses. 

Thus was closed by death one of the most thrilling 
chapters of the war. 

One of the saddest incidents which occurred in the prison, 
was the death of Calvin Huson, Jr. , of Rochester, N. Y. , 
who was the democratic candidate for Congress against Mr. 
Ely. They went out together in the same carriage, in 
company with Senator Foster, of Connecticut ; at Center- 
ville they became separated, and Ely and Huson were cap- 
tured and taken to prison. 

The South was greatly infuriated over the presence of 
members of Congress near the battlefield to encourage the 
troops. 

Senator Henry Wilson, and Representative John P. C. 
Shanks were there, and it is said that John A. Logan 
fouofht in the ranks. 



26 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Mr. Ely was given a long imprisonment for his rashness ; 
he had to pay the debt of all the members, as he was the 
only one captured. But poor Mr. Huson was a private 
citizen. Mr. Ely stated the facts in his case, and begged 
the authorities to release him. Mr. Huson was well known 
to many of the high officials at Richmond, and time after 
time his release was promised, but it never came from his 
captors. He was finally taken with typhoid fever, which 
soon released him from prison. It was a hard lot indeed, 
and there was no apparent excuse for it, unless it was to 
make an example of him, and thereby deter noncombatant 
citizens from visiting battlefields where their presence 
might inspire the troops to greater deeds of valor. 

Turning now to the army as it retreated toward Center- 
ville — there was confusion, it is true, for General Stannard, 
who was then a lieutenant colonel, said to me : " The com- 
mands were badly mixed before they reached the stream of 
Bull Run, but the enemy was not hotly pursuing." An 
army of observers had followed and were greatly frightened 
when our soldiers began to retreat. They soon managed 
to turn the retreat into a panic, and the road from Center- 
ville to Washington presented a wild pandemonium. The 
First New Jersey (3 years) Infantry marched from Vienna 
that afternoon, and when but a short distance from Cen- 
terville met the rear end of the retreating army. The 
colonel, William A. Montgomery, an officer of the old 
army, who had served in the Mexican War, halted his 
regiment, and throwing Company G, which was on the 
right at that time, across the road, endeavored to check the 
retreat. 

The scene presented at this point was one which cannot 
easily be forgotten. Soldiers and civilians, army wagons, 
ambulances, and private conveyances were coming up the 
broad turnpike in dire confusion. Wounded men were 
hobbling along, some stopping by the roadside to tighten 
the bandages around their wounds, while others quenched 
their thirst with the muddy and blood-tinged water from 



FIRST BULL RUN. 27 

the ditches along the way. The greater part of the men 
on foot, who were unhurt, climbed the fences on either side 
of the road, and taking to the fields went on unmolested 
toward Washington. The colonel and his staff officers suc- 
ceeded in halting some of the fugitives, and heard from 
them only the most discouraging accounts of the battle ; 
the burden of their story being that our army was not only 
beaten, but was almost destroyed, and in full retreat. 

Among the civilians who told this tale was " Bull Run 
Russell," the valiant (!) correspondent of the Lo7idon 
Times. Finding it impossible to stay the tide of retreat, 
Colonel Montgomery marched the regiment to Centerville, 
where it arrived about sundown, remaining until after mid- 
night and was among the last of our troops to leave the 
place. 

Dr. Taylor, the surgeon of the regiment, remained at 
Centerville in charge of the wounded ; he was, of course, 
captured the next day, sent to Richmond, and was after- 
wards exchanged. 

There is also testimony to prove that a part of our 
troops, at least, made that retreat in good order and with- 
out confusion. In this connection Major Roswell A. Fish, 
who was captured August 13, 1861, while skirmishing 
near Fairfax Court House, says : 

"The retreat was not an entire rout. Miles' division 
had not been engaged during that Sunday, and when the 
retreat began, Miles having mysteriously disappeared some 
time during the day (he was drunk before twelve o'clock, 
noon), the colonels of the regiments, having no brigade 
commander, marched their commands off toward Alexan- 
dria as they felt inclined, most of them hurriedly ; but 
Colonel Matheson, of the Thirty-second New York, known 
also as the First California, who was killed in 1862 at 
Crampton Gap, took position about five p. m. near Center- 
ville with the Eighteenth Massachusetts, a Maine regi- 
ment, and his own regiment, formed a line of battle, and 
checked the enemy. Those regiments remained in that 



28 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

position until about three p. m. next day, when they retired 
in perfect order to Fairfax Court House. While taking our 
coffee at six a. m. , in the grounds of the Ladies' Seminary 
in that village, we saw the enemy coming over the brow of 
the hill leading into the village, when the Thirty-Second 
left, and halted at the intersection of the old Braddock road 
and Alexandria pike, about one mile from Fairfax Court 
House, where it stopped and supported two guns of Green's 
battery. The Confederates were checked here by this 
movement, and finding opposition, and not being aware 
of its strength, made no regular advance beyond Fairfax. 
The Thirty-second, in the afternoon of that day, Monday, 
2 2d, leisurely marched to its old encampment, near 
Katt's Tavern and Fort Ellsworth, where its tents had 
remained pitched since the 1 6th of July, in possession of 
a sergeant and guard, as we had a notion when we left 
that we might want their shelter again. The next day 
the Thirty-second was marched into Alexandria, except 
one company, left in charge of camp, where it did provost 
guard duty for several months. ' ' 

The first battle of Bull Run seemed to mark an era in 
the history of the country, for the North was there duly 
notified that it meant a hard struggle, and, as Major Rit- 
tenhouse says : "It was the best thing that could have 
happened — the defeat of our troops there — for it gave us 
to understand that the South intended to fight." 

I will close this chapter with a quotation from General 
Schuyler Hamilton's description of the scene at Scott's 
quarters while the battle was going on that evening. He 
says : 

"At three o'clock, on Sunday, July 2i, a victory in 
favor of the Union army was reported at General Scott's 
quarters, President Lincoln and several members of his 
Cabinet being present. Very shortly afterwards the news 
came that the panic that General Scott had indicated in 
the Cabinet meeting previously referred to as likely to 
ensue had taken place, and the supposed victory had 



FIRST BULL RUN. 29 

turned into a stampede of the Union forces. That night 
General Scott's quarters were filled by the President, mem- 
bers of the Cabinet, Senators, Representatives, and Gov- 
ernors of States. There was a good deal of trepidation 
among them. General Scott said to Mr. Lincoln : ' There 
is terror in high quarters. It is needless ; with the aid of 
the gunboats stationed in the Potomac, and the troops 
under General Mansfield, which I have reserved here for 
just such a contingency, the enemy cannot cross either the 
Long Bridge, or the Chain Bridge. I would get into my 
cabriolet and head the troops myself, were it necessary. 
But, IVIr. President, the enemy have not wings, and I am 
assured that they have no transportation.' At that mo- 
ment some person in high official position said : ' Our sol- 
diers behaved like cowards.' General Scott immediately 
spoke out : ' That is not true ! The only coward, Mr. 
President, is Winfield Scott. When I was urging that 
this untoward battle should not be fought (at the Cabinet 
meeting to which I have referred), I should have insisted 
that my resignation be accepted rather than the battle 
should be fought.' 

' ' Winfield Scott was the only coward ! ' ' 



CHAPTER II. 
DRANESVILLE— THE FIRST VICTORY. 

THE battle of Dranesville resulted in the first Federal 
victory south of the Potomac, and was of great im- 
portance to the Union cause. The people of the North 
were gloomy and discouraged ; on the other hand, the dis- 
loyal sentiment throughout the entire country was rapidly 
increasing. The South was confident and boastful ; the 
sympathizers with the "cause" elsewhere were defiant; 
therefore, this victory, though not great in regard to the 
numbers engaged, was, notwithstanding, most decisive 
and important to the Union side and correspondingly de- 
pressing to the Confederate. It reanimated the people of 
the North and restored confidence to their troops. A his- 
tory of the First Corps, or any other history relating to the 
actions of the Army of the Potomac, would be incomplete 
without reference to Dranesville — the bright morning of 
our success — the beginning of the end. 

General McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, 
consisting of three brigades, commanded by Generals John 
F. Reynolds, George G. Meade, and E. O. C. Ord, was in 
camp at Langley, called Camp Pierpont. This division as 
yet had never crossed swords with the enemy. They were 
untried in battle, though officers and men had been selected 
with the greatest care, and had been closely examined as 
to age, health, and efficiency, for a campaign of three 
years ; also, they had been thoroughly drilled in the art 
of war for six months by officers among the best in the 
country. All the generals, and a number of the field 
officers and staff, were graduates of West Point, and all of 
30 



DRANESVILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY. 31 

whom highly distinguished themselves during the great 
conflict. Of course the bravery and success of the volun- 
teer officers and men of that celebrated division are notori- 
ous and historical facts, of which I have written elsewhere 
in this history. 

On the morning of December 20, 1861, General McCall 
directed General Ord, with the Third Brigade, to move out 
on the Dranesville road at daylight. Before Ord started, 
McCall thus addressed him : "The object of the expedi- 
tion is twofold. In the first place, to drive back the 
enemy's pickets, which have advanced within four or five 
miles of our lines, and have carried off two good Union 
men and threatened others ; and secondly, to procure a 
supply of forage." 

In case an engagement of any magnitude should be 
brought on, the First Brigade, under General Reynolds, 
was to be in readiness to support Ord, and the Second 
Brigade, under General Meade, held in reserve. 

Ord's expedition consisted of the Bucktail Regiment, 
Lieutenant Colonel Kane, to be employed as skirmishers ; 
The Tenth Regiment, Colonel McCalmont ; the Sixth, 
Lieutenant Colonel Penrose ; the Ninth, commanded by 
Colonel Jackson, and the Twelfth, Colonel Taggart ; to- 
gether with a detachment of cavalry under Lieutenant 
Colonel Higgins, and Eastman's batter}^, consisting of 
two 24-pound howitzers, and two 12 -pounders. On the 
march each regiment threw out two companies of flankers 
to prevent a surprise. One who was there says: "The 
march was as regular and as prompt as that of a body of 
old veterans. " When the head of the column arrived at 
Dranesville, and v/liile awaiting the regiments in the rear. 
General Ord disposed of what troops he had, by posting in 
advantageous positions the cavalr}^ and artillery, supported 
by the Ninth Regiment, and a portion of Kane's regiment. 
Sypher, in his History^ of the Reserv^es, says, and doubtless 
he received his facts from those who took part in the en- 
gagement, which are therefore accurate, that : ' * The 



32 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

presence of the enemy, mounted men on the slopes behind 
a wooded hollow south of the road, and also the appearance 
of a broad mass of smoke in the direction of Centerville, 
convinced General Ord of the enemy's presence. 

"To meet an attack from the Centerville road, the bri- 
gade was faced southward, and Lieutenant Colonel Kane 
was sent with his regiment to occupy the roads in the rear, 
on which it was believed the enemy had a considerable 
force. The Tenth, Colonel McCalmont, followed by the 
Sixth, Lieutenant Colonel Penrose, and the Twelfth, Col- 
onel Taggart, which formed the rear guard, closed up 
promptly. Colonel Taggart' s flankers discovered the 
enemy on the south side of the Leesburg pike. General 
Ord had dispatched a messenger to General McCall to 
inform him of the situation in front, and McCall immedi- 
ately proceeded to Dranesville, and arrived about the close 
of the battle. He approved of the disposition and conduct 
of battle made by General Ord. 

"Believing the enemy would attack simultaneously on 
both sides of the turnpike, Ord directed Colonel McCal- 
mont to place his regiment on the north side of the road in 
the woods, and bring it forward into line and attack the 
enemy if he advanced on that side of the road. Colonel 
Jackson was ordered to occupy a corresponding position on 
the south side of the road. The Bucktails were placed 
between these two flanking regiments, with orders to defend 
the column against an attack in the rear. The cavalry 
formed in the road west of the Bucktails ; the artillery 
was placed in the center, and the Sixth and Twelfth Regi- 
ments were on the turnpike ; and when the brigade faced 
the south toward the Centerville road it formed the left of 
the line. This, it appears, was the formation of our lines 
of battle in order to meet the enemy. 

"General Stuart was in command of the Confederate 
forces, which consistedof the Eleventh Virginia Regiment, 
Colonel Garland ; the Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant 
Colonel Secrest ; the Tenth Alabama, Colonel Forney ; 




GEN. JOHN S. MCCAI.MONT. 



DRANESVILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY. 33 

the First Kentucky, Colonel Tom Taylor; the Sumter 
Artillery, Captain Cutts, and Ransom's and Radford's Cav- 
alry. 

" Stuart arranged his lines as follows: The Eleventh 
Virginia and Tenth Alabama Regiments on the right of 
the Centerville road ; the Sixth South Carolina and First 
Kentucky Regiments on the left ; the artillery was advanced 
in the road between the columns of infantry, and the cav- 
alry regiments covered the flanks. In this order General 
Stuart moved his command forward until he encountered 
our troops. 

' ' General Ord immediately ordered the cavalry to the 
left flank ; and selecting a position for the artillery, directed 
Captain Eastman to open on the enemy's battery. The 
battery came down the pike in a full gallop, capsized one 
gun, placed the others quickly in position, and Captain 
Eastman opened on the enemy with three guns, and 
shelled the woods, taking aim at the rising smoke, as the 
enemy's battery could not be seen. The third discharge 
exploded one of the enemy's caissons, killing a number of 
men and horses, as was seen after the battle. It was first 
thought the enemy would attack on each side of the road, 
but instead, his whole force was on the south side. Gen- 
eral Ord quickly made the necessary change of his troops. 
Colonel McCalmont was ordered to the support of the 
battery. Colonel Jackson faced his regiment to the front, 
and with Kane's Rifles on his left, was formed in the 
woods on the right, west of the Centei-ville road, moved 
up the hill ; the men required no urging forward, but were 
restrained by the officers from rushing upon the enemy in 
a double-quick charge. Captain Eastman's gunners soon 
demolished the Confederate battery. 

"The Ninth Regiment came close upon the enemy in the 
woods, but the undergrowth rendered it difficult to distin- 
guish foe from friend. An officer in the bushes called to 
Jackson that the troops in his front were the Bucktails ; he 
therefore reserved his fire, until just as Captain Gal way was 
III 



34 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

reporting that they were the enemy, he received a volley 
from the First Kentucky. The Ninth promptly returned 
the fire and charged upon them and drove them from the 
woods. The Bucktails engaged the enemy from both sides 
of the road, and drove the Confederates back and hotly pur- 
sued them, led by Colonel Kane, who was soon shot in the 
face and fell to the ground, but quickly rose, bound up 
his wound, and joined his command. 

"Meantime the Sixth Regiment moved forward, between 
the Centerville road and the Alexandria pike, and engaged 
the Confederate regiments that were advancing to turn the 
left of Ord's position. 

"The Twelfth received the order to advance with 
cheers to capture the battery, but the enemy hurriedly 
withdrew his guns be}'ond the reach of the advancing regi- 
ment. General McCall ordered the whole line to advance 
against the enemy, who was giving way in every part of 
the field ; the retreat soon became a rout, and the enemy 
fled, leaving his dead and wounded, and a large number of 
arms with ammunition, and clothing on the field." 

The battle lasted an hour and a half The casualties 
on the Union side in this battle, were 6 killed and 6i 
wounded. The enemy reported Stuart's loss at 43 killed, 
143 wounded, and 44 missing. 

General Ord detailed several companies of his command 
to accompany the forage wagons. General McCall, in his 
report of the victory, says : " Last, but not least, I brought 
in sixteen wagon loads of excellent hay, and twenty-two of 
corn." 

Colonel John S. McCalmont, who was one of the heroes 
of Dranesville, gives the following in regard to the battle : 

" You ask me to give you, in brief, my recollections of 
the engagement between the Union forces under command 
of General Edward O. C. Ord, and the Confederate forces 
under command of General J. E. B. Stuart, at Dranesville, 
Va., on Friday, the 20th of December, 1861. 

" Perhaps it would be as well to take a short survey of 



DRANESVILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY. 35 

the operations of the brigade which General Ord com- 
manded prior to that time, and with which I was con- 
nected. 

" The regiments composing the Pennsylvania Reserve 
Corps, were ordered to Washington immediately after the 
first battle of Bull Run. The Tenth Regiment, which I 
commanded, encamped for a few days east of the Capitol 
building, near Lincoln Park. When General McClellan 
arrived at Washington and assumed the command of the 
Army of the Potomac, the regiments of the Pennsylvania 
Reserve Corps were moved to Tennallytown, where they 
took position ; were formed into a division, called McCall's 
division — after General McCall, who commanded it, and 
which division was divided into three brigades, commanded, 
respectively, by Brigadier General John F. Reynolds, Brig- 
adier General George G. Meade, and Colonel John S. Mc- 
Calmont. The command of the latter was but temporary. 
I understood from General McCall that he wished a Penn- 
sylvania general to command the Third Brigade, and that 
he had requested, or intended the appointment for General 
John G. Parke, then with Burnside's expedition to North 
Carolina. 

" McCall's division remained at Tennallytown, occupied 
in drilling, picket and grand guard duties, building forts and 
reconnoissances to Great Falls and other points, until be- 
tween the 3d and 13th of October, 1861, when the division 
was ordered to advance and to take position at Langlev, 
Va., where the camp of the division was named in official 
orders, ' Camp Pierpont, ' in honor of the then Union 
Governor of Virginia. 

"Previous to the advance of McCall's division, the Army 
of the Potomac had been held mostly on the defensive ; 
drilling and building the fortifications ; the line south of 
the river, I believe, being scarcely connected, and the 
right of it resting on Chain Bridge. After the advance in 
October, McCall's division occupied the right of the line, 
and the alignment of the whole Army of the Potomac, or 



36 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

that part of it south of the river, was completed and some 
miles in advance of its former position. 

"There was very little to engage the attention of the 
troops, except drilling and picket duty and the usual rou- 
tine of the camps, until about the 20th of October, when 
McCall's division was ordered to make a reconnoissance to 
Dranesville. The division marched on the 19th, and re- 
turned to camp on the 21st. 

"The orders given General McCall were not to proceed 
beyond Dranesville. On the 19th or 20th, General Mc- 
Clellan visited McCall's advance, and found that McCall 
had gone somewhat beyond Dranesville, and, as I under- 
stood from some one at the time, found fault with him. 
General McCall excused himself by saying that he did not 
see any town on the way. As there were only a few strag- 
gling houses in Dranesville General McCall did not know 
when he was passing through the town. 

"The advance brigade of the division on this reconnois- 
sance was the First, commanded by General Reynolds. 
Meade's brigade rested a few miles in the rear, and the 
Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel McCalmont, of the 
Tenth Regiment, rested a few miles nearer camp, at Diffi- 
cult Creek. On the 21st, the latter received orders from 
General McCall, through General Meade, to return to 
camp, left in front, as the object of th? reconnoissance had 
been accomplished. 

" In the Third Brigade all was quiet, and on the 20th no 
sound of cannon was heard. It was with some surprise, 
therefore, when it returned to camp, that the news was 
learned that a reverse had happened to some of the forces 
of the Army of the Potomac, and that the brigade should 
not break ranks, but should liold itself in readiness for a 
night's march. After some hours a dispatch came from 
General McClcllan to General McCall that Stone's com- 
mand at Ball's Bluff had succeeded in rccrossing the river, 
and therefore the march of the division was ended and the 
men returned to their tents. 



DRANESVILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY. 37 

" This disaster at Ball's Bluff, following after the rout at 
Bull Run, coupled with the manifest disposition to avoid 
forcing a general engagement of the armies, had a depress- 
ing influence upon the officers as well as the men. The 
men were beginning to express, if not to entertain, the 
belief that they would not be ordered into battle. But if 
any in the Third Brigade had such ideas they were soon 
awakened from the delusion. 

"In November, when I — to drop the third person of the 
pronoun and assume again the first — was on a short leave 
of absence, I found on my return to Camp Pierpont that 
Brigadier General Ord had been assigned to command the 
Third Brigade ; and I found him in possession of brigade 
headquarters, the tents of which he had pitched near my 
regiment, and I returned to my old command. 

"My relations with General Ord were of the most agree- 
able kind. He was a frank, communicative, considerate, and 
very gallant officer. On the evening of the 19th of Decem- 
ber he sent for me, to communicate the orders for the regi- 
ment to march with the brigade the next morning by day- 
light, on a reconnoissance toward Dranesville. The object 
of it was to cover a foraging party of the brigade that was 
to be detailed to gather hay, corn, etc., from some farmers 
near the Potom.ac. The foraging party was to be guided 
by a man by the name of Sherman, who was said to be a 
Union man, having knowledge of the country and in the 
confidence of General McCall. 

"Early on the morning of the 20th of December, 1861, 
it being Friday, and a very pleasant, sunshiny day — the 
atmosphere being somewhat hazy, but dry — the Third Bri- 
gade marched. Two of my companies were on picket duty. 
On the march General Ord detailed three of my companies, 
under charge of Lieutenant Colonel Kirk, to make up the 
foraging party. The arranging of the foraging party took 
some time, and thus threw the Tenth— or what remained of 
it — as well as the Sixth and Twelfth Regiments of the Re- 
serves, which were in the rear of it, some distance behind 



38 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the cavalry, Eastman's battery, and the Bucktails (or 
' Rifles ') and Ninth Regiments, which were in the ad- 
vance. • 

"Within a mile or so of Dranesville we were met by 
Lieutenant Sharp, General Ord's aid, stating that there 
were symptoms of an attack, and for us to hurr>' forward. 
When I arrived at Dranesville, at the further end of the town, 
on a hill where is a little church, General Ord had two of 
the four guns of Eastman's battery in position, pointing- on 
a road toward the southwest, where a few horsemen ap- 
peared, as if Confederate vedettes, at a halt across the road. 

"After looking some time and observing no motion, 
General Ord said to me it was time to return to camp, and 
for me to get ready to put my men in motion ; so returning 
to them in the lane in the hollow of Dranesville, just as I 
was about giving them some orders, General Ord passed me 
on a gallop, saying, ' Colonel, we are attacked ; put your- 
self under cover and await orders.' Looking to our 
rear up the hill, I observed a confusion as if men were being 
scattered by a fire, and at that moment the cavalry had 
halted directly in our rear, and the two pieces of artillery, 
with their caissons, came rapidly toward us from the front 
to pass. The lane being narrow between the fences, it 
seemed for the moment as if we would be crushed between 
our own troops. I had a splendid pioneer corps. They 
were provided with their axes, and in a moment they 
cut down panels of the fence and we marched through and 
along the inside of the fence toward the fire. When we 
got to the intersection of the Leesburg and Alexandria turn- 
pike with the road we were on, at the entrance of Dranes- 
ville, we marched right through the Hue of fire from the 
enemy's guns, which were placed within easy rifle shot of 
us. At that moment General Ord, who had been putting 
his artillery in position very rapidly, seeing me, ordered me 
to take position on the left of the guns. My regiment were 
the only troops— except the cavalry — on the left of the 
artillery. I detached Captain McConnell's company as 



D RANKS VILLE— THE FIRST VICTORY. 3? 

skirmishers on the. left to watch their opportunity and to 
see that our position was not turned by the enemy. 

'' The captain placed his men in some natural rifle-pits 
on the left, and very close to the enemy's troops, two regi- 
ments of which were deployed immediately in front of 
him. He kept up, with his men,- a constant fire during 
the whole of the engagement. 

"The artillery on both sides kept up a rapid and concen- 
trated fire on each other ; but soon the Union guns got the 
advantage. A shot through the house behind which the 
enemy was sheltering, and another which served to blow 
up a caisson, together with their losses from Captain Mc- 
Connell's firing, seemed to decide the day, and the enemy, 
takinof advantao-e of the thick woods that covered his re- 
treat, was soon beyond pursuit. The engagement lasted 
less than two hours. 

" From the position I occupied during the firing, very 
close to the left piece of artillery, the aim of whose gunner 
I at one time directed, I could see the movements on the 
roads in front, and advance of the Bucktails when the 
cannon ceased firing, but could not see the Ninth, Twelfth 
or Sixth ; nor did I see General Ord, nor Captain Eastman 
after the battle rightly opened, until the close of it. They 
were on the right of the field and I on the left. My im- 
pression is that the Ninth Regiment, after becoming en- 
gaged in the beginning of the battle, and with the Sixth, 
and other regiments on the right of the line taking their 
part under the eye of the general, were hidden from my 
view bv a hillock or ridge between where I was and their 
respective positions. 

"General McCall and his staff came up before and near 
the close of the battle. They had heard the firing at Camp 
Pierpont and made haste to come to our aid. General 
Reynolds also came up on a gallop in advance of his brigade. 
But as the enemy had gone beyond pursuit. General Ord, 
after firing, near dusk, a random shot or two, ordered the 
troops to return to camp. 



40 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

"The Union loss was so small, the Confederate loss so 
great, and the victory so decisive, in a contest of about 
equal forces, that the march of the troops back to camp was 
with a light step ; and though late at night, after a long 
day of marching and fighting, they seemed to be fresh and 
invigorated by the success of the battle. " 

The loyal people of the country were gTeatly rejoiced, 
especially those of Pennsylvania. Letters of thanks and 
congratulations poured in upon the victorious brigade from 
every direction. Among others, the following was re- 
ceived from the Secretary of War : 

War Department, December 28, 1861. 
Camp Pierpont, Virginia. 

General : — I have read ^our report of the battle of Dranesville, 
and, although no reply is necessary on my part, yet as a citizen of 
the same Commonwealth as 3'ourself and the troops engaged in that 
brilliant affair, I cannot refrain from expressing to you my admira- 
tion of the gallant conduct displayed, both by officers and men, in 
this their first contest with the enemy. Nearly all your command 
upon that occasion are either my personal friends, or sons of those 
with whom, for long years, I have been, more or less, intimately 
associated. I feel that I have just cause to be proud that, animated 
by no other motive than patriotism, they are among the first to re- 
vive the glory shed upon our country by the men of the Revolution 
and soldiers of the war of 18 12. It is one of the bright spots that 
gives assurance of the success of coming events ; and its effect 
must be to inspire confidence in the belief that hereafter, as hereto- 
fore, the cause of our country will triumph. 

I am especially gratified that a Pennsylvania artillery corps, 
commanded by officers who have necessarily had but limited sys- 
tematic instruction, have won, not only the commendation of their 
friends, but an unwilling compliment from the enemy, for the won- 
derful rapidity and accuracy of their fire. 

I wish I could designate all the men who, nobly discharging 
their duty to the country, have added to the glory of our great 
Commonwealth. Other portions of the army will be stimulated by 
their brave deeds, and men will be proud to say that at Dranesville 
they served under McCall and Ord. 

I am, General, your obedient servant, 

Simon Cameron, 

Secretary of War. 

Brigadier-General G. A. McCall. Commanding Division, 




COL. JOHN H. TAGGART. 



DRANESVILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY. 41 

Governor Curtin hastened to Camp Pierpont to provide 
for the care of the wounded soldiers, and to congratulate 
the Reserves for the honor they had conferred on the 
State. He issued the following order : 

The gallantry of our troops in the late affair at Dranesville, 
demands a public acknowledgment. 

Their courage, conduct, and high discipline are honorable to 
the Corps and to the Commonwealth by whose forecast it was raised 
and formed, in anticipation of the exigencies of the countr}', and 
whose sons fill its ranks. 

General McCall and Brigadier General Ord, and the officers 
and men who were engaged under their command, ma}' be assured 
that Pennsj-lvania is not insensible to their martial virtue, and from 
them and their fellows confidently looks for as many further illus- 
trations of it as there shall be opportunities afforded them. 

A. G. Curtin, 

Governor of Pennsylvania. 
A. L. Russell, Aid-de-Camp. 

The colors of the regiments that were engaged in the 
battle were taken to Washington, and on each flag 
" Dranesville, December 20, 1861," was painted in golden 
letters. 



CHAPTER III. 

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 
PRELIMINARY. 

"^ 7^ THEN, on the 13th of March, 1862, the council 
^ ^ of corps commanders called by order of the 
President in Washington, mapped out the plan of opera- 
tions which they confidently expected would result in the 
defeat of the Confederates and the capture of Richmond, and 
adopted Fortress Monroe as a base of supplies, it was ex- 
pected by the council that the four army corps then com- 
posing the Army of the Potomac, viz, the First, Second, 
Third, and Fourth Corps, would be employed as a solid mass 
in addition to the 10,000 men then at Fortress Monroe, under 
command of General Wool, that post being thought to be 
amply protected by the naval force in its vicinity, so that 
it might safely be left with a small garrison. 

At the same time the cooperation of the navy was 
desired and expected in the projected attack upon the bat- 
teries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in controlling 
the York and James Rivers, for the protection of our flanks 
and of the transports bringing troops and supplies to the 
army. W^ith these expectations General McClellan began 
the embarkation of troops and supplies at Alexandria, Va. 
It was intended at this time to embark INIcDowell's 
corps in mass and land them near Yorktown or on the 
Gloucester side of the York River ; but circumstances which 
^NlcClellan could not control seemed to balk his efforts 
from the start, and McDowell's corps, as a whole, was 
not permitted to join the main army until just before the 
second battle of Bull Run. 
42 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 43 

On the 17th ]\Iarcli Hamilton's division of the Third 
Corps embarked, and on the 2 2d Fitz John Porter's divi- 
sion of the same corps followed. On the ist of April 
General McClellan started for Fortress Monroe, reaching 
there on the 2d. On the 3d they were at the base of sup- 
plies and ready to move two divisions of the Third Corps, 
two divisions of the Fourth Corps, one division of the Second 
Corps, four regiments of cavalry-, and Hunt's artillery 
reserve ; in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns. Richard- 
son's and Hooker's divisions of Second and Third Corps 
had not arrived, and Casey's division (Fourth Corps) was 
unable to move for want of wagons. 

At the time General McClellan left Washington the 
War Department had issued an order placing Fortress ]\Ion- 
roe and dependencies under his control, and authorizing 
him to draw from the troops under General Wool 10,000 
men to form one of the divisions of the First Corps, which 
was then supposed to be embarked and on its way down 
the Potomac. 

During the night of the 3d, however, ]\IcClellan re- 
ceived a severe set-back through a telegram from the War 
Department revoking the order placing him in control 
over Fortress Monroe, and ordering him not to interfere with 
General Wool or his command, and forbidding him taking 
the 10,000 men stationed there. 

About this time the naval flag officer, Goldsborough, de- 
clared that the James River was closed to the operations of 
the Union vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's 
batteries on its banks and the Confederate war vessels, 
particularly the " IMerrimac," all the efforts of our naval 
vessels being concentrated in Hampton Roads in an en- 
deavor to destroy that ship. All this was contrary to what 
General INIcClellan declared he had been told before leav- 
ing Washington, and it seriously and materially affected 
his plans, for he had hoped by a series of rapid movements 
to capture the enemy on the Peninsula or drive them be- 
fore him, open the James River, and press on to Richmond 



44 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

before they could be heavily reenforced from other parts of 
their territory. 

He then determined to move the two divisions of the 
Fourth Corps via Newport News and Williamsburg road, 
to take position between Yorktown and Williamsburg, 
while two divisions of the Third Corps moved direct upon 
Yorktown, the reserves to move to support either corps 
should it become necessary, designing also to land the 
First Corps (should the works at Williamsburg or York- 
town offer serious resistance), on the York or Severn 
Rivers, and move it on to Gloucester and West Point in 
order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might 
have on the Peninsula and compel them to abandon their 
positions. 

Another thing that seriously hampered McClellan at 
this time was the want of accurate topographic informa- 
tion. Correct local maps were not to be had, and though 
the general features of the locality were known, the only 
papers to which he had access were found inaccurate in 
essential particulars. Reconnoissances proved to be the 
only trustworthy means of information, as events subse- 
quently proved. 

On the 3d and 4th of April the divisions of the Third 
and Fourth Corps moved as stated above, and on the after- 
noon of the 4th General Keyes, commanding the Fourth 
Corps, obtained information that a heavy force of the 
enemy was stationed in a strong position at Lee's Mill. 
General McClellan, at that time not knowing that this 
position was the key to the Warwick, instructed General 
Keyes to attack and carry it upon coming in front of it. 

Early in the afternoon of the next day (5th) the advance 
of each column was brought to a halt ; that of Heintzelman 
in front of Yorktown, after some severe fighting at Big 
Bethel and Howard's Bridge, while Keyes was unexpectedly 
brought to a stand before the enemy's works at Lee's ]\Iill, 
where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses 
the Warwick River. The progress of the army had been 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 45 

retarded by incessant rain on that day, which made the 
roads ahnost impassable for infantry, while only a small 
portion of the artillery could be brought up, and the am- 
munition, subsistence, and forage trains could not move 
at all. 

When the Fourth Corps reached Lee's Mill their left 
flank was assaulted by a heavy artillery fire from the oppo- 
site side of the Warwick River, and on approaching the 
vicinity of the mill they found it stronger than was ex- 
pected and incapable of being carried by assault. All the 
troops in each column were under a warm artillery fire 
during this afternoon, even the right column being engaged 
when covering reconnoissances. 

Just at this time and during this engagement General 
McClellan received the following dispatch from the War 
Department : 

Adjutant General's Office, 
April 4, 1861. 
General McClELLAN : 

By direction of the President General McDowell's army corps 
has been detached from the force under 50ur immediate command 
and the general is ordered to report to the Secretar\' of War. 

L. Thomas, 

Adjutant General. 

Though McClellan had been promised 10,000 men from 
Blenker, and that order had been rescinded, as well as the 
order placing the 10,000 men of General Wool's command 
under his orders — this last revocation was the heaviest blow 
he had yet received. He was then in front of the enemy, 
and only waiting for McDowell's corps in order to inaugu- 
rate a series of operations which the withdrawal of this 
corps rendered futile. The loss of 30,000 men was a calam- 
ity he could not overcome, and he was compelled to adopt 
another and less effective mode of campaign. It made 
rapid and brilliant operations impossible. With these pre- 
liminar}^ remarks we will now proceed to the record of his 
operations on the Peninsula, which began with the siege of 
Yorktown and the battle of Williamsburg, and ended with 



46 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the reembarkation of the remnants of his army at Harri- 
son's Landing three months afterwards. 

SIEGE OF YORKTOWN AND BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 

On April 4, Porter's division (Third Corps) with the 
Third Pennsylvania Cavalry moved to Big Bethel, Howard's 
Bridge, and Cockletown, repairing at Big Bethel the bridge 
destroyed by the enemy and clearing the road, being detained 
four hours by this cause. On reaching Howard's Bridge they 
found two pieces of artillery in position, supported by a small 
cavalry force and about four hundred infantry. After firing 
a few shots this force retired, and Porter sent forward Morell's 
brigade and Griffin's battery with a squadron of cavalry to 
Cockletown to occupy the junction of the Yorktown and 
Ship Point roads, thus cutting off the garrison, in case there 
was one, at Ship Point, and enabling him to control the 
avenue of communication between Warwick Court House 
and Yorktown, while Averell's cavalry was dispatched to 
Ship Point to ascertain the character of the defenses and 
garrison. Averell returned in the evening and reported 
them abandoned. The rest of the division encamped at 
Howard's Bridge. 

On the 5th the division united at Cockletown and moved 
toward Yorktown over a marshy road, rendered almost im- 
passable by heavy rain. When the skirmish line reached 
the junction of the Warwick Court House and Yorktown 
roads they became engaged with that of the eneni}-. Cav- 
alry and artillery were moving in advance, and close at 
hand were extensive defenses of the Confederates, from 
which they were immediately saluted with a warm artillery 
fire. Skirmishers were at once advanced to drive back the 
enemy's troops, find out what was in front, and cover the 
deployment of Morell's brigade, which quickly formed on 
both sides of the road, so as to resist attack or advance, 
should a favorable occasion arise. Weeden's and Griffin's 
batteries were posted by the latter to shell the Confederates, 
who, as the mists arose, were seen crowding the ramparts. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 47 

Shots from botli batteries were fired with skill and judg- 
ment, and the enemy driven from their camp and ramparts 
to seek shelter in the timber in the rear of their works. 
The Confederates warnil)- returned the fire, but their artil- 
lery, though of superior caliber, produced no effect upon 
Porter's well-served pieces, which soon drove their artil- 
lerists to cover, and at the same time Berdan's sharp- 
shooters did good ser^dce in picking them off whenever 
they showed themselves. 

Martindale's brigade now moved to the left to relieve 
Morell, while Butterfield's brigade and the cavalry were 
held in reserve to support either Martindale or Morell 
should they need it. 

At this time a reconnoissance showed Porter that a 
marsh intervened between the Confederate works on the 
left and Martindale's brigade, and that they dare not cross 
it to attack his forces. Porter's division camped on the 
ground it had been directed to occupy. 

Smith's division of the Third Corps also moved on 
April 4 toward Young's ]\Iills. After crossing Watts' Creek, 
his skirmishers frequently encountered the enemy's pickets 
who retreated as he advanced. On reaching Young's Mills 
they deserted their works, and his forces occupied 
them, having onh^ one man wounded during the opera- 
tions. On the 5th the division moved toward Williams- 
burg, the Second Brigade watching the road to Deep Creek, 
the Third Brigade in the center, and the First Brigade 
watching the right. On arriving at Warwick Court House, 
the Third Brigade moved across the stream with Wl:eeler's 
battery, while the rest of the division remained in the 
open fields on the opposite side of the creek. Soon after- 
wards the division was again moved about two miles, when 
the fortifications around and about Lee's Mill appeared in 
full view. Davidson's brigade was at once deployed out 
of sight along the edge of the woods with orders to hold 
the front. Hancock's brigade covered the right flank, and 
Brooks' brigade was brought up about half way through 



48 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the woods and held in resei-ve ; they held these positions 
till the 7th, when they were retired about a mile back, 
still maintaining the same relative positions. 

Porter's division still occupied the position taken by it 
on arrival before Yorktown, namely, one brigade in the 
woods skirting the upper part of Wormley's Creek, one 
brigade in the rear just west of the milldam on that creek, 
and the third brigade in the angle between the roads to 
Yorktown from Fortress Monroe and Warwick Court 
House ; while batteries were attached to each brigade and 
posted to sweep all approaches and the front of each com- 
mand. He remained in this position till the loth, being 
all the time in range of the enemy's guns, when the division 
was moved to the south of Wormley's Creek, and ordered 
to picket from York River to the Yorktown road, where 
they were joined by the pickets of Hamilton's division, 
which had arrived in the mean time. Hooker's division 
came up soon afterwards and encamped on Porter's left, 
and, closing the gap between him and Hamilton, com- 
pleted the line from the Warwick to York River. 

From this time till the close of the siege the troops 
were engaged in building the necessary approaches and 
bridges, batteries, etc. It was intended to have all the 
batteries in readiness to open fire on May 5 ; but on the 
night of the 3d, the Confederates hastily evacuated and 
abandoned their works on the Warwick and Yorktown, and 
the Union forces took possession without having to undergo 
the terrible ordeal of battle. On the night of ]\Iay i, one 
of Porter's batteries had opened fire on the town and 
wharves, driving away vessels that were apparently land- 
ing troops and ammunition ; and it is believed that the 
destructive effects of this battery and the knowledge of the 
enemy that but a few days must elapse before the other 
batteries would open, caused the abandonment. 

As soon as it was discovered that the works had been 
abandoned, the cavalry division was ordered forward to 
harass the rear guard, and Hooker's division was ordered to 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 49 

follow and support the cavalry. Cooke's cavalry division 
pushed forward and engaged the enemy about two miles 
below Yorktown ; here they had an encounter with the 
rear guard, who were forced to retire, leaving a spiked 
howitzer. On reaching a strip of swampy woods, Cooke 
learned that to his right and beyond the woods there were 
field works, which, however, were found on investigation 
to be abandoned. Receiving word that there was another 
road to the left, and by carrying which he might turn the 
.left flank of the Confederates, who had once more made a 
stand, Cooke sent the Sixth United States Cavalry, under 
Major Williams, up that road to attack their left flank. Gib- 
son's battery now opened fire at the outlet of the road, they 
warmly returning it from a battery perhaps i,ooo yards to 
the left front. Everything now looked as though the 
Southerners were trying to bring on a general engagement. 
Cooke was forced to advance to open ground where he 
might use both cavalry and artillery to advantage. The 
enemy now reoccupied the works on his. right front, and 
opening a new battery from a fort not over 400 yards away, 
their cross-fire of shell and shrapnel was very destructive, 
as they got an accurate range, killing and wounding many 
horses and a number of officers and men. In the mean 
time the Sixth Cavalry, who had gone to attack the left 
flank, had suddenly found themselves at the enemy's works, 
where they were confronted by a vastly superior force of 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and were compelled to re- 
treat after hard fighting, the rear squadrons suffering se- 
verely from tlie fire of the Confederate cavalry. In this 
skirmish the cavalry lost 35 killed and wounded. Finding 
that Hooker did not come up to support them (it was sub- 
sequently learned that he had been stopped by General 
Smith), and learning that the enemy had sent a large force 
to endeavor to surround them, the cavalry retreated to the 
open ground. 

About four o'clock p.m. of the 4th of May, Sumner's corps 
arrived at the position Stoneman held and found he had been 

IV 



50 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

engaged witli the enemy ; after a conference with Stoneman, 
Sumner moved Smith's division forward in two columns, 
but after advancing a short distance and finding that the 
underbrush was so thick that it entangled his lines, and 
night coming on, the division was halted and ordered to 
lie on their arms. One of the reasons given by Sumner for 
not pushing forward his troops was that Smith's division 
had marched without rations and he had to wait till the 
subsistence train came. On the morning of the 5th, after 
a careful reconnoissance, two of the forts on their left, 
were found to be unoccupied and Hancock's brigade was or- 
dered forward with ten pieces of artillery to seize and hold 
them, so that Sumner might force their left. This led to 
an attack upon Hancock by a superior force of the enemy 
which he repulsed in splendid style. He placed the artil- 
lery on the crest of a hill in front of the Confederate fort in 
short range and deployed the Fifth Wisconsin, preceded by 
skirmishers and followed by the Sixth Maine in column of 
assault across the dam and into the work, and finding it 
abandoned moved forward to the rear of work in open field 
in line of battle, with the artillery in the centre. A fort 
about 1,200 yards in his front commanding his position, he 
sent to General Smith for reenforcements, being deter- 
mined to take it at all hazards. Smith sent word that he 
would send four regiments and a battery of artillery imme- 
diately. On this Hancock advanced his line sufficiently to 
drive the enemy out of the two works nearest to his front, 
and also to make a diversion in favor of the forces at that 
time eno-asfed with the Confederates in front of Fort 
Magruder. Seeing that his present position was a very 
important point, giving him space enough to develop his 
front and entirely command the plain between him and 
Fort Magruder, Hancock placed three companies of the 
33d ■ New York in the redoubt, with his artillery on the 
right and left, moved his skirmish line 1,000 yards in 
advance, covering the whole breadth of the plain, and 
so continued to Fort INIaijruder. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 51 

On arriving at the second redoubt, and the skirmishers 
still advancing, he found that the enemy were uncertain as 
to what troops were in front of them. In answer to signals 
from the enemy he ordered the national flag to be unfurled 
on the parapet, on seeing which the opposing force deployed 
their skirmishers and began firing. Hancock's skirmishers 
were then but a few hundred yards distant. The enemy 
were soon driven off and Hancock's skirmishers took up 
their position at a line of fence separating them from the 
Confederates and extending across the plain. 

At this time Wheeler's battery joined Hancock, and with- 
out waiting for further reenforcements he advanced his line 
600 yards beyond the second redoubt, and ordering his infan- 
try to lie down opened an assault on the redoubts in front 
of liim. The Confederate infantry now lined the parapet 
of the two redoubts in front of him and poured a galling 
fire of musketry into his line and then opened upon the 
Union forces with artillery. Hancock's artillery replied, 
and finally, after hard fighting, drove them out of their 
works, his skirmishers killing many as they debouched 
from the gorges on the right side of each work as they 
stood in regard to them. Had the promised reenforce- 
ments arrived the Union troops would have encountered no 
serious obstacles in taking and holding these works, but at 
this juncture Hancock received an order from General 
Sumner to fall back to his first position, as he could not be 
reenforced on account of movements on the left. Hancock 
sent back a message showing the advantage he had gained, 
the bad impression it would make on his troops, and the 
inspiration it would give the enemy should he fall back, and 
again asked for reenforcements. While awaiting an answer 
the crisis in front of Fort Magruder appeared to have ar- 
rived, and Hancock aided our troops by pouring an effective 
fire of artillery into the fort. This annoyed the enemy so 
much that they brought two pieces of artillery to bear on 
Hancock's line and exploded shell within the line of his 
skirmishers, in one instance reaching the battery, killing 



52 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and wounding a number of his men. Hancock's artillery, 
however, was superior in efficiency to theirs, and perceiving 
this they soon ceased firing. It was now after five o'clock 
p.m. and receiving no answer to his message, and the rain 
pouring in torrents and drenching his troops, Hancock was 
about giving orders to fall back and occupy the crest on 
which the first redoubt was situated, when he observed that 
the enemy were throwing infantry into the redoubts on 
his front and firing on his skirmishers. At the same 
instant a column of Confederate cavalry appeared in the 
woods on his right. -The skirmishers kept up a constant 
fire on the cavalry, doing good execution at 400 yards 
distance. 

The enemy still persisting in an attempt to fonn, pre- 
paring for a charge on the artillery, Hancock shelled them 
for a few moments and then ordered the artillery to retire 
rapidly piece by piece to his second line. At this time he 
was informed that a Confederate regiment had gone in the 
woods on his left with the intention of flanking him there, 
and seeing their infantry break through the woods in front 
of the right flank of his advanced line, he ordered the two 
regiments on the left of the battery to fall back in line of 
battle to the crest on the left of the redoubt, which they 
did in as good order as though on dress parade. The 
Fifth Wisconsin, on the right of the battery, seeing the 
cavalry debouch from the woods, formed square to repel 
assault. The Confederate cavalry having been checked, 
and a brigade of infantry having broken through .the woods 
and deployed, the Fifth fell back in line of battle fighting. 
The last piece of artillery having thrown several charges 
of canister into the enemy when within a hundred yards, 
now retreated as rapidly as possible. 

The line of infantry now being reformed on the crest, 
and the artillery being retired to a third position between 
them and the dam, and the advance of the enemy being 
within thirty paces of his command, Hancock ordered an 
advance movement to the crest. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 53 

The whole line advanced cheering, and on arriving 
there fired two volleys, doing great execution ; they then 
charged down the slope and advanced in line of battle. 
A few of the enemy were bayoneted ; the remainder 
broke and ran. The column was halted and fifteen or 
twenty rounds fired with terrific effect. The plunging 
fire from the redoubt, the direct fire from the right, and 
the oblique fire from the left were so destructive that it 
seemed after the firing had ceased and the smoke cleared 
away that no man had escaped unhurt who had advanced 
within 500 yards of his lines. The enemy were com- 
pletely routed and dispersed. 

The Confederate assault was of the most determined 
character. The Fifth North Carolina was annihilated ; 
nearly all its superior officers were killed or wounded. 
The Twenty-fourth Virginia was about as badly cut up. 
The Fifth Wisconsin captured a Confederate battle flag. 
For 600 yards in front of Hancock's lines the whole 
field was strewed with Confederate dead and wounded. 
Shortly after the engagement was over the Third Vermont 
arrived, then General Naglee's brigade followed, and soon 
after the Forty-ninth and Seventy-seventh New York 
Regiments, and these were followed by Ayres' and Mott's 
artiller}-. That night they bivouacked in the rain on the 
ground they had won. 

Hancock in this engagement had but 1,600 men, as he 
had to detach many at various points to protect his flanks. 
The enemy in his front consisted of six regiments, num- 
bering about 5,000 men, under the command of Early. 

While the battle had been going on as related above, 
Hooker's division had its share. This division was ordered 
to support Stoneman and aid him in cutting off" the retreat 
of the enem\'. They moved from in front of Yorktown to- 
ward Williamsburg, and, after marching five or six miles, 
learned that Stoneman had fallen on the rear of the enemy 
and was waiting for the infantry in order to attack them. 
Hooker proceeded to the front, some six miles in advance 



54 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

of his column, and found that Smith's division was in his 
lead, and that his column must wait till Smith had 
passed. Finding that Smith's support would be sufficient 
to aid Stoneman, Hooker moved his column on to the 
Hampton road, which intersected the one on which Stone- 
man had halted at the point the Confederates occupied. Once 
on this road they pressed forward in order to come up with 
the enemy before morning. Owing to the roads being in 
frightful condition, and the men exhausted from want of 
sleep and from labor in the trenches the night previous, this 
was found to be impossible ; the troops were halted about 
eleven o'clock, rested till daylight of the 5th, when they 
again advanced and came in sight of the enemy's works in 
front of Williamsburg about half past five o'clock p. m. 
Here the column was halted in the woods while Hooker rode 
to the front to find what could be learned of the enemy's 
position. At the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton 
roads was Fort Magruder, and on each side was a cordon of 
thirteen redoubts extending, as far as could be seen, across 
the Peninsula from the York to the James River. 

Grover's brigade began the attack by sending the 
First Massachusetts as skirmishers into the felled timber 
on the left of the road on which they were standing, and 
the Second New Hampshire to the right with directions to 
skirmish up to the edge of the felled timber and there turn 
their attention to the occupants of the rifle-pits and the 
enemy's sharpshooters and gunners in Fort Magruder, while 
the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsyl- 
vania formed on the right of the Second New Hampshire, 
and also advanced as skirmishers. 

Webber's battery was tlirown forward in advance of the 
felled timber and brought into action on the right of the 
road about 700 yards from the fort ; as soon as it emerged 
from the timber the four guns from the fort opened on it, 
and before it reached its position they received the fire from 
two more, two officers and two privates being shot before 
thev had a chance to fire a sinofle "fun and the cannoneers 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 55 

were driven away in spite of the sharpshooters picking 
off the Confederate gunners. Volunteers were called for 
to man the guns now in position, and the officers and men 
of Osborn's battery jumped in and manned the battery and 
in a few minutes had the guns well at work. Bramhall's 
battery came into action on the right of Webber's, and by 
nine o'clock had silenced every gun in the fort and all the 
troops in the plain had dispersed. The guns in the fort 
were not again heard of till late in the afternoon. The 
Fifth New Jersey, of Patterson's brigade, supported these 
batteries during the day. The remaining regiments of 
Patterson's brigade moved through the forest on the left 
of the road in anticipation of an attack from that quarter. 
Bodies of Confederates were seen drifting in that direction, 
and heavy musketry fire showed that many others were flock- 
ing there whom the dense forest (near a mile wide here) 
prevented the Union forces from seeing. Patterson now had 
a heavy force of the enemy in his front and was actively en- 
gaged,, and the First Massachusetts, Seventy-second and 
Seventieth New York came to his aid. 

It was now after one o'clock, and the battle had in- 
creased till it was of gigantic proportions. The left had 
been reenforced by the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth 
New York, and all were desperately engaged. 

Three times the enemy advanced to within eighty yards 
of the road which was the center of Hooker's operations, 
and as often were they forced to retreat with great slaughter. 
Each time their advance was made with fresh troops, and 
each succeeding one seemed to be in greater force and deter- 
mination. The Eleventh Massachusetts moved to the left, 
while the Second New Hampshire was withdrawn from its 
advanced position in front to where they could look after 
the front and the left at the same time. About this time 
the enemy was reenforced by Longstreet's division. Plis 
troops had passed through Williamsbiirg on the retreat 
from Yorktown, and were recalled to strengthen their 
lines in Patterson's front. No sooner had they joined than 



56 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

they moved forward to drive in his left. After a violent 
and protracted struggle they were repulsed with great loss. 
Simultaneous with this movement an attack was made on 
Hooker's front and an attempt made to seize the bat- 
teries by the troops from Fort Magruder aided by reenforce- 
ments from the redoubts on the left. The withdrawal of 
the supports invited this attack, and it was at this time that 
four of Hooker's guns were captured. Between four and 
five o'clock General Kearny's division arrived and took up 
position in Hooker's front, while his division retired and 
was held as a reserve till dark. Kearny's division kept up 
a strong and unremitting fire on the enemy but were unable 
to advance further than the position first taken by them 
when relieving Hooker. The Thirty-eighth and Fortieth 
New York were ordered to make a charge on the rifle-pits 
and a battery in their front, which they did with great gal- 
lantry, and turning their flank got in the rear of the enemy 
and caused them to relinquish their cover. This silenced 
their light artillery and the battle was won. 

On the right, Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, got 
into action about twelve o'clock ; he had five regiments and 
two batteries. The One hundred and second Pennsylvania 
was deployed on the right of the road while the Fifty-fifth 
New York was deployed on the left and w^as afterwards 
moved further to the left to support a battery ; to the left 
of tlie Fifty-fifth, the Sixty-second New York was placed 
in position, where it found cover and held on till its ammu- 
nition was expended. A movement was made against Peck's 
front by a large body of Confederates who displayed Union 
colors and under heavy fire pressed his line back. At this 
juncture the Ninety-third Pennsylvania moved to the left 
center and by its steady fire aud splendid execution he was 
enabled to recover the ground from which he had been 
forced to recede. The enemy then moved to the right 
opposite to the One hundred and second Pennsylvania, 
where they tried repeatedly to get into the woods and 
secure a permanent lodgment. After repeated onslaughts 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 57 

the One hundred and second was forced to give way to 
superior numbers and retired for some distance, but soon 
reformed. At this crisis the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania 
came forward to the right and front and the enemy were 
quickly repulsed along the whole line. Before night Gen- 
eral Devens came up with the Seventh Massachusetts and 
Second Rhode Island, and shortly after General Palmer with 
two regiments and General Keim with three regiments 
came to the support of Peck. His supply of ammunition 
being exhausted six of these later regiments relieved his 
brigade and prepared to resist a night attack in case it 
should be made ; his pickets were thrown out in front and 
extended on the right to those of General Smith, but 
could not connect on the left with those of Hooker. His 
brigade also recaptured the four guns which had been taken 
from Hooker, as mentioned above. 

At three o'clock a.m. of the 6th the enemy abandoned 
their position before Williamsburg, leaving the Union 
troops in possession. 

WEST POINT. 

On May 7, about two o'clock a.m., Franklin's division 
of the First Corps landed on York River near West Point, 
and at daylight discovered the woods surrounding the plain 
on which they landed was full of Confederate infantry and 
cavalry. Extraordinary precautions were at once taken to 
prevent a successful attack — large trees were felled, senti- 
nels posted thickly, and the woods thoroughly watched. 
Franklin was unacquainted with the country, and in com- 
pany with General Newton made a reconnoissance of the 
position, which convinced him that his right and left flanks 
and front were protected by creeks, and that the only 
dangerous point was a space 200 yards wide at the right of 
his left flank. The road from the interior entered the plain 
through this space and was flanked on both sides b)- thick 
woods. There was a dam in his front, but this he protected 
by a strong picket. 



68 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

About nine o'clock firing began on tlie picket line in the 
vicinity of the road entering the plain from the interior. 
Hexamer's battery at once moved to that point, where it 
did excellent service ; but by eleven o'clock the pickets and 
reconnoitering parties were driven in and two regiments of 
Newton's brigade moved forward to reenforce them ; at the 
same time he moved into the woods in the right front four 
regiments with directions to feel the enemy and hold their 
ground at all hazards. General Slocum's brigade held the 
left of the line, but not being actively engaged, sent the 
Fifth Maine and the Sixteenth and Twenty -seventh New 
York to Newton's support. The fight raged with great 
fierceness from nine a.m. till three p.m. The Thirty-first 
New York charged the enemy in the woods and drove them 
till they gained an advantageous position, which, supported 
by the First New Jersey, they kept till the close of the 
action. The Thirty-second New York made a brilliant ad- 
vance, driving superior forces with the bayonet for a con- 
siderable distance till their progress was arrested by the 
enemy's reserves and artillery, when they retired in good 
order to their position. The Eighteenth New York, Fifth 
Maine and Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania did excellent work, 
the Ninety-fifth bringing on the action and keeping the 
enemy well in hand during the fight. The Union loss in 
this fight was 200. The enemy were not only repulsed in 
their attempt on Franklin's position, but at the end of the 
day he held a position in advance of that occupied by him 
when the battle began. 

From this time till the 27th there were no important 
engagements, the period being taken up in armed recon- 
noissances, in which several skirmishes occurred without 
nuicli loss. 

HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 

On the morning of May 27 Porter's corps broke camp 
and started to clear the Upper Peninsula of the enemy and 
destroy the railroad and other bridges over the South Anna 



PElSklNSULAR CAMPAIGN. 59 

and Pamunkey Rivers and thus protect the right flank of 
McClellan's army on the road to Richmond ; also to pre- 
vent the enemy getting in his rear from that direction, and 
lastly to cut the line of his communication between Rich- 
mond and Northern Virginia. 

The Fifth New York, First Connecticut, Sixth Pennsyl- 
vania Cavalry and Weeden's Rhode Island battery were 
brigaded and posted at Old Church under Colonel Warren, 
of the Fifth New York, from which point they engaged in 
destroying all means of communication over the Pamunkey 
as far toward Hanover Court House as was deemed prudent 
without cooperation of a large force. At the same time 
Morell's division of the Fifth Corps (Porter's) started from 
New Bridge with an advanced guard of two cavalry regi- 
ments and a light battery, under command of General Emory. 
Morell's command was to take the enemy in front, while 
Warren, taking the road along the Pamunkey, was to fall 
upon his flank and rear. The command, through a pelting 
rain, deep mud and water, pushed its way to Peake's Station, 
on the Virginia Central Railroad, about two miles from 
Hanover, when they came in the presence of the enemy. 
The Twenty-fifth New York and Berdan Sharpshooters 
were at once thrown forward to engage the enemy's skir- 
mishers and hold them in check till ^Morell's division could 
be brought up and deployed under the protection of Benson's 
battery, which was thrown into position to sweep the road. 
In the mean time a squadron of cavalry, and a section of 
artillery supported by other cavalry, was sent to the left on 
the Ashland road to guard his flank and destroy the railroad 
and telegraph at the crossing, where they soon became 
engaged with a portion of the enemy who were attempting 
to outflank the main body. At th^'s point they were re- 
enforced by Martindale's brigade (Tv/enty-fifth New York, 
Twenty-second Massachusetts, Second Maine and Martin's 
battery). The Twenty-second Massachusetts marched in 
line of battle, till they came in sight of the railroad and found 
a train of cars there with the enemy in great force. Martin- 



60 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

dale at once advanced his artillery to the line occupied by 
the Twenty-second Massachusetts and opened fire upon 
the enemy. They at once responded from a masked 
battery near the junction of the highway and railroad, but 
this was soon silenced by Griffin's battery. The Second 
Maine in the mean time had torn up part of the railroad. 
Martindale now perceiving- the enemy on his left, and that 
they were superior in numbers to his force, sent to Porter 
for a couple of regiments to help him, and formed his 
brigade on the Hanover road in the hope that he could form 
a rear guard sufficiently strong to protect not only the 
battery but his line of communication. Not being able to 
get the reenforcements he expected, and in order to prevent 
the enemy getting in his rear, Martindale ordered the 
Twenty-second Massachusetts to go through the woods to 
the railroad and follow it up, and the Second Maine to pro- 
tect the battery and the column in rear. The Twenty-second 
had hardly turned the corner of the woods when information 
was received that the enemy were advancing and had reached 
the position where the battery had first been planted. This 
was within 700 yards of the rear of his position. The Second 
Maine at once changed front and then marched back across 
the road from New Bridge and halted, throwing out skir- 
mishers. The Forty-fourth New York now coming up from 
New Bridge, joined Martindale and formed under cover of 
a ravine toward the woods on the left of the open ground 
in front, and threw skirmishers into the woods. INIartin's 
battery was placed on the left of the Second Maine, and the 
skirmishers being engaged with the enemy, the battery at 
once opened fire. It being reported that his hospital, about 
a mile to the rear, was in possession of the enemy, one wing 
of the Forty-fourth New York was sent to relieve it. 
Hardly had they passed out of sight, when a Confederate regi- 
ment deployed in line of battle before the Second INIaine and 
opened fire on them. The Second responded with terrific 
effect, and the enemy at once retreated into the woods in the 
direction the Forty-fourth had taken. About 150 of the 



PEN INS ULAR CA MP A IGN. 61 

Twenty-fifth New York, together with the Forty-fourth 
New York (which had been recalled) formed a line of battle 
on the left toward the woods, where the fire of the enemy 
now crossed on them and the battery. The firing was so 
hot that Martindale's center was forced to give way, and the 
Twenty-fifth retreated as well as the Forty-fourth. At 
length Martindale succeeded in reforming his line on the 
colors of the Twenty-fifth. The Second Maine, however, 
still held their ground on the right, though assailed by four 
times their number. The battle had lasted over one hour 
when reenforcements arrived, the Fourteenth New York 
coming to relieve the Second Maine, while the Ninth 
Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania deployed into 
the woods on the right, assailing the enemy in the rear, 
while the Fourteenth New York held them in front and on 
the flank. This move routed the enemy and ended the 
battle, though the Thirteenth New York, which went to 
the relief of the Forty-fourth, advanced so as to catch the 
last volleys of the enemy and drove them from the shelter 
of the woods in that direction. 

While Martindale was engaged as above described, 
Butterfield's brigade arrived on the field and took position 
where Benson's battery was in action, having in his first 
line the Seventeenth New York on his right, and Eightv- . 
third Pennsylvania on the left, with skirmish line in front ; 
on his second line the Twelfth New York was in rear of 
the Seventeenth, while the Sixteenth Michigan was in rear 
of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania. Finding the enemy 
drawn up in line near the house and orchard afterwards 
used by Porter as headquarters, he at once moved his com- 
mand in that direction in the order stated above, the rapid 
firing of his skirmishers greatly hastening their movements. 
Here they charged on the enemy and drove them back, 
capturing one of their cannon, with caisson and ammuni- 
tion, then pursuing rapidly, captured many prisoners, and 
completely routed them. vShortly afterwards, Martindale 
being strongly pressed, Butterfield pushed forward to assist 



62 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

him, and came up on the flank of the enemy in time to help 
in driving and capturing many of them, and found him- 
self in front of the Ninth Massachusetts, with his line 
perpendicular to theirs. 

Night now came on, and, with the enemy routed and 
beaten at all points and retreating, the battle was won. 

FAIR OAKS OR SEVEN PINES. 

This battle was fought by the Second, Third and Fourth 
Corps, and the part they each took will be related in the 
order stated above, commencing with Sumner's corps. 

On the 31st of May Sumner received orders from 
McClellan to be prepared to move at a moment's notice. 
He at once advanced Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions 
to the two bridges they had built across the Chickahominy, 
and ordered them to halt there, with heads of cohnnns on 
the bridges, till further orders. When these came, in the 
afternoon, the columns were ordered forward to support 
Heintzelman, and rapidly moved to the field of battle by 
two roads. Sedgwick, marching by the shortest road, 
reached there first, and found Couch's division and Kirby's 
and Brady's batteries. These were drawn up in line of 
battle near Adams' house. June i the brunt of the battle 
was borne by Richardson's division. On the night previous 
this division had been placed parallel with the railroad, and 
the enemy advanced across the railroad to attack them. 
This was an obstinately contested fight, lasting over four 
hours, and here Richardson's men showed the greatest 
determination and gallantry, and at length succeeded in 
driving the Confederates from the field. Richardson's 
division consisted of Howard's, Meagher's and French's 
brigades, and three batteries of light artillery, all of whom 
were actively engaged ; the battle raged so fiercely that the 
Confederates changed their regiments five different times in 
the first hour and a half in order that they might replenish 
their ammunition. 

French's brigade was in the front line at the beginning 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 63 

of the fight on the morning of the ist of June, and the 
enemy opened attack on him at the distance of fifty yards. 
Although this attack was bold and sudden, his men held 
their line with great steadiness, and did not swerve, but 
fired coolly and deliberately, repulsing the enemy. After 
a few minutes' pause the heads of the several columns again 
threw themselves upon the spaces between the regiments 
to the right and left of the Fifty-second New York, making 
the most desperate efforts to break his lines. The left of 
the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania time and again repulsed 
them. The Fifty-second New York finding their left flank 
was being turned threw back three companies to receive 
them and repulse them there. At this time, French's men 
finding themselves short of ammunition, Howard came 
up with the Sixty-first, Sixty-fourth, and Eighty-first New 
York and took their places, and immediately moved foi-ward 
into the woods with them. The fire of the Confederates 
was rapid and fatal. General Howard here lost his arm 
and Colonel Parker took command of his brigade, pressing 
back the enemy to and across the old road which General 
Casey's division had held the day before, and advancing to 
within thirty yards of their line found them in superior 
force here. 

The Fifth New Hampshire were on the edge of the 
woods, where they were actively engaged, and had taken 
quite a number of prisoners when the command of the bri- 
gade fell upon Colonel Parker. Finding the other regiments 
of the brigade had been severely handled, he ordered them 
to move out of the woods and form in rear of Meagher's 
brigade, while the Fifth New Hampshire moved forward 
to occupy their ground. While moving forward in line of 
battle, they encountered the enemy about 300 yards from 
the railroad and a fierce fight began. Twice the Fifth ad- 
vanced, and each time the enemy fell back ; the firing was 
very close and deadly, the opposing forces being not over 
thirty yards apart. The brigade fought with great cour- 
age during the entire engagement, making two successful 



6i THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

bayonet charges and driving the enemy from the field, 
leaving their killed and wounded behind. Meagher's bri- 
gade was in the third line on Sunday morning, when a 
brisk firing in the woods, in front of which they were bivou- 
acked, informed them of the immediate presence of the 
enemy. The brigade was drawn up in line of battle when 
Meaeher received orders to throw the Sixtv-ninth New 
York upon the railroad a little below where it was drawn 
up. Shortly afterwards the Eighty-eighth New York 
moved by flank to the left and occupied the railroad to the 
left of the Fifth New Hampshire, which regiment was on 
the left of the vSixty-ninth New York, A countermand was 
given to the Eighty-eighth New York during this move- 
ment, and, through the whole of the regiment not under- 
standing it, some confusion occurred, the two leading 
companies deployed on the railroad, and received a brisk 
fire from the enemy, till, the countermand being recalled, 
they were vigorously supported by the balance of the regi- 
ment. While the Sixty-ninth and Eighty-eighth were thtis 
deployed to the right and left of the railroad, Howard and 
French were maintaining their positions in front and hold- 
ing the enemy in check. The Sixty-third New York was 
detached the night previous to help the batteries in the 
rear that were stuck in the mud and could not be brought 
up without assistance. 

While Richardson's division was doing its part, as 
above stated, Sedgwick's division was no less actively 
engaged. On May 31 they broke camp near Tyler's 
house and marched for Fair Oaks Station as follows : 
Gorman's brigade with Kirby's battery, Burns' and Dana's 
brigades, with Tompkins', Owen's and Bartlett's batteries. 
With much delay and difficiilty they succeeded in crossing 
the Chickahominy and pushed on the point near which 
they understood Heintzelman and Keyes were fighting. 
The First Minnesota, the leading regiment, formed into 
line of battle under a sharp fire and was posted on the 
right of Abercrombie's brigade, the balance of Gorman's 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 65 

brigade formed on Abercrombie's left, where they became 
instantly and hotly engaged, and after snstaining, without 
wavering, repeated and furious charges of the enemy, 
in turn finally charged them at the point of the bayonet 
with such vigor and impetuosity as to drive them from 
their position. Just before this charge Kirby's battery was 
run up within loo yards of the Confederates and opened 
a terrific fire with case and canister which materially helped 
to rout them. Dana, with the Twentieth Massachusetts 
and the Seventh Michigan, pushed on to the front on Gor- 
man's left, where they immediately went into action and 
participated in the brilliant and decisive charge just spoken 
of, driving the enemy from point to point. Burns, with 
two regiments, took post on the right of the First Minne- 
sota, holding the balance of his brigade in reser\^e ; fighting 
continued all day, the troops retaining their position and 
resting on their arms. On Sunday (June i) parts of Gor- 
man's and Dana's brigades, with a section of Bartlett's 
artillery, were again engaged with the enemy. No sooner 
had they come within 150 yards of the Confederate lines 
than they became engaged in a deadly conflict ; the whole 
line along the railroad for nearly a mile seemed one constant 
blaze of musketry. After withstanding, as on the previous 
day, repeated charges of the enemy, they had the satisfac- 
tion of seeing them abandon the field and precipitately 
retire toward Richmond, leaving their dead and wounded. 
The Third and Fourth Corps were placed under charge of 
Heintzelman on May 25, and he ordered Keyes (com- 
manding Fourth Corps) to advance to Seven Pines, on the 
Williamsburg road, while he crossed the Chickahominy at 
Bottom's Bridge and moved to occupy a position two miles 
in advance of it. Casey's division, on May 31, occupied the 
advanced position of the army, about three-quarters of a 
mile from the crossroads at Seven Pines, where he had 
rifle-pits and a redoubt thrown up, and an abattis began in 
front of the pits. About twelve o'clock he received word 
that the enemy in force were approaching on the Richmond 
v 



66 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

road, and ordered a regiment forward to strengthen his 
picket line. Believing that they intended to bring on a 
general engagement, he immediately ordered the division 
under arms and at once prepared to give them battle, dis- 
posing of his forces to the best advantage. The Confederates 
now advancing, attacked him in large force on the center 
and both wings, and a heavy fire of musketry commenced 
along the whole line on both sides, his artillery throwing 
canister into the enemy's ranks with great effect. Repeated 
requests for reenforcements having been ignored, and find- 
ing at length that the enemy were threatening both his 
flanks, and that their columns still pressed on, in order to 
save his artillery Casey ordered a bayonet charge by the four 
supporting regiments in the center, which was executed in 
a brilliant and successful manner under command of Gen- 
eral Naglee, the Confederates being driven back. When 
the charge ceased, as the troops reached the edge of the 
woods in their front, a terrible musketry fire began. The 
enemy again advanced in force and threatened Casey's 
flanks so severely that he was forced to retreat to his works. 
Here the fighting continued with great fierceness, his 
troops stubbornly contesting eveiy step of the way, till, 
the rifle pits being enveloped by the enemy, he was again 
forced to retreat to his second line in possession of Couch's 
division. Two pieces of artillery were placed in the road 
between the two lines, which did good execution on the 
advancing enemy. Arriving at the second line he suc- 
ceeded in rallying a portion of his division, and, with 
Kearny's assistance, who had arrived at the head of one of 
the brigades of his division, attempted to regain possession 
of his works, but could not do so, Couch's division being also 
driven back, though reenforced by the Third Corps. Gen- 
eral Naglee received four wounds in this engagement. 
General Casey ascribes his defeat in this engagement to 
the fact that eight of his regiments were raw men who had 
never been under fire, but sa>s that, notwithstanding the 
■fact that he had only 5,000 men in his first line of battle, 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 67 

they withstood for three hours the attack of an overwhehn- 
ing force of the enemy without any reenforcement ; and 
concludes his report of the engagement by saying : " If a 
portion of the division did not behave so well as could have 
been wished, it must be remembered to what a terrible 
ordeal they were subjected. Still, those that behaved dis- 
creditably were exceptional cases. It is true that the divi- 
sion, after being nearly surrounded by the enemy, and 
losing one-third of the number actually engaged, retreated 
to the second line. They would all have been prisoners of 
war had they delayed their retreat a few minutes longer. 
In my humble opinion, from what I witnessed on the 31st, 
I am convinced that the stubborn and desperate resistance 
of my division saved the army on the right bank of the 
Chickahominy from a severe repulse, which might have re- 
sulted in a disastrous defeat. The blood of the gallant 
dead would cry to me from the ground on which they fell 
fighting for their country, had I not said what I have to 
vindicate them from the unmerited aspersions which have 
been cast upon them." 

Couch's division moved up to support Casey, Peck's 
brigade being ordered to the left, Devens' brigade covered 
the road leading to his center. Miller's, Flood's and Mc- 
Carthy's batteries were in position covering the same roads 
and flanks, Abercrombie's brigade was to the right of 
Devens, on the crossroads leading from Couch's center to 
Fair Oaks, which was three-fourths of a mile to the right 
and front, through a mass of thicket and heavy woods ; the 
First Long Island lay in rifle pits, supported by Miller's 
battery, then came the Twenty-third and Sixty-first Penn- 
sylvania, while the First United States Chasseurs and 
Thirty-first Pennsylvania lay at Fair Oaks with Brady's 
battery. The Twenty-third Pennsylvania was ordered up 
to feel the enemy (Casey's troops being in front), which 
they did with great vigor, twice repulsing them and then 
retired to their first position. Keyes now ordered the 
Fifty-fifth New York into some rifle pits to support Casey's 



68 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

center, Casey's right at this time being forced back on 
Couch's right and being opposed by a vastly superior force. 
Couch advanced with two regiments from the right and at- 
tempted to overthrow the Confederate left, which caused his 
artillery to cease firing on that flank. Pushing forward, 
they at once came upon a large force of the enemy's reserve, 
apparently moving toward Fair Oaks, in the edge of the 
woods. They immediately engaged but were finally com- 
pelled to retire, bringing in a few prisoners. In twenty 
minutes' time the Confederates had passed over the road 
leading to Couch's center, cutting off the advance at Fair 
Oaks, now reenforced by two more regiments that had been 
ordered up by Keyes. Being now separated from the main 
body of his division, and deeming it suicidal to attempt to 
cut through and rejoin them, and perceiving that large 
masses of the enemy were moving across the railroad to the 
right and front, with intention of surrounding and captur- 
ing his force. Couch, with Abercrombie, the four regiments 
and prisoners moved off toward Grapevine Bridge for a half 
a mile and took position facing Fair Oaks. Here word 
was brought that Sumner was at hand. On receiving this 
information Couch at once sent word to Heintzelman and 
Keyes that he would hold his position till Sumner came up. 
Sumner soon arrived and, as related before, drove back the 
enemv with jjreat slauQ-hter. The balance of Couch's di- 
vision during this time were heavily engaged. Peck's 
brigade was placed on the principal road connecting the 
Richmond stage road with the Charles City road to hold 
the left flank. The Ninety-third Pennsylvania was de- 
tached from this brigade when the engagement began and 
placed on left of Casey's division, but returned with flying 
colors in the afternoon. Later Peck received word that the 
enemy were assaulting the right flank, and he at once moved 
to its support across the open field under a concentrated fire 
of artillery from numerous batteries and heavy musketry 
from the right. The brigade came into line, however, as 
coolly as though on parade, and used their best efforts to 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 69 

sustain their comrades who were contesting inch by inch 
the advancing foe. During an hour his Hues swayed for- 
ward and backward repeatedly, till at last, unable to with- 
stand the pressure from successive reenforcements of the 
enemy, they were compelled slowly to fall back to the woods 
across the main road. Pushing forward to the road leading 
to the sawmill Peck endeavored to rally his men and re- 
form his line, but was ordered by Kearny to retire his force 
by way of the sawmill to the entrenched camp and rifle pits. 
Here, finding nearly all the forces, he took position in the 
rifle pits with Berry's brigade, and rested during the night. 
Devens' brigade was moved forward to the crossroads 
leading to Fair Oaks, where they took position about 
1:30 p. m., when the Tenth Massachusetts was moved for- 
ward to the left side of the Richmond road, supporting 
Flood's battery, and the Thirty-sixth New York thrown 
forward on the right side of same road in front of Fair 
Oaks road; the right of this regiment was screened by some 
rifle pits but the left suffered terribly. About four o'clock, 
Casey's line having been driven in, and an ineffectual 
attempt to recover a portion of the ground having been 
made b}- the Fifty-fifth New York, the Tenth Massachusetts 
was ordered to advance up the Richmond road through the 
felled trees and endeavor to hold the ground in front. 
Moving by the flank, as directed, they soon found them- 
selves assailed on the left flank and rear by heavy volleys 
of musketry, showing that the enemy had outflanked in 
considerable force the position held by them. They 
struggled, however, to hold their position, but the fallen 
timber entirely covering the ground on which they stood 
rendered this impossible, and they were soon thrown into 
confusion by the heavy fire from the enemy thus advan- 
tageously posted in regard to it. Devens now directed them 
to retire, but so nnich confusion ensued from the fire in the 
rear, and the left wing of the regiment being badly broken, 
that they retreated precipitately and fled to some distance 
behind the Fair Oaks road before they could be rallied and 



70 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

reformed to move to the position indicated for them to take. 
Reenforcements soon arrived and were at once engaged in 
opposing the advance of the enemy. The attack becoming 
very heavy in front of the troops to the right of his brigade, 
Devens started to support it, but soon returned to his own 
regiments on the Richmond road where he was severely 
wounded, and Colonel Jones took command. Within a 
few minutes Jones received an order to retire to the in- 
trenched camp, which he did in good order. 

Kearny's division had quite a share in this battle, 
though a number of his regiments were taken from his 
command and ordered to positions to help out the other 
divisions. Jameson's brigade (three regiments) had moved 
up the Richmond road, and Heintzelman detached one of 
his regiments to assist Peck ; with the other two regiments 
he filed off through the woods to the left of the road and 
meeting Kearny was ordered to clear the abattis on both 
sides of the road of the enemy who were then entering from 
the opposite side in force ; this they succeeded in doing 
after a sharp fight lasting near two hours. Soon after the 
brigade had become engaged, the enemy's heavy firing on his 
right showed Jameson that they were pressing hard at that 
point, and shortly after the line began wavering and the 
Union troops on the right of the abattis, in the rifle pits, 
broke and ran. Jameson spurred toward them and at- 
tempted to rally them, but to no purpose, as they appeared 
to be panic-stricken. By this time the Confederates had 
succeeded in turning the right of the line and the Union 
troops were all running from the field. Seeing this, Jame- 
son returned with great difficulty to his own command 
whom he found charging the enemy through the camp in 
front of the abattis. They were at once ordered to fall 
back and to the left, which they did with much difficulty. 
Before they succeeded in witlidrawing, one of the Fourth 
Corps batteries began shelling the abattis and camp they 
were occupying, thus subjecting them to the fire of both 
friend and foe. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 71 

Birney's brigade (3:15 p. m.) was moved to the rifle pits 
on the Williamsburg and Richmond road, being Kearny's 
second line, and was deployed on the railroad, Casey's 
troops pouring through them in a demoralized condition. 

Birney attempted to stop them and reform the line, but 
was unable to do so. At four o'clock the brigade was 
moved, by order of Heintzelman, up the railroad to sup- 
port Keyes' corps. After advancing about a mile up the 
road the Confederates opened a scattering fire on them from 
a wood that ran to the railroad, and the brigade was de- 
ployed into line of battle. 

Finding that the firing on the left M'as getting more to 
the rear, Birney advanced with two regiments into the 
woods and succeeded after a sharp fight in repulsing the 
enemy in their attempt to turn the right flank of the Union 
lines. Word came at this time from Couch that his com- 
mand had been cut off but if Birney could hold the rail- 
road and prevent the enemy cutting him off he could extri- 
cate himself At the same time Heintzelman sent him an 
order to advance still further up the railroad. This he 
did, advancing till his lines reached the woods near Fair 
Oaks, when the foe began shelling him obliquely from the 
right. He now received orders from Sumner to connect 
with French, commanding his (Sumner's) left, and advance 
with him ; at this time the Seventh Massachusetts was sent 
to reenforce his brigade, as the position held by him was 
deemed very important. Upon connecting with French 
(ten p. m. ) the brigade was posted behind the railroad em- 
bankment and bivouacked for the night. At daylight next 
morning Birney was, by Heintzelman' s order, relieved from 
command and placed under arrest [when tried by court- 
martial there were no charges made and he was restored to 
his command] and the command of the brigade turned over 
to Col. Hobart Ward. About nine o'clock on Sunday 
morning the enemy opened in the woods to the right and 
front of the brigade, and Ward changed front diagonally to 
meet it. As the enemy advanced on him and their volleys 



72 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

increased he gave orders to fiie and then charge. This was 
brilliantly executed, and they drove the Confederates before 
them, who, retreating to the opening beyond, were met 
with a destructive fire by two regiments of the brigade still 
stationed on the railroad. The enemy made an attempt to 
rally shortly afterwards, but failed — it was a complete rout. 
The brigade lost heavily, but succeeded in capturing many 
prisoners. 

Berry's brigade was ordered to position in rear of the 
intrenchments as a reserve (May 31) ; but had hardly 
reached their station when the Third Michigan was moved 
to the woods on the left of the Williamsburg road in their 
front, and within a few minutes the balance of the brigade 
was ordered to the front. The Fifth Michigan advanced, 
and by hard fighting drove the enemy about a mile to the 
left of the woods into and through the slashings. Berry 
now relieved the Third with the Fifth Michigan, and 
placed the Third in reserve to the Fifth. About an hour 
afterwards parts of regiments of other brigades coming up, 
Berry formed them on the left of his brigade into the tim- 
ber, and drove the enemy so far that he had serious fears 
that his troops would be flanked by them, as they were 
driving the Union troops down the road and plain as well 
as on the right of the road. At this time Berry's troops 
were in the woods, his line extending from the edge of 
the slashings below up the woods and on the left of the camp- 
ing-ground of Casey's division, completely commanding his 
old camp and the earthworks. Here they held the enemy 
in check, and could have driven them back farther had the 
center and right of the Union line been able to hold their 
position. About six p. m. Berry began falling back, and 
retired in good order to the intrenched camp. 

Hooker's division was not engaged on the 31st ; but on 
Sunday morning Sickles' brigade was ordered to follow 
Patterson's brigade along the stage road to the front. 
Hardly had they moved 300 yards when they were ordered 
by Heint/celman to form in line on the right of the road in 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 73 

a large field with thick oak undergrowth, being part of 
Snead's plantation. The column had hardly got into po- 
sition when two of the regiments were ordered to the left 
of the road in an opening bordered on the left and front by 
woods ; the balance of the brigade were already in line on 
the right. While making these movements, the enemy's 
skirmishers and sharpshooters in the woods in front kept 
up an annoying fire on the brigade, their object being to 
pick off the mounted officers. 

Skirmishers were thrown forward to silence this, and 
the brigade moved forward briskly under a heavy fire, the 
regiments immediately to the right and left of the road re- 
ceiving the worst of it. After receiving two volleys, these 
regiments were double-quicked across the field, and with 
a loud cheer charged into the timber, the Confederates fly- 
ing before them. The right of the brigade was now ad- 
vanced, and, penetrating the timber and crossing some 
swampy ground, found the enemy in an open space and 
drove them back across the clearing at the point of the 
bayonet until they disappeared in the woods beyond. The 
brigade havins: advanced bevond the line Sickles had been 
directed to hold, they were recalled. The enemy having 
retired, Sickles was ordered to send two regiments to sup- 
port Richardson, who was then hotly engaged on the right 
in the direction of the railroad ; this was done, and after 
helping to drive the enemy from that part of the line, they 
returned to the brigade, which now moved forward and 
occupied a portion of the battle-ground of the day before 
at Seven Pines. Here they remained during the night, 
resting on their arms. During the night the Confederates 
fell back a mile or more toward Richmond, moving 
their artillery and wagons on a road leading from the left 
of Casey's camp. Two regiments of Patterson's brigade, 
under command of Colonel Starr (Patterson being sick), 
supported Sickles during this fight, and in the charge upon 
the Confederate lines were led by Hooker in person, losing 
heavily in officers and men. The remainder of this brigade, 



74 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

as well as Grover's brigade, had been left at Oak Bottom 
swamp and the rifle pits at Bottom's Bridge to defend those 
places in case of attack, and so were not present during 
this battle. The Union loss in killed, wounded and miss- 
ing was 5,031 ; Confederate loss, 4,283. 

OPERATIONS JUNE 2-25, 1862. 

After much importunity on the part of General IMcClel- 
lan, McCall's division of the First Corps was detached from 
McDowell in the early part of June, 1862, and sent to reen- 
force the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, where it 
arrived on the 12th and 13th. They were immediately 
placed under Fitz John Porter, and became the Third 
Division of the Fifth Corps. At this time McCall's divi- 
sion consisted of three brigades of infantry (the Pennsyl- 
vania Reserves), four batteries of light artillery, and the 
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry. The First Brigade, com- 
prising the ist, 2d, 5th, 8th and 13th Pennsylvania Re- 
serves, was commanded first by Brig, (afterwards Major) 
Gen. John F. Reynolds (who was afterwards killed while 
in command of the First Corps, on July i, 1863, at Gettys- 
burg), who was captured at Gaines' Mills ; then by Col. S. 
G. Simmons, who was killed June 30, 1S62, and lastly by 
Col. R. Biddle Roberts. The Second Brigade was com- 
posed of the 3d, 4th, 7th and nth Pennsylvania Reserves, 
and its commanders were Brig, (afterwards Major-General 
in Command of the Army of the Potomac) Gen. George G. 
Meade, who was wounded June 30, 1862, and Col. A. L. 
Magilton. The Third Brigade consisted of the 6th, 9th, 
loth and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, commanded first by 
Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, who succeeded to the com- 
mand of the division when Gen. McCall was taken pris- 
oner, and then by Col. C. F. Jackson. The artillery 
consisted of Light Batteries A, B, G, ist Pennsylvania 
Artillery, and Battery C, 5th U. S. Artillery ; this, with 
Childs' (4tli Pennsylvania) cavalry, completed the organ- 
ization. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 75 

Nothing of importance occurred between June 2 and 
23, the time being taken up in reconnoissances, skirmishes, 
etc., among which was the daring cavalry and artillery 
raid made by Stuart on June 13, which came around the 
right flank of the Army of the Potomac, attacked and drove 
in the picket guard at Old Church (two squadrons of cav- 
alry), then proceeded to a landing three miles above White 
House, where they destroyed some wagons and burned two 
forage schooners ; from thence they went to Tunstall Sta- 
tion, on the railroad, where they fired into a train of cars 
killing several. Shortly after they left Tunstall's (about 
midnight), Reynolds' brigade of McCall's division came 
up, and about noon of the 14th, Warren's brigade, of the 
same corps, made its appearance with the cavalry division 
under Cooke, but as Stuart had disappeared twelve hours 
previous there was nothing for them to do. June 15, 
Casey made an armed reconnoissance to New Market ; and 
the same day there was a heavy skirmish on the picket line 
at Seven Pines, On this day also a parley was held be- 
tween Colonel Key and Howell Cobb to make arrangements 
for exchange of prisoners. June 18, there was a skirmish 
between the i6th Massachusetts and the enemy near Fair 
Oaks, while the former were making a reconnoissance. 
June 19, there was a skirmish between the enemy and the 
20th Indiana on the Charles City road. On the 20th 
there was an artillery duel near New Bridge, Va., and on 
the 22d Casey made a reconnoissance to White Oak Swamp. 
23d to 26tli of June, skirmishes near Ashland, at Atlee's 
Station, at Meadow Bridge, and at Point of Rocks. In 
advancing the picket line at Oak Grove a battle ensued, 
that object being accomplished with heavy loss of life on 
both sides. 

OAK GROVE. 

On the night of June 24 orders were received, through 
General Heintzelman, from McClellan to push forward the 
picket line covering the advance of the army before P.ich- 



76 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

iiiond, and early on the morning of the 25th the First and 
Second Brigades of the Third Corps were ordered to estab- 
lish their line of battle immediately in rear of the picket 
line preparatory to beginning the movement. Sickles' (2d) 
brigade was drawn up across the Williamsburg road, with 
Grover's (ist) brigade on its left extending to the south, 
while Carr's (3d) brigade was posted behind Hooker's lines 
of defense, to hold them or furnish support for Sickles or 
Grover as might be required. 

A belt of swampy soil surrounded by a heavy forest was 
situated about half a mile in front of Hooker's position on 
v/hich the picket line was posted, and from the great diffi- 
culty in relieving the picket line at this point, in many 
places waist deep, this swamp had tacitly become re- 
garded as the advanced picket lines of the opposing armies, 
and any invasion of it was looked upon as an aggressive 
encroachment to be repelled, if possible, at once. At eight 
o'clock the advance began along the entire line by sending 
forward skirmishers while the brigades followed within easy 
supporting distance. Grover's skirmish line became en- 
gaged at once, and as the enemy's fire increased they were 
strengthened from time to time to insure a vigorous and 
successful advance, one of Carr's regiments rendering good 
service in this movement. vSickles' brigade was slower in 
coming up with the enemy, but soon the musketry in his 
front showed that he had found them, and that they were 
also resisting his advance. They still pressed forward and 
had almost reached the edge of the woods, when the in- 
creased fire from the Confederate forces showed Hooker that 
Sickles was outnumbered. Carr at once sent a regiment to 
support him, and again the whole line pressed forsvard 
under a galling fire from the enemy. Grover, on the left, 
had fought his way up to the line and established his jMcket. 
It was now eleven o'clock, and, owing to some misunder- 
standing of Hooker's true condition at general headquarters, 
he received orders to withdraw his command from the con- 
test, and although General Birney tendered the services of 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 77 

his brigade at this juncture to Hooker, he was, under his in- 
structions, compelled to decline them, and the division was 
returned to its camp. As they reached camp McClellan ap- 
peared, and on learning the true state of affairs, ordered 
Hooker to resume and finish the duty given him the night 
before. Another regiment of Carr's brigade now took the 
place of the one that had been withdrawn during the suspen- 
sion of operations, and the line again moved forward under 
a severe fire from the enemy and established itself on the 
line it was to occupy. At this time Palmer's brigade, of 
Couch's division, arrived, and soon after a section of De 
Russy's battery, which being brought into action by that 
officer, opened to the right and left of the Williamsburg 
road and literally swept the jungles of the enemy ; a part 
of Palmer's brigade supported the battery, while the re- 
mainder of the brigade deployed and took the advance of 
the infantry in this part of the field and immediately moved 
forward to the outer edge of the woods. As soon as the 
undergrowth had been cleared of the foe the artillery 
opened with great effect on their encampment on the side of 
the field opposite their position. This continued till seven 
p. m. , when Hooker's command was withdrawn and Palmer's 
brigade left to defend the position for the night. Birney's 
brigade of Kearny's division again came up in the after- 
noon, but the principal fighting had been done before they 
arrived, and in the evening they relieved Grover and took 
up his position and remained till two a.m., when they were 
withdrawn and moved to various positions to strengthen the 
picket line. Robinson's brigade, Kearny's division, also 
moved forward for the purpose of extending the line of 
pickets in conjunction with those of Hooker, and his skir- 
mish line had a sharp encounter with the enemy, whom 
they steadily drove back until they came abreast of Hooker's 
line, when they rested till about six p.m., when the Con- 
federates made a desperate assault on his left flank with a 
heavy body of infantry. The 20th Indiana was ordered to 
the left for support, and while advancing received repeated 



78 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

volleys from the enemy, which they met by a charge, 
and, ponring a deadly fire on them in return, sent them 
flying from the field. At this time some one called out 
that the Confederates were bringing a battery to bear on the 
left, when the 87th New York became panic-stricken and 
broke and fled, and though their commander tried in every 
wa}' to rally them, he was unsuccessful, and they did not 
again appear on the field. The 20th Indiana was now 
hard pressed by reenforcements of the enemy, and was forced 
to give way and retreated a short distance, but soon re- 
formed and again advanced to the attack. At this time 
Kearny appeared with Birney's brigade, and with this sup- 
port they succeeded in driving the enemy from the field, after 
which Birney's brigade was withdrawn and relieved Grover, 
as before stated. Robinson's brigade remained in this 
position during the night, when the enemy made another 
attack upon him, which he easily repulsed. 

We now come to the series of great battles that ended 
with McClellan abandoning the Peninsula, beginning with 
the battle, on June 26, of Mechanicsville, or Beaver Dam 
Creek: 

MECHANICSVILLE, OR BEAVER DAM CREEK. 

On June 19, the First and Third Brigades of McCall's 
division moved from Gaines' Farm, where they had been en- 
camped, to Beaver Dam Creek, about a mile from Mechan- 
icsville, then the extreme right of the army, and relieved 
Taylor's brigade of Franklin's division. The position se- 
lected on the creek w^as naturally a strong one. The left 
resting on the Chickahominy and the right extending to the 
thick woods beyond the upper Mechanicsville road, which 
they occupied. The creek, however, w^as not fordable for the 
greater part of the front of the line, and there was but one 
road, that crossing at Ellison's Mills, over which it was 
practicable to move the artillery. Here an epaulement for 
a section of artillery was hastily thrown up, while rifle pits 
capable of holding a regiment were dug in front of each 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 79 

brigade. Cooper's battery- on the right, and Smead's bat- 
tery on the left, commanded the approaches from the npper 
road, while DeHart's battery, stationed near the front 
center, commanded a more distant view of the same road 
as well as the lower direct road to Mechanicsville ; at the 
same time Meade's brigade was held in reserve at Gaines' 
Farm, so as to be in readiness to snpport'Reynolds and Sey- 
mour, or to oppose the enemy's crossing at New Bridge, 
should they attempt it. 

In this position the Reser\^es awaited any movements 
the Confederates should make. Howell Cobb's legion was 
encamped in full view across the Chickahominy, while A. 
P. Hill's division lay about half a mile in the rear of 
Cobb, and had an extensive line of rifle pits and two re- 
doubts overlooking the river. 

Quiet prevailed until the 26th, when the Confederates 
were discovered to be advancing, and about noon IMcCall's 
pickets were driven in at Meadow Bridge. As their head 
of column approached, Meade's brigade was ordered up from 
Gaines' Farm and formed in the rear of the line, where they 
would be within supporting distance of any part of the 
field. At this time the division's line of battle was : On 
the extreme right six companies of the 2d Pennsylvania 
Reserv^es, next, six companies of the ist, then the 5th, 
8th, loth and 9th, the 12th being on the extreme left, 
while, as stated above, Meade's brigade was in reserv^e, 
together with Easton's and Kern's batteries. 

About three o'clock p.m. the enemy formed in front of 
McCall's division, and, throwing out skirmishers, rapidly 
advanced on his lines, keeping up a brisk fire. They 
w^ere in heavy force and were commanded by Gen. R. E. 
Lee. They attacked McCall's entire position from right 
to left, but he soon saw that they were concentrating 
their greatest efforts on his extreme right. Their efforts, 
however, were frustrated, though the battle raged at that 
point for quite a while with great fury, for Kern's battery 
had moved up to that place, supported by the 3d Re- 



80 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

serves, and the accurate and deadly fire of the battery caused 
them to retreat with a fearful loss. At the same time the 
Georgians rushed with almost resistless energy against the 
2d Reserves, only to be slaughtered like sheep in the sham- 
bles by the gallant Pennsylvanians. 

For a time the enemy retired from close contest on the 
right, but they kej^t up during the balance of the day a heavy 
general fire both of artillery and musketr>' ; this, with the 
rapid and steady firing of McCall's men, sounded at times 
like peals of never-ending thunder. Soon, however, they 
rallied again, and launched down the road to Ellison's 
Mills, where they made a determined effort to turn McCall's 
extreme left (Seymour's brigade) and flank him by crossing 
the stream below the mill. The 7th Pennsylvania now came 
to Seymour's rescue, and once more the Reserves sustained 
their character for steadiness in splendid style. Hour 
after hour they stood there, never flinching, never losing a 
foot of ground, hotly contesting the battle with the enemy's 
finest and bravest troops fighting under the eye of their 
most distinguished general. Yet it was noted that though 
the Union artillery dealt death unremittingly and to an 
awful extent, the greatly superior force of the enemy en- 
abled them to throw against McCall column after column 
of fresh troops, while his men were almost exhausted. 
About sunset Griffin's brigade, with Edwards' battery, ar- 
rived and was placed on McCall's extreme right, but as the 
enemy had advanced before they could all get into position 
only a portion of the brigade got into the action. Then, 
shortly before the engagement closed, the 4th Michigan re- 
lieved the 5th Pennsylvania, whose ammunition was ex- 
hausted. Edwards' battery having been left in reserve by 
Griffin, it was, late in the evening, turned over to Seymour 
and placed on his left. About nine p.m. this engagement 
closed, by the enemy withdrawing with heavy loss. x\t one 
a.m. McClellan ordered McCall to withdraw his forces to the 
rear of Gaines' Mills, but it was daylight before he received 
it. Meade's brigade was the first withdrawn, but before it was 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 81 

completed the enemy opened fire. Their fire was promptly 
returned, and soon the action became general all along the 
line. Griffin's brigade and Edwards' battery followed Meade 
and then Reynolds' brigade retired, keeping up a scattering 
musketry fire and firing one piece of artillery. Seymour's 
brigade was the last to retire, and was brought out in hand- 
some style. McCall buried his dead, sent off his wounded, 
saved all his artillery, and his brigades filed off the field as 
steadily as though leaving a dress parade, and it was some 
time before the Confederates discovered they had left, as they 
did not follow immediately. McCall' s division marched 
leisurely, and reached their designated position at ten a. m. 
of the 27th, where we will leave them for the present. 

IMorell came up to Mechanicsville with Griffin's brigade 
between five and six o'clock p.m., and found McCall en- 
gaged on the defensive, with Reynolds severely pressed, 
and he at once stationed Griffin and ordered him to support 
Reynolds and take care of the gap between him and Mar- 
tindale, who was near Richardson's division. Martindale 
was in position on the Hanover Court House road about 
three-quarters of a mile from Mechanicsville (to repel any 
approach from that quarter) and near McCall, ready to re- 
sist any effort to turn his right and assail him in the rear. 
The 8th Illinois Cavalry was stationed at this place and 
had been skirmishing with the enemy during the entire day. 
The battle had opened on Martindale' s left, and he sent two 
regiments to support Reynolds, and with the rest of his 
brigade waited demonstrations in his front, where the ene- 
my's artillery opened on him, without, however, doing any 
damage. At one o'clock a.m. he received orders to with- 
draw his brigade and retire before daylight, which he did 
in good order, and reached his camp in the Chickahominy 
Valley about one mile from New Bridge, shortly after 
daylight. 

Butterfield's brigade received orders at three a.m. of the 
27th to remove, by hand the heavy guns in batteiy 
near Hogan's house to a point on the hill, near Adams' 

VI 



82 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

house, east of Gaines' house, and guard them with his 
brigade, taking up position on the hills east of Gaines' 
house across the ravine during the passage of McCall's and 
Martindale's troops to the rear, and having accomplished 
this, by order took up a new position in the rear of the one 
last mentioned, with his left resting on the Chickahominy 
Valley, leaving the battery on the hill, where it had been 
stationed till the passage of all the troops and flying artil- 
lery had been effected, after which he brought the battery 
back and destroyed all the bridges. 

GAINES' MIIvIv. 

On the morning of June 27, Porter's (5th) corps was 
disposed in a semicircle, having its extremities resting on 
the Chickahominy, while part of his front was covered by 
the ravine of the Gaines' Mill stream, covered with trees 
and underbrush which partially masked his force and 
screened his reserves. By this disposition the roads from 
Mechanicsville and Cold Harbor were covered and defended. 

On the front as formed were Sykes' and Morell's di- 
visions, each brigade having two of its own regiments in 
reserve, while their artillery was posted to sweep the ave- 
nues of approach. McCall's division formed the second 
line in the rear of the woods skirting the ravine, Reynolds 
being on the extreme right, to cover the approaches from 
Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge. 
Cooke's cavalry were at the same time posted under the hill 
in the Chickahominy Valley to watch the left flank, and, 
should he have a chance, to strike the enemy on the plains. 

The dust from the immense columns of the enemy could 
be seen for miles, and Porter's scouts and pickets warned 
him that they were approaching along his entire front. 
About twelve o'clock p.m. they began to attack from the 
direction of New Cold Harbor on Morell's right, which was 
handsomely repulsed by Griffin's brigade. Again advancing, 
the Confederates made a second attack about 2 130, and again 
about half past five, each time extending along the entire 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 83 

front of Morell's division, and each time being repnlsed. 
At 6:30, however, they made a final attack, coming in irre- 
sistible force, throwing themselves against his center and 
left, and swept Morell's division from the ground, compel- 
ling them to retire. As Morell retired the artillery opened 
on the enemy from the left and rear, but the pressure was so 
great that his troops could not be rallied except in small 
bodies to support the artillery. Besides, Cooke's cavalry, 
having been repulsed in a charge on the Confederate right, 
added confusion to the Union line by riding at full speed 
obliquely through a large portion of the artillery, carrying 
men and horses along with them. The cavalry, however, 
reformed under the hill, beyond the reach of the musketry, 
and, advancing to the vicinity of Adams' house, imparted 
some steadiness to the retreating infantry near them ; at this 
time they received an order from Cooke to retire from the 
field, and rode briskly to the rear. The infantry followed 
and, finally rallied in the valley near the hospital, while 
Butterfield's brigade crossed the Chickahominy and bivou- 
acked with Smith's division of Franklin's corps. 

I think the weight of evidence is that General Cooke's 
cavalry charge at Gaines' Mill was made at the opportune 
moment, and arrested the advance of the enemy after the 
infantry supports had fallen back and left the guns of the 
several batteries exposed to inevitable capture. 

It is difficult to see how the capture could have been 
avoided, with the enemy within fifty or sixty yards of the 
guns, and their infantry supports in retreat. 

No doubt a repulsed cavalry charge woiild create some 
confusion, but in this instance it created sufficient confu- 
sion among the advancing enemy to enable the unsup- 
ported artillery to get away, and accomplished just what 
cavalry are intended to do in emergencies. 

The weight of evidence is also that the cavalry were the 
last troops to cross the river. (See " Battles and Leaders 
of the War," vol. ii, page 344.) 

Sykes' division was on Morell's right ; his troops oc- 



84 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

cupying the crest of a hill in an open field partly covered 
by a fence, and partly by the inequalities of the ground, 
McGeehee's house, in rear of his right center, being the 
commanding point of his position, while his front was 
masked 400 yards distant by heavy timber bordering a 
ravine. Buchanan's and Warren's brigades were deployed 
to the right and left, while Lovell's brigade was in reserve. 
About eleven a. m. the Confederates appeared in his front, 
and, with their artillery, tried to shake the center of his 
line, and from that time till two p.m., with successive bat- 
talions of fresh troops, assailed his center and flanks, and 
were as often repulsed. About noon Weed's and Tidball's 
batteries took position on Sykes' right, and so effective 
and deadly was their fire that they broke up every attack 
of the enemy on his right flank, and finally drove them to 
their main body on his left. From this time until night 
the battle raged furiously, attack after attack being met 
and repulsed, till the center of Porter's army was pierced, 
the troops in his front driven in, his left flank exposed, and 
his position no longer tenable, when, out of ammunition 
and thoroughly exhausted, they sullenly retreated, meeting 
with Meagher's and French's brigades about half a mile to 
the rear of the field. These had been sent to relieve Sykes, 
but arrived too late to take part in the battle. At mid- 
night the division retired across the Chickahominy and 
bivouacked on the heights commanding the approaches 
from the river. At 3:30 p.m. Meade's and Seymour's bri- 
gades, of McCall's division, were ordered up to support the 
front line, and soon after Reynolds' brigade followed, and 
the whole division became warmly engaged, while his bat- 
teries also advanced and shelled the enemy over the heads 
of the men in line. The action soon became general, and 
the fire in front of this division, which was near the center 
of the battle, increased to a deafening roar of musketry, 
above which, the artillery, at times, could scarcely be 
heard. The Confederates were drawn up in five lines at this 
point, and one line after another was thrown forward on his 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 85 

front as fast as the preceding ones recoiled from the mur- 
derous fire of the PennsN-lvania Reserves, or at such short 
intervals that their overheated muskets had no time to 
cool. In this way this division was under steady fire over 
three hours, when on the left one of Meade's regiments was 
driven in. They soon reformed, however, and resumed 
their place in the fight. Reynolds' men were now forced 
to retire from the right for want of ammunition, and soon 
the whole division was ordered to retire, which they did, 
crossing the Chickahominy and destroying the bridge (op- 
posite Trent's Hill) upon which they crossed, and en- 
camped for the night. The next morning the enemy cap- 
tured General Reynolds of this division, they having got 
in his rear when he retired to the woods, where he passed 
the night. At three p.m. Slocum's division of Frank- 
lin's corps crossed to the left bank of the Chickahominy 
to support Porter, and at once moved up to the front line, 
where Newton's brigade was placed on the right of the 
line and Taylor's New Jersey brigade on Newton's left, 
while Bartlett's brigade took position on the extreme left 
on the road leading from Gaines' house to Alexander's 
Bridge. On arriving at his position Bartlett supported 
Sykes' troops, who were nearly overpowered by the over- 
whelming numbers of the enemy, and remained in action 
at this point till the battle was over. Newton's brigade 
advanced in two columns to the woods in their front, 
which were then occupied by the enemy in strong force, 
and maintained their position over two hours, under a 
galling fire and against greatly superior numbers, until 
their ammunition was expended, when they retired to 
the rear and formed a new line. Taylor's brigade was 
also advanced into the woods, the 4th New Jersey being 
detached from the brigade and ordered to an advanced 
position in the woods, where, being cut off from the rest 
of the troops, the greater part of the regiment was cap- 
tured. The rest of the brigade maintained their position, 
doing deadly execution, till their ammunition was all 



86 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

gone, when they, too, were retired to the rear. Hexamer's 
New Jersey battery accompanied and supported Taylor's 
brigade, and did good and effective work. Porter's bat- 
tery was assigned to Bartlett's brigade, which it sup- 
ported and remained with during the battle, while Up- 
ton's battery did the same for Newton. Slocum's divi- 
sion in this action lost over 2,000 men. 

GARNETT'S FARM. 

While Porter was fighting at Gaines' Mill on the 27th 
of June, part of Smith's division of Franklin's corps had 
quite an engagement at Garnett's, on the Nine Mile road 
across the Chickahominy, Hancock's brigade, with six bat- 
teries of the reserve artillery, doing the fighting. About ten 
a.m. the Confederate artillery opened fire from the crest 
of the hill on Hancock's brigade and his batteries. This 
was replied to by Ames' battery, and after an artillery duel 
of an hour the enemy's batteries were silenced. After sun- 
down a body of Confederate infantry assaulted Hancock's 
brigade. They drove in his pickets and advanced to a little 
crest in the field separating them, about forty )-ards from 
his lines, and fired. The brigade responded bravely, and stood 
squarely up to their work. This continued till long after 
dark, when the enemy were at length repulsed with great 
loss. During this action the 6th Vermont came to Han- 
cock's relief and took position so as to take the enemy in the 
rear of their left flank, and General Brooks, with the 4th 
Vermont, took charge of Hancock's right and rendered 
great assistance at this point. At the beginning of the fight 
Lieutenant Colonel Buck, in command of the pickets of the 
New Jersey brigade on Hancock's left, threw his reserves 
into the rifle pits, where they, with a company of Berdan 
Sharpshooters did good execution, driving back the enemy's 
skirmishers who threatened an attack on Hancock's left 
flank, while the artillery also did their full share in repulsing 
their advance. 

This victory was, at this juncture, of the greatest inipor- 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 87 

taiice, from the fact that the Confederates had gained a bat- 
tle on the opposite side of the Chickahominy over Porter, 
and had they been successful in this assault on Hancock 
and enabled to force their way through the Union lines 
at this point, they would have separated the two positions 
of IMcClellan's army on either bank of that stream. 

PEACH ORCHARD AND SAVAGE STATION. 

On June 29, Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions of the 
Second Corps started for Savage Station from Fair Oaks. 
On arriving at Allen's farm (Peach Orchard), distant some 
two miles, Richardson was directed to form line of battle 
facing toward Richmond, his left flank resting on the right 
of Sedgwick, both being on the right of the railroad. He 
formed line, with French's brigade in front and Caldwell's 
brigade in rear (Meagher's brigade had been detached the 
day previous, and was at McClellan's headquarters at Savage 
Station), and obtained Sumner's permission to use a large 
house and some outbuildings in his front as an advance 
redoubt, they being occupied by the 53d Pennsylvania, 
Hazzard's battery being placed on an elevation a little to 
the rear of the 53d and supported by two regiments, 
this being considered the key to his position. Hardly had 
these arrangements been completed when the enemy ap- 
peared in force, attacking his left and Sedgwick's right with 
great fury. The 53d was soon engaged with the enemy, 
who made great efforts to dislodge them, but aided by the 
battery and a regiment from Sedgwick's right, they re- 
pulsed the Coufederates, who soon disappeared in the woods. 
Soon afterwards Sumner ordered both divisions to fall back 
to Savage Station as fast as possible, which was at once 
done, and on their arrival at the hills in the rear of the sta- 
tion were ordered to form in line nearly opposite the road 
which had been cut for the purpose of crossing White Oaks 
Swamp. This was about four p.m., and here Meagher's 
brigade came up and reported for duty. The different corps 
had already gained this new position when the enemy again 



88 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

appeared and opened fire on the commands of Franklin and 
Sedgwick. Parts of Caldwell's and Meagher's brigades, 
with Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries, w^ere detached from 
Richardson and went to their assistance, while French's 
brigade prepared to resist an attack in their immediate front 
toward which a heavy body of the enemy was reported to 
be moving, while the remaining portion of Meagher's and 
Caldwell's brigades, Richardson's second and third line, and 
one brigade of Smith's division formed on his right. The 
enemy, however, did not attack his front, and they were 
held in reserve, while in Sedgwick's front the enemy 
attacked again in strong force but more impetuously, but 
was gallantly resisted and driven back, the engagement 
lasting till dark. In the mean time Smith's division of 
Franklin's corps, on the 28th, while changing their position 
in order to get out of range of the Confederate artillery, who 
were firing on them from Gaines' Hill, found themselves 
shelled from Garnett Hill, though but little damage was 
done, and they had just evacuated their works, when two 
Confederate regiments attempted to occupy them, but were 
repulsed with great slaughter by his picket line, assisted 
by Mott's battery, which threw shrapnel into the enemy's 
ranks with terrific effect. At daylight on the 29th, the divi- 
sion formed in line of battle at the Trent house, covering 
the retreat of the wagon train and preventing the enemy 
crossing the Chickahominy by the bridges in their front, 
and then fell back to the front of Savage Station, where, 
finding both his flanks unprotected and the enemy in force 
in his front. Smith retired to the back of the station, formed 
junction with Sumner, and formed line of battle. Han- 
cock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right to 
hold the railroad. Brooks' brigade was placed in the woods 
on the left, while Davidson's brigade (under command of 
Colonel Taylor, General Davidson having had a sunstroke) 
was held in reserve. Brooks soon engaged the enemy and 
fought them till dark, and remained with the brigade, 
though wounded, and at ten p. m, the division moved to 
White Oak Swamp. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 89 

WHITE OAK SWAMP— G LEND ALE— NEW MARKET. 

Slocum's division received orders to move across the 
White Oak Swamp, and marched to a point on the Long 
Bridge road about one and one-half miles beyond the 
swamp, where they relieved Couch's and Peck's divisions 
(on the morning of June 30) who were under orders to 
proceed to the James River, and then took position on the 
Charles City road not far from its junction with the Long 
Bridge road and about a mile from Brackett's Ford, and 
blockaded the road as much as possible, getting into line of 
battle, placing artillery in position with infantry supporting 
the flanks of the batteries, and then destroyed the bridge 
near Brackett's Ford. About eleven a. m., the enemy drove 
in his pickets on the Charles City road and appeared in force 
in a large field in his front, opening on his line with two 
batteries, which were replied to by his artillery, and which 
was kept up till nearly dark. Word coming at this time 
that the left of the line (Heintzelman's corps) was being 
severely pressed, Slocum ordered Bartlett's brigade to 
advance to the front and endeavor to gain possession of the 
field on which the enemy had appeared in the morning. 
They at once encountered the enemy in strong force drawn 
up in line a short distance beyond a creek separating the 
opposing forces. Upton's battery was at once moved up to 
support Bartlett, and, opening on the enemy with canister, 
soon caused them to retreat. Taylor's brigade was ordered 
to the support of General Kearny, on Slocum's left, with 
his left (Robinson's brigade) posted on the New Market 
road, and Birney's brigade on the right, with Berry's bri- 
gade in reserve. The enemy began their attack on Kearny 
about four o'clock p.m. They charged on his lines re- 
peatedly, but were repulsed principally by the fearful execu- 
tion of Thompson's battery, which mowed them down by 
scores, seemingly, however, without much effect, as the 
gaps were instantly filled and the advance continued till 
they were almost up to the muzzles of the batter}-, when 



90 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the 63d Pennsylvania and 37tli New York coming to 
the support of the battery, with determined charge and 
repeated volleys drove them back in confusion. Three 
times the enemy advanced, each time being repulsed 
with great slaughter, till finding they could not break 
Kearny's line, they retired a short distance and kept up a 
rapid musketry fire on the troops. McCall's division 
Jiaving been overpowered and having abandoned their posi- 
tion on the left of Kearny, Taylor's brigade took their 
place and held it till the battle was over ; while Caldwell's 
brigade, after firing one volley, charged on the enemy and 
drove them through the open field, capturing a stand of 
colors, and, after fighting till their ammunition was ex- 
hausted, took position on the right of the field and 
remained there till withdrawn. On the morning of 
June 30, McCall's division (reduced to about 6,000 men 
from his losses at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill) formed 
in position on the New Market road, just in advance of 
where a lane turns off to Quaker Church, and it was at this 
point that they withstood for a time the combined onslaught 
of Hill's and Longstreet's divisions (from 18,000 to 20,000 
troops). The Second Brigade was on the right of the road, 
the Third on the left and the First in reserve. The division 
was hardly in position before the enemy's artillery attacked 
the left of his line. The pickets were driven in upon the 
main body, which at short range delivered their fire on the 
advancing foe, cutting one of their regiments to pieces. The 
position of the 3d Reserves being in the way of the artillery 
range, it fell back and was unfortunately fired upon by 
some of their own regiments and retired in confusion, re- 
forming only late in the day. The enemy pressed forward, 
however, on the left of INIcCall's line, and though for a 
time it resisted the advance, was at length compelled to 
give way before the overwhelming avalanche the enemy 
brought to bear at that point. As soon as the Parrott bat- 
tery was subjected to the musketry fire they were with- 
drawn and caused much confusion, which was added to by 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 91 

the cavalry doing the same. They soon reformed further 
in the rear, but not in position to do any further service. 
Cooper's men stood by their guns till there were so few of 
them left that they could not get them from the field and 
they were abandoned, while Anderson only retired his bat- 
tery when their ammunition was exhausted. On the right, 
Meade's brigade met a severe attack, but the excellent 
firing of Randol's and Thompson's batteries for awhile 
kept the Confederates at bay. At last they made a deter- 
mined attack on these batteries, which ]\Ieade met, keeping 
his men well to the ground till close at hand, then firing, 
followed by a bayonet charge — a desperate hand-to-hand 
encounter — till bv overwhelming force — Meade beinsf 
severely wounded — the brigade gave way. Just at this 
moment a part of Richardson's division came to their 
relief. McCall in trying to reform his troops and make a 
new stand, rode forward to where he supposed a portion of 
his line was stationed, but it imfortunately happened to be 
a Confederate regiment, and he was taken prisoner. 

Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps was in reserve 
on the left of McCall' s, and when McCall' s division gave 
way, it brought Burns' brigade directly to the front (Dana's 
and Sully's brigades had been sent to help Franklin), and 
they at once gave battle to the foe, while Dana and Sully 
were recalled and came at the double-quick, and at once 
dashed against the enemy. The entire division was now 
hotly engaged, and not only did they meet and repulse the 
attack of the enemy, but were forced to withstand the de- 
moralizing influence of the panic of the men of the first 
line, who, in many instances, broke through their lines in 
their haste to move out of reach of the enemy's fire. 

Hooker's division took position about nine a. m. on a 
crossroad leading to the Williamsburg road near St. Paul's 
Church, his right resting on this road and running parallel 
with and a mile in advance of the Quaker road, a forest 
covering the area between his position and the road, and 
his division being on the right of Sumner's corps, and 



i 



92 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

McCall on his right and stretching ofif in an obtuse angle 
with the direction of his own division. When McCall' s 
line gave way, the enemy pursued them until brought to a 
halt by the destructive fire poured into them from Hooker's 
right wing, which now advanced, and after a hot contest 
drove the enemy toward Sumner, who punished them severe- 
ly in passing and threw them over toward Kearny's front, 
where the firing was kept up till a late hour of the night. 

On June 29 Porter had been ordered to move the whole 
of the material of the army to a position on the James 
River near Turkey Island. He moved his command at 
sundown, and succeeded in reaching his destination about 
nine a. m. of the 30th, and took up a position on Malvern 
Hill west of Turkey Bridge, posting his two divisions, thor- 
oughly covering the River road and all the debouches from 
the New Market, Charles City and Williamsburg roads, 
Warren's brigade of Sykes' division being posted in the 
valley of the creek across the river road to prevent the left 
flank being turned by an advance from Richmond along 
that road. The supply trains of many of the divisions 
passed safely through the lines as well as the reserve artil- 
lery, which all reached a place of safety by four p. m. 

About this time the enemy appeared in Porter's front, 
began feeling the strength of his position, and about five 
o'clock showed themselves in force and attempted to turn 
his left flank ; under cover of the woods skirting the River 
road, the enemy planted their artillery to engage Porter's 
main body on Malvern Hill, while his infantry with some 
artillery moved direct on Warren's brigade, with whom they 
were soon engaged. These demonstrations soon brought 
upon them the concentrated fire of Porter's thirty guns and 
the infantry fire of Warren's brigade, the destructive effects 
of which caused them to immediately retreat. The Con- 
federate force making this assault was under Gen. H. A. 
Wise, and numbered 15,000 men, being part of the divi- 
sion of General Holmes. This fight is known as the battle 
of Turkey Bridge. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 93 

MALVERN HILL. 

On the morning of July i McClellan had concen- 
trated his entire army on the right bank of the Chicka- 
hominy, with the view of making Harrison's and Hax- 
all's Landings, on the James, his base of supplies, as he 
could there be aided by the gunboat flotilla under com- 
mand of Commodore Rodgers. This design W3S success- 
fully carried out, his entire v/agon trains reaching Haxall's 
in safety, and the army being placed in position to offer battle 
to the enemy should they attack him again. The troops 
were placed from left to right as follows : On the left, 
occupying an admirable position on Malvern Hill, was Por- 
ter's corps; Sykes' division, with the reserve artillery 
being on the crest of the hill, and ten siege guns posted 
to control the river road and sweep the left bank, placed 
at such elevation as to fire over the heads of Porter's 
men and reach the enemy advancing on the Charles 
City road, while on his right was Morell, then Couch's 
division, Keyes' corps, with the division of the Pennsyl- 
vania Reserves, under General Seymour, in reserve to them ; 
then the divisions of Kearny and Hooker, of Heintzelman's 
corps ; then Sedgwick and Richardson (Sumner's corps) ; 
then Smith and Slocum (Franklin's corps) ; while on the 
extreme right was Peck's division of Keyes' corps, with 
their right resting nearly on the James, and on the James 
itself the flotilla of Rodgers. Though an extensive line for 
such a force, McClellan felt that he must there meet the 
enemy and fight him regardless of the cost of life. His posi- 
tion on Malvern Hill was naturally a strong one, and the 
right of the line was strengthened by felling trees and 
blockinsf the roads. This done McClellan awaited the at- 
tack which he foresaw was imminent. 

Magruder's corps, about one p.m., appeared in Porter's 
front and opened up along his whole line with artillery and a 
strong skirmish line ; this continued till about four o'clock, 
inflicting, however, but small loss on Porter's troops, when 



94 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the firing stopped and the skirmishers withdrew to their 
main body. About 5:30 p.m. Magruder made a deter- 
mined attack on the right of Morell's and left of Couch's 
divisions, while a portion of the Confederate troops stealth- 
ily made their way along the valley, concealed by a growth 
of bushes and a mist prevailing at the time, to attack Mo- 
rell's left and rear. Martindale's and Butterfield's brigades 
were at once placed in position to meet them, and after a 
sharp engagement, in which the enemy were three times re- 
pulsed, at last succeeded in driving them away from his left 
and rear, and they did not again renew the attack in that 
quarter. At the same time they attacked his rear Magru- 
der' s troops also made a powerful attack on Morell's left 
front. They advanced in great force from the woods, and 
notwithstanding the destructive fire from the batteries on 
the crest of the hill moved steadily forward till they arrived 
near the batteries, when the supporting regiments (the 4th 
Michigan, 9th Massachusetts and 62d Pennsylvania) gal- 
lantly sprang forward and repulsed them. The enemy, how- 
ever, being constantly reinforced by fresh troops, who ex- 
tended their lines right and left, these supports were com- 
pelled to fall back to their first position, which they held 
till they were out of ammunition, when they were relieved 
by Butterfield's brigade, supported by Martindale's brigade, 
who continued the fight against treble their numbers, until 
they in turn were relieved by part of Sykes' division and 
Meagher's brigade, which latter was led into the fight by its 
own commander and General Porter. The Confederates, 
constantly reenforced, advanced to the attack on Morell's 
front time and again, each attack being repulsed, and fought 
with great obstinacy and determination, continuing the 
struggle till after dark, when, exhausted, they sullenly re- 
tired, leaving the field in his front in Morell's possession. 

Couch's division was posted on the right of the James 
River road, looking westward, with Kingsbury's battery on 
his left front. Porter's corps being on his left on the oppo- 
site side of the road. Palmer's brigfade was in a wooded 




GEN. DARIUS N. COUCH. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 95 

ravine on the right of the battery, while one regiment of 
Howe's brigade was in a peach orchard to the rear, between 
the battery and Pahner. On Palmer's right was a slojjing 
oat field bordered on the right by a tangled marsh and 
wooded bank. The balance of Howe's brigade held this 
position with part of Abercrombie's brigade and was the 
right of Conch's line, connecting with the left of Kearny's 
division. Abont three p.m. a Confederate brigade broke 
through the woods in front of Palmer and Abercrombie 
(making a feint attack to draw these troops to a disadvan- 
tageous position) but Kingsbury's battery and the steady 
firing of the infantry, together with a charge by the loth 
Massachusetts (in which they captured the colors of the 14th 
North Carolina), drove them back in confusion, rendering 
their attempt unsuccessful. The Confederates now massed 
heavy columns of troops in Couch's front, and kept up an 
incessant cannonading on his lines, which continued till 
about 4:30, when they pushed forward a large column from 
their right to assail Griffin's (of Morell's division) position. 
The fire of three batteries was concentrated on them, but 
they kept on, constantly reenforced, until they came within 
the range of Griffin's muskets, when they stopped and 
formed line. 

The battle now becoming general, Couch assumed com- 
mand of the whole front line for a time, ordered up the re- 
serves on the left, placed in position regiments falling back, 
and halted those bravely moving forward, as many of them 
had already masked the fire of his batteries. On seeing the 
Confederate advance on the left, both Abercrombie and Pal- 
mer pushed forward their brigades in front of the artillery 
in order to drive back the foe. The enemy constantly reen- 
forced their column of attack and advanced heavy reserves 
in support. Palmer and Abercrombie became engaged ou 
their right and left. Caldwell's brigade having been sent 
by Sumner to help Couch, joined his division and became 
fiercely engaged. Heintzelman sent Sesley's battery, which 
was posted with Howe's brigade, and it, too, went into the 



96 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

fight doing its whole duty. Shortly after six o'clock Hooker 
came up with three regiments and led them into the action, 
relieving some of Couch's troops who had exhausted their 
ammunition, while about seven o'clock up came the gallant 
Irish Brigade, under Meagher, advancing with rapid step 
and displaying their colors, marked by an alacrity and en- 
thusiasm which found expression in frequent cheers, and 
had the effect of rallying several fragments of regiments 
that had, after bravely sustaining themselves under an over- 
powering fire, been forced to retire from the front. As they 
came under fire they were met by General Butterfield, who, 
grasping the distinctive green flag of the leading regiment 
of the brigade, exhibited the ardor of a leader personally 
interested in its honor, thereby reexciting and renewing the 
spirit of the advance. The two leading regiments (the 69th 
and 88th New York) on coming into contact with the foe 
poured into them such an oblique incessant and murderous 
discharofe that it had the effect of silencing for some moments 
a fire that seemed overwhelming, retaining the position they 
had taken till the enemy retired. The second line of the 
brigade also maintained their position, though under a 
heavy fire from the enemy, which they were not in a posi- 
tion to either return or resist, while the 63d New York was 
sent to support a battery, relieving another on the line 
which had exhausted its ammunition. 

Sickles' also reported to Couch, and proceeded to 
relieve with two of his regiments two regiments posted 
in an open field in front of a belt of woods, behind which a 
battery was posted, and they were at once engaged with the 
enemy, while another was posted about 100 yards to the rear 
and left of the road in advance of another battery and far 
enough to its left to unmask it ; the fourth regiment sup- 
ported another battery on the right, while his last regiment 
relieved the U. S. Chasseurs, and the whole brigade thus 
placed gallantly fought the enemy till the close of the battle. 
The brigade remained in these positions during the fight, a 
detachment being engaged in supplying Couch's troops 
with fresh amnmnition. 



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 97 

Caldwell's brigade (of Richardson's division) also came 
to the support of Couch between five and six p.m., the 5th 
New Hampshire supporting a battery on the right and the 
other three regiments engaging the enemy on the extreme 
right of Couch's division, under the immediate command 
of Colonel Barlow, fighting steadily and pouring a most 
destructive fire on the enemv until their ammunition orave 
out, and then held their position without flinching, receiv- 
ing the enemy's fire though unable to return it. 

A portion of Birney's brigade (the 4tli Maine and four 
companies of 3d Maine) held the wooded ravine in front of 
Kearny's division, and when Couch's right flank was in 
danger of being driven back by a furious onslaught of the 
enemy, gallantly came to the rescue and aided him in driv- 
ing them back. 

The positions occupied by the divisions of Sedgwick, 
Hooker, Richardson (his brigades sent to Couch's assistance 
.have already been mentioned). Peck, Slocum (with excep- 
tion of Caldwell's brigade already mentioned). Smith and 
the Penns}-lvania Reserves, were not assailed by the infantry 
of the enemy, although at times the artillery fired at them, 
doing little damage. The flotilla also poured a deadly fire 
of shells into the enemy's reserv^es and advancing columns. 

During the day the heavy artillery on the line of Sykes' 
division, ranging far up the valley toward the enemy, 
assisted greatly in holding them at bay, and toward night 
Buchanan's and Lovell's brigades marched on to the field. 
These brigades were posted to cover the left of the line, and 
were not discovered by the enemy, wdio were advancing 
for a last attack on the Union lines, until their left 
flank was completely exposed, when they poured into 
them a well-directed and effective fire, which so completely 
shattered their lines that they were thrown into con- 
fusion and retreated precipitately and in disorder. This 
ended the battle, leaving the Union troops in possession of 
the field, the Confederate forces not again attacking Mc- 
Clellan in force while he remained on the Peninsula. 

VII 



98 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Between the 25th of June and the 2d of July the Union 
losses were, in killed, wounded and missing, 15,849, while 
the Confederate losses were 16,872. 

From this time forward to the 24th of August, Mc- 
Clellan's army was engaged in reorganizing, recuperating 
and being forwarded to Alexandria and Aquia Creek, Mc- 
Clellan himself arriving in, and taking charge of the forces 
around, Alexandria on the evening of August 26, where 
we will leave him for the present. 



CHAPTER IV. 

FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND BULL RUN. 

/^UR defeat at the first battle of Bull Run was the 
^-^ signal for the retreat of our armies to the front of 
Washington, and the news spread over the North and filled 
it with consternation. This result, so unexpected, shat- 
tered the hopes of many who were watching the battle with 
great anxiety, while it suddenly awoke the Government to 
the pressing needs of the hour. One of the first of these 
was the selection of a new commander, on whose ability 
and courage the country could rely, to relieve the National 
Capital of its new dangers. It was well understood that if 
the Confederates captured the city, though they held it no 
longer than the British in 1814, the effect on the loyal 
States might be disastrous ; and in addition, it might 
furnish the coveted opportunity to certain European 
powers to interfere in the Union cause at the outset, or to 
recognize the Confederacy. 

General Scott seemed favorable to McClellan ; and 
Schuyler Hamilton, Scott's military secretary, who had to 
go to the White House probably two or three times during 
the night, concurred in Scott's opinion. INIcClellan was 
accordingly called to Washington by telegraph a few days 
after to assume command of the defeated army which 
required a man at its head who had confidence in himself, 
and was able to imbue the men who were to serve under 
him with his own spirit. 

At that time Washington had but one railroad connect- 
ing with the North, viz, the Baltimore and Ohio ; while 
Baltimore had three, viz, the Baltimore and Ohio ; the 
Northern Central ; and the Philadelphia, Wilmington and 

99 



100 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Baltimore. New regiments, however, came pouring into 
the city and neighborhood for ' ' three years or during the 
war;" and the work at once began of organizing that 
grand army into brigades and divisions. The locations of 
these troops as they arrived cannot be given with any cer- 
tainty, and even if they could it would be of little value to 
history, as their positions were so rapidly changed. But 
some of the regiments became a part of the history of the 
places where they were stationed. Pleasonton's head- 
quarters were at the Park Hotel, on 7th Street, just north 
of the city ; there also the famous cavalry general prepared 
his command for future service. 

The 2d, 6th and 7th Wisconsin and the 19th Indiana, lay 
on Kalorama Heights, then a quiet place north of Washing- 
ton. The heights occupy a bend in Rock Creek, on the 
east side of the stream, and are deeply fringed with a forest 
of oaks, presenting a beautiful picture to the visitor. 
There these regiments were formed into a brigade, and 
Genl. Rufus King, of Wisconsin, was placed in command 
as brigadier general. This was afterwards known as the 
"Iron Brigade," and served in the First Corps until 
that corps was abolished by Grant. 

General Augur's brigade lay at Upton's Hill, Virginia, 
nearly four miles from Washington, and in the vicinity of 
Munson's Hill and Bailey's Cross Roads. McClellan had 
a review of the troops where the pretty village of Mount 
Pleasant now stands. It is to Washington what Glendale 
is to Cincinnati. 

Of the number of generals present there were IMcClellan, 
McDowell, Marcy, King, and probably " Baldy " Smith; 
this was the first time the soldiers had the privilege of 
seeing a general, and they were much interested in the 
review, although it was a rainy, miserable day. Then 
came the drill — squad, company, regimental, brigade and 
division. 

In the mean time a circle of fortifications had to be 
built around Washington for its safety. There were only 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 101 

two before the war, and these were at the south end of the 
Long Bridge, which leads into Virginia, but neither was 
manned. 

Necessarily the army was kept busy and, when not em- 
ployed at drill, men were put to work on the forts which 
pressed for completion. King's brigade was marched 
across the Chain Bridge into Virginia and was first under 
General Hancock. Here an exciting event occurred. A 
soldier named Scott, of the 3d Vermont, fell asleep on his 
picket post, which was supposed to be near the enemy. 
His commanding officer preferred charges against him ; he 
was court-martialed and sentenced to be shot. He was 
confined in a little, old log house, perhaps a smoke house, 
only a few rods from where the 19th Indiana lay. He 
was a short, thick-set boy, of somewhat stolid disposi- 
tion, though an honest, noble }-outh. Being new to the 
service, it was very exciting to see a soldier bound hand 
and foot while preparations were being made for his 
execution. Finally the hour came to remove him to the 
place where he was to be shot. Lieut. D. B. Castle, Co. 
B, 19th Indiana, had charge of the guard. Young Scott 
was taken out, seated upon his coffin, with his hands clasp- 
ing a Testament. Three sides of a hollow square were 
formed. The charge and findings of the court-martial, as 
well as the order for his execution, were read. The guns 
were handed to the guard, half of them being loaded, so 
that no one knew whether he was to fire a blank cartridge 
or a ball. The order was given to "shoulder arms," and 
in less than a minute more he would have been in eternity. 
In the mean time a devoted sister had come from Ver- 
mont to plead with the President for her brother's life. 
President Lincoln was not the man to turn a deaf ear to 
the maiden's prayer. He listened favorably and signed a 
reprieve, which was given to a courier mounted on a fleet 
horse. When the order was given to the guard '' shoulder 
arms!" the head of the courier's horse could just be seen 
coming up the hill. He was forcing the animal to its 



102 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

utmost speed, and it seemed as if he came like a bird 
through the air. Thousands of soldiers were standing look- 
ing on in breathless silence. The officers seeing the 
courier coming so rapidly delayed the execution until his 
arrival ; he came into the square on a "dead run," and 
stopped his horse in a manner that might have led to a 
tragedy. Taking from beneath his belt a large envelope, 
he handed it to an officer, when the President's pardon was 
read. The prisoner was instantly released, and many, in- 
cluding the officers, very cordially shook hands with him, 
and not a few shed tears of joy. He was granted a leave 
of absence, and returned home with his loving and de- 
lighted sister to Vermont. 

This event created quite a sensation throughout the 
country. Scott promised Lincoln that he would be a good 
soldier, and he was the first in the works at Williamsburg, 
where he gave up his life that the nation might live. 
Gen. George J. Stannard, then lieutenant colonel of the 
regiment, frequently told me that Scott ought not to have 
been court-martialed, and that the colonel was not justified 
in preferring charges against him. 

The next incident of any moment was a reconnois- 
sance toward Lewinsville by Lieutenant Colonel Stannard. 
McClellan directed him to reconnoiter the enemy's posi- 
tion and report to him. The enemy met us with five bat- 
teries, and for new troops, unaccustomed to war, it was 
an important event. In fact, the firing became so heavy 
that several regiments were sent out, the igtli Indiana 
being among the number, this being the first time that 
regiment was under fire. McClellan came from Wash- 
ington, fearing that it would result in a general engage- 
ment, as Longstreet was in command of the Confederate 
forces. 

King's brigade was then moved lower down the Poto- 
mac, and built and garrisoned Fort Baker, named in honor 
of Colonel Baker, a Senator from California. Colonel Baker 
exhibited true patriotism. While others went to the bat- 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 103 

tlefield to fight their way to the Senate, he left the Senate 
to assist in saving his country. 

McDowell soon moved his headquarters to Arlington, 
and King's brigade recrossed the Potomac at the Chain 
Bridge, and marched to that place, where he made his 
quarters for the winter, and created the famous cemetery 
on part of the Lee estate by the interment of the soldiers 
of that brigade, several of whom died there. The first sol- 
dier buried at Arlington was laid to rest oil the bank of the 
ravine, opposite where George Washington Parke Custis 
and his wife were buried. 

The next important service was preparing the field for 
McClellan's grand review near Bailey's Cross Roads. That 
was done by King's brigade, under the immediate super- 
vision of McDowell. 

An amusing though somewhat startling incident oc- 
curred on the afternoon before the review. The brigade 
had been marching from Arlington for several days. The 
soldiers complained of the weight of the cartridge boxes ; 
therefore tacit permission was given them to remove the 
cartridges. IMcDowell had the brigade marched in review 
before him, in order that he might ascertain, as he alleged, 
whether the field was adapted for the review of I20,cxdo 
troops the next day. 

After the brigade had performed that service, and 
"stacked arms," the enemy's artillery attacked the picket 
line, perhaps a mile and a half away. General McDowell 
ordered General King to take his brigade to the assistance 
of the picket line at the front. Then came the "tug of 
war." There was no dodging the fact that the brigade 
was without ammunition. General McDowell gave the 
order to General King in the presence of the troops. 

General King turned to the colonels and repeated the 
order. Lieut. Col. Lucius Fairchild — afterwards com- 
mander-in-chief of the G. A. R. — studied a moment, tlien 
replied to General King, " I am informed tliat the 2d Wis- 
consin is without ammunition." Immediately the colonels 



104 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

of the 6tli and ytli Wisconsin, and the 19th Indiana, made a 
similar report. General King appeared displeased, thongh 
I believe he knew it, but could not, of course, at the time 
confess it. 

General McDowell was in a great rage, and ordered the 
brigade to quarters with a sharp rebuke, and sent a staff 
officer post haste for Augur's brigade, which came forward 
at a double quick. We passed them not far from the cross- 
roads. They were simply swearing mad at us, and did not 
hesitate to express themselves as they passed. 

General Johnston had serious intentions of interfering 
with the review, but upon the approach of Augur's brigade 
his force retired, and quiet was restored along the lines. 

McClellan had taken command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac shortly after the disaster of Bull Run ; the country 
had been waiting with bated breath to hear of a forward 
movement, hoping that a crushing defeat of the enemy 
would be the result, but that feverish hope was destined to 
receive a terrible chill. 

INIcClellan wanted to learn the strength of the enemy at 
Leesburg, and accordingly, on the 19th of October General 
McCall, who commanded the Pennsylvania Reserves, was 
ordered to make a reconnoissance on Dranesville, to assist in 
shielding the move on Leesburg. In the afternoon Gor- 
man's brigade was sent to Edwards' Ferry to make a dis- 
play of his force there, while Colonel Devens, with the 15th 
Massachusetts, was sent to Harrison's Landing on the Poto- 
mac. He sent out a scouting party which reported a small 
encampment near Leesburg. Colonel Devens was ordered 
to take five companies, cross the river, advance under cover 
of the night, surprise the enemy at daybreak, and destroy 
their camp. When he arrived he was unable to find the 
camp as reported. He therefore concealed his men in the 
woods, as he knew the enemy was near. About eight 
o'clock in the morning the enemy discovered his position, 
and he retired in the direction of Balls Bluff, but again 
advanced in the direction of Leesburg. 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 105 

Colonel Evans, who was in command of the Confed- 
erates, was a skillful military officer ; it was he who bore 
the brunt of Hunter's advance at Bull Run. He jDre- 
sumed, in all probability, that Colonel Devens had no 
means by which to recross the Potomac, and that he was in 
a trap unless' well supported. He accordingly advanced 
with four regiments — one thrown forward to feel the way. 

In the mean time General Stone, whose headquarters 
were at Poolesville, Maryland, had directed Colonel Baker 
to assume command there. Baker, knowing that Gorman 
was at Edwards' Ferry, decided to risk an attack, but as 
there was no concert of action on the part of the Federal 
forces, he received no assistance, and the result was a ter- 
rible disaster to our troops. Baker fell mortally wounded, 
which greatly disheartened his men, who retreated down 
the bluff, only to be followed by the enemy, where no re- 
sistance could be offered. " By this time the four Confed- 
erate regiments were lined along the bluff, pouring a 
well-aimed and deadly fire into the remnant of Colonel 
Baker's troops, who rushed into the few imperfect boats, 
which were filled but to sink and drown the occupants. 
Some attempted to swim the river, but at that point the 
current was so swift that many met a watery grave. The 
few who succeeded in reaching the Maryland shore of the 
Potomac presented a sad sight indeed. "It was perfectly 
sickening," said a soldier to me, "to see our men suffer 
from the fire of the enemy on the other shore. ' ' 

The news was received in Washington wnth mortifica- 
tion and chagrin and the excitement over the disaster was 
at fever heat. 

Senator Sumner was seriously opposed to Gen. Charles 
P. Stone, and perhaps his influence greatly determined the 
Government to imprison him in Fort La Fayette, as ac- 
countable for this disaster, as General McClellan kept silent 
on the subject. The battle at Balls Bluff was a heavy blow 
to the Union cause. It was not a defeat but a disaster. 

The eyes of the country were now fixed on the Army of 



106 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the Potomac. Time wore away, but no forward movement 
was made. Finally McClellan was taken sick, which had a 
depressing effect upon the troops and upon the country 
financially. Lincoln became so distressed that he went to 
McClellan's house to see him, but the general was too un- 
well to be seen, therefore the President was denied an in- 
terview. Alarmed at the condition matters were in the 
President sent notes to Generals McDowell and Franklin, 
asking them if they could safely leave their commands to 
come to the White House that evening at eight o'clock. 

Seward, Chase, and the Assistant Secretary of War were 
there, beside Generals McDowell and Franklin. It was 
evident, from what McDowell told me, that the President 
was greatly troubled over the situation of affairs ; but the 
simple fact that he called McDowell and Franklin to the 
White House for consultation was abundant evidence that 
he was seriously alarmed. 

General McDowell said he advised advancing again in 
the direction of Bull Run. He also recommended that the 
army be divided into four corps. He had four divisions at 
Bull Run, and suggested that the right should rest near 
Vienna, the center at Fairfax Court House, the left at 
Fairfax Station. It was McDowell's opinion that that was 
the route to follow. He said Franklin favored approach- 
ing Richmond by the way of the Peninsula. As no decision 
had been reached, the President arranged that the consul- 
tation should be renewed the following evening. The next 
morning McDowell and Franklin called upon Secretary 
Chase, Colonel Kingsbury, Chief of Ordnance of the Anny 
of the Potomac, General Van Vliet, Chief Quartermaster, 
and ]\Iajor Shiras, Commissary of Subsistence, for informa- 
tion to be laid before the Executive. 

It occurred to General Franklin that they, McDowell 
and himself, ought to report to McClellan the nature of the 
work in which they were engaged. To that McDowell dis- 
sented and urged that they were obeying the orders of the 
President, the Couimander- in- Chief Finally they agreed 




GEX. vS. VAX VLIET. 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 107 

to obtain the views of Secretary Chase, which was done, 
and they received a decision, which accorded with Mc- 
Dowell's, "that as they were ordered by the President to 
do that work, there was no necessity for reporting to 
McClellan." 

In the evening Postmaster General Blair came in. He 
was decidedly opposed to the " McDowell forward move- 
ment," and intimated that it would be "Bull Run" over 
again. He advocated making the York River or Fortress 
Monroe the base of operation. His favorite idea was for 
our army to move to Siiffolk. That would cut off Norfolk, 
and endanger the enemy's southern communication. 

Secretaries Chase and Seward favored McDowell's plan. 
They were of the opinion that a victory at one place was as 
valuable as at another, and that it would take considerable 
time to reach Suffolk. General Meigs thought it would 
take from four to six weeks to get the transportation ready. 
As yet there was nothing definite decided upon. Each line 
had strong and earnest advocates. It was evident from 
McDowell's statements that Lincoln reserved his judgment. 

In a day or two McClellan was well enough to again as- 
sume command, and on the 13th of January there was an- 
other consultation at the White House, which was attended 
by General McClellan. It was then that he became aware 
of all that had transpired, which was a strong intimation 
that he must make a forward movement soon. At last, 
March 10, 1862, the day "fixed for McClellan to advance, 
dawned upon the world ; and early that morning the 
columns were ready to move. Nothing unusual occurred 
until we arrived at Fairfax Court House, There McClellan 
with several generals held a short consultation as they sat 
mounted. It was a novel spectacle to see a consultation of 
war held on horseback, and it inspired the troops with fresh 
hopes that the war would soon be over. 

After a short halt that magnificent army again took up 
its line of march with quickened step ; the men expecting 
to meet the enemy and crush him in a single tattle on the 



108 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

following morning. Such was the faith which sustained 
their courage. 

The troops commenced going into camp shortly after 
leaving the historic village of Fairfax Court House, which 
was nothing in comparison with the large and wealthy 
cities of the North, as there were so few houses around 
it. There is where Lord Fairfax lived and George Wash- 
ington transacted business, events which gave it its historic 
interest, even antedating the Revolution. 

It was soon learned that the enemy had evacuated his 
position and retreated behind the Rappahannock, and the 
long-expected battle was deferred. 

Great disappointment ensued, as the larger part of the 
army had sacrificed comfortable homes, and left lucrative 
business to go to ruin for the sake of defending the Union. 

After an absence of five days McClellan marched his 
force back in the direction of Washington. What this act 
meant was shrouded in mystery. 

Soon a heavy rain began, one of the worst which vete- 
rans ever experienced in the service, and continued all that 
day and well into the night. The next day, Sunday, found 
the whole army hovering around Alexandria. Then word 
came that McClellan would advance by way of the Penin- 
sula, to save his troops from marching, for which considera- 
tion he received great credit ; but in less than a week the 
men would not have complained of any route to Richmond. 

The excitement of sailing down the Potomac and on 
the Chesapeake was thrilling beyond degree. The ground 
where tlie British armies were defeated in the Revolution 
was to be the scene of another conflict between two great 
armies. But Washington was to be protected, and McDow- 
ell's command, the First Corps, was designated to remain. 
On the i2th of March, 1862, the President relieved McClel- 
lan as commander-in-chief, and assigned him to the com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac. The next day, the 
13th, the First Corps was officially designated, and McDow- 
ell assigned to the command of it. It was composed of 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN, 109 

three divisions, Franklin's, McCall's and King's, and he 
was ordered to report direct to the War Department. As 
McClellan had decided to take the Peninsular route, he 
could not protect Washington, so McDowell was given 
an independent command for that purpose to be directly 
under the orders of the Secretary of War. The first natu- 
ral military line being the Rappahannock, McDowell was 
directed to proceed to Fredericksburg, make his headquar- 
ters there, and picket the river to prevent a flank move- 
ment by General Anderson's force in his front, which was 
also acting as a corps of observation to prevent McDowell 
from uniting with McClellan' s right and closing in on the 
city of Richmond. Occasionally a force would be sent out 
to feel of the enemy and ascertain its whereabouts ; yet 
there was nothing of great importance the corps did until 
it was ordered to join Pope at Cedar Mountain ; then began 
its great work on the battlefield, lasting until the surren- 
der of the Confederate army at Appomattox. It was a diffi- 
cult matter to keep so constant and vigilant a watch day 
and night of so extended a front. Its position on the Rappa- 
hannock was highly necessary to protect Washington, which 
the Confederates were eager to take, for two reasons : first, 
it would give them possession of the great military stores, of 
which they were so much in need, and dishearten the peo- 
ple of the Northern States who were loyal to the Union ; 
likewise it would have been a plausible excuse for foreign 
recognition of the Southern Confederacy, which, as yet, was 
not acknowledged as a nation, only an attempted revo- 
lution to form one. Then, again, but for the First Corps 
holding the Rappahannock, McClellan could not have 
made the Peninsular campaign. It was a sore disappoint- 
ment to the First Corps not to be allowed to accompau}- 
McClellan, but McDowell started for Fredericksburg, to 
hold the line of the Rappahannock. 

McDowell was said to be able to "safely cover Wash- 
ington from Fredericksburg." He could cover Washing- 
ton from that position and aid McClellan, if an opportunity 



110 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

was presented, which was seriously contemplated, and 
greatly feared by the enemy ; in order to prevent such sup- 
port by McDowell, Jackson made a raid into the valley, 
slashing everything before him, as if he was in earnest 
in trying to capture Washington. 

McDowell really advanced as far as Bowling Green, 
only twenty-seven miles from McClellan's right, under 
Porter. Lincoln fully intended to assist McClellan with 
McDowell's command, having due regard to the safety of 
Washington ; he gave him Franklin's division, which was 
a magnificent body of men, composed of four brigades. 

Slocum commanded the 5tli Maine, i6th and 27th New 
York and the 96th Pennsylvania. The personnel of the 
brigade was excellent, exhibiting conspicuous gallantry 
which, perhaps, increased the fame of its commander. 

Phil. Kearny commanded the First New Jersey Brigade, 
composed of the ist, 2d, 3d and 4th New Jersey Regiments, 
which imbibed at once their commander's military spirit, as 
all through the war that brigade marched only to the sound 
of battle, seeking the hottest parts of the contest, until 
their decimated ranks were relieved by the close of the 
action. The State should present a medal to the survivors 
of the brigade, stamped with the impress of the hero of 
Cherubusco and Chantilly. 

General Newton commanded the i8th, 31st, and 32d 
New York, and the 95th Pennsylvania Regiments. These 
were made up of the best citizens of the Empire and 
Keystone States. If Slocum and Kearny were ever in 
a fight, Newton and his brigade could be depended upon to 
arrive and contest for the first fire. 

The President again robbed the corps to aid ]McClellan 
when Fredericksburg had been reached. This time the 
Pennsylvania Reserves were withdrawn, but they w^cre wel- 
comed back again shortly after the Seven Da>-s' fight, under 
the command of that model soldier. Gen. John F. Reynolds, 
who soon prepared to take an important part in the second 
battle of Bull Run. 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. Ill 

111 addition to the President taking two divisions of the 
First Corps to send to McClellan on the Peninsula, the 
following letters breathe the spirit of true friendship on the 
part of the great man who sat in the White House during 
that trying and perilous period. If McClellan had enemies, 
or those who were opposed to him, Lincoln was not one of 
them. The simplicity of his noble character is fully por- 
trayed in these letters : — 

Washington, D. C, May 23, 1S62. 

I left General jMcDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' 
command is there, but is so worn that he cannot move before Mon- 
day morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops 
for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a 
probable loss to us of one regiment of infantry, two companies of 
cavalry, and putting General Banks in some peril. 

The enemj^'s forces, under General Anderson, now opposing 
General ^McDowell's advance, have as their line of supply and re- 
treat the road to Richmond. 

If in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Ander- 
son you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's 
supplies from Richmond, preser\^e the railroad bridge across the two 
banks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, 3-ou will 
prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving accession of 
numbers of nearly 15,000 men, and if you succeed in saving the 
bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to 
the one you now have. Can 30U not do this almost as well as not 
while 3'ou are building the Chickahominy bridges ? 

McDowell and Shields both say they can and positively will 
move Monday morning. I wish you to move continuouslj' and 
safely. You will have command of McDowell after he joins 3'ou, 
precisely as you indicated in 3-our long dispatches to us on the 21st. 

A. Lincoln, 
Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan. President. 

Washington, D. C, May 24 — 6:24 p. m. 

In consequence of General Banks' critical condition, I have 

been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join 

you. The enem3^ is making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, 

and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force and part of 

General McDowell's on their rear. 

A. Lincoln, 

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan. President. 



112 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Again, he more fully telegraphed McClellan : 

Washington, D. C, May 55, 1862, 

Your dispatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg with 
about 6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a 
column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his 
force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 
7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding 
the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely, crossed the Shen- 
andoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed on to get north of Banks, 
on the road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race with them, 
beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a 
battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was 
beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is 
broken up into a total rout. 

Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, jvist now reports that 
Jackson is near Front Royal, with 10,000 troops, following up and 
supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks, also 
that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same 
direction. Stripped bare as we are here, we will do all we can to 
prevent their crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. 
McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces marching back to the 
vicinit}^ of Front Royal, and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is mov- 
ing to Harrisonburg, both these movements intended to get in the 
enemy's rear. One more of IMcDowell's brigades is ordered through 
here to Harper's Ferry, the rest of his force remains for the present 
at Fredericksburg. 

We are sending such regiments and batteries from here and 
Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry to supply their places 
in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We 
have also eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which 
there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation. 
If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely 
helpless. Apprehensive of something like this, and no unwilling- 
ness to sustain yon, have alwaN^s been my reasons for withholding 
McDowell's force from you. 

Please understand this, and do the best j'ou can with the forces 

vou have. 

A. Lincoln, 

Major General McClELLAN. President. 

How kindly he talks to McClellan, even gave Shields to 
McDowell, to swell his command to assist him before Rich- 
mond. 




GEN. W. S. ROSECRANS. 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 113 

Blenker's division had been withdrawn from McClellan, 
and ordered to Fremont. 

General Rosecrans was ordered to Washington, and he 
was directed by the Secretary of War to take Blenker's 
division to its destination, and while he was there to see 
General Banks, and make such suggestions as he deemed of 
advantage to the service. 

After looking over the situation of the different com- 
mands, it occurred to General Rosecrans that if they wxre 
all united in one, including McDowell's, it would make an 
army of about 85,000. It could then in a short time sweep 
down to Gordonsville, where it could unite with McClellan' s 
right, and blockade the entrance to the Shenandoah \^alley, 
which would then be in their rear. General Rosecrans 
called upon General Banks and told him of the idea. He 
at once agreed with Rosecrans, and hoped it would be done, 
and added, ' ' It makes no difference to me who commands. ' ' 

General Rosecrans sent the plan to Secretary Stanton, 
who replied, "It is now too late to adopt it ; " which answer 
admitted the excellence of the proposed military mo\'ement. 

As McDowell advanced on Fredericksburg he attempted 
to surprise the enemy — perhaps for various reasons — to save 
the bridge over the Rappahannock, and capture their stores 
before the dawn of day. The Harris Light and the 3d 
Indiana Cavalry were followed closely by the 14th Brooklyn 
Infantry, and Battery B, of the 4th U. S. Artillery. A 
cavalry m.an stated that the 14th Brooklyn Infantrj^ kept 
well up with the cavalry, which was marching splendidly. 

The night advance was anticipated, and a barricade was 
made across the road, some two miles northeast of Fal- 
mouth, which is a little town almost opposite Fredericks- 
burg on the east of the river. The cavalry charged, 
and were thrown into confusion for a moment, when the}' 
struck the obstruction. The enemy were in the woods close 
by, and poured in a well-directed fire upon the cavalry in 
the road, but were compelled to beat a hasty retreat in the 
direction of Falmouth. 

VIII 



114 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

They had prepared the bridges for destruction, and when 
the Union forces arrived, early in the morning, it was only 
to find that the wagon bridge leading over from Falmouth, 
the railroad bridge, and several steamboats in the river, were 
all burning at the same time. But McDowell's advance 
was not materially checked, as pontoon bridges were put 
down, over which a whole army could cross. The corps 
remained there for some time. The railroad bridge was 
rebuilt, and the railroad to Brooks' station, at x^quia Creek, 
on the Potomac, was repaired and put in running order. 

While at Fredericksburg, on the Fourth of July, an 
amusino; incident occurred in the ad Wisconsin. The bovs 
had resolved to have some fun. They organized a plan to 
capture the officers' coats, which were to be donned by a 
full set of new ones for the occasion. It was not long until 
they appeared in regular uniforms. Then the regular officers 
were all arrested and compelled to do police duty. They 
all submitted gracefully except one. The quartermaster 
took umbrage at it, and refused to be arrested. Lucius 
Fairchild was the lieutenant colonel. He took it quite good 
naturedly, and worked well. Gen. Rufus King was greatly 
taken with the joke, and said that if he had known it 
he would have permitted them to capture his coat, sword 
and sash, and permitted them to arrest him ; but he would 
not take off his coat on purpose. 

The only time General Bragg (then major of the 6th 
Wisconsin) went to church was one Sunday while in Fred- 
ericksburg ; he was accompanied by Captain Marsh. The 
usher invited them into the gallery ; Bragg looked up and 
saw none but colored people there. Said he to the usher : 
"The gallery is for 'niggers,' ain't it?" The usher 
answered in the affirmative. "Well," said Bragg, "show 
me the minister's pew." That frightened the usher, so that 
he at once conveyed them to the dominie's reserved seats, 
and the two ofldcers sat there and listened to the service 
and greatly enjoyed it, as the guests of the pastor. 

New combinations were forming, and the corps ex- 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 115 

pected hot work. There had been so many disasters in 
front of Washington and on the Shenandoah, that the Pre.s- 
ident resolved to bring a general from the West, who had 
been very successfnl every time he met the enemy, and 
place him in command. He was a personal friend of the 
President, and had accompanied him to Washington when 
he came to be inaugurated. So General Pope was given a 
command, with powers similar to those suggested by Gen- 
eral Rosecrans, though Fremont's command was not in- 
cluded. 

Pope saw that Gordonsville was a great military key to 
the Confederates, and he at once advanced in that direction, 
with Banks, followed closely by Ricketts' division of the 
First Corps. King's division, at Fredericksburg, was ordered 
to join the main body at Culpeper, McDowell's head- 
quarters were at Fredericksburg, and he rode with the 
division on the forced march. 

Before reaching his destination, however. Banks had 
marched some distance beyond Culpeper, where he was 
met by Jackson, who was aware that General Hatch had 
been ordered to Gordonsville to tear up the railroad track. 
Jackson had advanced in the direction of Culpeper to 
checkmate Hatch's move, who, having only a brigade, 
stopped at Madison Court House on learning that Jackson 
was at Gordonsville with his whole corps. 

When the forces under Banks and Jackson suddenly 
faced each other, both generals prepared for battle. Banks, 
as Governor of Massachusetts and as Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, had a national reputation before the 
war. His unfortunate assignment to the Shenandoah, 
where so many disastrous raids had been made by a 
superior force under Jackson, chafed him, and he was aching 
for a favorable chance to face the enemy on a fair field. 
Hence, when he met Jackson at Cedar Mountain, he at 
once resolved to make a stubborn fight. 

Men who were engaged in the battle said: "Banks 
was present everywhere on the field, cheering the men. At 



116 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

one place he rode liis horse in the line of battle. It greatly 
nerved the men to see such courage in their commander, 
and the result was they fought and really worsted double 
their number under Jackson." 

The Comte de Paris says that it was in truth a victory 
for the Federal side. The Union forces fought with such 
desperation that, in order to keep his line from breaking, 
Jackson had to rush on the field at the head of his old 
troops. 

Augur and Geary were both wounded and General Prince 
was taken prisoner. Col. James A. Tait, of Washington 
City, commanded a brigade on the extreme left of the 
Union line, where he greatly distinguished himself for 
coolness and bravery. 

Ricketts hearing the battle, pressed forward with his 
splendid division to assist Banks, "but the contest was 
ended when he arrived," says the Comte de Paris. About 
one o'clock that night King's division arrived on the battle- 
field ready for work. Sigel was there also, and had begged 
pennission to lead the attack in the morning. 

Every command was ready by the dawn of day, but as 
the fog cleared up, and the site of the enemy's former posi- 
tion could be seen, there were no troops in view. Jackson 
had received such a pounding from Banks that he was glad 
to avail himself of the night to escape, and sent in a flag of 
truce askincr hostilities to cease until the dead could be 

o 

buried. 

As this chapter is made up of miscellaneous incidents 
which occurred, and is not intended to be a regular narra- 
tive, some Confederate matters are here given. 

Being one evening in company with General Heth, I 
asked him what was the cause of the coolness between Jeff. 
Davis and Joseph E.Johnston? He said: "It originally 
began when General Jessup died. Davis wanted Floyd to 
appoint Albert Sydney Johnson quartermaster general, to 
fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of General Jessup. 
Joseph E. Johnston was successful in his efforts to succeed 



FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN. 117 

Jessiip. Then, when the Confederate Congress provided 
for five generals, Davis appointed them in the following 
order : S. Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnson, R. E. Lee, and 
Joseph E. Johnston. The latter was the qnarterniaster 
general in the United States Army when the war began ; 
S. Cooper was colonel and adjutant general ; Albert Sidney 
Johnson was colonel, and R. E. Lee was lieutenant colonel 
of cavalry. Putting Johnston fourth greatly displeased 
him, and he expressed his dissatisfaction to Davis very 
plainly. Davis replied that as quartermaster general he 
had no power outside of that department, and declined to 
rectify it. 

"It was evident he was not held in high esteem by Mr. 
Davis, for I was tendered his command in the west by the 
President ; but some of the Senators objected to me on the 
ground that I was a Virginian, and there were so many 
Virginians occupying prominent places in the army — Lee 
was in command of the largest and most important army in 
the Confederacy. I did not want it, and Hood of Tennes- 
see succeeded Johnston. 

"That reminds me that one day Davis sent for me and 
said : 'Heth, how much rank do you think you can stand?' 
I replied: 'I do not think I can stand very much.' He 
then said : 'I was thinking of giving you command of the 
troops west of the IVIississippi, in place of Price.' The 
western Senators learning of it, raised an objection to me 
on account of my being so }'oung. They did not want Price 
removed. As I did not want the place, I went to the Sec- 
retary of War, and said : ' Mr. Secretary, I do not desire to 
supersede Price in his command, and I hope my name will 
not be further considered in connection with it. ' 

"That ended the matter, and I remained with Lee's 
army." 



CHAPTER V. 

SECOND BULL RUN. 

^A FTER the battle of Cedar Mountain, which was a 
■^ ^ great rebuff to Jackson, who, with double the num- 
ber of troops, compelled Banks to retire his line ; but the 
stubborn resistance made by the Federals, and with Ric- 
ketts and Sigel on the field ready to renew the conflict in the 
morning, made it advisable for him to retire behind the Rapi- 
dan, or, perhaps, to draw Pope on. Ricketts came up just as 
the battle was closing, and his troops were engaged a short 
time. Jackson then retired to Gordonsville, and called for 
more troops, while Lee was greatly perplexed as towhat mili- 
tary move was to be executed. Was it a wily deception on 
the part of the Federals for Pope to boldly throw his anny 
forward to Culpeper, as if threatening Richmond from that 
direction — while McClellan would pretend to retreat, and 
then, if Lee supported Jackson with any material numbers, 
and weakened the force at Richmond — so that McClellan 
could suddenly head his columns for Richmond, and either 
capture the Confederate officers or compel them to fly for 
safety ? 

General Pleasonton found the forces around Richmond 
so weakened, when Lee was sending troops to reenforce 
Jackson against Pope, after the former was hurled back on 
Gordonsville, when the battle of Cedar Mountain was fought, 
that he dare not advance, and therefore Pleasonton wrote 
the followiug letter to Gen. R. B. Marcy, chief of staff: 

Genkr AL : — Your note of this date received. There are moments 
when tlie most decided action is necessary' to save us from o:reat dis- 
aster. I think such a moment has arrived. The enemy before us 
118 



i 



SECOND BULL RUN. 119 

is weak. A crushing blow by this army at this time would be in- 
valuable to disconcert the troops of the enemy to the north of us. 
That blow can be made in forty-eight hours. Two corps would do 
it, and be in position to go whenever they may be ordered by that 
time. 

From all I can learn there are not 36,000 men between this and 
Richmond, nor do I believe they can get more before we can whip 
them. I have guides ready, and know the roads sufficiently well to 
accomplish anything the general wants. 

I write this as a friend. I shall willingly carry out the general's 
orders, be they what they may, but I think he has an opportvinity 
at this time few men ever attain. Destroy this, and whatever I 
have said shall not be repeated by me. 

Very trulj- yours, A. PlEASOnton. 

This remarkable letter is dated Haxall's, August 11, 
1862. It is published on page 369 in the third part of 
volume eleven of the "Rebellion Official Record of the 
Union and Confederate Armies." It must have been sent 
to the War Department with the papers of General Marcy, 
as it was out of Pleasonton's possession, and by him re- 
quested to be destroyed. 

General Pleasonton was in Washington. I called on 
him, and asked him if the light of a quarter of a century 
still supported that letter of his. He said most assuredly, 
and more clearly now than then. 

McClellan telegraphed it to Halleck the next day at four 
o'clock p.m., but these two generals were not in hearty 
accord ; they distrusted each other, and Halleck made no 
response to him. It has been suggested to me by a promi- 
nent officer, that if Pleasonton had sent his dispatch direct 
to Halleck he would have ordered an advance on Richmond. 

From the following correspondence it is plain that L,ee 
was apprehensive of that move : 

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
August 12, 1862. 
General : — It is reported to these headquarters that the enemy 
is advancing by the way of Malvern Hill. General Lee directs me 
to say that he desires you to proceed at once to New INIarket, and 



120 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

make such disposition of 3-our troops as may be necessary to oppose 
the enem}' and drive him back. 

I am, very respectfull}-, your obedient ser\fant, 

A. L. Long, 
Colonel and Military Secretary. 
Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith, Commanding Division. 

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
August 13, 1862. 
General: — Having received information that Burnside's forces 
have left Fredericksburg to join Pope, unless 3'ou know to the con- 
trary I desire you to march at once with your command to Gordons- 
ville and report to General Longstreet. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

R. E. Lee, General. 
Brig. Gen. John B. Hood, Commanding Division. 

Headquarters near Richmond, Va., 
August 14, 1862. 
General : — Your letter of this date received. From every in- 
dication it appears that INIcClellan's forces on the James River are 
being withdrawn and sent to reenforce Pope. Under these circum- 
stances I think it will be necessary to withdraw R. H. Anderson's 
division from Drewrj-'s Bluff and send it in the direction of Gordons- 
ville. Colonel Gibbs' regiment and the 57th North Carolina, Col. 
H. C. Jones, had better be ordered for the present to that point. In 
case Anderson is removed these troops will serve for the defense of 
Drewr3^'s BluflF; and since they are new, they can be drilled and 
accustoiued to camp, &c. 

I am, very respectfulh', 3"our obedient ser^'ant, 

R. E. Lee, General. 
Hon. George W. Randolph, Secretar3- of War. 

It is quite plain tliat Pleasonton was right. 

Had our army advanced and ca]:)tiired Richmond and 
liberated our prisoners confined in Libby and Belle Isle, it 
would have been a great victory. AlcClellan would have 
been in Lee's fortifications and in a position to cut oflf his 
supplies from the South. If he could not have followed 
Lee, he could have held Richmond and destroyed the rail- 
road between Gordonsville and Lynchburg, the only way 
for relief from the southwest. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 121 

Pope and Buniside had within a few thousand as many 
men as Lee. So, if Lee had paid no attention to Mc- 
Clellan's occupying Richmond in his rear, and marched for 
Washington, with Pope and Burnside in his front, it would 
have taken him ten days or more to force his way there. 

There were 12,000 troops at Harper's Ferry ; Washing- 
ton and Baltimore could have added 10,000 more; then our 
army in front of Washington would have lacked 13,000 
of being equal in numbers to Lee's, with Philadelphia, 
New York, Boston, Harrisburg, and Cincinnati to draw 
from to make up that difference, with o\'er a week to 
do it in. 

Besides, McClellan could have sent a corps to Washing- 
ton and still held Richmond, as the fortifications around 
Richmond were equal to 20,000 troops. 

But it was thought advisable to withdraw McClellan 
from the Peninsula, and unite the two armies in front of 
Washington, with the Rappahannock as the line. 

There were enough of McClellan' s men who never fired 
a gun at the Second Bull Run to have captured Richmond 
and held it. Franklin and Sumner never reached the field. 

Pope had camped on the battlefield of Cedar Mountain 
ever since the battle on the 9th. Why, no one could tell. 
The stench was very offensive from the dead horses ; and 
the Confederate dead were scarcely covered up in many 
instances, although they were supposed to have been 
buried under a flag of truce. Jackson sent in a flag for the 
purpose of burying their dead ; with all the advantage in 
our favor, the proposition for hostilities to cease until the 
dead could be buried was agreed to. If Jackson had been 
granted the same ad\'antage on the second morning that 
Pope had, there would have been more dead to bury before 
that solemn act was performed. In other words, Jackson 
never stopped for an}-thing when he had a chance to win a 
victory. The battlefield was full of soldiers from both 
armies while the dead were being buried. The Confederate 
soldiers repeatedly said that the next evening they expected 



122 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

to eat their supper in Culpeper ; a genteel way of boasting 
that they expected to win the next battle. During the 
suspension of hostilities the two armies lay almost two 
miles apart, concealed in the woods. When the truce ex- 
pired, and our army advanced, there was no enemy there. 
Ricketts' division moved forward to the Rapidan, and 
marched up the river for some distance in the direction of 
Gordonsville. Captain Smith, of the 97th New York, 
said: " One night the colonel called the officers aside and 
said to them, 'We are in a trap, and must retire quietly;' 
and then added, ' Give your commands in a low tone until 
we get out of this. ' ' ' 

Jackson had been reenforced by Longstreet, and they 
were weaving a net around Ricketts ; but he was too wary 
an officer to be caught that way. Sigel's command fol- 
lowed Ricketts to the front. Pope was notified of the ad- 
vance of Longstreet and Jackson by a staff officer, who 
returned from Ricketts and Sigel. No doubt Pope had 
his reasons for remaining on the field. I heard him remark 
' ' that it was twenty-six miles before we would be under 
McClellan." That would indicate that at that time the 
orders to McClellan might be revoked, and both generals 
push on to Richmond. 

Three days' rations were cooked and served for a for- 
ward movement. A letter of Lee's had been captured, 
giving all the information regarding the disposition of their 
commands, with the probable strength of each. Such 
letters are frequently lost purposely, to mislead the enemy. 
It is certain that Pope did not act on that letter at once, as 
it was captured on the i6th. Our cooked rations came in 
good on the retreat to the Rappahannock, whither we 
started very soon, without stopping on the way to gather 
daisies and sweet williams ; we left them for the countiy 
maidens and children of that region. 

Pope crossed the Rappahannock on the left side, and 
placed his army as follows : McDowell at Rappahannock 
Ford ; Banks at Rappahannock Station ; Reno at Kelly's 




GEN. FRx\NZ SIGEIv. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 123 

Ford on the left ; and Sigel on the extreme right. Such 
was the position of Pope's army when he faced again to 
confront the advancing foe. The majority of McClellan's 
troops were to land at Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, twelve 
miles north of Fredericksburg, where Burnside was then 
in command. From Aquia Creek they could be conveyed 
by rail to Fredericksburg, where they would take the route 
up the Rappahannock ; the last command all the time 
serving as Pope's left. 

This was a dangerous move ; the line was entirely too 
long, reaching from Fredericksburg to Sulphur Springs, 
opposite Warrenton ; the line was weak and liable to be 
pierced at any point by either Longstreet or Jackson ; but 
that was the plan decided upon by Plalleck, and orders from 
him had to be obeyed. He was managing the battle from 
his office at Washington, It was frequently observed by 
military men that he ought to take command in person on 
the field. 

On the 2 1st the forces of Longstreet and Jackson lined 
the right bank of the Rappahannock. Soon cannonading 
commenced, and was continued for some time, but no 
strong attempt was made to cross the river. There were 
one or two advances, as if they intended to force a passage, 
but subsequent events proved that they were simply feeling 
our position. On the 2 2d Longstreet extended his lines 
up the river to cover the space which Jackson occupied 
the day before, Jackson having already begun his flank 
movement of Pope's army. At Hazel River Milroy 
attacked his rear, but did not delay him much. Finding 
Freeman's Ford well guarded, he p'assed on to Waterloo 
Bridge, where only a light guard was posted ; this was 
brushed aside by General Early, who crossed to the same 
side with Pope, who had anticipated that move, and really 
welcomed it, for he wanted a part of their forces to get far 
enough over to crush them before they could receive assist- 
ance. 

In the mean time Pope changed his mind, and was going 



124 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

to cross to the riglit side of the Rappahannock and attack 
Longstreet while Jackson was seeking a crossing higher up 
the river. He thought there were enough troops coming 
from Washington to take care of Jackson, as Halleck had 
written him on the 21st : " Do your best to keep possession 
of the Rappahannock. To-morrow large reenforcements. 
Defend eveiy inch of ground ; fight like the devil until we 
can reenforce you. In forty-eight hours you shall have all 
the troops you want." 

On the night of the 2 2d a terrible storm raged in that 
part of the State. The Rappahannock is a short river at 
best, and the two armies lay at the foot of the mountains 
on either side of the river, so that in a few hours the rush- 
ing torrents from the mountain sides began to swell the 
quiet little river into a roaring stream of power and force. 
It struck the Waterloo Bridge and swept it away ; which 
left Early in a bad predicament. He could neither get 
back, nor could they assist him. If Pope could grapple 
him before the river fell he would have been captured ; but 
Pope had arranged his forces with reference to crossing the 
river and attacking Longstreet ; so it took some time to 
countermand the orders and have them march on Early. 
Sigel was ordered to Waterloo Bridge to cut off his retreat, 
or prevent any assistance being rendered him by Jackson. 
Reno and Banks were to closely follow him, while Mc- 
Dowell and Reynolds were ordered to Waterloo. 

Sigel had the hardest part of the work to perform, as his 
route was parallel with the river, and he was compelled to 
cross its tributaries, which were so swollen that it greatly 
retarded his progress. Jackson knew Early's perilous posi- 
tion, and hastily constructed a trestle bridge, by which 
communication was reestablished between the forces during 
the night, and at daybreak Earh- recrossed the river. 

Buford arrived there a few hours later, only to meet 
with a sad disappointment. But there was a superabund- 
ance of that on hand during that campaign. It was just 
then learned that Stuart was at Catletts Station, and had 



SECOND BULL RUN. 125 

captured General Pope's papers, which contained informa- 
tion valuable to the enemy. It sent a shudder through our 
forces, for there seemed to be lurking in every move some 
disaster to our armies. The Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
road had to furnish our supplies, and Stuart, as a matter of 
course, would tear up the track, and destroy the telegraph, 
leaving us completely cut off from Washington. It was a 
gloomy state of affairs, yet the soldiers kept in good spirits, 
hoping for the best. 

We were yet holding on to the line of the Rappahannock 
with powerful tenacity, anxiously looking for the promised 
re enforcements Halleck said would arrive within forty- 
eight hours. 

The Rappahannock was still ver}' high, and the artillery 
of both armies kept up a constant fire without producing 
any material results. 

On the 24th, Pope's command was as follows: Sigel at 
Waterloo Bridge, with Banks on his left ; Reno at Sulphur 
Springs, Ricketts was east of Waterloo Bridge, and King 
was near Sulphur Springs. Porter's corps was marching 
up the river from Fredericksburg, while Heintzelman, who 
landed on the 22d at Alexandria, sent forward Kearny's 
division to Manassas by rail. The next day the remainder 
of his corps, and a division under General Sturgis, followed 
Kearny. 

The Stuart raid, in Pope's rear, caused great consterna- 
tion ; the trains were cautiously run, fearing at any time to 
suffer from Stuart's removing a rail to wreck and capture 
them. 

Jackson was aware of the great alarm that Stuart had 
caused, and knew his cavalry would be defeated if met by 
the Federal forces ; he therefore hurried forward to assist 
in the great destruction in Pope's rear, following the 
Hedgeman River (the Rappahannock assumes that name 
above Waterloo) until he reached Hinson's Ford, where he 
crossed and passed through Orleans. 

The rano-e of the Bull Run Mountains lay between him 



126 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and the Federal forces, though he was much farther in the 
direction of Washington, and twenty miles from Thorough- 
fare Gap, which was the nearest place he could cross the 
mountain. It is a great wonder that Halleck did not send 
a division forward from Washington to block that gap, 
knowing how passionately fond Jackson was of such mili- 
tary moves. McClellan's troops were already arriving, and 
his work must be done at once. Jackson took his infantry 
across fields, through woods, and bypaths, pushing forward 
as rapidly to the front as possible, his soldiers eating their 
scanty rations while marching. 

The artillery and the wagons were left to come up as 
best they could, there being no enemy in or near the gap, 
it made no difference where the artillery was. 

Passing through the gap unmolested he took the shortest 
route to reach the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which 
was the feeder of Pope' s army. What damage Stuart hastily 
did it he feared would soon be repaired and of little conse- 
quence. 

Pope was not aware that Jackson, with his entire corps, 
was directly between him and Washington. The water of 
the Rappahannock was falling, and Pope feared an attack 
from Longstreet, who could then cross the river. 

On the evening of the 24th he decided to form a line of 
battle along the railroad, with Aquia Creek at his back, in 
order that reenforcements could reach him either from Alex- 
andria or Fredericksburg. The order was not delivered to 
Sigel correctly, and he remained at Waterloo all day of the 
25th. In the evening he learned that all the rest of Pope's 
army had moved, and that he was occupying an isolated 
position, so he made a night march, and joined McDowell 
at Warrenton. 

Pope now fully aware that Jackson was in his rear, de- 
stroving his line of communication with Washington and 
attempting to prevent troops from joining him from the 
Capital, decided to march on him at once, before Longstreet 
could form a junction, which was now evident that he 



SECOND BULL RUN. 127 

would attempt, by taking the same route through Thorough- 
fare Gap. The order was given for the different commands 
to fall back in the direction of Washington. 

The pike running through Thoroughfare Gap and cross- 
ing the railroad at Gainesville, which connects with a road 
leading to Warrenton, made it the strategic point on the 
Second Bull Run battlefield. If Pope had captured and 
held that point it would have prevented Longstreet from 
joining Jackson, who was posted along and behind the 
old railroad bed which has never been finished to this 

day. 

There was a heavy fall in front of a part of his line ; while 
immediately on the right of the fall was a deep cut, making 
a splendid position for defense, and which could not be as- 
sailed without great loss. 

The left wing, as it moved north, was commanded by 
McDowell. Two corps, comprising Sigel's command and 
his own, composed of three splendid divisions— Ricketts', 
King's, and Reynolds' (the Pennsylvania Reserves)— had 
rejoined the corps under the command of General Rey- 
nolds. 

Kearny and Reno went to Greenwich. Pope came with 
the right wing, along the railroad, with Hooker's division 
of Heintzelman's corps, while Porter was to remain at 
Warrenton Junction, and was to move forward as soon as 
Banks came up to relieve him. 

Near Bristoe Station, Hooker's division came up with 
Ewell's division of Jackson's corps. The rear guard of 
Ewell and the advance of Hooker's forces at once began fir- 
ing ; Hooker heard it, and rapidly rode to where he supposed 
General Pope was. He soon found Pope with other general 
officers, and asked him about the firing. Pope said he did 
not know what forces were engaged. Hooker then said he 
would ride forward and ascertain. When he came up with 
his command he at once observed a force of the enemy in 
his front. 

Ewell had resolved to make a stubborn resistance to 



128 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Hooker's advance, and soon the battle raged all along 
Hooker's front with terrific fury. 

Pope came forward and witnessed the battle, saying 
afterwards that it was a grand thing to see General Hooker 
ride the line on his white horse at almost full speed. It 
was the first time he had ever met Hooker, and he 
was greatly impressed with his commanding manner in 
battle. 

Ewell was compelled to retire in the direction of Ma- 
nassas, where Jackson was resting with the remainder of 
his corps. That fight took place on the evening of the 
27th, and it seems that it had the effect to mislead Pope, 
he supposing that Jackson would remain at or near 
Manassas Junction to give him battle, which would give 
McDowell a chance to encircle him by the way of Gaines- 
ville, 

Reno and Kearny moved forward from Greenwich, and 
Porter and Banks followed Hooker. On the 27th McDowell 
moved north through Warrenton, and encamped about ten 
o'clock that night at New Baltimore. Ricketts' division 
had been sent to Thoroughfare Gap, to impede the advance 
of Longstreet, while McDowell hurried forward to Gaines- 
ville, to occupy the key of the field, where the conflict was 
soon to take place. 

King's division started early on the morning of the 2Sth, 
and marched steadily all day, until about four o'clock, when 
it halted to rest and to make coffee. There is no doubt but 
that while resting there, a Confederate spy dressed as a Fed- 
eral cavalryman came to the 19th Indiana, and casually 
made an observation of the strength of the command, then 
retired as if going to the front, then posted off to the enemy 
and reported. Only Gibbons' brigade was in sight ; the 
others were shielded from him by woods. He had to make 
an excuse for coming to us, so he said Jackson was posted 
just beyond, and that we would soon encounter him. A 
prominent staff officer of tlie division has since informed 
me that we had no cavalrv where he came from then. It 



SECOND BULL RUN. 129 

was evidently Jackson's intention to fight our commands in 
detail. 

The march was soon resumed in the following order : 
Hatch led, followed by Gibbon, Doubleday, and Patrick. 
Hatch drew out first upon the road about half an hour in 
advance of the other brigades. General Gibbon, with his 
brigade, had just straightened out on the pike, when the 
head of Doubleday' s column reached the road, and found 
General Patrick watching a group of horsemen upon a 
slight elevation, a few hundred yards to the northwest. 

After a brief consultation it was decided that they were 
Confederate officers, taking observations of our position and 
numbers. They almost instantly opened fire from a bat- 
tery. 

General Gibbon halted his column, faced toward the 
enemy, and placed his brigade behind the fence, along the 
pike in the woods. General Doubleday hastened forward, 
his brigade marching along the pike, until he reached 
General Gibbon, who informed him that General King, 
the division commander, not being present, and General 
Hatch, the ranking brigade commander, a half an hour's 
march in advance, that he was the senior oflScer present, 
and asked what should be done. Doubleday's reply was : 
"What are the troops opposed to us?" Gibbon said he 
thought there was a force of cavalry, with a light batter}\ 
Lieutenant Brooks, of the 6th Wisconsin, who was then 
serving on Pope's staff", had just arrived with an ordei. He 
and Gibbon had been in consultation before Doubleday rode 
up, and they were of the impression, as stated above, that 
the forces were only cavalry and a light battery. The 
pickets fired on Brooks as he came up the pike to deliver 
the order. 

Doubleday then said to Gibbon : "I think we ought to 
charge them, but we have officers superior to us on the 
field and it is for General King or General McDowell to 
say what shall be done." "Very well," said Gibbon, 
"give the order, and I will put my brigade in." 

IX 



130 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

General Doubleday accordingly gave the order to 
'charge. Gibbon replied, "By heavens, I will do it," and 
ordered the 2d Wisconsin in under Colonel O' Conner. I 
did not know, and Gibbon I think did not know, that Mc- 
Dowell had left the field, and the Iron Brigade, already in 
line of battle, moved forward like veterans, led by General 
Gibbon in person. They were immediately engaged with 
an overwhelming force of the enemy — infantry and artillery. 
Doubleday's brigade, consisting of three regiments, were 
ordered by him (Doubleday) to assist Gibbon — the 56th 
Pennsylvania and 76th New York forming a part of Gib- 
bon's line, while the 95th New York supported Battery B, 
4th Regular Artiller3^ Gibbon sent for Battery B, and posted 
it on the right of the line, keeping the 95tli New York in 
reserve. 

This was one of the most stubborn and sanguinary con- 
flicts of the war, considering the short time the battle lasted. 

As the above expression seems pretty strong, I support 
it by the testimony of a disinterested witness, who has 
written a work on the late war. 

On p. 285, 2d vol., Comte de Paris says: "An artillery 
battle had just commenced between King and Jackson, 
when the latter was informed by Stuart that his right flank 
was not menaced by the enemy at the Gainesville road. 

Finding himself then free in his movements, he ordered 
Ewell to bring his and Taliaferro's divisions to the attack, 
and to fall upon the flank of the Federals, who were seen 
marching in column from the other side of the road, 

Stuart's brigade of Taliaferro's division, supported by 
the fire of three batteries, advanced first as skirmishers ; but 
the Federal guns soon silenced those of the Confederates. 
The other divisions, siipported on the left by two of Ewell' s 
brigades, came up to restore the fortunes of the fight. Gal- 
lantly led by their chiefs, the six brigades rushed furiously 
upon the two Federal brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday, 
posted in a large orchard. Both sides defended their posi- 
tions with r^reat stubbornness ; the two Confederate division 



SECOND BULL RUN. 131 

commanders were severely wounded. Ewell lost a leg, 
while charging at the head of his soldiers. The latter, 
however, despite their efforts and numerical superiority, 
could not succeed in dislodging their adversaries. Night 
alone put an end to the battle. ' ' 

Accepting this statement of a foreigner, who had no 
jealousies to warp his judgment, it is not only compliment- 
ary to Generals Doubleday, and Gibbon, but it gives great 
credit to their military skill. If every battle had been 
fought as well, the war would not have lasted so long. They 
were both artillery officers when the war broke out. Double- 
day directed the first gun fired by our batteries at Sumter, 
in response to the Confederate guns from Charleston ; while 
Gibbon was captain of Battery B, 4th Artillery. When he 
was promoted to brigadier general, his old battery remained 
with him, and this is the one the Comte de Paris says, 
silenced three batteries of the enemy. 

Mr. John Johnson, who was a member of the battery, 
and present in that action, says : "Our cannoneers soon got 
the range of the enemy's batteries, and poured in an enfilad- 
ing fire on them until they were silenced. ' ' 

While Gibbon was captain of the battery, he filled it 
with recruits from the brigade, which was composed of the 
2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th Indiana. 

The officers and men vied with each other in pressing 
forward when the order was given to charge. Many sug- 
gestions were made in the ranks, which from an officer 
would have been a command. The igtli Indiana was on 
the extreme left, and suffered terribly from Taliaferro's flank 
movement. It was a terrible contest. The lines of battle 
were close enough to do effective work. The regiment 
held its position until Major May gave Capt. W. W. Dud- 
ley, of Company B, an order to take his own and Company 
G, and charge a battery, which had taken position in ad- 
vance of their extreme right and a little to the front, so 
that their fire enfiladed the center and right of the 19th In- 
diana and the left of the 7th Wisconsin. 



132 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

When Dudley charged the battery their infantry ad- 
vanced, and attempted to fill the gap. The regiment 
greatly felt the loss of those two companies, and swung 
back a little. In the mean time General Gibbon came over 
to the left, and assisted Dudley until he got back in line ; 
for he had to force the enemy's infantry back to assume his 
place in line with the regiment. 

General Gibbon tied his sorrel horse to a peach tree 
limb, examined the ground to our left, and waited for some 
support to come in on his left from General Patrick, whose 
brigade lay back - beyond the pike, less than half a mile 
from the battle. 

Gibbon's horse became so frightened that he broke loose 
and ran away, leaving the general in a dangerous and ex- 
posed position. Col. Solomon Meredith met with a serious 
accident in the fight. His horse, ' ' Old Roan, ' ' was shot in 
the neck, and fell on the colonel's leg, but the horn of the 
saddle saved it. He was taken off of the field by Lieut. 
Col. A. O. Bachman, and Captain Dudley.* 

Capt. ly. B. Wilson, of Company B, had no sword, but 
he led his company into action — standing there with his 
arms folded, he looked every inch a soldier. Sergt. Wil- 
liam E. Murray was wounded in the ankle, which disabled 
him from active serv^ice. 

Lieutenants Cook and Newman, of Company C, were 
both wounded, and the company was taken off the field by 
Corporal Nelson Pegg. 

The 2d Wisconsin sustained heavy losses — 74 were killed 
in the action, as against 43 at Gettysburg, Colonel O' Con- 
ner, commanding the regiment, a graduate of West Point, 
being auiong the number. That afternoon, when he dis- 
mounted to go into battle, I thought I never saw a hand- 

■* General Patrick informed me at the Dayton Home, after the 
war, that he declined to put liis brigade in there on Gibbon's left, 
for the reason that he disapproved of Gibbon's making the attack 
withont more consideration and knowledge of the strength of the 
enemy. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 133 

somer man. It was not long before he was mortally 
wounded, and the command devolved on Lieutenant Colonel 
Fairchild, whose reputation as a soldier and an officer is 
well known all over the country. 

The 6th Wisconsin had hot work. It had not been en- 
gaged long when Colonel Cutler was severely wounded, and 
Lieut. Col. E. S. Bragg took command. The regiment was 
getting a heavy fire from the front and oblique. 

Bragg in his report says : "I cannot speak too highly of 
the conduct of both officers and men during and subsequent 
to the engagement. It was hardly possible to be placed 
under a hotter fire, but there was no confusion, no faltering. 
The regiment fought as brave men only can fight. The 
wounded went to the rear without a murmur, or died where 
they fell without a groan. The list of casualties is as fol- 
lows : Colonel Cutler severely wounded ; Lieut. J. B. John- 
son, Company E, wounded and a prisoner ; Capt. J. F. 
Marsh, slightly wounded. Enlisted men wounded, 6i ; 
killed, 8 ; missing, 3 ; total, 72. Total engaged, 504. 

"In conclusion, I cannot refrain from referring especi- 
ally to Corporal John H. Burns, and Private Harr}G. Drum, 
of Company E, and Sergeant William Campbell, Company 
K, who left the ambulance upon tht sound of the first fire, 
procured muskets and ammunition, and joined the regiment 
and fought to the last." 

The 7th Wisconsin, under Col. W. W. Robinson, did 
heroic work that afternoon. The valor of the regiment was 
that day put to the test, and stood it well. 

Lieut. Col. Charles Hamilton, who went into the fight 
mounted, was wounded through the thighs early in the ac- 
tion, but maintained his seat in the saddle with his boots 
full of blood, and limbs about paralyzed, and had at the 
close of the engagement to be lifted from his horse, and 
carried to the hospital in a swooning condition. 

The 56th Pennsylvania did valuable service in that en- 
gagement. There then occurred a curious incident : the 
left wing of the brigade had been forced back quite a dis- 



134 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

tance, and the Confederate right advanced to within a few 
feet of our first line, where the writer lay wounded. One 
of our regiments was coming on the field, when the Con- 
federates said : ' ' The 56th Pennsylvania ! ' ' and ran back to 
the position they had previously held. It is said the enemy 
knew the regiment by Hofmann's voice, which was one of 
the best in the service. 

There were four captains wounded (Captain Corman 
died), two lieutenants, and 55 enlisted men. 

The 76th New York, under Colonel Wainwright, ac- 
quitted itself well. Colonel Wainwright threw Captain 
Grover forward with eight men — Whitney, Knapp, Fox, 
John W. Seever, Ripley, Moore, Marvin Maynard, and 
Norman Maynard, as skirmishers. 

They advanced a short distance to a fence, close enough 
to hear the commands given by the enemy, which they 
communicated to General Doubleday, and the information 
greatly assisted him in arranging the lines. 

This small skirmish line also did another gallant deed ; 
they commenced and kept up a brisk fire on the enemy's 
line of battle, loading on the ground, and then rising and 
firing, which was so annoying to the enemy that it drew 
the fire from the 76th New York. 

Judge A. P. Smith, who was quartermaster of the regi- 
ment, in his history of the regiment, says, "Captain Grover 
and two of the skirmish line were severely wounded." 
Noble band of heroes ; I wonder where they are now. 
(Grover was made lieutenant colonel, and was killed at 
Gettysburg, his next battle.) 

During a lull in the action, a body of men were seen mov- 
ing on the extreme left flank. As they came forward they 
shouted, " Don't shoot our own men." It was at first un- 
certain who they were, but it was soon perceived that they 
were trying one of tlieir tricks at the first battle of Bull 
Run. 

The colonel gave the command, " By the left oblique ! 
Aim ! Fire ! " It was at short range, and it seemed as if 



SECOND BULL RUN. 135 

every bullet did its work, for the ground was literally 
covered with the wounded and dying. At some places the 
distance between the two lines was scarcely the width of 
a street. The line of the enemy was melting away on the 
left front of the 76th New York. 

Colonel Wainwright wanted to find the rest of the bri- 
gade. He decided to let them remain where they were, 
and send some one to find General Doubleday. If he 
moved his regiment he might march right into the enemy's 
line, and all be captured, as it was then dark. 

Corporal (afterwards) Captain Bartholomew, of Company 
C, and Private Redman, of Company I., promptly and 
coolly stepped forward and tendered their services. 

Judge Smith says : " Bartholomew was afterwards killed 
in the Wilderness, on the 5th of IMay, 1864. Private Red- 
man was an old soldier, having served twelve }-ears in 
the English army, and was present at the attack upon 
Sebastopol, during the Crimean war.-' His wife went 
along with the regiment, and was a great favorite. He 
further says: "Though Ann did not shoulder a musket, 
she should be set down as much more useful to the army 
than many who did. ' ' 

In the mean time Captain Halstead withdrew the regi- 
ment from the field by the direction of General Doubleday. 

There were several cases of heroism so deserving that 
they are here recorded, although the chapter is lengthening 
out wonderfully, and the whole is not told by any means. 

William H. Miller, 76tli New York, was wounded in 
the foot, so badly that he could not stand ; he lay upon the 
ground and loaded his gun, then raised up and fired. John 
L. Wood, of Company C, who was not quite eighteen, had 
his thumb shot off, but continued in the fight until he was 
mortally wounded. 

Daniel McGregor, of Company C, received a wound in 
his thigh, from the effects of which he died. He continued 
to load and fire, resting upon the other knee, until, from 
loss of blood, he was unable to load or hold his gun. 



136 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Sergeant Laurence M. Baker, of Company F, fell mor- 
tally wounded. On hearing of it his brother Isaac went to 
him. He had scarcely got there when the bugle sounded, 
indicating that a new movement was to be made. ' ' Leave 
me and rush to the front ! ' ' shouted the d}'ing sergeant ; 
and in a short time he was numbered with the dead. 

The roll of honor of the 76tli New York is quite lengthy, 
and I will content myself with giving some of their names : 
Thomas H. Hoffman, Albert Olin, James J. Card, Captain 
Fox, Captain Sager, and Captain Swan, are among the 
noted ones ; though there was scarcely a member of the 
regiment who was not a true soldier, deserving of honor- 
able mention. The firing ceased, after dark, almost simul- 
taneously, and both armies occupied the ground upon which 
they fought until half-past ten o'clock. General Hatch, 
hearing the firing-, returned to ascertain the cause, and like 
a true soldier went to the sound of battle. He reached the 
field about the time the action was over, having counter- 
marched his brigade. 

Gen. John F. Reynolds, who commanded the Pennsyl- 
vania Reserves, heard the firing and came to us, attended 
only by an orderly. He said he would return and bring 
Tip his division. General King in the mean time had as- 
sumed command and called a council of war on the side of 
the pike in the. evening perhaps between nine and ten 
o'clock, at which the four brigade commanders were con- 
sulted as to what should be done. 

General Gibbon being the junior brigadier, was first 
asked his opinion. He decided that General King should 
withdraw from the field towards Manassas Junction. 

General Patrick was then asked for his opinion, who 
inquired what General King's orders were. On being 
informed that they were to move to Centervnlle, by the 
way of the pike, said "Then I should go to Centerville, 
sir." 

General Doubleday expressed himself decidedly of Gen- 
eral Patrick's opinion. General Hatch said in 1892, "that 




HON. A. R. BUSHNELL, M. C. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 137 

he did not understand it was a regular council of war, but 
that they got together and gave their opinions. He says 
he advised King to go to Centerville by the way of Ma- 
nassas for the reason that he would avoid a heavy force of 
the enemy and obtain rations at Manassas." McDowell 
was in command of Pope's left wing ; he did not delegate 
his powers to King or any other officer when he rode ahead 
to consult Pope, so King had no authority to act except as 
he did. McDowell did not return to his command until 
ten o'clock the next day, then Longstreet was arriving on 
the field and McDowell's opportunity forever gone. 

If McDowell, who had ridden on ahead, had returned 
like Hatch when he heard the battle commence, he could 
have held his ground, and not only ha\'e fought Jackson, 
but have won a victory over him. Only six of his regi- 
ments had been engaged against six brigades of the enemy, 
and the Comte de Paris says, "They held their ground 
until darkness put an end to the conflict. ' ' 

It is true those two brigades, with the exception of the 
95th New York, were badly cut up. But there were 
Patrick's magnificent brigade and Hatch's ; neither had 
been engaged, and they w^ere in splendid condition. The 
Pennsylvania Reserves were close at hand. 

Sigel's Corps opened the fight next morning at half 
past six, with Reno and Heintzelman at Greenwich to be 
hastened forward, as they never lagged when there w^as a 
chance to engage the enemy. IMcDowell was in good con- 
dition to go at his work next morning. Here is McDowell's 
view of it. At a conference at the Riggs House, after the 
war, \vhen Major Halstead told him of the council of w^ar, 
the night of the 28th, and what transpired at it, he turned 
to Halstead with a look of surprise and indignation, and 
said ' ' Major, this is the first I ever knew that King called 
a council of war, and I never knew before v/hy the divi- 
sion went to Manassas Junction. I always felt very hard 
at my brigadiers, who were all West Point graduates for 
leavine the field unless thev came to Centerville according 



138 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

to orders. I feel aggrieved that Gibbon should have disap- 
pointed me so, after I promoted him from captain of a battery 
and made him a brigadier, and otherwise greatly supported 
him, which " McDowell said "was a permanent benefit to 
Gibbon." I listened closely when this conversation took 
place, and took note of it at the time, so as to give Mc- 
Dowell the benefit of his statement. 

No officer or veteran will be written up or down in this 
work ; it shall be as correct, after years of study, as I can 
make it. This was but a short time before McDowell died, 
and he seemed to be greatly hurt over Major Halstead's 
statement. From that conversation he gave us to fully 
understand that he did not presume the division would 
leave its position after the battle that evening. He said : 
"Two brigades had held their ground against two of Jack- 
son's divisions and, at the close of a severe action were in 
good spirits. We were feeling for Jackson, and when his 
real position was developed that evening, the division 
should have remained there and renewed the battle early 
next morning." 

While McDowell felt thus toward his generals, for leav- 
ing the field after the battle on the 2Sth, which resulted, as he 
said, in King's division abandoning the position, which was 
the key of the whole field, yet he was just ahead of Hatch 
when the firing began, and said to me that he distinctly 
heard it, yet he kept on, although he was in command of 
the left wing, two-thirds of Pope's army. It certainly was 
his bounden duty to return and assume command. 

The enemy had thrown two out of three divisions on 
Doubleday and Gibbon, and were badly handled. Hill's 
division alone had not been engaged. 

If McDowell* had returned, on the evening of the 
28th, and assumed connnand of his troops, and directed 

*In answer to my question, if lie heard the battle of Gainesville, 
he said he did. I asked him where he was ? "Not far from the 
Stone Brid.^-e." In an.swer to my qnestion whj^ he did not return 
and assume command, he s.iid lij wanted to see Pope. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 139 

Ricketts to fall back slowly in front of Longstreet, contest- 
ing every inch of gronnd, and hnrled Hatch, Patrick, 
Reynolds, and Sigel at Jackson, he would have flanked 
him and driven him out of his hiding place behind the old 
railroad embankment and sent him flying to the mountains. 

If he had thrown himself on Jackson and defeated him 
before Longstreet arrived it would have retrieved his 
fortunes shattered in the first Bull Run. 

We will now turn to Ricketts, at Thoroughfare Gap, 
who, upon nearing the Gap, learned that Longstreet's ad- 
vance was already occupying it. Ricketts hoped by a 
desperate move to force them back, and he threw forward the 
Third Brigade, supported by the First, Second, and Fourth. 

Colonel Stiles, of the 8oth New York, commanded the 
advancing brigade. Ricketts had excellent artillery with 
him, but the road was full of timber, and it was difficult to 
get a position for the artillery to play upon the gap. 

General Ricketts learned that heavy columns of troops 
were crossing the mountains north and south of him and 
would soon gain his rear, so he retired in the direction of 
Gainesville, but having learned that King had forsaken that 
point, he took a road leading to Bristoe to avoid being 
crushed between Jackson and Longstreet. 

In 1883, when we were looking over these fields. Long- 
street said to me "that the time for the Federals to win the 
battle was to attack and defeat Jackson before he arrived." 
If King's division had held its ground and assisted Sigel, on 
the morning of the 29th, the victory would have been ours. 

When Longstreet arrived he formed his left near the 
pike, with his right resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad, 
which formed an obtuse angle. If he had simply formed 
on Jackson's right, extending his line, it would not have 
been difficult for Pope to advance and attack. The angle 
put our troops in a dilemma ; if they advanced against 
Jackson, Longstreet's artillery had a converging fire over 
the ground upon which our attack had to be made. 

On the morning of the 29th, Sigel made an attack on 



140 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Jackson's right ; the fighting was stubborn on both sides, 
Milroy and Schenck having brought their commands in. 
The fioht had ah-eadv lasted for a considerable length of 
time, and Schurz's division was pressed hard ; although 
the Confederates were forced back, Schenck attempted to 
assist Schurz, but receiving a vigorous attack, was unable 
to do so. Kearny came up and formed on the right of 
Sigel, while Hooker arrived soon after and put his division 
in front of A. P. Hill's division, which rested on the Sud- 
ley Springs. Reynolds came up with his Pennsylvania 
Reserves and formed the extreme left. There was no one 
on the field to order a general assault, and Jackson con- 
tented himself with keeping them at bay, by a heavy can- 
nonade, assisted by infantry, until Longstreet could get 
into position, and rake the Union line with his artillery. 

Pope, in the mean time, had arrived and ordered Hooker 
to charge ; which he objected to, but Grover's brigade 
made a charge, and penetrated between the brigades of 
Gregg and Thomas. The rest of Hooker's division came 
to their assistance ; but General Early advanced and re- 
pulsed them. Kearny took the place of Hooker ; he 
charged the Confederate right, and rolled it up on the 
center, but that move was not supported, and all the 
ground gained was afterwards lost. 

King had not been well for a number of days, and Gen- 
eral Hatch had taken command of his division. Just after 
Kearny had been forced back, Hatch arrived upon the 
field. Major Halstead was sent to McDowell to inform 
him that the division was ready for action. His reply was : 
" The enemy is retreating, pursue them at double quick, 
and gobble all the prisoners you can. Go tell your gen- 
eral that, and go at double quick." 

Hatch charged with three brigades, Doubleday's, 
Patrick's, and his own. The firing was so heavy from 
the left that General Hatch directed Major Cranford to 
order his old brigade, tlien commanded by Colonel Sulli- 
van, to face obliquely to the left, and meet the heavy fire 




GEN. RUFUS KING. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 141 

coming from that direction. An attempt was made by the 
enemy to steal upon Colonel Fowler, in the uniforms of 
the 14th Brooklyn, which they had captured at Manassas 
a few days before. But that was foiled by Fowler, who 
commanded that regiment, and knew that it must be a de- 
ception. They shouted: "For God's sake don't fire on 
your friends." But few of the alleged 14th Brooklyn 
were taken prisoners there. 

The Comte de Paris says: "They returned to the 
charge several times, but in vain ; they could not make 
these fresh troops falter." 

The Confederates knew that this was the division they 
met the day before, and they advanced to meet it with 
several lines of battle. The 2d Regiment of Berdan Sharp- 
shooters went forward as skirmishers. The enemy did not 
respond to their fire, though it was galling and severe. 

After a desperate fight, the attack was repulsed with 
considerable loss. When Kilpatrick saw the division 
of which his regiment constituted a part until a few days 
before, suffering so, he begged of General Bayard to be 
allowed to charge with his regiment, the Harris Light 
Cavalry. This being accorded, he charged with a squadron, 
supported by the regiment. They cut their way through 
the enemy's lines, and attempted to rejoin our forces by 
going around the left flank of the enemy, but were captured. 
Every man of that squadron was either killed or wounded. 
Over fifty of them were buried there the next day. 

Hatch's adjutant general, Capt. J. A. Judson, and Cap- 
tain Garrish of the ist New Hampshire Light Battery, 
artillery, were captured. They were splendid officers, 
and the service suffered by their capture. Garrish lost 
one gun. Maj. H. L. Cranford, of the 14th Brooklyn, 
took the place of Captain Judson as adjutant general on 
Hatch's staff". 

Our troops were repulsed, which ended the contest for 
that day, with Jackson holding the position behind the 
old railroad bed and Longstreet well posted on his right 



142 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ready for work in the morning. The position of the Con- 
federate line was as follows : A. P. Hill commanded the left 
division of Jackson's forces, while the center was com- 
manded by Lawton, as Ewell had been wounded in the 
leg, which was amputated upon the field.* Starke com- 
manded the right division in place of Taliaferro, who 
also had been wounded the day before. 

The Federal line was as follows : Kearny and Hooker 
upon the extreme right, then Reno reaching toward vSi- 
gel ; Hatch's division, of McDowell's corps, was upon 
Reynolds' right, and in advance of Sigel. Ricketts had 
gone to Kearny on the right. Porter had been brought 
up and passed in front of the Federal line, halting on 
the left of Hatch, to be ready to charge. In the mean 
time the Federal left had opened, about one o'clock, a 
sharp musketry fire. It must be remembered that all 
the Federal forces were massed in front of Jackson ; not 
a single command yet faced Longstreet. 

The charge was made by Porter's corps in the center. 
They were supported by Hatch on the right. As 
Porter's troops moved forward over the field in front of 
the railroad bed where Jackson's men were concealed 
and waiting, Longstreet ordered his artillery to open 
on them with an enfilading fire. This was a severe 
ordeal — in fact it was too much ; the skeletons of the 
regiments were hurled back on Sigel. Hatch and Sigel 
held their own remarkably well. 

Ricketts' division was hurried from the right to their 
assistance. Grand old man ; his troops were kept fl)-ing 
from one point of the field to the other, wherever 
the storm of battle raged with the greatest fury ; soon 
you find them over on the left helping Reynolds, with 
his Pennsylvania Reserves, stay the advancing columns 
of Longstreet, 

The only wonder is that a charge was not made 

*The author saw it taken oif. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 143 

on the extreme right by Kearny, and then rolled along 
toward the left. In sncli case victory might yet have 
crowned the work of the Federals. IMcDowell, seeinof 
heavy columns of Longstreet's troops advancing to envel- 
ope and turn our left, had ordered Reynolds to checkmate 
it. Two great generals faced each other when Reynolds 
and lyongstreet met. 

Porter's charge has passed into history as being the 
charge of that battle, as Pickett's was at Gettysburg. 

Not wishing to pluck one single honor from the brave 
boys of the Fifth Corps, I still think that there never was 
a grander charge made on any field of battle than the 
PennsN'lvania Reserves made to save the Warrenton Pike. 

Colonel Talley, ist Pennsylvania Reserves, says, in 
speaking of the battle : 

Immediately after the defeat of our troops, and while in rapid 
retreat, Gen. John F. Reynolds saved the Union Army from an 
overwhelming disaster, if not from utter niin. When our forces 
were in rapid retreat, and the enemy in hot pursuit, General Rey- 
nolds discovered that the latter's aim was to seize the Warrenton 
pike in rear of our broken masses. He at once threw his division 
of Pennsylvania Reserves in the breach and saved the army. He 
galloped to the artillery on the crest, sighted each gun, gave orders to 
the ofiicers and cannoneers, mounted, dashed along his line, and 
called upon his men to charge upon the advancing foe. The brave 
Reserves immediately charged with a cheer and yell across an open 
field, and met the enemy advancing in great numbers. The con- 
test was desperate. Sypher states, and I know it to be true, that 
the " 1st and 2d Regiments of Reserves w^ere engaged in an almost 
hand-to-hand encounter ; the left was pressed and the right gave 
way. At this critical moment the gallant Re3'nolds, observing that 
the flagstaff of the 2d Regiment had been pierced hy a bullet and 
broken, seized the flag from the color-bearer, and dashing to the 
right, rode twice up and down his entire division line waving the 
flag about his head and cheering on his men. The Reserves, in- 
spired by the intrepidit}^ of their leader, rent the air with cheers, 
plied their tremendoiis musket fire with renewed energv and vigor, 
and in a few^ moments the ranks of the Confederate regiments gave 
way before the steady and unrelenting vollej^s poured upon them." 
Night came on and put an end to the contest, but the famous Stone 



144 



THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



Brido-e over Bull Run was, by the genius and heroic darmg of 
General Reynolds, and the valor of his brave men, preserved for the 
use of the national army. The enemy, thus beaten back retired 
beyond the range of our guns, appalled at the havoc they wit- 
nessed in their ranks, and confounded by their failure to reach the 
turnpike The sun was now setting and the battle had ended. 
John F Reynolds was my beau ideal of an officer and a soldier. No 
braver man lived, and he was as able and patriotic as brave. 

The fighting became so desperate that the Pennsylva- 
nia Resen^-es were being mowed down like grass. The 
ist and 2d Regiments were engaged in an almost hand-to- 
hand conflict. The left was being turned, and the troops 
on the rio-ht of the Reserves were being forced back. Just 
then Reynolds saw that the colors of the 2d had been shot 
from the staff as his lines were melting away, and weaken- 
ino- in the face of the furious attack of Longstreet's troops. 
He seized the colors, and waving them, as he rode the hue 
of his division, urged his men to save the pike. As he 
rode up and down the line, with the colors m his hand, 
the bo)-s cheered him, and rushed at the enemy with 
renewed determination to hold their ground ; then oc- 
curred one of the most sanguinary struggles of the war. 
The enemy fired volley after volley at Reynolds as he car- 
ried the colors along the line, but Providence saved him to 
perform deeds of valor until he reached his native State, 
where, early in the action at Gettysburg, he received his 

death wound. 

So thorouo-hly am T convinced of the great valor of the 
work performed by the Reserves there, that Reynolds' re- 
port is here quoted : 

On the morning of the 30th I was directed to take post with my 
division on the left of the pike, near the Henry House, and ordered 
by Major General Pope to form my division in columns by com- 
pany at full distance, with the whole of my artille-y on the left ; 
that I would be the first in that attack which Porter's corps was to 
make on the enemv's right, then supposed to be on the pike and in 
retreat Having formed mv division in the position indicated, and 
opened with my rifled batteries to drive the enemy from the first 



SECOND BULL RUN. 145 

ridge, the skirmishers advanced and the attack by Porter's corps 
commenced. When the skirmishers arrived in the thick woods op- 
posite Groveton, I found the resistance so great that another regi- 
ment was deployed to support them, and finally a second ; in all 
three regiments. 

The advanced skirmishers were the ist Rifles, Colonel McNeill, 
and the ist Infantr}', Colonel Roberts, supported by the 7th Infan- 
try, Lieutenant Colonel Henderson. The 6th Regiment, Colonel 
Sinclair, was thrown through the woods on our left flank. Becom- 
ing convinced that the enemy was not in retreat, but was posted in 
force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to the 
edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground be- 
yond ; and advancing mj'self into the open ground, I found a line 
of skirmishers of the enemy nearh' parallel to the line of skir- 
mishers covering my left flank, with cavalr}^ formed behind them, 
perfectly stationary, evidently making a column of the enemy, 
formed for attack on my left flank when our lines should be sufii- 
ciently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I was 
obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my di- 
vision, losing one of my orderlies who had followed me through the 
woods. I immediately communicated this to the commanding gen- 
eral of the corps, who came upon the ground and directed me to 
form my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which 
were rapidly completed. 

Other troops were to be sent to my support, when the command- 
ing general, observdng the attack of Porter to have been repulsed, 
ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to 
form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immedi- 
ately started my division in the direction indicated ; but before the 
rear of my column left the position the threatened attack of 
the enemy's right began to be felt, and the rear brigade, under 
Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, was obliged 
to form on the ground on which they foi:nd themselves, to op- 
pose it. Passing across the field to the right, with Meade's and 
Seymour's brigades and Rosecrans' battery, my course was di- 
verted by the difiicult nature of the ground, and the retreating 
masses of the broken columns, among troops of Heintzelman's 
corps, already formed, by which much time was lost and confusion 
created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with his right so far 
as almost to cut us off" from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear 
brigade and the three batteries of artillery of my division, and 
scattered troops of other commands to resist the advance of the ene- 
my upon our left. It was here that the most severe loss of the 
division was sustained, both in men and material, Kern losing 



146 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

his four guns, but not until wounded and left on the field. Col- 
onel Hardin, commanding the 12th Regiment, was here severely 
wounded. 

The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson sustained it- 
self most gallantly, and though severely pushed on front and flank 
maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell 
back, taking up new positions wherever the advantage of ground 
permitted. The two brigades and battery of artillery under my im- 
mediate command, finding ourselves perfectly out of place, moved, 
by the direction of an officer of General Pope's staff, to a position 
to the right of the Henry House, which position was most gallantly 
maintained by the commands of Meade and Seymour, and Ransom's 
battery, for nearly two hours, when they were relieved by the divi- 
sion of regular troops under Colonel Buchanan. 

The report of General Hatch has so many valuable 
points in it that it is given in full : 

Camp near Frederick, Md., 
September 13, 1862. 

Captain : — I have the honor to submit the following reports 
of the movements of the First Division, Third Corps, temporarily 
under my command during parts of the 29th and 30th da3^s of 
August : 

Late on the afternoon of the 29th ultimo I was ordered by 
General McDowell, in person, (who was at the time stationed near 
the Stone House, on the turnpike from Gainesville to Centerville) 
to move the division on the Gainesville road in the pursuit of the 
enemy, who, he informed me, were retreating. 

Gibbon's brigade had been detached to support some batteries. 
With the three other brigades of the division, and Garrish's battery 
of howitzers, I proceeded with all the speed possible, hoping by 
harassing the enemy's rear to turn their retreat into a rout. After 
marching about three-quarters of a mile the 2d Regiment of 
U. S. Sharpshooters was deplo3'ed to the front as skirmishers, the 
column continuing up the road in support. The advance almost 
immediately became warml}^ engaged on the left of the road. Two 
howitzers were then placed in position, one on each side of the road, 
and Doubleday's brigade was deploj'ed to the front, on the left of 
the road, and moved up to the support of the skirmishers. We 
were met b}^ a force consisting of three brigades of infantry, one of 
which was posted in the woods on the left, parallel to and about an 
eighth of a mile from the road. The two other brigades were drawn 
up in line of battle, one on each side of the road. These were in turn 



SECOND BULL RUM. 147 

supported by a large portion of the Confederate forces, estimated by 
a prisoner, who was taken to their rear, at about 30,000 men, drawn 
up in successive lines, extending one and a half miles to the rear. 
Doubleday's brigade moved to the front under a very heavy fire, 
which they gallantly sustained ; but the firing continued very 
heavy. Hatch's brigade, commanded by Colonel Sullivan, was also 
deployed, and moved to the support of General Doubleday. Pat- 
rick's brigade, which had been held in reserve, took up a position 
on the opposite side of the road, completely commanding it. The 
struggle, lasting some three-quarters of an hour, was a desperate 
one, being in tnany instances a hand-to-hand conflict. 

Night had now come on, our loss had been severe, and the enemy 
occupying a position in the woods on our left, which gave them a 
flank fire upon us, I was forced to give the order for a retreat. The 
retreat was executed in good order, the attempt of the enemy to fol- 
low being defeated by a few well directed volleys from Patrick's 
brigade. 

On the afternoon of the 30th ultimo I was directed to report with 
the division to General Fitz-John Porter, who, as I was informed, 
held us as a reserve to support the attack on the enemy's center. I 
found General Porter's troops formed in the rear of a piece of woods 
about one-half mile to the right of the front, at which the division 
had been engaged the day previous. On reporting to General 
Porter, and informing him of the order under which I came, he 
directed me to post the division on the right of his own troops, and 
to make the attack simultaneously with himself. 

The division was drawn up in seven lines, compOvSed as follows : 
First and Second, Hatch's brigade ; Third and Fourth, Patrick's 
brigade ; Fifth and Sixth, Gibbon's brigade ; Seventh, Double- 
da\-'s brigade ; the 2d U. S. Sharpshooters being advanced as 
skirmishers in the woods. At the word given by General Porter 
the division advanced, with an interval of fifty yards between the 
lines. The enemy were very strongly posted behind an old disused 
railroad embankment where, according to their own statement, they 
had been awaiting us for two days. This railroad embankment, 
which runs parallel to the edge of the woods where we entered in 
front of our right wing, bears more to the rear on reaching a piece 
of open ground in front of our left wing. 

After passing through the woods and reaching the open space 
the left wing of the first line was obliged to make a partial wheel to 
the right, to enable them to approach the enemy. This movement 
was executed under a heavy fire of artillery on the left and of 
musketry from the woods directly in our front. 

Seeing the great disadvantages under which the first and second 



lis THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

lines labored, the others, as they came up, were ordered to oblique 
more to the right, to enable them to attack the troops behind ihe 
railroad embankment, and also to get a partial flank fire upon that 
portion of the embankment which crosses the open field. The con- 
test for the possession of this embankment was most desperate. 
The troops on both sides fought with the most determined courage, 
and I doubt not that the conflict at this point was one of the most 
bloody of the war. Having myself received a wound which dis- 
abled me, I was forced to leave the field before the struggle 
terminated. * * * * General Doubleday exhibited the greatest 
gallantry in leading on his brigade under a terrible fire on the night 
of the 29th, and with his aid-de-camp, Maj. U. Doubleday, and 
Capt. E. P. Halstead, assistant adjutant general, did much of reck- 
less daring toward keeping this brigade from giving way when hard 
pressed. 

Capt. Robert Chandler, assistant adjutant general, (King's 
staff) and Capt. J. A. Judson, assistant adjutant general (who was 
taken prisoner while carrying an order on the field), were distin- 
guished for their good conduct on the 29th. 

***** **** 

Lieutenants Bennett and Lyon are also noted for their gallantry 
on the field. John P. Hatch. 

Capt. R. Chandler. 

On the morning of the 30th, General Ricketts was 
ordered to send two brigades to the assistance of Kearny 
on the right. Taking the First, under Duryea, composed 
of the 97th, 104th, and 105th New York Regiments, and 
the 107th Pennsylvania, and the Fourth Brigade under 
Colonel Joseph Thoburn, composed of the 84tli Penns)'l- 
vania, iioth Pennsylvania, ist West Virginia, and. 7tli 
Indiana, he immediately marched to Kearny's assistance. 

Colonel Thoburn' s brigade relieved a portion of Kear- 
ny's command, while Duryea advanced on his left, through 
the woods, attacking the enemy along the old railroad ex- 
cavation. His command, as it neared the enemy's posi- 
tion, received a very severe fire from artillery and infantry. 
Duryea received a wound from a piece of shell, but re- 
mained in command. At this critical time in the battle. 
Captain Fisher, of Ricketts' .staff, had his horse shot under 
him, and was taken prisoner. 




GEN. LOUIS WAGNER. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 149 

While the First and Fourth Brigades were thus hotly 
engaged (Kearny never called for assistance except in great 
need), the Second and Third Brigades were advanced on 
the left, under the command of Gen. Z. B, Tower. The 
Second Brigade, which was Tower's, was composed of the 
26th and 94th New York, and the 88th and 9otli Penn- 
sylvania Regiments. The Third Brigade (HartsufF's) 
had the 12th, and 13th Massachusetts, 83d New York, and 
nth Pennsylvania. These two brigades fought with a 
valor and heroism never excelled on the field of battle. 

Quite an incident occurred in the 88th Pennsylvania. 
Two officers, Louis Wagner and R. B. Beath, were both 
wounded. They were devoted friends, and both have been 
Commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic, 
liot only are they held in high esteem by the ex-soldiers, 
but they are eminent and useful citizens. 

Hall's and Leppien's Maine batteries were engaged on 
Tower's left. While Ricketts' division was thus disposed, 
he was ordered to advance on the road leading from Sudley 
Springs to New Market, and follow along the road, " in 
pursuit of the enemy." He gave the order and reported to 
General Heintzelman as directed. Ricketts finding his 
division was being hard pressed by the enemy, reported it 
to McDowell, when the order was revoked. 

Thompson's battery was moved to the right of the line 
to assist in checking the eneni}^, but was outnumbered in 
guns, so it was withdrawn and ordered to the right of 
Stevens' division to assist Matthews' battery. 

Ricketts' division had fought most gallantlv, but the 
tide of battle was setting in against the Union troops, and 
a retrograde movement was gradually being made all along 
the line. 

Longstreet was forcing Reynolds back off" of Bald 
Hill which uncovered McLean's brigade on the right. 
Sigel seeing the perilous position of McLean sent Milroy's 
brigade to his assistance, but the latter, failing to close up 
on McLean, left a gap through which the enemy poured, 



150 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and threw our line into confusion. Sigel again seeing the 
necessity of holding Bald Hill directed Koltes' brigade to 
go to their assistance. He made a gallant charge in which 
he surrendered up his life, but the hill was not retaken. 
General Schenck was wounded while leading a charge. 

As our troops came back, Longstreet attempted to take 
possession of the hill where the Henry House stands, turn 
our left, and get possession of the road to the Stone Bridge, 
but was thwarted by Buchanan's Regulars, assisted by the 
two brigades under General Tower. 

Reynolds here reformed his lines with those commands 
which formed a nucleus for other troops to rally round, 
and checked the great tidal wave of Longstreet's troops. 

Pope had left the field and put Hooker in command, 
who directed General Gibbon to cover the retreat. He 
then (Gibbon) gave the order to retire. When the troops of 
Gibbon's brigade reached near the Stone Bridge, Kearny 
rode up to Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, and 
directed it to hold that position until he gave orders for it 
to be relieved. Companies B and G of the 19th Indiana, 
under the command of Capt. W. W- Dudley, supported 
the battery, and destroyed the bridge after all the troops 
had crossed. It was then well into night, and confusion 
again began to reign as it did a year previous when the 
first Bull Run was fought. 

The commands of Sumner and Franklin lay within a 
few miles of the battlefield on the 30th, and that, too, right 
in rear of Jackson's corps. If these troops had been 
hurled on Jackson he could not have maintained his posi- 
tion a single hour.; and there was ample time for their 
arrival on the field, as the last assault began about half- 
past four in the afternoon and continued until the Union 
Army gave way. If they had attacked as late as five 
o'clock defeat woukl have been changed into victory. 

While the Confederate army was following up the re- 
treating columns of the Union forces, General Lee was 
seated on a log, in company with some officers, when his 



SECOND BULL RUN. 151 

horse got frightened, and so badly hurt or sprained the 
general's arm in his attempt to hold him that he could not 
ride on horseback, and was compelled to go in an ambu- 
lance until he arrived at Sharpsburg just before the battle 
of Antietam. 

That there was rank jealousy against Pope, everyone 
in the army knew. In speaking of that matter to me, 
Pleasonton said that Pope came from the Western army to 
take command at a time when misfortune, more or less, 
had attended our operations ; that already the spirit of 
jealousy was exhibiting itself at home, but to have a foreign 
officer, so to speak, come and to take command, even if he 
had had success in the West, was more than our officers 
could bear. He said he declined service in the West on 
that very account. 

Pleasonton was a clear-headed officer, who seldom ex- 
hibited jealousy against other officers, and never in but one 
instance did I ever hear him so speak during the time that 
he assisted me in this work, and then in no unkind manner. 

There was one element that was always loyal to every 
commander, and that was the rank and file — they wished 
everyone a victory and did all in their power to accom- 
plish that end. A more patriotic and intelligent army I do 
not think was ever organized, and many of them have 
since occupied positions on the bench — two from the 19th 
Indiana — Gibson and Buckles stand high as judges in 
California, while others have been governors of States ; 
W. W. Brown, of the Pennsylvania Reserves, served four 
years in Congress where he made his mark. Their loyalty 
to the Constitution and their country has never flagged. 
Many of them were the descendants of the soldiers of the 
Revolution, and the country with one flag will ever be safe 
in their hands either in peace or war. 

Pope's army lay around Centerville on August 31, 
Sigel on the south, Franklin immediately around the 
village, and Porter at the north. 

On September i Pope, learning that Jackson was men- 



152 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

acing his right and rear, hastily moved his army to Fairfax 
Court House. 

Hooker was again placed in command and took the 
Little River road. In marching in tlie direction of Clian- 
tilly he passed through Germantown, with McDowell and 
Franklin taking position to his left and rear, at the angle 
of the roads. 

Reno formed on Hooker's left, with Heintzelman's 
corps supporting, Kearny's division leading. Ricketts' di- 
vision, of the First Corps, and a part of King's division, 
acted in conjunction with Reno. 

Patrick's brigade was pushed forward in the direction 
of Chantiily, and the 20th New York (Ulster Guard) was 
especially detailed to report to Hooker, who directed 
Colonel Gates to take possession of a piece of woods and 
hold it near where the enemy appeared to be fixing to place 
a battery in position. Colonel Gates deployed the regi- 
ment, and held the position until relieved. 

As Jackson marched in the direction of Fairfax, he 
struck Hooker, and opened his artillery without effect. In 
the mean time he had formed his corps to the right of the 
road, with Starke's division first, then Lawton's, and finally 
A. P. Hill's. The latter opened the battle, with Brocken- 
borough's and Branch's brigades upon the Union left. 
These forces made no impression upon Reno who, in turn, 
drove them back in disorder. Hill at once ordered Thomas, 
Pender, and Gregg, with a part of Lawton's division, to 
their assistance. 

The second attack fell heavily on Stevens' division, 
which gave way when its gallant commander was killed. 

Here a sad occurrence took place. As the battle raged 
with desperate fury, Stevens took the colors of a regiment 
and was in the act of riding to the front with them, when 
he was informed that his son, who was on his staff, had 
been mortally wounded on the left of the line. He turned 
to a chaplain, and asked him to go to his son. He had 
scarcely finished his request when he was killed. 



SECOND BULL RUN. 153 

This movement forced back Reno. Kearny coming up 
with the advanced division of Heintzehnan's corps, ordered 
Birney's brigade into the gap made by Stevens' division. 
Then Kearny rode forward to examine the situation at the 
front, when he soon found himself right up to the enemy's 
lines, who ordered him to halt. Turning his horse sud- 
denly to retrace his steps, a volley from the eneni}- mortalh- 
wounded him. Thus ended the life and military career of 
an officer booked for fame. As an officer of dash, coolness, 
decision, and military spirit Kearny was not excelled, and 
his death was a great loss to the Union cause. 

This battle was fought while a thunderstorm was ras^- 
ing with a madness that seemed livid with its fury. 

The next morning Pope's army moved on unmolested 
to its destination in front of Washington, where the differ- 
ent commands took their old quarters, while tlieir chief. 
General Pope, reported to the War Department, and asked 
to be relieved, which was speedily done, and his army van- 
ished from existence as if it had never been created. So 
ended one of the distinctive events of the war, remembered 
in history for its bright prospects and monumental failure. 



CHAPTER V. 

SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 

^ I ^HE Army of the Potomac had again suffered defeat 
-^ on the same inglorious field of Bull Run, and that 
stream had proven itself bitter waters to the Union forces. 
The defeat of the second Bull Run was more severe than 
the first, for that was fought at the beginning of the war ; 
both armies had been seasoned and disciplined with the 
Peninsular Campaign, and having met after that, were 
more fully prej)ared for war in the second. 

After the first battle our troops were not pursued much 
this side of Centerville, but Chantilly was fought after the 
second, where we lost Kearny and Stevens. 

Lee had pursued the Union Army almost to Washing- 
ton, where it rested inside of the fortifications. 

What should he do? Wherever the two armies had 
met the Confederates had decidedly the advantage, and 
now he was pausing only a few miles from Arlington, his 
old home, which came to him from Colonel Custis. Lee 
married his granddaughter. 

Victorious he could not retire to Richmond without con- 
fessing a weakness or timidity. If he remained where he 
was he might be flanked with a heavy army, and suffer 
defeat, which would neutralize his former work. 

Maryland was a slave State, and there were many bit- 
ter secessionists in it who were loud in their professions of 
that fact. The State was rich in many respects ; no army 
had marched through it to consume its fine products. Her 
pastures were filled with fat cattle and splendid horses. 
154 



1 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 155 

lyce's army was hungry and poorly clad. Lee had 
strong hopes that he would recruit his wasting army with 
the Southern sympathizers, who perhaps had had no favor- 
able opportunity to enlist. 

That he also had an idea of making Pennsylvania pay 
tribute is undoubtedly a fact, for Chambersburg will soon 
testify to that fact. If he still continued successful in bat- 
tle Harrisburg was in easy reach, where the Pennsylvania 
and Northern Central Railroads could have been destroyed 
and the rich coal fields of that part of the Keystone State 
fired, which would have greatly crippled the Union cause. 

On that subject Gen. Bradley T. Johnson says : 

General Lee's purpose, then, in transferring the seat of the 
war to the north of the Potomac was : ist. To relieve Virginia from 
the pressure of the contending armies and delay another invasion 
until the next season. 2d. To inflict as great an injury — material 
and moral — to his enemy as was practicable. 3d. To reenforce the 
Confederacy by the alliance of Maryland, which could have been 
certainly secured by a permanent occupation and by an exhibition 
of superior force. 4th. As a consequence, the occupation of the 
Federal capital, the evacuation of it by the Federal Government, 
the acknowledgment of the Confederate Government as a Govern- 
ment de jure as well as de facto by France and England, and the 
necessary achevement of the independence of the Confederate 
States. During the summer of 1862 the Emperor of the French had 
been openly in sympathy with the cause of the Confederate States, 
and under the name of sometimes mediation, sometimes recogni- 
tion, had always been anxious to intervene in their behalf. He was 
pressing the English Government without ceasing to unite with 
him in acknowledging the existence of the new government, and 
recognition, as all the world knew at that time, meant independ- 
ence. Therefore when Lee crossed the Potomac he was playing 
for a great stake. 

This is what one of Lee's generals said in Richmond in 
October, 1884, before the Virginia division of the Associa- 
tion of the Army of Northern Virginia. 

No doubt General Johnson was one of the men who in- 
sisted on his marching into Maryland, as he had lived 
there before the war. 



156 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Lee piit liis army in motion for Leesbnrg on the 3d 
of September. He knew his purpose would not be under- 
stood until he had ample time to throw his whole f my 
into Maryland, for it might be supposed he was going back 
to the Shenandoah, which would put the mountains between 
the two armies and give him a chance again to rush 
through some gap and pounce on the Union Army while 
marching by the flank, and give it a stunning blow. 
It had never been hinted that he had designs of a North- 
ern invasion, hence his movements were not understood 
in Washington. 

On the 5th of September Jackson crossed the Potomac 
at White's Ford near Leesburg — he was then in " ;«jj/ 
Maryland. ' ' 

Marching toward Frederick, which is in an easterly 
direction from South Mountain, he halted his command 
on the right bank of the Monocacy to prevent a surprise or 
an attack from Washington. But it took some time to 
reorranize the Armv of the Potomac, so there was no dan- 
ger from that source. 

General Pope had requested to be relieved from his com- 
mand and McClellan had again been restored, to the great 
joy of the majority of the officers and men. 

McDowell was relieved of the command of the First 
Corps and it was placed under General Hooker, — an excel- 
lent selection. 

Sumner remained in charge of the Second and also the 
Twelfth under Mansfield, which was the center grand 
division ; Porter had the Fifth and Franklin the Sixth 
Corps, composed of the divisions of Generals W. F. Smith, 
Slocum, and Couch. The Ninth (Burnsides' old corps) 
was given to Reno, and Burnside placed in command of 
the right wing. Gen. H. J. Hunt was assigned to the 
command of the artillery and General Pleasonton the cav- 
alry. 

The troops were now ready to march up the left bank 
of the Potomac to meet the enemy then known to be in 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 157 

Maryland ; though their position was not definitely known, 
it might well have been easily surmised, for General White 
with 4,000 troops had been compelled to retire from Mar- 
tinsburg to Harper's Ferry, when he swelled Miles' com- 
mand to nearly 12,000 with immense stores, greatly needed 
by Lee's half clad and hungry army. 

Although Jackson had crossed below Harper' s Ferry on 
the 5tli of September, L,ee did not expect Halleck would 
attempt to hold that position, for, though a very strong mili- 
tary point, it was then utterly worthless as a key or even 
an ordinary position with the whole of Lee's army weav- 
ing itself around it — it was a great stake to play for indeed. 
It was more than Lee hoped for — rashness beyond degree to 
leave the troops there ; and it was the worst military blind- 
ness for Miles to remain there, for he knew the enemy had 
crossed between him and Washington, and cut the wires, 
and there was no way to communicate with him but by 
courier, and also great danger of important dispatches 
being lost. 

Gen. George J. Stannard, then commanding the 9th 
Vermont, was at Harper's Ferry. Just before his death he 
gave me a full account of it, and made an engagement 
to go up there to see where he formed his line of battle 
with his regiment, and kept the enemy at bay for 24 
hours, all the time begging Miles to follow Davis out, who 
had crossed the Potomac along the Maryland Heights, and, 
evading the right wing of McLaws, continued up the left 
bank of the Potomac until near Sharpsburg, then march- 
ing northward struck and captured Longstreet's train. 

But we must now turn our attention to Lee. He had 
received positive information that Miles was still holding 
Harper's Ferry, and he resolved to capture that prize, for 
he could make prisoners and parole about 12,000 men, 
one-eighth of the Army of the Potomac, and they could 
not fight him again that year, besides which he would 
capture nearly $1,000,000 worth of stores. 

So far, his reception in Maryland had been cold. It 



158 



THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



was not close enough to Baltimore to breathe the secession 
air as it was borne on the breeze up the Chesapeake from 
the South. Nearer the Federal Capital there was a good 
wholesome Union sentiment largely in the ascendency, while 
the neutral men were stolid and gave no expression, leav- 
ino- the secessionists alone to their glory— they, seeing the 
ra^o-ed and jaded condition of the soldiers of the Confed- 
erate army, decided to stay at home yet a little while and 
take care of their families. _ 

Lee was not slow to observe the cold manner m which 
he had been received. . 

If he had crossed the Potomac at or near the Cham 
Brido-e, and passing around closely to Washington, marched 
rapidly on Baltimore, compelling its surrender, he might 
have induced many to join his standard. Simply to enter 
the State at one side, and inarch only one day toward the 
interior was not enough evidence that he was master of 
the situation. But his immediate move was to capture 

Harper's Ferry. , 

The Comte de Paris says : " He (Lee) determined to take 
advantage of this strange imprudence. ' ' Strange, I should 
say with no hope but certain capture if our troops re- 
mained there ; it was a key to the door which had been left 

open ! 

Accordingly Lee issued the following order to capture 
Harper's Ferry before McClellan's army could attack him : 

Headquarters Army oe Northern Virginia, 
September 9, 1862. 
This army will resume its march to-morrow, takin.o: the 
Ha-erstown road. General Jackson's command will form the ad- 
van^ce and after passing Middletown with such portion as he may 
select take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac, and 
bv Friday night take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martmsburg, 
and intercept such of the enemy as may attempt to escape from 
Harper's Ferry. General Longstreefs command will pursue tne 
same road as far as Boonsboro, where it will halt with the re- 
serve supply baggage trains of the army. 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 159 

General McLaws, with his own division and that of Gen. R. 
H. Anderson, will follow General lyongstreet. On reaching Mid- 
dletown he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday 
morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and en- 
deavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. 

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the ob- 
ject in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's 
Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, and take possession of 
Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key's Ford 
on his left and the road between the end of the mountain and 
the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co- 
operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercept- 
ing the retreat of the enemy. 

General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of 
the army pursuing the road taken by the main body. The re- 
serve artillery, ordnance and supply trains, etc., will precede 
General Hill ; General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry 
to accompan}'^ the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and 
McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the 
route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may be left 
behind. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, 
after accomplishing the object for which they have been detached, 
will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro or Hagers- 
town. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its 
axes in the regimental ordnance wagon, for use of the men at 
their encampments to procure wood, etc. 

By command of Gen. R. E. Lee : 

R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General. 
Major General D. H. Hill, Commanding Division. 

McClellan's army arrived at Frederick on the 1 3tli ; the 
Twelfth Corps, under General Mansfield, encamped on the 
same ground occupied by Gen. D. H. Hill. First Ser- 
geant John M. Bloss and Private B. W. Mitchell, of Com- 
pany F, 27th Indiana, an excellent regiment, found Lee's 
order wrapped around three cigars. It was taken imme- 
diately to McClellan, and gave him full knowledge of Lee's 
intentions and movements. 

Burnside was on the right, in command of the First and 
Ninth Corps, under Hooker and Reno, Sumner in the 
center, with his own — the Second Corps — and the Twelfth 
under Mansfield, Franklin, with the Sixth Corps, was 



160 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

forging his way up the river, on the left, while Hooker, 
with the First Corps, was on the old national road on the 
extreme right. 

Lee's orders exploded Halleck's theory that Lee was 
perhaps making a feint in crossing the Potomac into Mary- 
land, and that his real intention was to draw McClellan as 
far away from Washington as possible, and then recross 
the Potomac, make a forced march and capture Washing- 
ton before the x\rmy of the Potomac could be counter- 
marched to checkmate the move. IVIcClellan claimed that 
he was moving very cautiously to suit Halleck's fears. 

But he was in possession of Lee's plans on the 13th, 
and there was no more danger of Washington than there 
was of Boston. Furthermore Lee had divided up and dis- 
tributed his army to suit McClellan's wishes as much as if 
General Marcy (his father-in-law and chief of staff) had 
made the arrangements. Jackson had to march from the 
vicinity of Middletown to Martinsburg, then move back on 
Harper's Ferry, approaching it so as to prevent an escape 
of the troops there up the left bank of the Shenandoah — 
which would compel him to throw a part of his command 
around south, and let his right sweep the bank of the She- 
nandoah, hugging it closely. That was a long distance, 
and much of the road was rough and difficult to march 
over. 

Walker was directed to occupy Loudon Heights, McLaws 
marching on Maryland Heights, Jackson off in Virginia, 
marching around to come in the rear of Bolivar Heights, 
Longstreet directed to Hagerstown, and D. H. Hill near 
Boonsboro — a mile or so west of the base of South Moun- 
tain on the old national road. This placed Lee's army in 
the best possible condition to attack. A single blow at 
any of these commands might be fatal to Lee. 

This was McClellan's golden opportunity to place his 
name by the side of Napoleon's. The distance was not 
very far from Frederick to Harper's Ferr>-. The army was 
m good condition and spirits, and marching on South 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 161 

Mountain. Franklin was bearing on Crampton's Gap, 
while Reno was taking tlie old Braddock route through 
Sharpsburg, crossing the mountain at Foxe's Gap. Hooker 
was on the old national road which crosses the mountain 
at Turner's Gap. Near its base he left it, and took the old 
Hagerstown road, which makes a deflection from the na- 
tional road north, and again comes into it at the IMountain 
House, a romantic country inn on the top of the mountain, 
where the weary traveler could rest and enjoy one of the 
most fascinating landscapes in America. 

Mrs. Admiral Dalghren has purchased it since the ad- 
miral's death, and fitted it up in an elegant manner for a 
summer residence. It was the headquarters of Generals 
Hill and Colquitt during the battle of South JMountain. 

Hooker formed his line of battle as follows : Gibbon's 
brigade on the pike — but that brigade was temporarily de- 
tached from the First Corps to support and assist Reno's 
right, as he was meeting with stubborn resistance. 

After leaving Washington on its march toward Rock- 
ville the Iron Brigade was pretty thoroughly reorganized 
and many new recruits joined the different regiments — 
especially the 19th Indiana — having been forwarded to 
them after the battle of Second Bull Run, to fill up their 
decimated ranks. 

Quite a halt was made at Rockville and the company 
officers were very busy getting up their muster rolls and 
performing duties necessary after a long and arduous 
campaign. 

After leaving Rockville the column moved very steadily 
and rapidly across the IMonocacy River through Frederick, 
and on Sunday morning, the 14th of September, it passed 
over the eastern range of the Blue Hills and had spread out 
before it the purple fields of Pleasant Valley beyond which 
the South Mountain range loomed up, and upon which the 
brigade knew the enemy had formed his lines to dispute its 
farther progress westward. The spirit of the men was 
never better ; and the enthusiastic loyalty exhibited by the 

XI 



162 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

citizens of Frederick, as they passed through, did much to 
fill the brigade with ardor for the fight they knew was 
before them and the necessity for repelling the invasion of 
Lee. About three o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, they 
were halted upon the western side of the valley near the 
foot of the hills, their line stretching on either side of the 
national road. The noncombatants were sent to the rear, 
and the word came that their task had been assigned them, 
viz. : to carry Turner's Gap, through which the national 
turnpike passes. Far off to the left and on the right they 
could see the troops advancing to the attack, and about 
five o'clock came the word for the Iron Brigade to move 
forw^ard. The 2d Wisconsin was placed in the rear of the 
other three regiments, which were in line of battle, the 
6th and 7th Wisconsin on the right of the turnpike and the 
19th Indiana on the left. After moving forward across a 
creek through an orchard. Company B of the 2d Wisconsin 
passed through between the iQtli and 7th, and moved 
rapidly to the front, deploying as skirmishers, the line halt- 
ing in the mean time, while Captain Caldwell developed 
the skirmishers of the enemy in their front. Very soon the 
firing commenced along the skirmish line, and as the line 
of battle moved forward, the skirmishers preceding the Con- 
federate line of battle moved a little back toward the base 
of the hill, the 6th Wisconsin skirmishing with the enemy 
amongf the large bowlders on the side of the mountain on 
the right hand side of the pass. About this juncture Captain 
Caldwell sent back word to the 19th Indiana that the enemy 
were preparing to concentrate the fire of several batteries 
upon our line, and suggested that Battery B, 4tli U. S. 
Artillery, be brought as close as possible to the line of 
battle to respond. We had now come within easy rifle 
range of the base of the mountain, and the Confederate 
sharpshooters were beginning to annoy the Union line ver}' 
much by their marksmanship in picking off officers in the 
line of battle. At this time Captain Caldwell, who was a 
magnificent looking soldier, fell mortally wounded, and his 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 163 

line retired while the line of battle pushed still farther for- 
ward. As the gorge contracted it became necessary to 
change the formation somewhat, and the command was 
given by Colonel Meredith, "By the right of companies to 
the front." While marching forward in this formation they 
were subjected to a ricochetting fire of solid shot, which 
fortunately did but little damage, owing to the peculiar 
front presented, the shots, most of them, passing through 
between the companies ; but it was evident, as the artillery 
fire was increasing and as they should meet with the line of 
battle of the enemy, that the column formation must be 
abandoned and the lines of battle resumed. On our right 
Colonel Bragg, commanding the 6th Wisconsin, had met 
with the same conditions, and to meet it had thrown his 
line, owing to the narrowness of the field through which he 
was advancing, into the form of column by wing, and as his 
right wing advanced his left wing halted, and when the 
right had delivered its volley it halted and the left passed 
over it. 

This formation was quickly adopted in rotation by the 
brigade, and they were soon pressing the enemy by succes- 
sive wing volleys to a point beyond which to retire on their 
part meant a rout ; they consequently made a stand at 
what was known as the "stone wall" line, which ran 
across the gorge and up the right side of the defile — the 
only opening in it being that made by the national road 
turnpike. Here the two wings were deployed, and the 
single line of battle formed by moving the igtli Indiana 
well off to the left in the field, and the 7th Wisconsin fol- 
lowing it, leaving a gap between the turnpike and the 6th 
Wisconsin which was immediately filled by Colonel Fair- 
child, who movsd the 2d at once into action. It was now 
getting dusk, and the contest over the stone wall was 
very severe, our men forcing their way to one side of the 
wall while the Confederates held the other with a courage 
worthy of a better cause. It became necessary to flank 
them out of this position, and the darkness made it easy to 



164 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

do so. Colonel Meredith ordered Companies B and G, 
under command of Captain Dudley, to withdraw from the 
line of battle, and gave him instructions to move rapidly to 
the extreme left of the gorge, climb the side of the moun- 
tain and press far enough forward to get an enfilading fire 
upon the western side of the wall. This movement was 
accomplished without encountering any of the enemy ; and 
very soon our fire seemed to have the desired effect, for 
with a shout our men soon had the foe in full retreat up 
the side of the mountain, and the battle of South Moun- 
tain was over. 

I should have spoken of the work done by two guns of 
Battery B, which at Colonel Meredith's request were, by 
order of General Gibbon, following the line of battle to 
the road behind us ; and while we were suffering from the 
fire of the sharpshooters located in the frame building to 
the west side of the defile, he planted a few well-directed 
shells into the building and put a stop to that pastime ; for 
immediately after the shells had struck the roof the Con- 
federate riflemen deserted the building and made good 
haste in climbing the hill to get out of the way of Stew- 
art's shot. A little spherical case followed the shells, and 
our left was relieved from the galling fire of their marks- 
men. When we occupied the ground we found several of 
them wounded in the house, and could easily see what ter- 
rible havoc had been done by the well-directed fire of 
Stewart's guns. 

Skirmishers were at once thrown forward to follow the 
retreating enemy ; they gained the crest of the mountain, 
and the brigade rested upon its laurels about ten o'clock at 
night, gathered up the wounded and slain and gave them 
proper attention, relieved the agonies of our fallen enemies 
as far as possible, and bivouacked upon the field that night. 
The next morning at daybreak we started in pursuit, and 
from the Mountain House, which is located at the side of 
the turnpike at the summit, to Boonsboro, and off to the 
left to Keedysville and Antietam Creek, the command 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 165 

moved very rapidly, hardly stopping to gather up the 
prisoners, who, having thrown ever}'tliing away, were ly- 
ing along the roadside, apparently glad to be captnred. The 
enemy who opposed the Iron Brigade on the night of Sep- 
tember 14 were found to be Georgia troops under command 
of General Colquitt, afterwards United States Senator from 
that State. 

Hatch's division, composed of Patrick's, Doubleday's 
and Col, Walter Phelps' brigades, were on the right of Gib- 
bon, the Penns}dvania Reserves forming the extreme right 
under General Meade. Governor Curtin, anticipating 
an invasion of Pennsylvania, had called for 75,000 volun- 
teers to defend the State, and General Reynolds was or- 
dered to Harrisburg to command them, while General 
Meade was placed in temporary command of the Penn- 
sylvania Reserve Division. 

Now let us turn from Hooker's line of battle, formed 
near the base of the mountain on the north side of the 
pike, and see how the gallant Reno is faring south of it, 
up the old Braddock route. Gen. J. D. Cox, connnanding 
the Kanawha Division of Reno's corps, directed Colonel 
Scammon to feel the enemy with his brigade, and Colonel 
Crook followed with his brigade in supporting distance. 

General Cox sent word back to Reno that he was ad- 
vancing with his whole division, and that if a severe en- 
gagement took place he wanted Pleasonton to connnand 
until he (Reno) could come up. 

Col. R. B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United 
States, was directed to take the 23d Ohio and turn the 
enemy's right if possible. 

The fighting was severe ; if the Confederates were re- 
pulsed then the connnand of McLaws could scarcely escape 
capture, and that would ruin Lee's army. South j\Ioun- 
tain was a good defensive position ; a few hours would 
be sufficient to pile up a stone wall behind which troops 
could pour a deadly fire into the lines of battle as they ad- 
vanced up the side of the mountain. Besides, it was a 



166 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

grand position for artillery, while the Union artillery- 
could do but little effective work. The only thing that 
operated against the Confederate artillery at short range 
was to get its guns depressed enough. 

General Garland commanded the enemy at that point. 
He was a determined and brave officer, and fought with 
great desperation. The mountain has two crests there ; 
our troops gained and held the first one by noon. 

Garland, in a bold assault, was mortally wounded, 
which depressed his men, and they gave way, but soon the 
brigades of Anderson, Ripley, and a part of Colquitt's re- 
enforced them. 

In the mean time Wilcox's division of Reno's corj^s ar- 
rived and formed on Cox's right, and with Harlan's bri- 
gade of Rodman's division extended well over to the Na- 
tional road. Fairchild's brigade of Rodman's division 
had been sent to the left to help Colonel Hayes. Sturges' 
division supported Wilcox. 

The Comte de Paris, on page 321 of his second volume, 
says : "Hill's right, which defended the ridge south of the 
pass, only consisted of Garland's brigade; its numerical 
inferiority, however, was fully compensated by the defen- 
sive advantages of the ground it occupied." 

When Wilcox was forming he was attacked so severely 
by Longstreet's men, who had hurried forward to save 
Hill, that his command was thrown into confusion mo- 
mentarily, and the gunners of one of the batteries retreated 
on seeing that the enemy sprang forward to capture them, 
but the 79th New York and 17th Michigan made a sally, 
drove back the enemy and restored Wilcox's line. 

When the advance was made IMeade ordered Lieutenant 
Colonel Clarke, commanding the 3d Regiment, to move to 
the right and occupy an eminence to protect the right 
flank, and also observe the movements of the enemy. 

The Bucktails were thrown forward as skirmishers, fol- 
lowed by the 2d as a support. The Second Brigade, 
commanded by Colonel Magilton, was on the left, the 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 167 

Third, commanded by Colonel Gallagher, was in the center, 
while on the extreme right was the First Brigade, com- 
manded by General Seymour. In this formation they ad- 
vanced over the uneven ground. It was utterly impossible 
to keep any alignments — in fact each brigade was almost 
an independent command, except as they could tell where 
the others were by the firing. The enemy took advantage 
of hiding places in ravines, behind bowlders, on the side of 
the mountain, stone walls, or anything that would shelter 
them. 

That gallant and fearless regiment, the Bucktails, was 
firing and advancing as if they were going to take the crest 
of the mountain itself. Suddenly they came to a cornfield 
where the enemy were thickly posted. A terrific fire soon 
brought the skirmish line to a halt. General Seymour, 
seeing his work clear, directed Colonel Biddle Roberts of 
the ist to charge up the mountain. Observing Colonel 
Fisher of the 5th coming up with a splendid line of battle, 
Seymour said : ' ' Colonel put your regiment into that corn- 
field and hurt somebody." "I will. General, and I'll catch 
one alive for you." This repartee between General Seymour 
and Colonel Fisher so amused the men that they scaled the 
stone wall and soon captured eleven, which they sent back 
to the general. A cheer went up along the whole line, 
and the 2d Regiment, under Captain Byrnes, and the 6th 
under Colonel Sinclair, went forward to gain the crest be- 
fore the ist or 5tli if possible. 

Colonel Gallagher, commanding the Third Brigade, fell 
badly wounded while leading the charge of his brigade, 
and Colonel Anderson of the 9th took command of the bri- 
gade. The nth, under connnand of Col. S. ls\. Jackson, 
was ordered to drive the enemy from a deep ravine. As they 
advanced, a single volley from the concealed enemy played 
sad havoc with the officers ; one-half had fallen, but the 
regiment, infuriated by their loss, rushed on them, and 
drove them up the mountain. The Second Brigade, on 
the left, moved up the slope over toward the pike. They 



168 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

had heavy work, and moved slowly up the mountain. 
The 8th, on the extreme left of the brigade, suffered heav- 
ily, losing more than all the rest of the brigade. Meade 
feared his right flank would be turned, and called for 
help. 

Duryea's brigade of Ricketts' division was sent to his 
assistance. It had a very rough road to travel to reach 
that part of the line. When Duryea reported it was a little 
late, and he was directed to go in on the left of Seymour, 
who was holding his position, and in fact pressing back 
the enemy. Ricketts' division was supporting Platch and 
Meade. 

The losses of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division are as 
follows : — The ist, commanded by Colonel Roberts, 3 
officers and 7 men killed, 3 officers and 27 men wounded ; 
in the 2d, commanded by Captain Byrnes, 7 men killed, 
I officer and 9 men wounded. The 3d, on the plank 
road, not engaged. The 4th, commanded by Capt. F. 
B. F. Fisher, 5 men killed and 22 wounded ; in the 5th, 
commanded by Colonel Fisher, i man was killed and 12 
wounded; in the 6th, commanded by Colonel Sinclair, 12 
men were killed, i officer and 39 men were wounded ; in the 
7th, commanded by Colonel Bolinger, 5 men were killed, 
and' Colonel Bolinger and 1 1 men were wounded, leaving 
Maj. C. A. Lyman in command ; in the 8th, command- 
ed by S. W. Baily, i officer and 13 men were killed, and 
I officer and 36 men were wounded — when Colonel Ander- 
son took command of the brigade, Capt. Samuel B. Dick 
assumed command of the regiment ; in the loth, com- 
manded by Lieutenant Colonel Warner, 4 men were killed, 
I officer and 18 men were wounded; in the nth, com- 
manded by Lieut. Col. S. W. Jackson, 2 officers and 10 men 
were killed, and 5 officers and 24 men were wounded ; and 
in the 12th, commanded by Capt. J. A. Boler, 6 men 
were killed, and i officer and 19 men were wounded. In the 
Bucktail Regiment, commanded by Colonel McNeil, i offi- 
cer and 15 men were killed, and 2 officers and 32 men were 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 169 

wounded. The artillery could not be used, and suffered no 
loss. 

The casualties among the officers were as follows : — In 
the ist Capt. Thomas P. Diven, and Lieuts. John H. Tay- 
lor and John D. Sadler were killed, and Lieuts. Joseph Tag- 
gert, F. McManus, and H. N. Minnigh were wounded. 
In the 2d Lieut. Richard Clendenning was wounded. In 
the 6th Capt. C. D. Roush was wounded. In the 7th 
Colonel Bolinger was severely wounded. In the 8th Lieut. 
William M. Carter was killed, and Lieut. Samuel Mc- 
Candless was wounded. In the 9th Lieut. William Hope 
was wounded. In the loth Lieut. H. I. Howe was wounded. 
In the nth Capt. E. R. Brady and Lieut. W. F. Jackson 
were killed, and Col. Thomas F. Gallagher, Capts. Evard 
Rierer and Nathaniel Nesbits, Quartermaster H. A. Tor- 
rence, and Lieut. J. S. Kennedy were wounded. In the 
1 2th Lieut. E. Kelly was wounded. In the Bucktails Lieut. 
Charles Bitterling was killed, and Capt. E. A. Irvin and 
Lieut. Samuel A. Mack were wounded. 

General Meade gives the following report of this battle : 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the opera- 
tions of the division of the Pennsj'lvania Reserves under my com- 
mand during the action of South Mountain Gap, on the 14th inst. : 

The division left its camp on the Monocacy early on the morn- 
ing of the 14th instant, and marched to Middletown and beN'ond, 
where it was halted about one p. m. of that day, General Reno's 
corps being in front and engaged with the enemj-. About two p.m. 
this division was ordered to the front to his support. The enemy 
was disputing our passage over the turnpike through the South 
Mountain, and had been attacked on the left by General Reno. 
After some consultation with the general commanding the right 
wing and the corps, I was directed to move the division on a road 
leading off to the right of the turnpike and toward the enemy's left. 
After advancing for over a mile on this road, the division, which 
was in advance of the corps, was turned across the field to the left 
and moved in an advantageous position to support Cooper's battery, 
which it was proposed to establish on an adjoining eminence. The 
enemy perceiving these dispositions, opened on the column from a 
battery on the mountain side, but without inflicting an}^ injury. 



170 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Captain Cooper's battery of three-inch ordnance guns was imme- 
diately put in position on the ridge above referred to, and at the 
same time, by direction of the general commanding the corps, the 
regiment of ist Rifles of the division was sent forward as skirmish- 
ers to feel the enemy. 

Being well satisfied from various indications that the enemy 
occupied the mountain in force with his infantry, the general com- 
manding the corps directed me to advance my division to the right, 
so as if possible to outflank him, and then to move forward to the 
attack. A slight description of the features of the ground is neces- 
sary to properly describe the movements of the division. The turn- 
pike from Frederick to Hagerstown, in crossing the mountain, 
takes a general direction of northwest and southeast. The moun- 
tain ridge occupied by the enemy was perpendicular in its general 
direction to the road ; parallel to the mountain was another ridge, 
separated from it at the turnpike by a deep valley, but connected at 
the upper end by a very small depression ; over this second ridge 
there was a road, along which I advanced Seymour's brigade of the 
division, directing him to push forward and feel for the enemy. Soon 
after advancing General Sej'mour reported that he covild take the 
crest of the first ridge along which ran the road, and could then ad- 
vance across the ravine to the second ridge, which I immediately 
directed him to do ; at the same time I deplo3-ed Gallagher's Third 
Brigade and also Magilton's Second Brigade on the same line, but 
down in the valley, and when the line of battle was completely 
formed, directed a general advance of the whole. Seymour soon 
gained the crest of the first ridge, and then moved in the same 
direction as the other two brigades. Anderson and IMagilton ad- 
vanced steadily to the foot of the mountain, where they found the 
enemy's infantry; in a short time the action became general 
throughout the whole line. Steadily the line advanced up the 
mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, 
from whence he was slowly but gradually dislodged, Sej-mour first 
gaining the crest and driving the eneni}^ to our left along the ridge, 
where he was met by the fire of the other two brigades. Soon after 
the action commenced, having reason to believe the eneni}^ was ex- 
tending his left flank to outflank us, I sent to the general commanding 
the corps for reenforcements, which were promptly furnished by send- 
ing General Duryea's brigade, of Ricketts' division. Owing, how- 
ever, to the distance to be traveled to reach the .scene of action, 
Duryea's did not arrive on the ground till just at the close of the 
engagement. His men were promptl}^ formed in line of battle and 
advanced on the left of Seymour, but only one regiment had an 
opportunity to open fire before the enemy retired and darkness 
intervened. 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 17i 

The conduct of the division on this occasion was such as to up- 
hold its well-earned reputation for steadiness and gallantry, and 
fortunately was witnessed by the general commanding the corps, as 
well as others. I am greatly indebted to Brigadier General Seymour 
for the skill with which he handled his brigade on the extreme flank, 
securing by this manoeuver the great object of our movement, viz, 
the outflanking the enemy. To Colonel McNeil, of the ist Rifles, 
who with his regiment has always been in advance, I was indebted 
for ascertaining the exact position of the enemy. Colonels Magil- 
ton and Gallagher, in command of the Second and Third Brigades, 
formed their men and carried them to the summit of the mountain 
in the most creditable manner. I regret to report that Colonel 
Gallagher, while gallantly leading his brigade, received a severe 
wound, and was compelled to leave the field. To my personal staff, 
consisting of Capt. E. C. Baird, assistant adjutant general; Capt. 
J. Adair, commissary of subsistence ; and Lieuts William Riddle 
and A. G. Mason, 5th Pennsylvania Reserves, acting aids-de-camp, I 
am indebted for the prompt execution of all my orders, carried under 
a severe fire across rocks, stone walls and the most rugged country 
I almost ever saw. 

The command rested on their arms during the night. The 
ammunition train was brought up and the men's cartridge boxes filled, 
and every preparation made to renew the contest at daylight the 
next morning, should the enemy be in force; unfortunately the 
morning opened with a heavy mist, which prevented an}' view of the 
country being obtained. So that it was not till seven a.m. that it 
was ascertained the enemy had retired entirely from the mountain. 

Geo. G. Meade. 

Gen. John P. Hatch, who had commanded the First Divi- 
sion of the First Corps from just prior to the second battle of 
Bull Rnn, was ordered by Gen. Joseph Hooker with three 
brigades to advance by a detour to the north of the old 
United States turnpike and dislodge the enemy from the 
motmtain. These brigades were commanded by Brig. Gen. 
Abner Doubleday, Brig. Gen. M. R. Patrick, and Col. Walter 
Phelps. The First Brigade, Phelps', was composed of the 
2 2d, 24th, and 30th New York, the 14th Brooklyn (New 
York Militia), 84th New York Volunteers, and the 2d U. 
S. Sharpshooters ; the Second Brigade, Doubleday' s, of 
the 56th Pennsylvania Vohmteers, 76th and 95tli New 
York Volunteers, and /tli Indiana; the Third Ihigade, Pat- 



172 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

rick's, of the 20th, 21st, 23d, and 35th New York Volun- 
teers. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, with his (Iron) brigade of the 
2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin Volunteers and the 19th Indi- 
ana Volunteers, with Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, 
of Hatch's division, received orders from INIajor General 
McClellan to move up the United States turnpike arid carry 
the pass, which he did by advancing the battery along the 
turnpike and his infantry north and south of it. Gen- 
eral Hatch was a brave and skillful soldier, possessed of 
indomitable energy and dash. He moved from the turn- 
pike to the north, along a narrow wagon road at the base of 
the South Mountain about half a mile, then turned to the 
westward and ascended the mountain where it was so steep 
in places that his officers were obliged to walk and lead 
their horses. When he reached a bench about three-quar- 
ters of the way up toward the summit, he formed his 
brigade in three lines, with Patrick's in advance as skir- 
mishers, then Colonel Phelps', with Doubleday's in the 
third line of battle. The lines were formed on the eastern 
edge of the wood which covered the side of the mountain 
to near the top, and with his usual impetuosity he ordered 
General Patrick to charge and uncover the enemy. After 
waiting some time and hearing little or no firing from 
Patrick, who had gone to the left of the enem\-, he became 
impatient and ordered the second line to advance and 
clear the mountain, directing the charge himself. Phelps' 
men responded with alacrity, as they always did, went for- 
ward rapidly, and drove the enemy from what seemed 
almost an impregnable position. In this charge Phelps 
lost some men killed and wounded, but held the ground 
taken. General Hatch was severely wounded in the calf of 
the leg, which kept him from the field nearly a year, and 
he never entirely recovered from its effects. The loss of 
his services was sorely felt, he being one of the best officers 
in the corps. When wounded and compelled to leave the 
field, he went quietly and alone to avoid attracting the 
attention of his troops. 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 173 

As soon as lie was gone Capt. H. L. Cranford, his acting 
adjutant general, rode rapidly down the mountain and or- 
dered General Doubleday, in the name of General Hatch, 
to advance. His troops being in line awaiting orders. 
General Doubleday instantly gave the command "for- 
ward," and rode with his staff in advance of his line until 
he had passed through the woods to the edge of a clearing 
and occupied the line held by Colonel Phelps' brigade, 
which he ordered to fall back ten paces and have his men 
lie down, holding himself in readiness for any sudden emer- 
gency. 

On the way up the mountain General Doubleday was in- 
formed that General Hatch had been wounded and left the 
field. He at once assumed command of the division, 
which he held till after the battle of Fredericksburg in 
December, 1862, when he was assigned to the command of 
the Third Division of the Corps. 

When General Hatch was wounded he left no orders for 
the division, but Captain Cranford at once assumed the re- 
sponsibility of ordering up General Doubleday in General 
Hatch's name. 

It was nearly dark when General Doubleday received 
the order, and the enemy fought so stubbornly that it was 
after nine o'clock at night before the firing ceased. Some 
tinie after nine o'clock, when General Doubleday' s bri- 
gade had nearly exhausted its ammunition. General Rick- 
etts came groping his way through the woods in the direc- 
tion of the firing, and when he arrived said :" Doubleday, I 
thought vou were having a hard time here and might need 
help; I have brought my division here without orders." 
Doubleday ordered his men to lie down and General Rick- 
etts moved his men over them, fired a few volleys, and the 
victors- was ours. General Ricketts' division went into 
the action on the right of Doubleday, and General Meade's 
division on the extreme right of our line of battle. This 
movement flanked the enemy out of the pass, and the old 
United States turnpike was free to our advance. General 



174 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Ricketts' noble conduct in this instance needs no comment ; 
it reflects greater glory upon him than any words can do. 
General Doubleday continued in command of his brigade 
until the battle was over, when he formally assumed com- 
mand of the division. The fighting was stubborn and 
severe. Colonel Wainwright of the 76tli New York was 
wounded in the arm and left the field, which left Double- 
day's old brigade in command of Lt. Col. J. Wm. Hof- 
mann, of the 56th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, a 
gallant and efficient officer. 

Among the brave men who fell in that action was one 
who deserves special mention, Charles E. Stamp of the 
76th Regiment, New York Volunteers, a lad of immature 
years, tall and handsome, with a smooth face, full of reso- 
lution, and who seemed inspired with patriotism at the 
second battle of Bull Run. When the color-bearer was 
shot down — as several had been before him — young Stamp 
stepped out in front of the line and asked General Double- 
day to let him carry the colors ; his request was granted, 
and he bore them with great pride and apparent satisfac- 
tion. At this battle the regimental line, while charging 
up through the woods, became somewhat broken in passing 
so many trees ; seeing this irregular line, and mistaking it 
for a lack of courage in the men, Stamp stepped forward 
into the clearing a few feet or yards, put his standard on a 
rock, turned to the regiment, and said : ' ' Boys, come up to 
that !" The regiment assumed a correct alignment on the 
colors as if by magic ; but the spirit of the young hero had 
fled, a minie ball having pierced his brain. 

An incident worthy of note occurred on the day follow- 
ing the battle, September 15 ; Corporal Benjamin Van 
Valkcnburg, of Company I, 76th New York Volunteers, 
who had been detailed as an orderly at division headquar- 
ters, was sent out in search of provisions for the mess, when, 
on coming to a small mountain stream in the road, he sud- 
denly discovered five Confederate soldiers filling their can- 
teens. Van said he was frightened nearly to death, but 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 175 

knew if lie ran they would kill liini, so drawing his revol- 
ver he rushed at them and demanded their instant surren- 
der ; there was some little hesitation, but~ as he threatened 
to shoot, and some of them had laid down their guns, the 
others followed suit, and all came in and were marched 
back to headquarters. 



CHAPTER VII. 

ANTIETAM. 

"T '\ THEN the heavy mist on South Mountain tardily 
^ ^ cleared away on the morning of the 15th of 
September, it was ascertained that the enemy had retreated 
down the western slope. 

McClellan knew, from Lee's own order, where the 
enemv was, as well as the Confederate commander himself 
did. Ivongstreet and D. H. Hill were near Boonsboro, a 
small town on the old national road, not far from the 
western base of the mountain. But it possessed a military 
advantage from the fact that there were several roads 
diverging from it to points in that vicinity. The national 
road runs northwest to Williamsport ; one leads south to 
Rohersville ; while another, in a southwesterly direction, 
passes through Keedysville, crossing the Antietam midway 
between that little railroad village and Sharpsburg, thence 
across the Potomac, where it greets Shepherdstown on the 
West Virginia side. 

Jackson's corps was to take a circuitous route so as to 
invest Bolivar Heights, his left resting on the Potomac, 
with his right on the vSheuandoah. Walker's division was 
to occupy Loudon Heights, and McLaws, with his own and 
R. H. Anderson's divisions, Avas to move up in the rear of 
Maryland Heights and invest them. 

Thus McClellan had a full and perfect knowledge of 

the movements of the whole of Lee's army, and that, too, 

before he fought the battle of South Mountain. The 

mountain rauge is rent in twain by the Potomac, while 

17G 



ANTIETAM. 177 

two high peaks — Maryland and Loudon Heights — are the 
natural military fortifications of that place. 

Harper's Ferry is an amphitheater at the confluence of 
the Potomac and the Shenandoah, hundreds of feet below 
these two majestic points. McClellan could either throw 
his army to the left, and fall on the two divisions of 
McLaws on Maryland Heights, where he was isolated from 
Jackson and Walker entirely, without any hope of aid 
from Longstreet and Hill. It is quite evident that ]Mc- 
Laws would have been a sure prey to McClellan, if 
he, McClellan, had boldly assaulted him with his army, 
except the First Corps, which was on the extreme right 
and held the national road, and would have prevented 
lyongstreet and D. H. Hill from returning from Boonsboro. 

Besides the attack on McLaws it would have been a 
notice to Miles to " hold the fort " a little while longer, 
until he could be relieved. 

With McClellan's army surrounding ]\IcLaws on three 
sides, there was but little hope of more than a short re- 
sistance on his part with a mere handful of men in com- 
parison to McClellan's army. 

It is true that McLaws would have made those heights 
famous in a desperate struggle to hold them, but it would 
have been a short and bloody conflict. 

McClellan's army was massed too far to the right. 
Three corps and one division remained idle on the 14th, 
the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth, and Couch's division. 
Fitz-John Porter, in his report, says : 

On the morning of the 14th of September, I reported in person 
to the major general commanding the Army of the Potomac and 
troops engaged in the defense of Washington, and resumed com- 
mand of Sykes' division and that portion of the Reserve Artiller>- 
not distributed to the corps. This portion of the command was held 
in readiness to take part in the battle of South IMountain, but so 
gallantly and successfully were the enemy driven from the heights 
by Burnside and Sumner that its services were not called for. 

The First Corps carried the heights known as Turner's 

XII 



178 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Gap, through which the national road passes, while the 
Ninth Corps followed Braddock's route more to the left or 
south of it. McLaws, fearing he would be hemmed in, sent 
a force back to Crampton's Gap with orders to hold it if the 
"last man was lost in the endeavor." 

Not only did McLaws have fears of Crampton's Gap, but 
of Brownsville, about a mile south of it, and his troops 
were stationed on the mountain to be ready to march to 
either or both as necessity might require. 

But Weverton Pass, near the Potomac, afforded another 
approach to Maryland Heights that McClellan might ad- 
vance through and at once relieve Harper's Ferry, as it was 
on the river but a few miles below, and if that point was 
attacked and carried, McLaws would be compelled to aban- 
don his siege on Maryland Heights. Then again, if a heavy 
force of the Union Army had appeared at Weverton Pass 
the battle could have been distinctly heard at the ferry above 
and greatly delayed the surrender. 

Gen. George J. Stannard, of Vermont, whose record on 
the field of battle shines with a golden luster, was a colonel 
then, under the command of General Miles. His statement 
to the writer, just before he died, was that the sound of 
battle seemed to die away, instead of growing nearer, which 
would not have been the case if Weverton Pass had been 
attacked. Stannard advised Miles to follow the cavalry out 
and abandon the ferry, leaving only the stores for the 
enemy to capture. If this advice had been followed Mc- 
Laws would have been in a still worse condition, for INIiles' 
force would then have constituted the right wing of the 
attack on the morning of the 15th. 

Weverton Pass was occupied by two brigades of Ander- 
son's division — Wright's and Pryor's. If the Twelfth 
Corps, under Mansfield, had been left as a reserve to Reno 
and Hooker, and the Second Corps sent to ^^"everton Pass 
on the afternoon of the 14th and attacked Wright and Pryor, 
those two brigades must have yielded to the superior force 
of the veterans of that corps. Then Fitz-John Porter's 



ANTIETAM. 179 

corps, assisting Franklin's at Crampton and Brownsville 
Gaps, would have swept the eneni}- from those two points, 
and placed McLaws, on the morning of the 15th, at the 
mercy of three corps and Conch's division. That would 
have left two corps, the Ninth and Twelfth, within easy 
reach if needed. 

The effective force of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth 
Corps and Couch's division was too overwhelming for Mc- 
Laws to have successfully resisted. But for him Harper's 
Ferry was in no danger, and he is entitled to the credit 
of its capture. If he had retired, as directed by General 
Ivce, there would have been, in all probability, no sur- 
render. Walker's artillery, on lyoudon Heights, did but 
little damage, and even if Jackson had strongly pressed the 
works, Miles could have retired to Maryland Heights and 
saved his command but for McLaws' presence. Besides, 
Jackson could not have compelled a surrender until 
IMcClellan's army, tardily as it moved, came to its 
relief. 

Lee was fearful that a copy of his order was in ]\Ic- 
Clellan's possession, and he was greatly distressed for ]\Ic- 
Laws' safety, as evidenced by the dispatch, received by 
courier during the night of the 14th by McLaws, from 
General Lee's headquarters, signed by R. H. Chilton, 
adjutant general, which reads as follows : 

Headquarters Army Northern Virginia, 
September 14, 1862 — S p. ni. 
General : — The day has gone against us, and the army will go 
by Sharpsburg and cross the river. It is necessary for you to aban- 
don your position to-night. Send j^our trains not required on the 
road to cross the river ; your troops 3-ou must have well in hand to 
unite with this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send for- 
ward officers to explore the way and ascertain the best crossings of 
the Potomac, and if 3-011 can find between yourself and Shepherds- 
town any road for the command, send an officer to report to me, on 
the Shepherdstown road, where j'ou are and what crossing you will 
take. * * * Respectfully yours, R. H. Chilton, 

Assistant Adjutant General. 



180 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Later in the niglit he received another dispatch from 

General Lee : 

Headquarters Army Northern Virginia, 
September 14 — 11:15 p. m. 

General, : — In addition to what has been said relative to the 
abandonment of Weverton * * * I will mention that you might 
cross the Potomac below Weverton into Virginia. I believe there 
is a ford at the Point of Rocks at Berlin below, but do not know if 
it is accessible to you. The enemy from JefFerspn seems to have 
forced a passage at Crampton's Gap, which may leave all on the 
river clear. This portion of the command will take position at Cen- 
terville, commonly called Ritersville, two and one-half miles from 
Boonsboro, on the Sharpsburg Road, with a view of preventing the 
enemy, that may enter the gap at Boonsboro, from cutting you off, 
etc. If you can pass the river hard by Harper's Ferry, or pass the 
mountain below Crampton's Gap, toward Sharpsburg, let me know. 
I will be found at or near Centerville. * * * 

By order of General Lee : R. H. Chilton, 

Assistant Adjutant General. 

He also received the following, sent him by Colonel 
Munford : 

Headquarters Army Northern Virginia, 
September 14, 1862 — 10:15 p. m. 
Colonel : — Hold your position at Rohersville, if possible, and if 
you can discover or hear of a practical road by which McLaws, at 
Weverton at present, can pass over the mountains to Sharpsburg, 
send him a messenger to guide him immediately to Colonel Mun- 
ford, Rohersville. 

By order of General Lee : R. H. Chilton, 

Assistant Adjutant General. 

Lee's official orders, quoied above, full}- give ]\IcLaws the 
credit of the capture of Harper's Ferry. If he had aban- 
doned the heights on the 14th, as directed, Franklin's 
command would have arrived in time to prevent the 
surrender, as there would have been no enemy in his front 
to retard his march. The fact of the evacuation of Mary- 
land Heights would have been enough to have assured 
the officers and soldiers of Miles' command that jNIcClellan's 
army was so near at hand that McLaws was compelled to 
retreat. Besides, Franklin's advance would have soon 



ANTIETAM. 181 

made its appearance on tlie Maryland side, if McLaws had 
withdrawn during the night of the 14th, as directed by 
General Lee. 

As it was, the firing did not cease until ten o'clock a.m. 
of the 15 th, and then began the usual preliminaries for a 
surrender, which occupied considerable time. Then the 
officers began their work of paroling, and the disgraceful 
surrender was completed. 

If McClellan had pressed his army well to the left, and 
forced McLaws to surrender, he would have saved the 
troops at the ferry. Then Lee would have been com- 
pelled to retreat back into Virginia in a very damaged con- 
dition. One of Lee's generals — Longstreet — said to me: 
" If he (McClellan) had attacked and captured McLaws, it 
would have been hard for him (Lee) to have effectually 
reorganized his army." 

General McLaws, a graduate of West Point, was a very 
able officer, and a man of candor — whose opinions on that 
battle are the best authority, hence the length of my quo- 
tation from him. He further said : 

If General Jackson had failed in the assault, no one who will 
consider the condition of the Confederate forces, scattered and sepa- 
rated from each other, those with General Lee pressed by a largely 
superior force, with General Jackson across the river from hira, near 
to a large force that had repulsed his assault, ready and in position 
to attack in his rear should he attempt to join General Lee ; with my 
two divisions between the force in Harper's Ferry and Franklin, and 
no way to join General Lee, or to receive aid from him ; and Walker's 
division across both the Potomac and Shenandoah, with the force in 
Harper's Ferry between him and General Lee, you will see that the 
situation of each of the scattered commands would have been pre- 
carious in the extreme. The hoisting of the white flag upon the 
outer works was not regarded as a request to cease firing until it had 
been hoisted over the town as well ; and it was ten o'clock before the 
firing ceased. This cannot be refuted. General Franklin certainly 
did not know anything about it, and had done nothing to inform 
himself as to the condition of affairs in Harper's Fcny. It, there- 
fore, cannot be accepted as an excuse for not advancing against me 
on the morning of the 15th, when he says, "that Harper's Ferry 



182 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

surrendered at eight o'clock," quoting General McClellan as author- 
ity, who wrote what was quoted after the battle of Antietam, and 
who was more ignorant upon the subject than Franklin, as he was 
five miles more distant ; Harper's Ferry did not surrender at eight 
o'clock, nor did the Confederate cannon cease firing upon the town 
until ten o'clock, for the reasons heretofore given, and it was not 
until after the firing had ceased that a white flag was received, 
acknowledged by General Jackson, and a conference agreed on. 
And then the preliminaries before the inter\aew, and the intendew 
itself, must have taken some time, and the terms offered, I suppose, 
were submitted to the consideration of a council comprised of the 
ranking ofi&cers of the command. Therefore, I think it reasonable 
to suppose that the actual agreement to surrender did not take place 
before twelve o'clock on the 15th, and that up to eleven o'clock 
nothing positive had been done. General White says that General 
Miles at or about nine o'clock called a council of the ofiicers com- 
manding brigades and conferred with them upon the propriet}' of 
surrendering. This took some time. Then, after it was determined 
to hoist the white flags, they were hoisted on the lines outside the 
city, more than a mile distant. After this was done General ]Miles 
was wounded by the cannonade which was still kept up. So I think 
that the time stated when the firing ceased against Harper's Ferr}', 
at ten o'clock, is correct and confirmed by Federal reports. Mj^ 
object is to show that General Franklin had ample time, on the 
morning of the 15th, to advance his forces and engage mine, which 
were in line but a mile and a half distant from Crampton's Gap, and 
that the sound of his cannon would have been a notice to the garri- 
son in Harper's Ferry that relief was coming, and as his guns would 
have been fired directly towards Harper's Ferry, which was not three 
miles distant, in an air-line, the}- would have been doubtless heard 
by the garrison. Even if it should have so happened that Franklin 
had not advanced until negotiations had been actually commenced, 
the .sound of his cannon woujd have changed the possibilities of ex- 
trication from the surrounding fire that the garrison would have had 
a right to obtain, and certainly it was reasonable to ask for more 
liberal terms than could be expected when there was no likelihood 
of rescue. They could have asked that they be allowed to march 
out with arms in their hands and with colors flying, or they would 
stand an assault and defend the place a Vontrance. 

If General Franklin's orders contemplated the relief of the be- 
sieged garrison in Harper's Ferry, he woiild have effected it with 
more chances of success if he had made Weverton Pass his point 
of attack, for a mere demonstration there would have made known 
to the garrison that McClellan's forces were coming and that the}' 



AN T J ETA M. 183 

must "hold the fort." And it would have diminished the chances 
for the escape of my command should Harper's Ferry not surrender. 
But by going to Crampton's Gap, although he feared it, a way was 
left for me to retire through Weverton to the ford at Point of Rocks, 
below at Weverton. General Lee's anxiety was from the belief that 
McClellan would send reenforcements to Franklin with orders to 
press me at once, and accordingly presented front to McClellan at 
Rohersvilleand trailed him awa}^ from me, leaving Franklin without 
reenforcements. Having done this he apparently felt no longer any 
anxiety on my account so far as Franklin's forces were con- 
cerned, but formed line of battle against McClellan at Sharps- 
burg in order to keep him where he was, on the Antietam, intend- 
ing probabh^ to carry out his original intention to cross the river 
at Sharpsburg, shotild McClellan push him before General Jackson 
arrived. But .McClellan not doing so, and Harper's Ferry in the 
mean time having surrendered, Jackson's force w'as free to join the 
main body ; but I suppose that General Lee, then believing that he 
could reunite his forces in time to offer battle with his whole army, 
determined to try it. I think that enough has been taken from the 
Records of the War of the Rebellion, to show that the campaign of 
1862 realh- hinged on Harper's Ferry ; that General ]\Iiles, bj' hold- 
ing on to the town, as he was most positively ordered to do, gave 
the opportunit3' to INIcClellan to engage General Lee's forces in de- 
tail, each separate force with a vastl}- superior one, and that McClel- 
lan failed to avail himself of it, although he had been made aware 
of the scattered condition of Lee's army by finding a cop}- of Special 
Order, No. 191, heretofore given, which was picked up in the camp 
of one of General Lee's commands at Frederick, ]\Iar3-land, and 
handed to General McClellan when his armj' arrived there, follow- 
ing General Lee, wherein the position of each division was given. 

It will be observed that General McLaws fully confirms 
my view that McClellan shotild have reenforced Franklin 
heavily, as he positively knew the position and location of 
the whole of Lee's army. 

Mansfield's corps was a sufficient reserve to the forces 
under Hooker and Reno against D, H. Hill and Longstreet. 
As Fitz-John Porter said in his report, the reserv^e force was 
not called into action, as Hooker and Reno carried the 
mountain without assistance. Franklin had also been suc- 
cessful on the extreme left. 

Gen. Howell Cobb, who was directed by General I\Ic- 



184 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Laws to return with his brigade and assume command, said 
in his official report : 

When I reached the gap I found both General Munford and 
Colonel Parkham active and energetic in the discharge of their duty, 
which continued to the end of the fight. Shortly after the lines 
were broken, and I was endeavoring to rally the troops. General 
Senimes appeared on the field, and, at great exposure and with great 
coolness and courage, gave me his cordial aid and cooperation. 

If it had not been wisdom to place Sumner with the 
Second Corps at Weverton Pass, and Fitz-John Porter 
\vith Franklin in the beginning of the action, undoubtedly 
the proper thing would have been to reenforce Franklin 
with at least two corps the moment the whole of South 
Mountain was carried. 

The Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps, which had not 
been engaged, could have marched on the i4tli to the assist- 
ance of Franklin and arrived there shortly after dark. 
Then McLaws could have been attacked early on the morn- 
ing of the 15th with four corps and Couch's strong division. 

McLaws formed a line of battle in Pleasant Valley early 
on the morning of the 15th with his whole command, ex- 
cept one regiment left on Maryland Heights. Suppose the 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth Corps had borne down 
on him by nine o'clock, could he or any other general 
have withstood such an overwhelming force, and would 
not only McLaws' command have been compelled to sur- 
render, but Miles, in Harper's Ferry would have refused 
to capitulate, but on the other hand would have likely 
followed and attacked Jackson in his retreat. 

Then, instead of a battle at Antietam, the fight with 
McLaws would have ended the campaign in Maryland, for 
Lee would have retreated across the Potomac at Shepherds- 
town, while Walker and Jackson would have retired up the 
valley sadder but wiser generals. Lee then could have 
been rapidly forced up the valley and could not have de- 
fended Richmond. 

The following, from General Rosecrans, explains itself: 




CAPT. JAMES THOMPSON. 



ANTIETAM. 185 

Treasury Department, Register's Office, 
July 23, 1889. 
Dear Sir : — I have read your manuscript chapter of the opera- 
tions of the Army of the Potomac on the 14th and 1 5th of September, 
1S62. 

It demonstrates that we lost a garrison and a great opportunity 
to do irreparable injury to the Confederate armj' under General L,ee. 

Yours truly, W. S. Rosecrans. 

J. H. Stine, Washington, D. C. 

Maj. C. A. Richardson, of tlie 126th New York Regi- 
ment, is under the impression that the surrender took place 
earlier than IMcLaws states. That regiment was stationed 
on Maryland Heights until the abandonment of that strong 
military position by the order of Colonel Ford. The regi- 
ment had just entered the service when it was ordered to 
Harper's Ferry at that perilous moment. It received an 
uncalled-for, unsavory record, through the statements of 
the acting adjutant, S. A. Barras, who fled to the rear 
when the firing began, and reported to Miles and Ford, 
and to a correspondent of the New York Tribune^ that 
he was there to stop the cowards from the 126th New 
York Regiment from running away. This false and sen- 
sational story was believed at the time and widely published, 
especially in New York State. It greatly damaged the 
record of the regiment, and caused the major to be dismissed 
from the service ; but on the War Department learning 
that Adjutant Barras' statements were false, I\Iaj. William 
H. Baird was restored to his rank and served until in front 
of Petersburg, where he was killed. 

When Mar>dand Heights was abandoned the 126th New 
York was ordered to occupy Bolivar Heights. The regi- 
ment was in no sympathy with the idea of surrendering. 
To such extent were they opposed to it, that when Colonel 
Trimble was carrying the white flag one of otir batteries 
fired four or five shots more, and the Confederate batteries 
again opened on the whole line. 

Capt. Truman N. Burrill, of tlie 126th New York, says 
"that just at that juncture General Miles walked up and 



186 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

directed Captain Phillips, of the 126th New York, to get 
something white and wave it. Captain Phillips said "I 
shall do nothing of the kind ; I never played the coward's 
act and I shall not commence it this morning." Miles 
said, "Do you know to whom you are talking?" Phillips 
replied, "I suppose I am talking to Colonel Miles ; I know 
I am talking to a d — d traitor." 

General Miles intimated to Captain Phillips that "he 
would prefer charges against him when the battle was over. '' 
The above is the statement of Captain Burrill, who was 
only a few feet away. 

Major Richardson, who was then a lieutenant, says : 
"When General Miles was shot on Bolivar Heights, Sep- 
tember 15, he was in my rear about 40 feet distant. He 
had ordered Captain Phillips to raise something white, 
which Phillips refused to do. When ]\Iiles was shot Phil- 
lips said aloud, so that Miles' staff must have heard it, 
' Good ; ' we ail felt it, if we did not say it, and the feeling 
of the men was so bitter against Miles that it was difficult 
to find enough who were willing to carry him from the 
field. The remark of Captain Phillips was well known to 
have been made and was published, but no attention was ever 
given to it by superior officers or any friends of JMiles." 

Captain Burrill said: "Immediately after the colloquy 
between General Miles and Captain Phillips, Miles received 
his mortal wound, only a short distance from them." 
Whereupon Burrill, and he thinks Phillips, joined with 
him in directing him (Miles) to be taken off the field to the 
hospital, where he was attended to b)' the surgeon of the 
126th New York, Dr. Fletcher M. Hammond. 

Thus sadly ended the military and earthly career of one 
who, if he had placed nearly all of his batteries and a 
strong force of men on Maryland Heights, would have sent 
his name thunderino- down through the corridors of time as 
a military genius of great renown. If McClellan had at- 
tacked McLaws, that battle would have been the Auster- 
litz of America, and McClellan's fame would have shone as 
brightly in America as Napoleon's or Wellington's in Europe. 



ANTIETAM. 187 

Headly says : "When it is remembered that just one 
month had elapsed since Napoleon took command of the 
Army of Italy at Nice, that only sixteen days had inter- 
vened between the time when his headquarters were at 
Savona and when they were at Cherasco, that in that in- 
terval the combined armies of Austria and Sardinia had 
been severed, and one driven in confusion and disgrace to- 
ward i\Iilan, and the other annihilated ; that the haughty 
and selfish Kingdoms of Piedmont, Sardinia and Savo}- had 
been precipitated into the dust ; that the Alps had been 
passed, and the immortal battles of IMontenotte, Milessimo, 
Dego and Mondovi had been fought," is it surprising that 
had McClellan done half such work as Napoleon did in Italy 
on that campaign it would have so seriously crippled L,ee, 
after South Mountain, thathe^vould have never crossed the 
Potomac ? But it seems that the enemy rather presumed 
that McClellan would follow Longstreet and D. H. Hill, so 
Jackson hastily left Harper's Ferry, with the divisions of 
Starke and Lawton, for Sharpsburg. These divisions were 
commanded at Gainesville by Ewell and Taliaferro, who 
were both wounded there. 

Longs treet and D. H. Hill fell back on the 13th across 
the Antietam ; Longstreet formed on the right of the road 
before described, coming from Boonsboro through Keedys- 
ville, and tracing across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. 
It was important for them to guard that road with more 
than jealous care, for it was their only route of retreat if a 
great reverse happened. Longstreet's line stretched well 
down the Antietam, below bridge number 3, known as the 
Burnside Bridge. D. H. Hill fonned on the left of that 
road, with his left resting in the direction of the celebrated 
Dunker Church, which is on the road from Sharpsburg to 
Hagerstown, perhaps a mile from Sharpsburg. The Anny 
of the Potomac pursued with Richardson in the advance, 
followed closely by Hooker, Sunnier and Mansfield. 

When Sykes struck the Antietam he filed to the left, 
while Richardson formed on the ricjht of the road leading 



188 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

from Keedysville to Sharpsbnrg, The other two divisions 
of Sumner were massed behind Richardson, while Hooker 
formed the First Corps on the right of Richardson, with 
Pleasonton's cavahy on his flank, and Mansfield support- 
ing him. It was late in the afternoon of the 15th when 
the two armies were again facing each other across the 
sluggish waters of the Antietam. The Comte de Paris 
says, in his second volume : ' ' Thus McClellan had in 
hand thirteen divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, 
raising the nominal effective to 66,000 men, no less than 
45,000 or 50,000 of whom were certainly ready for bat- 
tle. Lee, who had scarcely more than 25,000 men to oppose 
him, had confined himself to rectifying his line of battle." 

It must be remembered that the Comte de Paris, 
who is an eminent military scholar, came over from 
France and was appointed an aid on McClellan's staff 
so he could fully understand our war. This explanation 
is made to show that he was personally friendly to Mc- 
Clellan. If he was partial to any of our generals it 
was " Ivittle Mac. " But he would not sacrifice the truth ; 
that would ruin his work, and reduce it to the scale of fiction. 

lyce was not wishing "for night or a Blucher," but 
for night or a Jackson. 

McClellan occupied the whole of that afternoon in mak- 
ing observations and studying the battlefield without ad- 
vancing. Both armies rested near each other expecting 
that at the dawn in the morning another great battle would 
begin. To their great disappointment all was quiet along 
the line, which was, however, ascribed to a heavy fog that 
lingered in the valley, as if warning the combatants that 
they had no right to commence the work of death and 
destruction there. 

It was not until one or two o'clock on the i6tli that 
McClellan fully decided how he was going to fight the 
battle. The Antietam is a quiet stream, but difficult to 
ford with infantry and artillery. 

Where the national cemetery is, Lee placed all of his 



ANTIETAM. 189 

available artillery. It is a high point just east of Sharps- 
burg on the right of the road to Keed}-sville. From that 
position he could sweep Richardson's and Sykes' front, and 
greatly annoy Burnside's right down to our extreme left. 
That disposition of his artillery was made to enable him to 
rob the center of infantry to reenforce the left, where he 
anticipated McClellan would make his main attack. Their 
troops, after the first day, were well concealed until the 
action began, while all of ours, except on the extreme right, 
were in full view. Lee was an able general, and studied 
the ground where he was going to give or accept battle. 

By the time McClellan ordered an advance, on the 
afternoon of the i6th, Jackson had formed on D. H. Hill's 
left. Hood holding the extreme left in the woods around 
the Dunker Church. 

About two o'clock on the afternoon of the i6th General 
Hooker received orders to advance and turn the left flank 
of the enemy under Hood, the corps, as indicated above, 
marching in columns until the right division under Double- 
day reached nearer to the Hagerstown pike. The skirmish 
line of this division was thrown forward west of the pike, 
in the direction of the Potomac, by E. P. Halstead, adju- 
tant general of the division. It was a critical work to per- 
form in view of the fact that Meade's pickets were so hotly 
engaged during the night that more than once a battle was 
quite imminent. It was not until after midnight that 
Halstead considered it safe to leave the line and return to 
report to Doubleday, whom he found sleeping under his 
blanket in the midst of his men. Hooker directed a 
squadron of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry fonvard to de- 
velop the enemy. In the mean time General Meade, who 
was in command of the Pennsylvania Reserves, was ordered 
to cross the main stem of the Antietam and engage the 
enemy — the divisions of Doubleday and Ricketts moving 
abreast, with Meade's division formed in columns of attack, 
with the artillery well closed up, as the enemy was evidently 
massed but a short distance in his front. 



190 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

General Meade directed Colonel McNeil to deploy his 
regiment of Bucktails as skirmishers, and Captain Byrnes, 
commanding the 3d Regiment, was also directed to ad- 
vance four companies as skirmishers to occupy the woods 
on the rio-ht. The skirmish line met with such a stubborn 
resistance that General Seymour, commanding the First 
Brigade, was ordered forward to their support with Cooper's 
battery. Here the ist Rifles (Bucktails) met with a severe 
loss — Colonel McNeil was killed while leading forward his 
regiment. Col. R. Biddle Roberts, of the ist Regiment of 
the Reserves, was assigned temporarily to the command of 
the brigade, and Capt. W. Cooper Talley was placed in 
command of the regiment at midnight by General Warren. 
Immediately upon assuming command. Captain Talley 
doubled the picket line in front of his regiment, and in 
person advanced it a distance of from 50 to 100 yards and 
drove back the enemy's pickets. The decided vantage 
ground thus gained was maintained during the engagement. 

Meade put Ransom's battery in position, supported by 
Magilton's and Anderson's (Second and Third) brigades. 
Simpson's battery was posted in the rear, and played effect- 
ively on a battery of the enemy that was attempting to 
drive back Seymour's brigade. The enemy was concealed 
in a cornfield near the Dunker Church, which at first gave 
him a great advantage, until the corn was partly mowed 
down by the artillery ; then he retreated to the woods 
around the Dunker Church, where a great portion of Lee's 
left wing was well protected by ledges of rocks and timber. 
But an army acting on the defensive has the advantage of 
choosing positions which are aimed to be as detrimental to 
the attacking force as possible, and that was especially 
Lee's idea on his extreme left at Antietam, for McClellan 
had been on the left bank from the afternoon of the 15th, 
and given ample notice where he would deal the heaviest 
blow. Lee did not care whether Longstreet had more than 
one light brigade to defend the whole of his line from the 
center of Sharpsburg to his extreme right or not. 




GEN. A. J. WARNER. 



ANTIETAM. 191 

Everything was devoted to the left center and extreme 
left. The two picket lines were so close to each other, 
during the night of the i6th, that the firing several times 
seemed as if a battle was imminent. Hooker and Meade 
were both called to the front from the Poffenberger barn, 
where their headquarters were that night, to see the condi- 
tion of affairs. 

Doubleday had arranged his division for the conflict, 
with General Patrick's brigade on the extreme right in a 
piece of woods, Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann's brigade on 
his left connecting with Meade's right, holding the brigades 
of Gibbon and Phelps massed in the rear as reserv^es. 

On the left of the corps Ricketts had thrown for^^ard 
the Third Brigade under that gallant soldier, General Hart- 
suflf ; with the Second Brigade, commanded by Col. Wm. 
A. Christian, toward the left of the Third, and the First 
Brigade, under General Duryea, in reserve. When da)' be- 
gan to dawn in the east both armies were ready for their 
deadly work. 

The enemy made a heavy attack not only on IMeade's 
front, but along the line of the First Corps. Meade had 
placed Magilton and Anderson on the right of Seymour, 
so that his whole division was engaged with the exception 
of the loth Reserv^es, under Lieut. Col. A. J. Warner, which 
was detached and sent to the right to resist an anticipated 
flank movement by the enemy. In the action there Warner 
did such valuable work that Meade highly recommended 
him for promotion. 

Hooker was overhopeful that morning j he was never 
himself unless he was riding the line of battle almost at full 
speed. He courted danger and laughed at fear. 

When the battle opened that morning four generals. 
Hooker, IMeade, Doubleday, and Ricketts, whose names are 
household words, were on the line of battle before the stars 
had fairly disappeared from the heavens. 

As Ricketts moved forward he encountered the three 
brigades of D. H. Hill, while IMeade in the center struck 



192 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Starke's division, and witli the aid of Doiibleday's left, after 
an hour's desperate fighting, swept Starke back on the 
Dunker Church. 

Meade was well advanced into the cornfield and attempted 
to cross the Hagerstown road near the Dunker Church. 
Early in the morning Doubleday on the right had re- 
arranged his division, giving Gibbon the advance, sup- 
ported by Phelps' brigade and Patrick to follow in twenty 
minutes. 

Hofraann's brigade, by order of Hooker, was left to sup- 
port the batteries and prevent a flank attack from the right, 
with his brigade facing west. 

Gibbon advanced the 2d and 6th Wisconsin Regiments 
as a heavy skirmish line, supported by the 7th Wisconsin 
and 19th Indiana. Quite an amusing incident occurred as 
the skirmish line was advancing through the woods in the 
rear of Miller's house. Gibbon sent his compliments by 
lyieutenant Haskell, of his staff, to Lieut. Col. E. S. Bragg, 
commanding the 6th Wisconsin, ' ' to advance as far as it 
was safe." Bragg said to Haskell, "Give General Gibbon 
my compliments, and tell him it has been d — d unsafe here 
for the last thirty minutes ; ' ' and pulling his hat down over 
his face said, "Forward, 6th Wisconsin !" The two regi- 
ments on the skirmish line forged ahead until they reached 
the edge of the cornfield so noted in history ; then the 7th 
Wisconsin and 19th Indiana were deployed in line of bat- 
tle on the right, when the Iron Brigade moved forward on 
Meade's right, facing a deadly fire from the front, and suf- 
fering heavily from an enfilading fire from the woods on 
the right, where General Stuart, with a battery of horse 
artillery, and a body of Confederate cavalry was well 
posted for work. 

The 2d and 6th Wisconsin, on the left of the Iron Bri- 
gade, were under equally as heavy fire as the right wing, 
and Phelps' and Patrick's brigades ; many brave boys from 
those two Wisconsin regiments surrendered their lives for 
the perpetuity of the Union. Lieutenant Colonel Allen of 



ANTIETAM. 193 

the 2d, and Lieutenant Colonel Bragg of the 6th were 
both wounded. 

The 19th Indiana lost heavily in a gallant but ill-ad- 
vised charge, ordered and led by Lieutenant Colonel A. O. 
Bachnian, to capture a section of artillery posted in the 
cornfield to the front and left. This battery was supported 
by a Texas regiment that suddenly rose up and delivered a 
most fatal volley into the 19th Indiana when it was charg- 
ing. Bachman was mortally wounded, and the regiment 
almost annihilated. 

Capt. W. W. Dudley then assumed command of the 
regiment, and ordered his command to fall back to the reg- 
ular line of battle, the i9tli Indiana being far in advance. 

Sergeant W. W. Macy ordered John Yost, Thomas, 
and Henry Kirby to bring back Lieutenant Colonel Bach- 
man, who was dying. While Sergeant Macy was caring 
for Bachnian in his expiring moments he (Macy) was hit 
in the head. He had to make his way through Patrick's 
brigade. As he went back all covered with blood, Gene- 
ral Patrick turned to his command and said : "Make way 
and let that brave man through. ' ' 

General Gates, in his excellent history of the Ulster 
Guard, relates the following : "Passing back again through 
the woods, two Confederate colonels and one brigadier 
were found on the ground, and interspersed with the mul- 
titudes of their fallen, there were so many of those Na- 
tional uniforms that at a glance one might see how fearful 
was the cost of the victory. Upon one dead body was 
found a large black dog that had been killed from some 
chance shot which had struck him whilst stretched upon 
his master's breast. — W. J. Pollock of the Ulster Guard." 

When the left of the 20th New York made a charge 
under Major Hardenburgh to help save the 6th Wisconsin, 
(the enemy were so determined to capture Battery B, 
Jackson had ordered it taken at any sacrifice), the two lines 
were so near to each other that Isaac Thomns, of the Ulster 
Guard, shot the color-bearer and captured the flag. 

XIII 



194 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

General Doubleday was fearful of a flank movement 
from the right, and therefore ordered .the Second Brigade, 
under Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann, to hold a position near 
the Hagerstown pike, in the rear of the line of battle, to 
checkmate any movement of that kind. No army in the 
world ever had a better brigade commander than Hofmann. 
Always on the alert, there was no danger that the enemy 
would steal a march on him. The magic of his voice in 
battle has thrilled the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac 
on more than one battlefield. The 95th New York was 
detached by Hooker to support a battery near the front, 
leaving the 7th Indiana, 76th New York and 56th Pennsyl- 
vania under the direct command of Hofmann. 

Ricketts was so sorely pressed that Hooker directed 
Meade to send him a brigade. To comply with the request 
would leave a gap in his line, yet he must obey the order, 
as Hooker knew the whole line better than any other offi- 
cer, and was handling his corps with great skill. 

The following letter from General McClellan will fully 
substantiate the above statement : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 
Sharpsburg, September 20, 1862. 

My Dear Hooker : — I have been very sick the last few days, 
and just able to go where my presence was absolutely necessar}', so 
I could not come to see you and thank you for what you did the 
otlier da3% and express my intense regret and sympathy for yowx un- 
fortunate wound. 

Had you not been wounded when you were, I believe the result 
of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the Confed- 
erate army, for I know that with you at its head your corps would 
have kept on imtil it gained the main road. As a slight expression 
of what I think of your merit, I have requested that the brigadier 
general's commission, rendered vacant b}' Mansfield's death, may be 
given to you. I will this evening write a private note to the Presi- 
dent on the subject, and I am glad to assure you that, so far as I 
can learn, it is the universal feeling of the army that you are the 
most deserving in it. 

With the sincere hope that your hcallh will soon be restored, so 
that you may again be with us in the field, I am, dear general, your 
sincere friend, George T?. McClellan, Major General. 

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, Commanding Corps. 



ANTIETAM. 195 

When Meade took Magilton out of the center and di- 
rected him to go to Ricketts' assistance, the enemy made a 
dash and filled the gap, with the hope of piercing our cen- 
ter. Meade saw that it was a critical condition, and that 
soon our line would be broken unless the enemy was re- 
pulsed at once. He directed Ransom to turn his battery 
on their advancing column in the gap, and also ordered 
Seymour and Anderson to pour in an enfilading fire, that 
compelled them to retreat into the cornfield. 

Ricketts seeing Meade's dangerous position came to his 
assistance. Doubleday's Third Brigade, the First (Phelps') 
and the Fourth (Gibbon's) were already engaged. Patrick's 
was a solid New York brigade: 21st, under Colonel Wm. 
F. Rogers ; 23d, commanded by Colonel Henry C. Hof- 
mann ; the 25th, Colonel Newton B. Lord, with the 80th, 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gates ; the last regi- 
ment is known in the history of the Empire State as 
the Ulster Guard. The latter was ordered to support 
Battery B ; the left was thrown forward to strengthen 
the 6th Wisconsin. When Patrick arrived at the front 
he was directed to advance his brigade to the right of 
the turnpike. As he moved up he discovered a force 
of the enemy moving around our right flank, and at- 
tempting to gain our rear. He notified General Double- 
day, who directed that the 30th New York be sent to 
checkmate the move. 

Patrick, stripped of two of his regiments, moved for- 
ward with the 2ist and 35th New York Regiments to assist 
Gibbon and Phelps. At this juncture our troops in the 
cornfield were being forced back on Patrick's left. 

Colonel Hofmann had been relieved from his work on 
the right and reported to Patrick, when he (Patrick) directed 
the 2 1st, 23d, and 30th New York, 19th Indiana, and 7th 
Wisconsin to make a dash on the advancing enemy to help 
save Gibbon's left and Battery B. The 35th New York, 
under' Lord, dashed forward and captured the colors of the 
regiment that was trying to take Batter^' B. 



196 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The enemy rallied again, forced our line back, and at 
the same time renewed the attack on our right flank, which 
compelled Patrick to take advantage of a line of rocks, 
which he held ; in the mean time Doubleday ordered Hof- 
mann to put his brigade in to assist Gibbon, who had suffered 
so severely, but Hooker revoked Doubleday' s order, and 
said he wanted Hofmann to remain where he had been 
posted. 

The troops in that small space swung to and fro like a 
pendulum, for three corps, the First, Twelfth, and Second, 
all fought over the same ground, only to have it held later 
in the day by Franklin until night put an end to the 
conflict. 

The best way to convey a correct idea how the Pennsyl- 
vania Reserves suffered in that battle, will be to take the 
9th Regiment, as the sheet of leaden hail greeted the whole 
division about the same. Sergeant Blanchard was wounded 
with the colors ; Walter Beatly had scarcely raised them up 
when he fell mortally wounded ; Roberts next took them, 
but no time had elapsed until he was killed ; then Edward 
Doran gave a splendid illustration of the genuine rich char- 
acter and presence of mind, by seizing the colors, and lying 
on his back, held them up until the line was relieved by the 
Twelfth Corps. For that gallant and heroic act Doran was 
made a noncommissioned officer on the field. 

The Iron Brigade, under Gibbon, was melting away under 
the steady fire in front and the raking, enfilading fire from 
the right, so General Doubleday ordered Col. Walter 
Phelps, Jr., to bring up his brigade, composed of the 22d 
New York, under Capt. John D. O' Brian; 30th New York, 
under Col. William IM. Searing; 14th Brooklyn, under 
William H. de Bevoise, and the 2d United States Sharp- 
shooters, commanded by Col. Henrv A. V. Post. 

When Colonel Phelps moved up the fire from the right 
was so severe that he ordered Colonel Post to take his Sharp- 
shooters and dislodge the enemy in that direction if possible. 
No regiment in the ser\'ice went to the front with more 



ANTIETAM. 197 

alacrity than the Sharpshooters. Col. Post gave the com- 
mand and the gallant boys were soon at their work. Phelps 
soon observed that the Sharpshooters were fighting against 
great odds, and he assisted them with the remainder of the 
brigade. In the mean time Colonel Post was wonnded. 
Although these two brigades were holding their ground, 
they were failing from great losses, and Gen. IMarsena R. 
Patrick was ordered by Doubleday to bring forward Lieu- 
tenant Stewart, of Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, 
who advanced with one section and took position in front of 
Miller's barn, just to the right of the road, followed shortly 
by Captain Campbell with the other four guns, going into 
battery on Stewart's left, and commencing to fire canister 
at the enemy in the cornfield on the east of the pike, at 
fifteen or twenty yards distance. 

The loss of the battery whilst in this position was i 
captain wounded, 3 sergeants, 4 corporals, 32 privates killed 
and wounded ; 26 horses were killed and seven wounded ; 
one of Stewart's pieces had only two men left — Packard 
and Johnson. 

Ricketts' division was formed, the Third Brigade in the 
center, with General Hartsuflf supported on the left by the 
Second Brigade, commanded by Col. William A. Christian, 
with the First Brigade on Hartsuff's right. 

The division moved forward closely followed by Battery 
F, ist Pennsylvania, under Captain Mathews, and Captain 
Thompson's Independent Pennsylvania Batter}', each con- 
sisting of four three-inch rifled guns. Both batteries suc- 
ceeded in getting into position and opened an effective and 
deadly fire on the enemy. 

Hartsuff's brigade was formed with the 12th Massachu- 
setts on the right, the nth Pennsylvania next, then the 
13th ^Massachusetts, with the 83d New York on the left. 

The other regiment of the brigade, the i6th Maine, was 
guarding a railroad, hence not in action. The 12th Massa- 
chusetts selected Sergt. George Kimball to furnish data for 
that re.mment. Since the war he has been serving on the 



198 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Boston Journal. His account of tlie regiment in that battle 
is used in full, as it really represents the brigade : 

The 1 2th Massachusetts Volunteers (Webster's regiment j reached 
Keedysville about noon of the 15th. 

At South Mountain it had been its good fortune to be pitted 
against a portion of Garnett's (afterwards Pickett's) Confederate 
division — the very troops that had made a successful flank attack 
upon the 12th and other regiments of Ricketts' division at the Second 
Bull Run — and the issue this time had proved most satisfactory and 
creditable to the Massachusetts men. Consequently the esprit de 
corps of this fine body of troops was now particular!}' high. The 
men felt that if any shadow of discredit had attached to them on 
account of the disaster at Manassas, it had been swept away by the 
brilliant flank movement at South Mountain. 

The regiment was under command of Maj. EHsha M. Burbank, 
Col. Fletcher Webster having been mortally wounded at Bull Run 
August 30, and Lieut. Col. Timothy M. Bryan, Jr., being absent on 
sick leave. 

It numbered (nine companies) 325 officers and men. One of its 
companies (H), Capt. James L. Bates (afterwards Colonel Bates), 
was at this time detached as provost guard at brigade headquar- 
ters. During the afternoon and night of the 15th the regiment lay 
in an open field just beyond the town of Keedysville, awaiting orders. 

Early on the morning of the i6th the men were awakened by 
heavy firing in front, and preparations were immediately begun for 
a move. Rations were issued and cartridge boxes replenished. The 
men knew that a great battle was pending and were read}' to do their 
whole duty. Besides the forty rounds that the cartridge boxes con- 
tained, each man put twenty rounds more into his haversack. After 
a hasty breakfost, the regiment marched with its brigade toward the 
right of McClellan's line of battle. A wide detour was made 
to screen the movement from the enemy and to avoid his artil- 
lery fire. 

Antietam Creek was crossed by the bridge known as Number i, 
and the column then filed sharply to the left, soon coming out into 
a large cornfield near Joseph Poffenberger's house. Here the bri- 
gade halted, formed line of battle, and began preparations for supper. 
The march had been a short one, but much time was con.sumed in 
waits and measures, and the day was far spent. 

The men were comparatively safe in this position, as only occa- 
sionally did shells burst in their midst and they were out of range 
of the enemy's infantry. 

Not .so, however, with Meade's brave Pennsylvania Reserves and 



ANTIETAM. 199 

the other troops whose lot it was to be nearer the foe. All through 
that long, cold, dismal night the crack of rifles greeted the ears of 
Hartsuff's troops. Occasionally Doubleday's artillery thundered 
out its defiance, only to be answered by the heavy roar of the 
enemy's guns as they savagely belched forth their acceptance of the 
challenge. 

Everything betokened a desperate battle on the morrow, and no 
one who lay tfiat night among Hartsuff's men will ever forget the 
terror, the anxieties, and the discomforts of his experience. Hooker, 
before going to sleep, is reported to have said : " To-morrow we fight 
a battle that will decide the fate of the Republic." 

With the first gray streaks of coming day, that memorable 17th 
of September, the men of the 12th Massachusetts were awake and 
ready for any duty— any sacrifice their country might require of 
them, The battle began in earnest. From the extreme right, held 
by Doubleday, all along the front the fighting raged with a ferocity 
born of desperation. 

Hartsuff's brigade was compelled to remain for some time in- 
active, but finally, it becoming apparent that Jackson's division was 
advancing, and Hooker seeing that more troops were needed, and 
that it was necessarj^ to make a grand heroic effort to check this 
Confederate onslaught, dispatched Colonel Candler of his staff 
with orders for Hartsuff to advance. The men never obeyed a sum- 
mons with greater alacrity. They moved forward as if on parade. 
At the foot of the little rise of ground upon which they had been 
standing, a double row offences, inclosing a farm road, was encoun- 
tered,' the rails passing through the posts. It was impossible to 
throw them down, and there was therefore no recourse but to climb 
over. The Confederate skirmishers had already gained the large 
cornfield on the opposite side ; bullets were flying. Many of the 
12th were killed or wounded while climbing the fences. On the 
other side the line was reformed. Companies K and E were thrown 
out as skirmishers, under Capt. B. F. Cook, and the regiment moved 
forward again. It was soon discovered that one company of skir- 
mishers was sufficient, and Company E returned to the line. 

On they swept through the waving corn, reaching far above 
their heads, the bullets of the enemy doing deadly work at every 
step and shells bursting all about them, while the yells of the foe, 
more exultant because of their easy victory at Harper's Ferry, 
pierced every Union ear and nerved every lo^'al heart — on, on they 
pressed, closing up every gap made by the enemy's missiles, their 
noble leader riding personally behind them and encouraging them 
fonvard. As they passed General Hooker his handsome face wns 
wreathed in smiles, and he remarked to one of his staff": "I think 



200 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

they will hold it." Jackson, too, was moving- forward. His skir- 
mishers had be;;n checked by ours, but the main line was still in 
motion. The 12th at last reached the other edge of the cornfield. 
Here another fence was encountered, but this one was easily removed. 
Be3'ond this point the ground rose slightl}^, culminating in a small 
knoll some fifty yards from the fence. 

When the men of the 12th reached the summit of this knoll, 
they found themselves actuall}^ face to face with the eneni}-. They 
needed no order, for their duty was a plain one. Every musket was 
leveled at once and fired simultaneously, and the effect was distinctly 
noticeable. So near was the foe it is undoubtedly true that every 
bullet did its work. The eneni}' wavered and recoiled before this 
fearful storm of lead, but soon rallied and returned the fire, and the 
men of IMassachusetts met their onslaught with a fortitude not ex- 
celled on any battlefield of the war. 

For three hours it was give and take, with no thought on the 
Union side of giving up the contest so long as a man was left. 
Stewart's battery, to the right of the 12th, did murderous work. The 
Massachusetts boys were falling by the score, but still the\- fought 
on, and kept closing up on their colors as fast as gaps were made in 
their line — Hooker and Hartsufif were both wounded. The latter, 
while being borne to the rear, begged of those who carried him not 
to tell his brave men of his mishap, feeling that their love for him 
and their confidence in his leadership might perhaps create a tem- 
porary feeling of discouragement. 

Major Burbank fell mortally wounded, and every officer of the 
12th Massachusetts but three was either killed or woixnded. But 
the enem3''s advance was checked and victory for the Ami}' of the 
Potomac made possible, for had it not been for the heroic resistance 
of Hartsuff's brigade to Jackson's advance, who can predict what 
the result would have been at Antietam ? This grand result, how- 
ever, was not secured without frightful losses. Out of the 325 
ofiicers and men of the 12th Massachusetts who entered the fight, 
47 were killed and 166 wounded — a total of 213. 

It is doubtful if any Union regiment in the battle of Antietam 
can show a larger percentage of loss than the 12th, and it was cer- 
tainly not many times exceeded on an}- battlefield of the war. The 
officers killed or who died of their wounds were Maj. Elisha M. 
Burbank, Asst. Surgeon Albert A. Kendall, First Lieuts. William G. 
White and Lysander F. Gushing, and vSecond Lieut. George W. 
Orme. When relieved by the brigades of Crawford and Gordon, of 
Mansfield's corps, but a -handful were left. The colors of the 12th 
w^ere toward the close of the fight fl^'ing from their poles while the 
latter were stuck in the ground. As the regiment started for the 



ANTIETAM. 201 

rear Lieut. Arthur Dehon picked them, up from where the3' had 
fallen. They were literally covered with dead heroes — those who 
had been killed beneath them or had been wounded and crawled 
upon them to die. It was only with difficulty that Dehon could get 
possession of these sacred emblems of patriotism and valor. The 
j-oung- lieutenant was made a captain for his bravery, and while 
serving as an aid upon the staff of General Meade at Frederick.sburg 
was killed. WJaen the regiment reached the rear it numbered but 
thirty-two, but these were even still willing to render further ser- 
vice, as was evidenced b}' their voluntarily going forward again to 
support a battery. A number of the men left the ranks when the 
regiment fell back to help off wounded comrades. None of the men 
were captured by the eneni}-. 

The circumstances were in no way exceptional. It was not an 
ambuscade. The 12th INIassachusetts did not fall into a trap. It 
was one of the fairest tests of bravery upon any battlefield of the 
war. It abundantly proved the regiment to be possessed of the 
highest discipline and to have the best of fighting qualities. They 
honored themselves and reflected immortal honor upon the First 
Army Corps at Antietam. Two-thirds of their number was their 
percentage of loss. 

Thus Sergeant Kimball graphically describes the part 
taken by the 12th Alassachiisetts in the bloody battle of 
Antietam — the Borodino of America. 

Though such heroism was displayed by the 12th Massa- 
chusetts, the other three regiments of the brigade — the i ith 
Pennsylvania, 13th IVIassachusetts, and 83d New York — 
fought with as mtich valor, and would have sacrificed the 
last man to save the nation. To be a member of Hartsuff's 
brigade is a proud distinction that of itself ought to be a 
passport even in foreign lands. 

To support this famous brigade Ricketts ordered the 
Second Brigade, tinder Col. William A. Christian, on its left, 
which formed line of battle with the 26th New York on the 
left, the 94th New York next ; then the 88th Penns\-lvania 
and the 90th Pennsylvania on the right of the brigade, and 
on the left of the 83d New York. 

Lieut. Col. R. H, Richardson commanded the 26th New 
York, Lieut Col. Calvin Littlefield, the 94th New York, 
Maj. George W. Gill the 88tli Pennsylvania, until he was 



202 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

wounded, then Capt Henry R. Myers assumed command 
of it ; the 90th Pennsylvania was commanded by Coh 
Peter Lyle. 

Colonel Christian was a brave officer, and had a brigade 
second to none in the service, and on that field it added 
another star of great brilliancy to its glory. 

On the right of Hartsuff was the fighting brigade of 
Abram Duryea, composed of the 97th New York, under 
Maj. Charles Northup ; 104th New York, commanded by 
Maj. Lewis C. Skinner; 105th New York, led by Col. 
Howard Carroll, and loytli Pennsylvania, commanded by 
Capt. James Mac. Thompson. General Ricketts, in his 
report, says: "I commend the general good conduct of the 
division," and among those he personally mentions are 
General Duryea, Colonel Coulter and Capt. John W. Wil- 
liams, his assistant adjutant general. 

"When night had stilled the battle's hum " Ricketts had 
the supreme pleasure of knowing that his division had 
crowned itself with glory that day, while his command at 
night was a mere handful, yet his heroes lay thick on the 
line of battle. * 

* A singular coincident occurred to the 13th Massachusetts. At 
the second battle of Bull Run the regiment lost their knapsacks, 
having filled them before going into action, and as our army re- 
treated the knapsacks fell into the hands of the enem3\ At South 
Mountain many of these knapsacks were recovered, having been left 
in haste by a Georgia regiment, as the Confederate force retreated. 
Some of them had not been disturbed in the least. 

Another similar coincident in that regiment's history- occurred 
there. In the early days of the war the regiment had seen service 
on the upper Potomac, and the boys knew every ford in the Poto- 
mac, from Sandy Hook to Hancock. It had been camped in nearly 
every grove, had marched over every road, had visited every village 
and hamlet, and had become acquainted with nianj' of the people. 
Their winter camp in iS6i-'62 was at Williamsport, but the}' had 
spent considerable time in camp at Sharpsburg during the fall of 
186 1. It was their mission, during these months, to picket the 
river, guard the fords, see that no hostile bands disturbed the 
Maryland side. They were well acquainted with the Antietam 



ANTIETAM. 203 

Several histories have it that Hooker, in his extreme 
anguish, cried out to Doubleday to send him his best bri- 
gade, when Hartsuff was dispatched to him. HartsufF 
never was under the command of Doubleday. As will be 
seen in this chapter, he (Hartsuff) commanded a brigade 
in Ricketts' division. 

When he was ordered to Meade's assistance the other 
two brigades of the division gallantly supported him. 

In that movement Hartsuff was severely wounded, 
and taken from the field ; wherepon the brigade was com- 
manded by Colonel Coulter of the nth Pennsylvania. The 
artillery did valuable service in that great battle, being 
skillfully and ably managed. 

Gen. H. J. Hunt had command of the artillery of the 
army, with Capt. J. Albert Monroe in charge of that of 
the First Division of the First Corps. 

Hooker directed Company Iv, ist New York Artillery, 
Capt. J. A. Reynolds, to take a position on the left of 
Thompson's battery, which was busily engaged in adminis- 
tering canister in heavy doses to the enemy advancing on 
Duryea's brigade, then being forced back. Reynolds 
could not select even a swell in the ground enough to op- 
erate his guns on, and he moved his battery farther to the 
right, where he went into action, and silenced a battery of 
the enemy on the west side of the pike. Then General 
Gibbon directed him to move to the right still farther, and 
with Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, to shell the 

Creek, with the South Mountain range, with Pleasant Valley, and 
all the country. On the 17th of September, 186 1, the regiment had 
a skirmish at Lockport, a station on the canal just below Sharps- 
burg. The enemy was engaged in throwing up an earthwork on 
the Virginia side, and had one cannon. The 13th Massachusetts 
had a rifled 12-pounder which was drawn into position in order to 
conceal it. Suddenly the Union boys surprised the Confederates by 
firing two shells into their midst. Then came a brisk musketry 
skirmish across the river. It seemed rather strange to the members 
of that regiment that one year from that day they should be parti- 
cipating in a heavy battle in the same locality. 



204 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

woods. Both of these batteries were then retired to the 
ridge in the rear to receive ammunition and rearrano-e, as 
both had lost heavily in men and horses. 

Hooker directed Captain Monroe, Company D, 1st 
Rhode Island Artillery, to advance to the edge of the corn- 
field ; Lieutenant Edgell and ist New Hampshire Battery 
to follow and take position about lOo yards in the rear. A 
battery of the enemy opened on them at once, but the fire 
was not returned. Monroe observing a column of their in- 
fantry retreating, and only about 125 yards distant, the 
captain directed one section to play on them, throwing 
them into great confusion ; the other four guns opened 
with canister upon a large force of the enemy advancing in 
front. The New Hampshire Battery directed a well-aimed 
and heavy fire on the same column of the enemy. The 
combined fire of these two batteries compelled the enemy 
to fall back. 

After the most stubborn fighting from early dawn until 
eleven o'clock the corps, infantry and artillery, having suf- 
fered frightful losses, and nearly expended their ammunition, 
retired from the position which they had taken and held in 
front of the IVIiller house to a position just north of the 
Poffenberger barn. 

To cover that retrograde movement General Gibbon 
was directed by General Doubleday to form a line in the 
skirt of woods through which the corps had passed in going 
into the battle. Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann was thrown 
forward on to the rise of ground west of the Hagerstown 
pike. These precautions were deemed necessary to prevent 
the enemy from making a flank attack. The First Divi- 
sion of the corps held the extreme right of the line of battle 
from the commencement to the close, and was not replaced 
by any other troops. The Twelfth and Second Corps, in 
their advance, passed over tlie ground which had been oc- 
cupied by Meade's and Ricketts' divisions. There was no 
further fighting on the extreme right after the corjDS retired 
to the heiMits on the Poffenber<rer farm. 



ANTIETAM. 205 

As the artillery did siicli heroic and valuable service, it 
is but simple justice to the gallant officers and men to give 
as full an account of them as possible, consequently I have 
decided to quote from the able and clear report of J. Albert 
Monroe, commanding artillery, First Division, First Army 
Corps. He says : 

In an extraordinarih^ short time all the division batteries, ex- 
cept Company B, Fourth Artillery, were in position on the ridge 
upon which they had been during the night, and which ran nearly 
parallel with the position occupied by the enemy's guns, and about 
800 or 1,000 yards from it. Before the enemy's batteries were 
silenced, which was done in about one hour and a quarter. Company'- 
L, ist New York Artillery, was ordered through the woods at the 
left into the plowed land bej-ond, leaving in the position bi:t Com- 
pany D, Rhode Island Artillerj^ commanded \)y myself, and the 
ist New Hampshire Battery, Lieutenant Edgell. But two bat- 
teries from another division came up and took position on the 
right. 

Company B, Fourth Artillery, Capt. J. B. Campbell, accom- 
panied General Gibbon's brigade through the woods to the open 
ground beyond, where Lieutenant Stewart's section was detached 
from the battery, and ordered to a position near the turnpike, to 
shell the woods bej'ond. Here the section suffered severely in men 
and horses, but it did excellent service, throwing a body of the 
enem}', 400 or 500 strong, into considerable confusion, so that they 
partialU' broke and ran through a hollow, gaining the cover of some 
fence rails. 

About this time Captain Campbell placed his other four guns in 
position on the left of Lieutenant Stewart's section. In the mean 
time the enemy had crept into a cornfield near the battery and on 
the left of the turnpike, and opened a murderous fire, which was re- 
plied to with canister with good effect. Captain Campbell was here 
seriously wounded in the shoulder, and the command of the com- 
pany devolved upon Lieutenant Stewart. The battery was sup- 
ported b}^ General Gibbon's brigade and 20th New York. Being 
very much weakened, General Gibbon directed Lieutenant Stewart 
to change position to the right, out of range of the enemy's mus- 
ketry, and to shell the woods in front ; but only one section went 
into position, on account of the great number of wounded men and 
horses in the other two sections. Company L, ist New York 
Artillery, Captain J. A. Reynolds, after moving through the woods, 
was ordered to move forward into the plowed ground, where it took 



206 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

position and opened upon one of the enemy's batteries in the field 
beyond the turnpike, silencing it after sharp fire for some time. 

From this position Captain Reynolds was ordered by General 
Gibbon to move to the right and shell the woods in front, with Com- 
pany L, and the section of Company B on the left of Company L. 
Soon after both of these batteries were ordered to the rear. Captain 
Re3molds went back to the advance train to obtain a supply of am- 
munition, and upon his return was ordered to the extreme right, 
where he had no opportunity to use his guns. Lieutenant Stewart 
retired to the rear of the woods through which he had advanced, 
moved his disabled horses, and regulated his men and horses 
throughout. 

Shortly after the enemy's batteries upon the hill were silenced, 
and about the time Company B, 4th Artillery, and Company L, 
New York Artillery, were ordered to the rear, Company D, Rhode 
Island Artillery, commanded by myself, was ordered through the 
wood, and immediately after the ist New Hampshire Battery, 
Lieutenant Hdgell, was ordered to follow, General Hooker directed 
me to move forward beyond the second cornfield, if possible, and 
take position as near the woods as the ground would admit. 

I advanced, followed by Lieutenant Edgell, ist New Hamp- 
shire Battery, and went into battery about 50 yards from the wood, 
the New Hampshire Battery taking position about 100 yards in the 
rear. A battery of the enemy here opened upon me, but no atten- 
tion was paid to it, and its fire was perfectly ineffective ; but the 
battery with one section opened upon a body of the eneni}-, which 
was seen retreating at the left of their front, and about 120 3-ards 
distant, throwing them into great confusion. The other four guns 
opened with canister and case upon a large force advancing through 
the woods in front, which were very open, and with the assistance 
of the other section, which had accomplished its object b}' a few 
shots, and the ist New Hampshire Battery, checked the enemy, 
and he retired out of sight. 

While engaged forcing the enemy in the woods, a body of 
sharpshooters had, unobserved, crept along under a little ridge that 
ran diagonally to the front of the Rhode Island Battery and opened 
a most unerring fire upon it, killing and disabling many horses 
and men. As quickly as possible a section was directed to open 
upon them with cani.ster, which, though it caused them no injury, 
they lying down under the ridge, kept them almost silent, they 
firing but an occasional shot without effect. 

While this section was keeping the sharpshooters silent, the 
other four guns, with the guns of Lieutenant Edgell, opened upon 
the battery that was still firing, and soon silenced it. I then or- 



ANTIETAM. 207 

dered my battery to limber to the rear. The sharpshooters took ad- 
vantage of the opportunity thus offered, and opened most briskly, 
severely wounding a number of men and killing and disabling a 
large number of horses. ]\Iy own horse was pierced with six bul ets. 
All the horses bvit one lead horse of one piece were either killed or 
disabled, and the piece had to be drawn away by hand by means of 
a prolonge. The timber was left, but was subsequently recovered. 
The New Hampshire Battery left its position at the same time, and 
went back to its original position. After securing the piece that 
was drawn away by hand to its caisson, I moved my battery into 
the lot between the second cornfield and the plowed land beyond 
the first cornfield, and went into position with five guns, and 
shelled the woods beyond the turnpike. After firing a short time I 
retired to my original position, when the disabled piece was sent to 
the rear. 

The battlefield of Antietam, besides being the bloodiest 
in the late war, presented as many deeds of heroism as 
any battle recorded in history. Generals leading their 
commands rode to death in the face of the enemy, btit it 
was left to a mere youth to quietly and fearlessly exhibit a 
spirit of valor that astonished officers of the regular army 
who were veterans of the Mexican war. He modestly rode 
up to General Hooker and requested to be assigned to duty 
as an aid on his staff The battle was raging with great 
fury at the time. Wherever the daring and intrepid 
general, on his white horse, rode to cheer his men, there 
was this youth. After a little all of Hooker's staff were 
either absent taking orders or wounded, so he had no one 
to assist him, and seeing the coolness of the youth he 
appointed him a volunteer aid on his staff in the midst of 
the battle, and at once gave him orders to deliver on 
different parts of the field. 

The Comte de Paris in his work has severch' criticised 
Hooker for not taking Allen's Hill, where J. E. B. Stuart 
had his artillery stationed near our right flank. It was the 
key of the field ; once in the hands of the Union forces, the 
enemy's line was untenable. 

Hooker had opened the battle where he was directed. 
He was then only comn^anding the First Corps, and did 



208 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

not have the general management of the battle. With their 
field-glasses at headquarters those in common could see 
Hooker in the midst of the fight, and should have ordered 
Mansfield to his right, or Sumner, who went in third. 
When the First Corps was ordered forward, the desperation 
with which the enemy pressed it made it almost imperative 
for Hooker to cheer his men with his presence, so he dashed 
to the front and rode his horse at great speed along the 
line, which greatly encouraged the soldiers and did much 
to make that part of the field famous. 

Notwithstanding the fact that Hooker was chained down 
to a particular work, yet he grasped the situation that the 
hill on our right, the point above alluded to, needed atten- 
tion, and proceeded to examine it with this volunteer aid, 
who proved to be George W. Small ey, the correspondent of 
the New York Tribinie^ and since the war its London cor- 
respondent. He had dismounted to go a little farther to the 
front to make a more careful examination, and on returning 
just after he mounted he was wounded. In a few minutes 
he swayed unsteadily in his saddle from the loss of blood. 
Then turning to Mr. Smalley Hooker said: "There is a 
regiment to the right. Order it forward ! Crawford and 
Gordon are coming up. Tell them to carry those woods and 
hold them, and it is our fight." But INIr. Smalley had to 
assist the general from his horse before he could deliver the 
orders, as he was rapidly losing strength and liable to fall at 
any minute. Thus a youth unaccustomed to war made a 
most vahiable staff officer. 

When Hooker was wounded Meade was placed in com- 
mand of the First Corps, and ably managed it until the 
battle was ended. He remained in command of the First 
Corps for twelve days, until Reynolds returned and assumed 
command, and Meade returned to the command of the 
Pennsylvania Reserves. 

jMansfield arrived with the Twelfth Corps, composed of 
two divisions. General Williams commanded the right 
division and Green the left. Williams was a very keen, 



ANTIETAM. 209 

observing officer, and at once saw tliat he must flank the 
Dunker Church and take it in reverse. Lee was promptly 
advised of this movement, and D. H. Hill was moved to 
the left to face Green, while Hood, who was in reserve, was 
ordered to the extreme left to meet Williams. Hood had 
his men well ensconced behind stone walls and ledges of 
rock, so Williams was in heavy luck. 

Green, on the left, had forged his way well up to the 
Dunker Church, but General Mansfield, who accompanied 
the left, had been mortally wounded, and General Williams 
was placed in command of the corps. Crawford took com- 
mand of Williams' division. The losses were heavy on 
both sides. Starke, who commanded one of Jackson's 
divisions, had been killed, and Lawton, who commanded 
another, was wounded. As they were bearing away Hooker 
and M'ansfield from the field, it was announced that Hart- 
suff and Gordon were also wounded. Death and destruction 
seemed to reign supreme. There appeared to be a lull ; 
from sheer exhaustion neither could advance, but both 
anxiously waited for reenforcements, for it was almost im- 
possible to hold the lines much longer. 

General Sumner arrived with the Second Corps, and it 
seemed as if victory was going to perch on our banners 
with the troops of that corps, that had been almost invin- 
cible in the presence of the enemy. When the Second 
Corps arrived on the field Green and Williams were holding 
their ground with two small knots of soldiers, instead of 
divisions. Sedgwick was the first on the field. He at once 
advanced, soon passing Green and Williams, driving Hood 
back beyond the Dunker Church, and the nearer he ap- 
proached the enemy the more he quickened his pace. The 
Dunker Church and the woods around it was taken, the 
key to Lee's left, and the Confederates were retreating in 
the direction of the Potomac. 

But here comes another simoon. French's and Richard- 
son's divisions of Sumner's corps have not arrived on the 
field. Sedgwick's flanks are exposed, and McLaws and 

XIV 



210 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Walker are both advancing on him, and many of Hood's 
men have taken fresh courage and have returned to the 
attack. McLaws, in command, saw there was a gap be- 
tween Sedgwick's left and Green's right, and he pushed 
Renshaw's brigade into the unoccupied space. Falling on 
Green's right, he was compelled to yield ground, while 
Sedgwick's left, under Howard, was taken in reverse and 
thrown into confusion ; at the same time Crawford's brigade, 
which was supporting Howard, yielded to the confusion and 
gave way ; the other two brigades of Sedgwick, supposing 
their rear was being gained and that they might be sur- 
rounded, abandoned their position around the Dunker 
Church, notwithstanding Sedgwick did everything in his 
power to prevent the disorder. Although he had been 
wounded three times, he remained in his saddle, tr}-ing to 
regain the ground he had captured only a short time before. 

Williams then ordered Gordon to take his brigade and 
attempt to carry the Dunker Church. The brigade ad- 
vanced under cover of the dense cloud of smoke until it 
penetrated the woods near the church, when it was com- 
pelled to retire before a concentric fire of the enem}^ 

If French and Richardson had only appeared on the 
field when Sedgwick did, Sumner would have greatly 
changed the conflict, McLaws did not follow Sedgwick, 
but contented himself in holding his position around the 
Dunker Church. It was a defensive battle on their part. 
McLaws pretended to follow him, but a few shots from our 
batteries sufficed to quiet his nerves, and he returned to the 
shades of the church — perhaps to worship. The next one 
who went to church was French, taking with him Alax 
Weber, Morris, and Kimball. To his utter astonishment, 
while he found McLaws at church, yet he had serious doubts 
about his pious intentions, for he at once assailed his right 
and attempted to mash it, which was not a Christian act, to 
say the least of it. 

Max Weber moved straight forward. IMorris was ex- 
posed to an enfilading fire and his troops had seen but little 



ANTIETAM. 211 

service, and were thrown into confusion, but the veterans 
under Kimball passed them and deployed on Weber's left, 
while Richardson advanced still on the left of French, with 
Meagher in front, supported by Caldwell and Brooks. 
Richardson swept past the Roulette farm, over the first 
range of hills toward Piper's. Between these ranges of 
hills winds a deep ravine, meandering from the Hagerstown 
pike to the Keedysville road. That ravine had been con- 
nected with a country road, known before the battle as the 
Sunken road ; since then it is called "the Bloody Lane." 

]\Ieagher met a heavy force of the enemy ; that only in- 
creased his determination, and dashing forward, his Irish 
Brigade was only too glad to follow him, no difference 
where he led them. Meagher was wounded, and the com- 
mand devolved on Colonel Burke, who proved himself 
worthy to command the brigade that Meagher had led in 
battle so often. The contest at this point in the line 
amounted to desperation ; the enemy had massed his forces 
and attempted to break our lines, but the Irish Brigade, 
although it suffered greatly, maintained a splendid line. 
Finally it was relieved by Caldwell's brigade. 

The enemy was safely posted in that sunken road where 
neither artillery nor infantry fire could annoy them. 

Col. Francis C. Barlow, commanding two regiments in 
Caldwell's brigade, took the hollow in flank, compelling 
them to hastily abandon that position, though not without 
great loss, including 300 prisoners and three flags. 

Just before that flank movement, there was one of the 
most gallant and admirable feats performed that occurred 
on the field. The 4th Alabama stuck their colors in the 
ground. Maj. Theodore W. Greig, serving under Colonel 
Barlow, saw the flag flying ; he sprang fon,vard, captured it, 
and returned to his regiment unharmed, though imme- 
diately after that flank movement he was severely wounded 
in the neck. He received a medal of honor for capturing 
the flag. 

General Caldwell rallied the 7tli New York, which was 



212 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

suffering under such a deadly fire it seemed they would 
give way, but when Caldwell offered to lead them in per- 
son, they fought with great determination. The enemy 
attempted to turn Caldwell's left by moving behind a ridge 
in a cornfield. Colonel Cross, of the 5th New Hampshire, 
instantly changed front forward and met the advancing foe 
with a well-directed volley, which checked and drove him 
back. But rallying, he made another attempt to still 
farther turn our left, when the 8ist Pennsylvania moved to 
the left to assist the 5th New Hampshire, and the enemy 
was finally repulsed at that point with great loss. In the 
last conflict the 5th New Hampshire captured the colors of 
the 4th North Carolina. 

These two regiments were drawn so far to the left to 
prevent the enemy from turning that flank, that quite a 
gap was made in Caldwell's brigade, which was filled with 
a reo^iment from Colonel Brooke's brio^ade. 

There was no enemy then in the front of Caldwell, and 
as they had attempted to steal around the left flank under 
cover of a ridge in the cornfield. Barlow's suspicions were 
aroused, and making a hasty examination, he found they were 
attempting to turn the right in the same manner they had 
just previously the left. Moving his two regiments ob- 
liquely to the right, about 300 yards to a hill, he opened a 
severe fire on them, which compelled them to break and 
hastily retreat. 

Then an attempt was made to force Caldwell's center; 
as soon as the heavy firing indicated that the battle was 
renewed there. Barlow immediately moved to the left, and 
uniting with the rest of the brigade, moved forward, driving 
the enemy out of the cornfield and through the Piper 
orchard. 

While leading his men forward Barlow was danger- 
ously wounded by a grape shot in the groin. F'rench's 
left was being forced back, when Brooke moved his brigade 
to the right to check the enemy's advance in that direction. 
Richardson had driven back the brigades of Rodes and 



ANTIETAM. 213 

G. B. Anderson, of D. H. Hill's division, at the point of 
the bayonet beyond the Piper house, and was nearly to the 
Hagerstown road, and very close to Sharpsburg, and would 
have pierced Lee's line, gained the rear of his left wing, 
and at the same time have taken Lee's reserve artillery in 
reverse and rear had he succeeded. French on the right 
was held back by the artillery of the enemy at the Dunker 
Church, but Richardson had almost broken the center. 
"Can't you go a little farther, general? Pleasonton is on 
your left with three batteries of artillery, and fully believes 
the center is failing. ' ' As Van Manning' s regiment moved to 
the left, Pleasonton' s artillery struck it in column, wounding 
many and killing quite a number, but Van Manning moved 
steadily forward to his position. There, brave bo}-s ! they 
have gone as far as they can without assistance. Fitz-John 
Porter is just across the Antietam, and has not fired a shot. 
If he will only rush down the Keedysville road, in thirty 
minutes the victory will be ours. No support comes and 
Richardson's heroes are compelled to fall back and form a 
line in the rear. 

The Comte de Paris has this to say on that point : " But 
Richardson could not follow up his advantage alone. On 
the right Sedgwick was mixed up with the debris of the 
corps of Hooker and Mansfield. French was arrested by 
the enemy's batteries posted in the vicinity of Dunker 
Church, which enfiladed him every time he attempted to 
advance. Porter remained in reserve at the very time 
when he should have come to attack the troops opposed to 
Burnside in the rear. In short, this latter general had not 
yet emerged from his fatal immobility." 

It was then about one o'clock. General Richardson 
was mortally wounded, which was a severe blow for the 
Union side ; his soldiers had great confidence in him in 
battle. McClellan immediately ordered Hancock to take 
charge of his division — a good selection. He was not only 
making a reputation on every field where he fought, but 
his presence inspired the men and aroused in them fresh 



214 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

enthusiasm. But the action was mainly over in that part 
of the field ; it was only necessary to hold their lines intact 
and be prepared to meet a new attack. That the enemy 
was very weak is beyond question. I heard General Long- 
street tell General Rosecrans that he held Richardson back 
for quite a time with a section of artillery supported only 
by one North Carolina regiment. The general held the 
horses of two of his aids while they handled the guns. 
Genl. D. H. Hill says in his report : 

Gen. G. B. Anderson still nobly held his ground, but the 
Yankees began to pour in through the gap made by the retreat of 
Rodes. Anderson himself was mortally wounded and his brigade 
was totally routed. Colonel Bennett, of the 14th, and Major Sillers, 
of the 30th North Caroliria Regiments, rallied a portion of their 
men. There were no troops near to hold the center except a few 
hundred rallied from various brigades. The Yankees crossed the 
old road which we had occupied in the morning and occupied a 
cornfield and orchard in advauQe of it. The}' had now got within a 
few hundred jards of the hill which commanded Sharpsburg and 
our rear. Affairs looked very critical. 

The enemy received reenforcements on the left and 
made another desperate struggle, forcing back Richardson's 
division, and pressing French so hard that Brooke's brigade 
of Smith's division, Franklin's corps, was ordered to his 
assistance. 

Swintonsays: " The arrival of Franklin was opportune, 
for Lee had now accumulated so heavily on his left, and 
the repulse of Sumner's right under Sedgwick had been so 
easily effected that the enemy began to show a disposition 
to resume the offensive, directing his efforts against that 
still loose-jointed portion of Sumner's harness between his 
right and center." 

The losses of Sumner had made it impossible for him to 
present a solid front to the enemy. As Smith came on the 
field with his division Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, of Sum- 
ner's staff, informed him that a battery on the right center 
was unsupported. He sent two regiments of Hancock's 
brigade to support it, and soon ordered the remaining regi- 



ANTIETAM. 215 

ments of the brigade and two batteries to that point. The 
enemy was well massed there and attempted to pierce that 
point in the line. Col. W. H. Irwin, commanding the 
Third Brigade, was ordered to charge the enemy. The 
fury of that charge hurled him back until the brigade ad- 
vanced far enough to receive an enfilading fire from the woods 
on the right, which threw the 37tli and 77tli New York 
into confusion that lasted only for a moment, when they 
faced by the rear rank, poured a well-directed fire into the 
enemy, and drove him back in that direction. A battery 
of the enemy advanced and opened fire on the 20tli New 
York, raking its entire front. Sharpshooters on the right 
and extreme left opened a deadly fire on Irwin's brigade, 
which made the position perilous. In order to relieve his 
front he ordered forward the 7th Maine, under Maj. Thomas 
W. Hyde. 

That regiment fixed bayonets and charging, forced the 
enemy back a quarter of a mile, flanking them on the 
left in an orchard, where they broke and ran, while those 
in front hastily retreated, leaving their colors. The regi- 
ment dashed forward up a hill in hot pursuit, until a regiment 
of the enemy rose up behind a stone wall and delivered a 
volley at short range and then double quicked around to the 
left to cut off their retreat. Those in front seeing that move 
returned to the fight, and it seemed as if the 7th Maine 
would be captured. 

Colonel Irwin's orders were so positive that he could not 
rescue them, nor the other regiments of the brigade, nor 
could the right regiment of Brooke's brigade assist them 
without orders. Colonel Hyde, seeing his critical position, 
marched his regiment by the left flank, delivering a volley 
into the troops that v/ere attempting to cut him off, and 
then faced those pursuing in front. He finally succeeded 
in reaching the orchard ; by that time the enemy was ad- 
vancing on him from three opposite directions. A battery 
at short range was firing canister but the trees in the 
orchard shielded them partially, and in a short time he man- 



216 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

aged to rescue the brigade. There was great joy in the 
brigade over the return of that regiment, for they expected 
those who were not killed or wounded would be captured. 
The battle lulled on that part of the field and was taken up 
on the left under Burnside. It is said that Sumner was 
afraid to throw Franklin's corps in there, as it was the only 
one that had not been cut up in the fight, and he held that 
command for an emergency, in case the enemy attempted 
to turn the right flank or make another attack. 

The situation was desperate on both sides. More men 
had been lost on that field tlian any other in the great inter- 
necine war. It challenged the noted battles of Austerlitz, 
Marengo, and Waterloo for heavier losses. 

Although virtually a drawn battle, Lee was severely 
punished and several times stood that day on the brink of 
ruin. Their victories had placed an artificial value on their 
valor, with a corresponding depreciating one on ours. 
Although posted on the side of a stream which at the 
time was thought to be too deep to be crossed except at the 
bridges, which gave them great advantage, yet at the 
Dunker Church, where the two forces met, the modest 
yeomanry of the North met the dashing chivalry of the 
South in such a soldierly manner, that argued we were one 
people, each posssessing courage, honor, and pride that the 
world would admire, and which we could not afford to 
waste in such a war. May never such occur again. 

Burnside is opposite Bridge No. 3, below Sharpsburg, 
with the Ninth Corps. Jacob D. Cox at that juncture of 
the battle was in command. When McClellan moved from 
Washington he gave Burnside command of a grand division, 
the First Corps, under Hooker, and the Ninth, under Reno. 
The brave Reno was killed at South Mountain and General 
Cox took command of the corps. When Hooker was moved 
to the right at Antietam Buruside did not relieve Cox from 
the counnand of the Ninth Corps. Burnside, however, 
gave direction how it should be placed in position, with 
General Crook's brig^ade of the Kanawha Division on 



I 



ANTIETAM. 217 

the right, supported by Sturges' division; Rodman's divi- 
sion on the left, supported in the rear by Ewing's brigade 
of the Kanawha Division. 

The troops were far enough away to be well shielded 
from the enemy's artillery, which opened at early dawn, 
and was replied to by Benjamin's and Durell's batteries. 
About seven o'clock Burnside ordered an advance to the 
ridge nearest the Antietam, to be in readiness to carry the 
bridge by storm. 

The right, under Longstreet, was posted on the high 
cliffs on the right side of the stream — a natural Gibraltar. 
General Cox thus describes it : 

The bridge itself is a stone structure of three arches, with stone 
parapet above, this parapet to some extent flanking the approach 
,to the bridge at either end. The valley in which the stream runs is 
quite narrow, the steep slope on the right bank approaching quite 
to the water's edge. On this slope the roadway is scarped, running 
both ways from the bridge end, and passing to the higher land 
above by ascending through ravines above and below ; the other 
ravine being some 600 yards above the bridge, the turn about is half 
that distance below. On the hillside immediately above the bridge 
was a strong stone fence running parallel to the stream. The turns 
of the roadway were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks, made of 
rails and stone, all of which defenses, as well as the woods which 
covered the slope, were filled with the enemy's infantry and sharp- 
shooters. Besides the infantry defenses, batteries were placed to 
enfilade the bridge and all its approaches. Longstreet had displayed 
great capacity in handling his artillery at the first, and especially 
the second. Bull Run, where he placed his command on Jackson's 
right so as to form an acute angle, that would enable his artillery to 
plow the attacking columns of the Union army and break them be- 
fore they could reach the infantry. Here he was provided with 
another natural fortification that he could defend against great odds, 
and we will again see his ability equal to the occasion, although he 
is opposed by such ofiicers as Cox, Sturges, Rodman, Hartranft, 
Wilcox, and Crook — the name of the latter to-day is a full guaranty 
that he knows but one kind of warfare, and that is to whip the 
enemy. One might as well accuse General Wayne of toving with 
the Indians as to breathe a suspicion that Crook would not fight to 
the utmost capacity of the command. The names of these generals 
are referred to in this manner because McClellan had a fear that 



218 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Burnside sold him out, as he (Burnside) was his successor in com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac in so short a time, Swinton and 
the Comte de Paris both sympathize with McClellan's view of it ; but 
there were too many officers engaged in that corps who would have 
spurned an intimation of that kind, besides Cox was in command 
of the corps, and not Burnside. 

I have carefully studied that bridge and its approaches. I 
wonder it was taken at all ; but it seems to me strange that Rodman, 
down on the left, supported by Ewing's brigade could not cross the 
ford, yet I would not do the memor\- of that gallant man any in- 
justice by even breathing it, for he sacrificed his life on that field. 
"Speak lightly of the dead." 

In order to protect the assatiltiiig coltimn, Diirell's, 
Clark's, Muhlenberg's, Crook's, Benjamin's and one section 
of Simmond's batteries were placed in position to open on 
the enemy when the infantry were ready to charge. 

The First Corps, on the extreme right, had suffered 
terribly, and McClellan was anxious for the Ninth, on the 
extreme left, to cross the Antietam and relieve the heavy 
pressure on the right. 

About nine o'clock the nth Connecticut, under Colonel 
Kingsbury of Rodman's division, was deployed as skir- 
mishers, follo\ved closely by Crook's brigade aud Sturgis' 
division. 

The stream where the bridge crosses is slow, and too 
deep to be forded by infantry. The 2d IMaryland and 6tli 
New Hampshire charged with fixed bayonets, but the 
heavy concentrated fire on the bridge compelled them to 
fall back. These regiments again and again attempted to 
take it, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Then the 
51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania were ordered up, 
and about one o'clock carried the bridge, planting their 
banners on the opposite bank. The remainder of Sturgis' 
division then marched over, when he deployed one brigade 
to the right and the other to the left. Advancing, they 
carried the heights. Crook immediately followed Sttirgis 
aud formed on his right. Rodman carried the ford below 
at about the same time, which placed the Ninth Corps on the 



ANTIETAM. 219 

right bank of the Antietam, though with but little ammu- 
nition, which the stubborn fighting had well nigh ex- 
hausted. As Sturgis had borne the brunt of the fight all 
day, Cox sent a request to Burnside to move forward the 
division of Wilcox to take the place of Sturgis. 

Cox says: "It was three o'clock when the necessary 
changes in the line of battle were completed, and the com- 
mand to advance was given. Wilcox had no trouble in 
forcing the enemy back on the right until the village of 
Sharpsburg was nearly reached. Rodman was ordered to 
move in the same direction, bringing his command en eche- 
lon on the left of General Wilcox. ' ' 

Rodman made desperate efforts to clear his front and 
preserve his connection with Wilcox, but his extreme left 
was being crushed by the enemy attacking his flank. 
While attempting to change front of a part of his command 
he fell severely wounded. 

A. P. Hill arrived at half past two, and formed his divi- 
sion facing the Antietam, connecting with the right of 
Jones' division, which was facing Wilcox. 

The brigades of Archer, Gregg and Branch formed 
Hill's left, while Pender and Brockenborough were on the 
right ; this long line overlapped Rodman, and gave Hill a 
splendid opportunity to fall on his flank with Archer, 
Gregg and Branch. 

Cox, seeing that he could not hold his position, with 
the left so sorely pressed, withdrew the line to a ridge along 
the Antietam. The enemy did not pursue, so that virtually 
ended the great battle.' 

Lee's, Jackson's, A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's head- 
quarters were at Mr. Grove's house in Sharpsburg, an old- 
fashioned brick house with large halls and rooms. Long- 
street wanted to see his lines, and was consequently late 
reporting to Lee. All the other generals were there, but no 
word came from Longstreet. Lee began to be quite uneasy 
about him, and wondered if he had been wounded or killed. 
None of the generals had seen him since the battle. Just 



220 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

then Longstreet rode up in the dark, and dismounted in 
front of the house ; no one recognized him for an instant. 
When Lee realized who it was, he said, "Here comes my 
old stand-by." The next day both parties lay in front of 
each other, but as McClellan did not advance, the next 
night Lee retreated across the Potomac. Major A. J. 
Sellers of the gotli Pennsylvania, who was on picket, 
learned of Lee's retreat, wrote it on a shingle and sent it to 
McClellan. 

The First Corps lost in that engagement 417 killed and 
wounded and 122 missing. The Second Corps had 15,000 
on the field and lost 883 killed, 3,859 wounded, and 396 
missing. The Ninth Corps had 438 killed, 1,796 wounded, 
and 115 missing. The Twelfth Corps had 12,300 on the 
field, and lost 275 killed, 1,386 wounded, and 85 missing. 
The casualties in the other corps were comparatively 
liorht. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

FROM ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN. 

/""^N the morning of the iSth of September, 1862, the 
^—^ soldiers of McClellan's army fully expected a renewal 
of the battle. Burnside was across the Antietam on the 
left, with Warren's brigade of Porter's corps, ready to assist 
him. Hancock, who had succeeded Richardson in com- 
mand of the left division of the Second Corps, was holding 
his ground, which gave Porter a splendid opportunity, with 
his fresh corps, to move forward and attack Lee's center; 
French's and Sedgwick's, the other two divisions of Sum- 
ner's corps, were badly used up ; but Franklin's corps had 
suffered but little, except Irwin's brigade. The First 
Corps, on the extreme right under Meade, was in excellent 
spirits and condition. Hofmann's brigade, of Doubleday's 
division, had been in reserve, and consequently suffered but 
few casualties. 

Hofmann would leave a banquet any time to fight a 
battle, and his brigade had greatly acquired his nature. 
Couch and Humphreys arrived in the morning with their 
divisions. They were in excellent condition, and com- 
manded by two such generals they would have struck a 
fearful blow to the enemy. 

With two full corps, two divisions, and one brigade, 
which had not been engaged the day before, McClellan was 
in prime condition to renew the contest. But it seems 
that Sumner stubbornly opposed a renewal, although in 
his report he does not even allrde to it. McClellan feared 
he was fighting a greater number of the enemy than he 

221 



222 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

really was— though, in my opinion, Lee had more troops 
in that battle than he had credit for. 

Gen. H. J. Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the 
Potomac, stated that question the best. After the war was 
over he was down South, and they told him of the size of 
their armies in this and that engagement. "Well," said 
the general, "where were your men? They were too 
brave to shirk a battle, yet when your reports were made, 
there were only a few present for duty." 

Along Jackson and D. H. Hill's front there were 
repeated'' rumors that an armistice had been declared to 
bury the dead and to care for the wounded. That was an 
old trick of Jackson's when he got worsted ; he always 
mourned for the wounded and the dying, but, strange to 
say, when his colors were advancing he never thought of 

them. 

The enemy approached General Hancock's front with a 
flag. The general sent out to see about it, and on finding 
that it was accompanied by General Pryor, he sent General 
Meagher out to meet him. But it was soon learned that it 
was not a flag of truce ; Pryor said if Hancock would send 
a request to care for the wounded and bury the dead, he 
thought it would be honored. Of course it would, for they 
were^'simply wearing the day away in the most plausible 
manner, so they could retreat under cover of the night. 
Hancock very properly sent word that he had no occasion 
to make such a request; that the majority of the wounded 
lyincr between the lines were Confederates. Longstreet 
became alarmed at the critical condition of affairs, and wrote 
a note to Lee to get ready to retreat across the Potomac at 
early candle light, and be sure to not light the candle 
either Lono-street knew they would be crushed if an 
attack was made. Lee in the mean time came to Long- 
street's headquarters, which then were with his corps, for 
Burnside was menacing him all the time, and at any 
moment might make an attack. 

That night the)' silently stole away, and when the 



ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN. 223 

morning sun shone on Sharpsburg the "Grove's Mansion," 
where I^ee and his generals had had their headquarters, 
"knew them no more forever." 

When it was learned that Lee had retreated across the 
Potomac into Virginia, McClellan ordered Porter to pur- 
sue ; accordingly Griffin, with his own and Barnes' brigade, 
crossed the Potomac, and encountered the rear guard under 
Lawton, and after a sharp action, drove him and followed 
him in his retreat. Lawton lost four guns, which fell into 
Griffin's hands. 

Griffin's success elated Porter very much who next 
morning pressed on after the enemy. 

Jackson was given the position of bringing up the Con- 
federate rear, with instructions to watch the advancing foe, 
for the country was full of disabled men from the Confed- 
erate army, who would join their commands in a few daj'S 
if not captured ; the number is even put as high as 30,000. 
They never crossed into Maryland. Citizens of Shepherds- 
town fully confirm this. 

Learning that the Confederates established a hospital in 
Shepherdstown during the battle, I visited that place sub- 
sequent to the war to hear the citizens' statements. They 
said every house and barn were full of men who had been 
compelled to fall out of ranks to rest and seek food, in addi- 
tion to the wounded from the battlefield. The ladies said 
they were baking for days, and taking the utmost care of 
the disabled soldiers, so they could return to the army. 
Hence Lee must keep McClellan on the Maryland side of 
the Potomac to give him (Lee) time to collect together one- 
third of his arm}', which was straggling and certain to be 
captured if McClellan forced him up the valley. For that 
reason Lee placed Jackson in the rear, knowing that he 
would make desperate efforts to prevent his forces being 
pursued. 

Lee placed his command behind the Opequan, a tribu- 
tary of the Potomac, and was thus lying in wait, with A. P. 
Hill's division in broad view in front, while Early was con- 



224 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

cealed in ambush where he could strike any advance move- 
ment on the flank. 

When Porter came up Hill opened with a vigorous fire 
to draw him still closer, so that Early could enfilade his 
flank. In due time Early opened a murderous fire from 
his concealed position, and Porter was driven back across 
the Potomac. In this engagement the Corn Exchange 
Regiment — a magnificent body of men of Philadelphia — 
suffered severely. Lee had succeeded in accomplishing 
just what he wanted to — prevent an advance for a few days, 
as he might then gather up his straggling soldiers and feed 
his half famished army on the abundance of that rich, bounti- 
ful and beautiful country — the Shenandoah. 

It was a golden opportunity, for the country was as the 
"Land of Goshen," and the citizens gave with alacrity as a 
a rule, for they were intensely Southern in their sympathies. 

On the 19th General Stuart recrossed the Potomac at 
Williamsport with a heavy force of cavalry and infantry, 
supported by a few field pieces. General Couch was ordered 
to go in pursuit of him. But Stuart had performed the 
task assigned to him and avoided a battle, although he 
sustained losses. 

The authorities at Washington, urged on by an impa- 
tient press in the North, were unceasing in their endeavors 
to have McClellan make a fonvard movement. 

Although Lee had collected his stragglers and again 
possessed a large army, yet if he could keep INIcClellan 
from advancing a little longer it would be too late for a fall 
campaign, and the Confederacy might receive foreign re- 
cognition by spring. He was not only playing the part of 
a shrewed general, but that of a skillful diplomate. 

On the 6th of October the enemy appeared in force in 
the valley of Sir John's Run. Waiting to see the effect of 
that move, Lee soon received the glad tidings that Averell 
had been ordered post haste to that point. 

Pleasonton was weakened by the absence of Averell, 
and Lee knew that Stuart could then undertake a circuit 



A N TIE TAM TO RECTORTO WN. 225 

of McClellan's army, which would alarm the North, and 
perhaps retain McClellan where he was awhile longer. 

So, on the loth of October, Stuart, with three brigades 
of cavalry', under Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and Jones, set 
out on that perilous march and crossed the Potomac at 
McCoy's Ferry. He evaded Cox's division on its way "to 
West Virginia, and hurried forward, as his work must be 
done quickly, or his whole command would be sacrificed, 
as Averell was returning with all speed possible, in ac- 
cordance with an order from McClellan. Avoidingf 
Hagerstown, which Stuart feared was well defended, he 
pressed on to Mercersburg, continuing in a northeasterly 
direction, and arrived at Chambersburg the same evening. 
This bold movement had already caused great alarm and 
anxiety, as the following correspondence will show : 

Harrisburg, Pa., October lo, 1862. 

I am just informed that a bodj' of rebel cavalry' have occupied 
Mercersburg, said to be 3,000 strong. They have cut the telegraph 
wires, and are thought to be advancing on Chambersburg. The 
Anderson Cavalry are at Carlisle, and we have 2,500 cavalry unarmed, 
none of them mounted. 

Will you not order Anderson's Cavalry up to Chambersburg, 
and send arms for them here? The rebels have taken all property 
they could move, but have not taken life. A. G. Curtin. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton. 

Harrisburg, Pa., October 10, 1862. 
The following is just received from provost marshal : 

Chambersburg, October 10, 1S62. 
About 15 on horseback, in town, with carbines and a flag of 
truce. Want to see the principal men of town. Have large force 
about one mile from town. Will enter in an hour. 

F. M. KiMMEL, Provost INIarshal. 
Andrew G. Curtin. 

The Anderson Cavalr>' should be ordered at once, and the troops 
in camp here. We cant get Chambersburg by telegraph. 

A. G. Curtin, Governor. 
XV 



226 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Harrisburg, Pa., October lo, 1862. 
The people have surrendered Chambersburg. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton. A. G. Curtin. 

Harrisburg, Pa., October 10, 1862. 

I have a dispatch from vShippensburg, 11 miles from Chambers- 
burg, saying that Chambersburg surrendered at 7 o'clock p. m., and 
is now in possession of rebels. No doubt they will retire before 
we reach there with troops from Carlisle, and am preparing all here 
for service. 

Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck. A. G. Curtin, Governor. 

War Department, Washington, D. C, 
October 10, 1862. 
Communicate with General IVIcClellan and General Wool, and 
use any troops, within your reach to cut off the rebels at Cham- 
bersburg. I have telegraphed to General McClellan, but am uncer- 
tain about his getting the message. H. W. Halleck, 

Governor Curtin, Harrisburg, Pa. General-in-Chief 

Baltimore, October 10, 1862. 
I have received a dispatch from Governor Curtin that the rebels 
are in force at Chambersburg. I will send several regiments from 
this cit}', and I will be at Harrisburg as soon as possible. 

John E. Wool, Major General. 
Maj. Gen. McClELLAN, Knoxville, Md. 

Headquarters Cavalry Division, 

October 11, 1862, 4 a. m. 
Your dispatch of 10 p. m. of last evening is received. I cannot 
find out where McCoy's Ferry is, but presume it is near Hancock. I 
shall therefore move towards Hagerstown, and make inquiries as I 
proceed. My command is very small, from the fact of many horses 
being unshod, and shoes could not be had. The 8th Penns\'lvania 
has not been able to obtain horses to replace the old ones of the 
Peninsula, now used up. Shall, however, do the best I can under 
the circumstances. Very respectfully, 

A. Pleasonton, 
Brigadier General, Commanding Cavalry Division. 
General R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters First Army Corps, 
October 11, 1862, 11 p.m. 
General : — General Reynolds directs that you send a brigade 
of your troops out to-night, and occupy that strip of woods on the 



ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN. 227 

Sharpsburg turnpike at the Dunker Church, near the center of the 
battlefield. We have a few cavalry out to picket that road toward 
Hagerstown, and they are the only forces on the immediate approach 
to our rear in that direction. 

This force is desired to occupy the position indicated that it may 
protect the batteries from an attack of cavalry in the event of an 
attempt to cross towards Mercersville. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

ChAS. B. lyAMBORN, 

A. A. A. G. 
To Brigadier General Doubleday, Commanding First Division. 

(Indorsed:) HEADQUARTERS First Division, 
October ii, 1862. 
Colonel Hofmann will forward with his brigade and battery to 
comply with the within orders and directions. 

By command of Brigadier General Doubleday. 

E. P. Halstead, 

Captain and A. A. G. 

Headquarters First Army Corps, 
October 13, 1S62. 
The general commanding having received information that the 
rebel cavalryman Stuart arrived near the mouth of the ]Monocacy 
\'esterday about noon, directs that you recall brigade from the 
Sharpsburg road. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Chas. B. IvAmborn, 

' A. A. A. G. 
Brigadier General Doubleday, Commanding First Division. 

Colonel : — You will withdraw your brigade immediately. 
By command of Brigadier General Doubleday. 

E. P. Halstead, 
To Colonel Hofmann, Second Brigade. Captain and A. A. G. 

There were some State militia stationed at Chambers- 
burg, but they had never been under fire, and the night 
being dark and gloomy added, perhaps, to the confusion ; 
but they offered no resistance to the entry of the Confeder- 
ate cavalry — the first on Northern soil. 

They conducted themselves well, as no pillaging was 
allowed. The men promenaded the streets in the most 



228 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

orderly manner, with the intention, no doubt, of creating a 
favorable im|)ression on the minds of the people. However, 
the depots of the Government were destroyed. They took 
a great many horses from the farmers, leading away many 
of their own jaded animals. 

Before daylight next morning Stuart was off, taking the 
Gettysburg road to deceive his pursuers ; but soon turned 
to the right, passed through Emmittsburg, continued south- 
ward, and kept the South IMountain range between him and 
McClellan. As all the telegraph wires were cut, no news 
could be received as to the direction in which he was 
marching. Finally, however, news was received by Mc- 
Clellan that he was taking the eastern route. Pleasonton 
was immediately ordered to Mechanicsville ; Burnside, then 
in Pleasant Valley, was ordered to occupy the railroad 
bridge across the Mdnocacy ; Cox was to halt and guard 
the upper Potomac ; while Stoneman, at Poolsville, was to 
distribute his troops so as to protect all the lower fords of 
the Potomac. 

Stuart followed down the right bank of the Monocacy 
until near Frederick, when fearing that troops were de- 
tained there, he turned suddenly to the left, crossed the 
Monocacy, and continued in the direction of INIonrovia. 
Although night had overtaken him while near Frederick, 
there was no lime to be lost for the reason that thousands 
of Federal soldiers were in pursuit of him. 

When Pleasonton reached INIechanicsville he learned 
that Stuart was not more than an hour in advance. Be- 
lieving that Stuart would attempt to cross the Potomac as 
early next morning as possible, Pleasonton pushed forward, 
reached the mouth of the Monocacy about eight in the 
morning of the 12th, where he found a regiment of infan- 
try, but no tidings could be learned of the Confederate 
raiders. At daylight Stuart passed through Hyattsville, 
took the road to Barnesville, and continued in the direction 
of Poolsville, where Stoneman had his headquarters. 

Just before he reached the town he threw his command 



ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN. 229 

into the woods, passed around it, and struck the George- 
town and Hauling Ford road. While Pleasonton was mov- 
ing on that road down the Potomac, his advance soon 
struck the Confederate cavalry, but were too few in num- 
bers to make much impression upon the enemy, as they 
were four times as many. 

Stuart formed a line of skirmishers, then made a detour 
to the left and crossed the Potomac at White's Ford. When 
he reached the Virginia shore he saw Pleasonton' s whole 
column arrive ; also a brigade of infantry from Poolsville 
that was expected at that point much earlier in the day. 
It was fortunate for him that he reached that ford so early 
in the morning. Every move he made from the time he 
left Chambersburg showed the work of a guide thoroughly 
pasted, who could lead him around the towns where troops 
were stationed. 

Nothing more of interest occurred until the army was 
ordered to move. On September 29 Gen. John F. Rey- 
nolds, having joined the army from detached service, was 
assigned to the command of the First Army Corps. 

General Meade took command of the Pennsylvania Re- 
serve Division. Although he had commanded the First 
Corps only twelve days, yet their confidence in him on the 
field was great, and they were proud of him when, later in 
the war, he commanded the Army of the Potomac. 

The First Corps had two of Pennsylvania's illustrious 
soldiers in it — Reynolds commanding the corps and ]\Ieade 
the Pennsylvania Reserves. That division had suffered so 
severely that Governor Curtin endeavored to have it re- 
turned to the State to be recruited to its maximum, and 
accordingly addressed the following letter to the President 
on that subject : 

Pennsylvania Executive IMansion, 
Harrisburg, September 30, 1862. 

Sir : — I have the honor to refer to some of the topics of our 
conversation last week, at which time you were pleased to say, that 
you desired the Governors of the loyal States present to put their 
susforestions in writing:. 



230 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

I proposed, at that time, to fill the regiments in service most 
reduced by the casualties of war, by retiring a given number from 
the more active service with the armies in the presence of the enemy, 
and having filled them and obtained a perfect reorganization, re- 
turn them to the field and retire others until they were all filled to 
the standard established by the Government, in the mean time sup- 
pljdng their places in the field with new regiments. I named ten 
regiments as the number to be retired at each time from this State. 
Most of our regiments that have participated in the recent battles 
are reduced to mere skeletons, and although we have furnished 
about fifteen thousand recruits for regiments from this State, no 
efiicient strength has been given to any of them. 

The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, numbering thirteen regiments 
of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one of artillery, with a 
numerical strength of fifteen thousand seven hundred and sixty 
men, were taken into the service of the United States in July, 1861, 
immediately after the first battle of Manassas. 

The thirteen regiments of infantry did not muster four thousand 
men after the battle of Antietam. 

All of these regiments are much reduced in number, whilst 
many of them can scarcely be said to retain regimental organiza- 
tions. The brilliant history of the Reserve Corps in the war, and 
the State pride, which has followed them since they entered the serv- 
ice, together with the circumstances surrounding their organiza- 
tion, would I have no doubt, prove such incentives to enlistment 
that the corps could be filled to the maximum in a short space of 
time. 

I suggest that the corps be returned to the State, and placed in 
the camp at this Capital, and, if I am correct in my impression, the 
success would affect the minds of our people favorably and other 
regiments in the service could be filled in their turn promptly. 

It is proper that, in this connection, I should say that the sug- 
gestion reflects the opinion of all the officers of the corps. I take 
this opportunity of again renewing the suggestions of all the Gov- 
ernors on the occasion referred to, that so far as consistent with the 
interests of the public service, sick and wounded volunteers be taken 
to the hospitals within the State in which they were enlisted. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant. 

A. G. CURTIN. 

To His Excellency A. Lincoln, President. 

That was a wise proposition, but the President was 
afraid to drain the army of the brave old soldiers in face of 
the enemy. On that account Governor Curtin's request 



ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN. 231 

for the Pennsylvania Reserves to be sent home, was not 
granted, and the regiments were reorganized as best they 
could be. 

Colonel Roberts, of the ist Regiment, who had won dis- 
tinction on the Peninsula, and had displayed great soldierly 
qualities in command of a brigade, had been recommended 
for brigadier general, but by some failure or accident, his 
name was not forwarded by the War Department to the 
Senate. After the battle of Antietam, Governor Curtin 
asked General McClellan to accept his resignation, so that 
he could appoint him on his staff. On the urgent request 
of Curtin, McClellan accepted it, and he at once entered on 
duty in the military office of the Executive Department at 
Harrisburg, and served on Curtin' s staff until the close of 
his second administration. Capt. William Cooper Talley, 
who had gallantly commanded the regiment at Antietam, 
was commissioned colonel. A worthy and deserved pro- 
motion. 

In the 3d Regiment there were many changes, and the 
regiment hailed with delight the return of Colonel Sickles, 
who was a great favorite. In the 8th Regiment Lieutenant 
Colonel Oliphant was in such bad health that he was com- 
pelled to leave the service, and Major Bailey was made col- 
onel. The loth was brought into the service by Col. John 
S. McCalmont, a classmate of Rosecrans, Doubleday and 
Longstreet at West Point, but who was then on the bench 
which he left when the tocsin of war sounded. He was an 
able officer, but in consequence of his bad health, he was 
forced to resign in May, 1862, to save his life. The service 
lost a valuable man. Meade and Reynolds had great con- 
fidence in him, and both were loath to lose him. McCal- 
mont in appearance is tall and angular, and not unlike 
Lincoln. He also possesses much of that quiet, quaint 
way of reasoning for which qualities the martyred Pres- 
ident was so distinguished. Colonel McCalmont displayed 
bravery and military skill in the battle of Dranesville. 

Lieut. Col. James T. Kirk was promoted to be colonel of 



232 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the regiment, but the Peninsular campaign had ruined his 
health, and he was also compelled to resign. In turn he 
was succeeded in the command of the regiment by A. J. 
Warner, an excellent officer, and who since has been 
an able and distinguished member of Congress from Ohio, 
to which State he removed soon after the war. 

In the 1 2th Capt. D. N. Mathewson resigned on account 
of sickness, though he afterwards entered the service as 
lieutenant colonel of the 30tli Regiment of the Pennsyl- 
vania emergency troops of 1863. 

Col. J. H. Taggart resigned at Harrison's Landing, to 
return home to attend to business, which had been neglected 
during an absence of more than a year. General Truman 
Seymour indorsed the following on Colonel Taggart' s 
resignation: "Colonel Taggart has rendered useful and 
honorable service during these last battles. At Mechanics- 
ville his regiment occupied the post of honor on the left, 
and held the enemy firmly in check and behaved with great 
gallantry." 

General McCall, in his report on the battle of Mechanics- 
ville, thus refers to some of his officers: "Where all so 
gallantly supported the honor of the flag, it would appear 
invidious to particularize, but my thanks are particularly 
due to Generals Reynolds, Meade, and Seymour ; to Colonels 
Simmons and Taggart ; to Lieutenant Colonel IMcCandless 
and Major Stone, all of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, 
and who were zealous and active, as well as gallant, in the 
discharge of their arduous duties throughout this well- 
fought action." 

In 1864 Colonel Taggart was appointed chief preceptor 
of the Free Military School for Officers for Colored Troops, 
organized in Philadelphia by the supervisory committee 
for recruiting colored troops, designed to instruct white 
officers for such troops, there being a demand for white 
commissioned officers. This school was under the direction 
and patronage of Secretary Stanton. 

Col. Hugh McNeil, of the Bucktail Regiment, was 



A NTIE TA M TO RE C TOR TO IVN. 233 

killed on the afternoon of the i6th, when he was advancing 
the skirmish line. The command of the regiment was given 
to Capt. Charles Frederick Taylor, the youngest brother of 
Ba>-ard Ta^'lor, who earned fame later in the service. In 
addition to the different changes and promotions the division 
was materially strengthened by the accession of two new 
regiments. 

The 12 1st Pennsylvania, commanded by Col. Chapman 
Biddle, was added to the First Brigade, and the I42d, com- 
manded by Col. Robert P. Cummins, joined the Second 
Brigade. 

In the mean time McClellan and Lee had been using 
their utmost endeavors to put their armies in the best pos- 
sible condition. The month of October was quietly steal- 
ing away, and as yet the Army of the Potomac had not 
moved. A growing impatience pervaded Washington, and 
the bickerings between Halleck and McClellan were ripen- 
ing into bitter feelings, though Halleck also expressed the 
sentiments of the Secretary of War. 

Finally a forward movement was decided on, and Berlin, 
five miles below Harper's Ferry, selected as the place to 
cross the Potomac. McClellan had decided to take the line 
in the valley east of the Blue Ridge range, while Lee was 
in the Shenandoah Valley just west of the Blue Ridge. It 
was evident that McClellan had chosen that line for the 
reason that Lincoln promised him help from Washington if 
lie did so. Lincoln did not oppose McClellan' s following 
Lee up the Shenandoah Valley and driving him out of it. 
On the contrary, he would have been glad if such had oc- 
curred, if he attacked him as early as possible. 

While Berlin was selected as the main place of crossing, 
bridges were thrown across the Potomac and Shenandoah 
at Harper's Ferry, and the army commenced crossing into 
Virginia on the 26th. The Ninth Corps, under WMlcox, 
was the first to cross at Berlin, followed by the reser\'e 
artillery, Stoneman's division, the First and Sixth Corps. 
The Second and Fifth Corps crossed at the ferry. Slocum 



234 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

with the Twelfth remained at Harper's Ferr}'. jMorrell had 
three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry with which to 
guard the upper Potomac from the mouth of the Monocacy 
to the Cumberland. 

Now that McClellan's army was marching up the valley 
between the Bull Run and Blue Ridge Mountains, with only 
the Blue Ridge between the two armies, the passes in that 
range suddenly assumed a value of great importance ; as 
either army might suddenly dash through one of them and 
strike the other on the march and overwhelm it before it 
could prepare for battle. Napoleon would not have peace- 
ably marched parallel with the enemy without attempting 
to take advantage of his adversary when strung out on a 
march. Hampton came very near defeating Kilpatrick in 
just such a march, x^ll that saved him was his artiller}men 
raking a road in Hampton's rear, when he supposed the guns 
were manned by his own men, whereas they were Kilpatrick's, 
hid in a corn-crib to avoid being captured when Hampton 
made his charge. They left their guns loaded and hid in the 
crib when Hampton swept past them. Then the)' ran out to 
the guns and fired them down the narrow road where Hamp- 
ton's victorious cavalry were charging, which compelled them 
to seek safety in the woods. Just then Kilpatrick came from 
the swamp, where he had fled for safety, and mounted on a 
horse without saddle, and no clothing on except a shirt, 
he fell on his adversary with a fury that knew no bounds, 
driving the South Carolina cavalier from the field. 

The passes of the Blue Ridge beginning at the Potomac, 
are \"estars Gap, Gregory's Gap, Snicker's Gap, Ashby's 
Gap, Manassas Gap and Chester Gap. 

As a matter of course McClellan would have to get his 
supplies from Berlin, on the Potomac until he could strike 
the Manassas Gap Railway, running from INIanassas Junc- 
tion through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run IMoun- 
tains, and passing on through Manassas Gap in the Blue 
Ridge. Pleasonton's cavalry marched along the east base 
of the Blue Ridge to clear McClellan's front, as Lee was 



AATIETAM TO RECTORTOWN. 235 

using his cavalry to guard the gaps in the mountain. On 
October 31 Pleasonton reported to McClellan that from sev- 
eral sources he learned there were 6,000 men in Snicker's 
Gap. He asked for a support of infantry, and Hofmann's 
brigade of Doubleday's division of the First Corps was 
sent to him. When Hofmann arrived he found Pleasonton 
engaged with the enemy in front of the town of Philmont. 
The Confederates were shelling him with considerable 
rapidity. Pleasonton immediately directed Hofmann to put 
two of his regiments in the woods on the left of the road. 
Accordingly the 56th Pennsylvania, under Major Smith, 
and the 95tli New York, under Lieutenant Colonel Post, 
were directed by Hofmann to deploy in obedience to the 
order of Pleasonton. These two regiments having cleared 
their front, they were recalled, and Hofmann was directed 
to take his brigade and advance through the town and hold 
it. As the brigade was advancing Pleasonton sent for a 
regiment to support a battery to the left and rear ; the 76th 
New York, under Major Livingston, was directed by Hof- 
mann to perform that duty. 

After Hofmann had passed through the town, he sent 
the 95th New York and two companies of the 56th Penn- 
sylvania to take possession of a strip of woods to the left 
of the road, and some three hundred yards to the front. 
Two companies of the /tli Indiana, commanded by Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Cheek, were directed to picket the road 
into the town. 

Hofmann sent back for some artillery, which Pleasonton 
immediately brought up in person. Pleasonton then directed 
Hofmann to advance again, still leaving the 76tli New York 
on duty in the town. The enemy's artillery opened at 
once, one shell striking the colors of the 7th Indiana, kill- 
ing the color sergeant, and wounding several others. When 
our artillery arrived and got into position, the enemy retired 
about three-quarters of a mile, Hofmann pursuing. The 
56th Pennsylvania suffered in crossing a field, but the 
regiment never faltered, the gap was at once closed up, 



236 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and they moved forward as if on dress parade. The 
brigade was then shielded behind a stone wall while our 
artillery again played on the enemy with considerable effect. 
The 95 th New York was ordered to go to the left to support 
a section of artillery ; soon it was deemed advisable to reen- 
force that point with the 56th Pennsylvania. The enemy 
again retreated, and darkness put an end to the action. 

Pleasonton ordered these two regiments to take posses- 
sion of and occupy a hill a little to the left and front. In 
the morning Pleasonton directed Hofmann to bring forward 
the 7th Indiana and the battery, to hold the hill. While 
that regiment was coming up the 56th Pennsylvania was 
thrown forward on the right to feel the enemy in that di- 
rection in a piece of woods, which was accordingly taken 
and held until evening. 

One section of the battery was advanced about half a 
mile when it became hotly engaged with a battery of the 
enemy, posted under cover of a large house and barn on 
our left front. 

Finally Pleasonton decided that the position of the 
enemy at the house and barn would have to be carried by a 
charge. Hofmann ordered the 95th New York to comply 
with Pleasonton' s order, and as soon as Lieutenant Colonel 
Post gave the order to advance they dashed forward in 
magnificent style, soon taking the position, while the 
enemy prudently retired. 

The brigade was not advanced any farther, but Pleas- 
onton followed with his cavalry, taking with him Lieuten- 
ant Edgell with two sections of his battery. 

In the evening General Pleasonton directed Hofmann to 
return with his brigade to his division, and give his com- 
pliments to General Doubleday for the valuable assistance 
of so excellent a brigade. The boys had won golden opin- 
ions from tlie cavalry commander, and highly pleased their 
brigade commander. 

It was evident to Lee that he could not hold his position 
in the Shenandoah Valley with jMcClcllan moving up the 



A N TIE TAM TO RECTORTO WN. 237 

valley on the east side of the range, as he (McClellan) wonld 
soon gain his rear and cut off his communication with 
Richmond, and as there were about 70,000 troops in and 
about Washington under Banks, there was no hope of his 
turning suddenly and making a forced march, appearing 
before Washington, and demanding its surrender before 
McClellan could overtake him. The 70,000 at Washington 
would warmly greet him, and, with the aid of the artillery, 
be amply able to repel any assault made. 

If he had again attempted to invade the North, with 
McClellan in his rear, the chances were that his army 
v/ould have been ruined, and the Confederacy have been 
placed in its death throes. 

So, assuming that prudence was the better part of valor, 
he at once commenced a rapid retrograde movement up the 
valley to forestall the movement of McClellan. His stores 
and a considerable portion of his artillery passed through 
Thornton's Gap for Culpeper Court House on the ist of 
November, followed by Longstreet, who moved up the val- 
ley, crossed the Shenandoah at Front Royal, passed through 
the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and fell back on Culpei^er. 

With Longstreet at Culpeper, D. H. Hill's division at 
Chester Gap, and Jackson in the valley at Millwood, nearly 
100 miles from Longstreet, it would have been an easy mat- 
ter for the Army .of the Potomac to fall on and crush D. H. 
Hill, and then, facing down the valley annihilate Jackson. 
I say annihilate, for the Army of the Potomac had just 
been reenforced by Sigel's corps and Sickles' division. If 
two-thirds of the army had marched down the Shenan- 
doah, and one-third had countermarched down the same 
valley it came up, Jackson would have been ruined. 

It is not known what McClellan intended to do aside 
from the fact of making Warrenton his headquarters. 
Many officers and soldiers deplored his removal. Many do 
to this day. He had embittered Stanton and Halleck, and 
had more than once hurt the feelings of President Lincoln, 
which mortified many of his friends. 



238 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

On the 6th of November McClellan's army was sta- 
tioned as follows : The First Corps at Warrenton ; the 
Second at Rectortown, on the Manassas Gap Railroad ; the 
Eleventh, under Sigel, was at New Baltimore ; Sickles' di- 
vision was at Warrenton Junction ; the Fifth Corps was at 
Snicker's Gap, and the Sixth at Upperville, bringing up 
the rear. 

No one then dreamed of McClellan's removal, although 
he had had a lurking suspicion that he would be ; but as 
he was marching, it came on him like a clap of thunder in 
a clear sky, when he was making every arrangement for 
the fall campaign. 

One of his last orders was appointing General Patrick 
provost marshal general of the Army of the Potomac, and 
assigning him to duty at his headquarters. 

The following is General Patrick's order communicating 
it to his brigade : 

Hdors Third Brigade, First Div., First Army Corps, 
General Orders, No. 64. Camp Barrett, October 7, 1862. 

The Brigadier- General commanding having been assigned to 
duty at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac by General 
Orders, No. 161, of the 6th inst., hereby relinquishes to Colonel 
Rodgers, of the 21st New York Volunteers, the command of the 
brigade he received from him seven months ago. Only seven months 
ago he assumed command ; j-et the ties that bind those who, 
like ourselves, have shared each other's hardships and dangers, who 
have followed the standard through so manj' battles, and gathered 
around it with their ranks thinned, but unbroken, when the combat 
was over — such ties cannot be broken by the order that relieves 5'our 
general from the command. That he must continue to take the 
liveliest interest in the welfare of a brigade that has never failed in 
the hour of peril, whether in daylight or darkness, to honor his 
every command, no one can doubt ; and he trusts that both officers 
and men will touch lightly upon his faults, in the full conviction 
that, as their commander, he has endeavored to discharge his duties 
to them, to his country and to his God. He leaves you with fervent 
wishes for your prosperit}^ and the earnest hope that an honorable 
peace may soon be won, so that we may once more return to our 
loved homes by the broad rivers and lakes of the Empire vState. 

By order of General Patrick. 



ANTIETAM TO RECTO R TO IVN. 239 

On the evening of November 7 General McClellan was 
seated in his tent at Rectortown. A furious snowstorm 
was raging in the State that once claiined to be the mother 
of Presidents ; now this sacred soil was the heart of a for- 
midable rebellion to destroy the Government that George 
Washington, Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson greatly 
assisted to bring into existence. While thus meditating, 
little did the young American Napoleon dream that he 
soon would be deposed from the high and responsible 
position he held, never again to enjoy it. It was a 
great shock to the Army of the Potomac, for the officers 
and men adored him. No one knows to this day, posi- 
tively, why he was relieved. The half insinuation that 
he was removed for political reasons is scarcely true in the 
face of the fact that Grant, Rosecrans, Logan, Meade, Rey- 
nolds (who fell at Gettysburg), Hooker, Hunt (the great 
artilleryman), Sickles, Slocum, and other prominent gen- 
erals were Democrats whom the country trusted then and 
honor still, certainly forever removes any such suspicion of 
that kind ; and the candid individual or historian must look 
for some other reason. 

McClellan had been Lincoln's favorite, and he never 
consented to his removal except upon what appeared to 
him not only justifiable grounds, but a necessity, for, so 
noble was Lincoln that he would not harm his bitterest 
enemy ; and the Southern people sincerely regretted his 
assassination, for they knew he was sympathetic beyond 
degree ; that his charity had enough in it to make a mantle 
for the whole South ; while his simplicity and honesty was 
more Godlike than manlike. 

He never wronged INIcClellan — he simply did his duty as 
President. He had his reasons, which were forced upon 
his convictions notwithstanding his attachment for this 
brilliant and popular officer. 

The following orders are given in full that the public 
may be in possession of them, and free to form their own 
opinions : 



240 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Executive Mansion, 
Washington, November 5, 1862. 

By direction of the President, it is ordered that Major General 
McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, and that Major General Burnside take command of that army. 
Also that Major General Hunter take command of the corps in said 
army which is now commanded by General Burnside. That Major- 
General Fitz-John Porter be relieved from the command of the corps 
he now commands in said army, and that Major General Hooker 
take command of said corps. 

The General-in Chief is authorized in (his) discretion, to issue 
an order substantially as the above, forthwith, or as soon as he may 
deem proper. A. Lincoln. 

Headquarters of the Army. 
Washington, November 5, 1862. 
General : — On receipt of this order of the President, sent here- 
with, you will immediately turn over 3'our command to Major Gen- 
eral Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting, on your 
arrival at that place, by telegraph, for further orders. 

Very respectfull3% your obedient servant, 

H. W. Halleck, General-in Chief. 
To Major General McClELLAN, Commanding, &c. 

General Orders, | War Department, Adj. Gen.'s Office, 

No. 182. i Washington, Novembers, 1862. 

By the direction of the President of the United States, it is or- 
dered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the command 
of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major General Burnside take 
the command of that army. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

Ed. D. Townsend, Asst. Adj. General. 

Headquarters oe the Army, 
Washington, D. C, Novembers, 1862. 
General : — Immediately on assuming command of the Army 
of the Potomac, you will report the position of j-our troops, and 
what you purpose doing with them. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief 
To INIajor General Burnside, Commanding, &c. 

These orders were given to General Buckinoliam, with 
instrtictions to proceed to the front and deliver them to 
General McClellan. As the historians do not agree about 



ANTIETAM TO RECTO RTOWN. 241 

this matter, I have decided to give General Buckingham's 
own statement of it : 

I was at the time on special duty at the War Department, my 
office being adjoining the Secretary's private room. On the even- 
ing of the 6th of November, about ten o'clock, the Secretary sent 
for me to come to his office, where I found him with General Hal- 
leck. He told me that he wanted me to go and find the Army of 
the Potomac, and spent some time in giving minute directions as to 
the route I should take. Just before I left he handed me two envel- 
opes, unsealed, telling me to take them to vay room, and, having 
read them, to seal them up. I was thunderstruck to find that one 
of the envelopes contained two orders for McClellan — one from the 
President, relieving him from the command of the army, and the 
other from General Halleck, ordering him to report to some town in 
New Jersey and report b}'- letter to the War Department. The other 
envelope contained two orders to Burnside — one from the President, 
assigning him to the command of the army, vice McClellan, and 
the other from General Halleck, directing him to report what his 
plans were. Before leaving next morning, I saw the Secretarj^ at 
his home, and he explained to me his reasons for sending an officer 
of my rank on an errand like that. The first w^as that he feared 
Burnside would not accept the command, and my instructions were 
to use, if necessary, the strongest arguments to induce him not to 
refuse. The second reason, though a characteristic one, had ver}- 
little foundation. 

The Secretary had not onl}' no confidence in McClellan's mili- 
tary skill, but he very much doubted his patriotism, and even loy- 
alty, and he expressed to me some fear that McClellan would not 
give up the command, and he wished, therefore, that the order should 
be presented by an officer of high rank, direct from the War Depart- 
ment, so as to carry the full weight of the President's authorit}-. 
He directed me to see Burnside first and get his decision. If he 
consented to accept, I was to see McClellan ; but if not I was to re- 
turn to Washington. 

I found Burnside about fifteen miles south of Salem, where his 
division was halted and he alone in a little chamber. Closing the 
door, I made known my errand. He at once declined the command. 
Whatever my private opinion may have been, my dut}' was to fol- 
low the directions of the Secretary of War, and, if possible, over- 
come his objections. It happened, however, knowing, as I did, that 
the President was resolved at all events to remove IMcClellan, that I 
felt fully satisfied that he (Burnside) ought to accept, and urged 
him to do so. Among other objections, he urged his want of confi- 
XVI 



242 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

dence in himself, and his particularly friendly relations to McClel- 
lan, to whom he felt under the strongest obligations. I met these 
objections by stating that McClellan's removal was resolved upon 
at any rate, and that if he (Burnside) did not accept the command, 
it would be given to Hooker, who became, in fact, Burnside's suc- 
cessor. He at length consented to obey the order, and I requested 
him to go with me to find McClellan. We returned to Salem, whence 
I had ridden on horseback through a snowstorm, and I had my lo- 
comotive fired up the same evening, and on it we proceeded about 
five miles up the railroad to McClellan's camp. 

About eleven o'clock we found him alone in his tent, examining 
papers, and as we both entered together, he received us in his usual 
kind and cordial manner. 

My task was not only a painful one, but particularly distasteful 
to me in view of rny friendly feelings for McClellan. But as the 
blow had to come, I was glad that it was not to be given through 
an unkind hand, and in a mortifying way. 

General McClellan has himself borne testimony to the kind 
manner in which I communicated the order, and I can bear testimony 
to his prompt and cheerful obedience. 

This is Buckingham's statement of it. 

The Comte de Paris, on page 555, second vohime of 
his work, says that Burnside was in INIcClellan's tent 
"when the bearer of a dispatch from tlie President was 
announced. This was General Buckingham, an officer un- 
known to the Army of the Potomac, who brought him an 
order contained in three lines, signed by Halleck." 

Buckingham has made two mistakes in his statement. 
He says McClellan was to report by letter, whereas the 
order says by telegraph; he says he fotmd Burnside at 
Salem in command of a division — that is one-third of a 
corps. At that time Burnside was in command of a grand 
division — two corps. 

They both agree that there was the strongest friendship 
existing between McClellan and Burnside, for McClellan 
turned the order over to Burnside with the remark : "Well, 
Burnside, you are to command the army." On Burnside's 
part, he paid McClellan the highest respect in his power 
— ordered the troops out to pass in review before him. 



ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOIVN. 243 

It was a just and noble act on the part of Burnside. Mc- 
Clellan was simply relieved from command, the same as 
Pope had been, and Burnside and Hooker were soon to be. 
He passed on hastily to Trenton, and in accordance with 
orders telegraphed to the War Department, which ended 
his military career. 

A prominent general of the Army of the Potomac said : 

McClellan will live in the history'- of his country, and occupy a 
very prominent place in it. He did valuable service in organizing 
the Arni}^ of the Potomac. He had only been a captain, when he 
was made a general. It was not long until he was given a command 
next to General Scott. He was promoted too rapidly. If he had 
risen more graduall}' he would have been surer of success. Hancock 
never had more magnetism than McClellan possessed. 

Swinton says of him : 

To General McClellan, personally, it was a misfortune that he 
became so prominent a figure at the commencement of the contest ; 
for it was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the 
nation's ignorance of war. Taking this into account, estimating 
both what he accomplished and what he failed to accomplish, in the 
actual circumstances of his performance, I have endeavored in the 
critique of his campaigns to strike a just balance between McClellan 
and histor}^ Of him it ma}' be said, that if he does not belong to 
that foremost category of commanders, made up of those who have 
always been successful, and including but few illustrious names, 
neither does he rank with that numerous class who have ruined 
their armies without fighting. He ranges with that middle 
category of meritorious commanders, who, like Sertorius, Wallen- 
stein, and William of Orange, generally unfortunate in war, yet 
were, in the words of Marmont, "never destroyed nor discouraged, 
but were always able to oppose a menacing front, and make the 
enemy pay dear for what he gained." 



CHAPTER IX. 

FREDERICKSBURG. 

-^nn^HERE were many reasons why Burnside should be 
-*- the successor of McClellan. He was the acknowl- 
edged and avowed friend of the General-in-Chief, to the ex- 
tent that he did all in his power to hold him at the head of 
the army. Burnside had been twice offered the command 
before, but positively refused it. 

McClellan gave him the command of two corps, a grand 
division, in the Maryland campaign, an honor that he did 
not confer on any other general, and that must have given 
Burnside the idea of forming grand divisions, which he pro- 
ceeded to do as soon as he assumed command. The warm 
friendship between them probably made it easier for Burn- 
side to succeed him than any other general. He accom- 
panied Burnside from Rectortown to Warrenton, where he 
bade him farewell, after reviewing the army, and proceeded 
to Trenton, N. J., to which place he had been ordered by 
General Halleck. 

Burnside had succeeded well in North Carolina and, that, 
I)erhaps, gave additional confidence in him at Washington 
and throughout the countr}'. 

It was claimed by the friends of McClellan that he was 
about to strike a fatal blow to the enemy, though no one 
ever gave his plans to the public. Gen. J. C. Duaue, his 
engineer, informs me that McClellan would have forced a 
battle in forty-eight hours if he had not been relieved. 

Burnside knew the position of the Confederate forces, 
and there could be no delay, or else the fleet-footed Jack- 
son would soon unite his forces with Longstreet, and 
244 



FREDERI CKSB UR G . 245 

the valuable opportunity would be lost. Would lie hurl 
his army on D. H. Hill's division, at Chester Gap, and 
then turn down the valley, crush Jackson or compel his 
command to scatter and fly to the mountains ; or, would 
he march, with all possible haste, on Culj^eper and attack 
Longstreet before he could receive assistance ? He knew 
the authorities at Washington wanted him to make a 
vigorous campaign, and his plan was demanded by Halleck. 
Day after day witnessed his army still hovering around 
Warrenton, while he was reorganizing it, which he should 
have done in one night, and then issued oi-ders to move 
the next morning by daylight. When Meade relieved 
Hooker the army moved on just as if no change had 
been made in commanders. Burnside's success depended 
on the celerity of his movements while the enemy was 
divided. 

Jackson's fame for rapid marching already filled the 
whole land with wonder, and as he was nearly one hundred 
miles from Longstreet, it gave Burnside a good chance 
to defeat one of them, and he- could take his choice. 
But he decided to pay no attention to the enemy, and to go 
on with his grand scheme of reorganization. He did not 
take Governor Curtin's plan, when he sent a force into 
Delaware to save the Dupont powder works. His attorney- 
general told him that it was unconstitutional to send troops 
into another State without a request. "Well," said the 
Governor, " I will save the powder, and then consider the 
constitutionality of it." Had Burnside fought a great 
battle and been victorious, he would have had plenty of 
time to reorganize his army, and have an admiring world 
looking on while the great chieftain prepared to strike 
another blow. But we still find the new commander hard 
at work arranging his commands, which, when settled, were 
not such great changes after all. 

The army under the new regime gave Sumner the right 
grand division ; that was all that was new in that wing, for 
Couch already commanded the Second and Wilcox the Ninth 



246 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Corps. The center grand division was placed under Hooker, 
with the Third Corps under Stoneman, while Butterfield re- 
lieved Porter in the Fifth. The left grand division was com- 
manded by Franklin, with the First Corps under Reynolds, 
and the Sixth under W. F. Smith, known as " OldBaldy." 
The new regiments had been assigned by McClellan before 
he crossed the Potomac, so Burnside had no heavy task in 
that matter. The 24th Michigan had been assigned to the 
Fourth Brigade of the First Division of the First Corps. 

The 136th Pennsylvania was added to the Second Bri- 
gade of the Second Division of the First Corps. It was a val- 
uable addition indeed, for it returned to the great State of 
Pennsylvania with the jJ^oud record of having valiantly 
fought on the field and won distinction for bravery, under its 
gallant colonel, Thomas ]\I. Bayne, who has since served his 
State many years as a distinguished member of Congress. 
That regiment also furnished another able member of the 
House of Representatives — afterwards United States Sena- 
tor — John I. Mitchell, of Pennsylvania, who was a captain 
in it. The i6th Maine, which had been on detached serv- 
ice since the 13th of September (it rejoined on the 9th), 
was assigned to the Third Brigade of the Second Division 
of the First Corps. These were all the new regiments re- 
ceived by the First Corps. The corps had great reason to 
be proud of every one of them, for their banners always 
floated where the battle raged with the greatest fury. 

The 19th Maine was assigned to Howard's brigade of 
the Second Corps. 

On the 9th, Burnside made a plan which was not satis- 
factory to the President, Secretary of War, or General Hal- 
leck, but it was decided to permit him to follow his own 
judgment, as he had been so successful in North Carolina. 
It was evidently his intention to avoid a battle until spring, 
and then take the old route up the Peninsula, where Mc- 
Clellan led the army the year before, but was compelled to 
retire after he had pressed close enough to see the spires in 
the city of Richmond. 



FREDERICKSBURG. 247 

Halleck went to Warrenton to consult with Burnside, 
but it is quite evident, from his report to Secretary Stanton, 
on the 15th of November, 1862, that they did not agree, 
for Halleck says in his report : 

On reaching Warrenton, however, General Burnside proposed 
to give up the pursuit of Lee's army toward Richmond, and to move 
down the north side of the Rappahannock to Falmouth, and estab- 
lish a new base of supplies at Aquia Creek or Belle Plain. 

This proposed change of base was not approved by me, and in 
a personal interview at Warrenton I strongly urged him to retain 
his present base, and continue his march toward Richmond in the 
manner pointed out in the President's letter of October 13 to General 
McClellan. 

General Burnside did not full}' concur in the President's views, 
but finally consented to so modif}- his plan to cross his army by the 
fords of the upper Rappahannock, and then move down and seize 
the heights south of Fredericksburg, while a small force was to be 
sent north of the river to enable General Haupt to reopen the rail- 
road and to rebuild the bridges, the materials for which were nearly 
ready in Alexandria. 

I, however, refused to give va.y official approval of this devia- 
tion from the President's instructions until his assent was obtained. 
On my return to Washington, on the 13th, I submitted to him the 
proposed change in the plan of campaign, and on receiving his 
assent, rather than approval, I telegraphed, on the 14th, authority 
to General Burnside to adopt it. I here refer, not to General Burn- 
side's written plan to Falmouth, but to that of crossing the Rappa- 
hannock above its junction with the Rapidan. 

********* 
Very respectfully, your obedient serA^ant, 

H. W. Halleck, 
To Hon. E. M. Stanton, General-in-Chief. 

Secretary of War. 

Ivincoln's letter to McClellan, referred to by Halleck, is 
so remarkable that it is here given in full : 

Executive IMansion, 

Washington, D. C, October 13, 1862. 

My Dear Sir : — You remember my speaking to you of what I 

called youxovercautiousness. Are you not overcautious when j-ou 

assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing ? 

Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act 



248 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

upon the claim ? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck 
that you cannot subsist j^our army at Winchester, unless the rail- 
road from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. 
But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a dis- 
tance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as 3'ou would 
have to do, without the railroad last named. He now wagons from 
Culpeper Court House, which is just about twice as far as j^ou 
would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more 
than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly 
should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from 
Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of 
autumn to give it to 3'ou, and in fact ignores the question of time, 
which cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard 
maxims of war, as you know, is to operate upon the enemy's com- 
munications as much as possible without exposing your own. You 
seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your 
favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he 
would break your communications with Richmond within the next 
twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if 
he does so in full force he gives up his communications to you ab- 
sohxtely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. 
If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is 
left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water line, you are now 
nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and 
he must take. Whj^ can yoxi not reach there before him, unless 3'ou 
admit that he is more than your equal on a march ? His route is 
the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good 
on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to 
cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue 
Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's 
communications, which I would seize if he would permit. 

If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, hold- 
ing his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his com- 
munications and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to 
him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity^ should present, and at 
least try to beat hira to Richmond on the inside track. I say ' ' try ; ' ' 
if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at 
W^inchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him 
there, on the idea that if we cannot beat liim when he bears the 
wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage 
of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too im- 
portant to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he 
tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should 
not so operate as merely to drive him away. As we must beat him 



FREDERICKSBURG. 249 

somewhere or fail finall}-, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than 
far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never 
can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond. 

Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, 
the facility of supplying from the side away from the eneni}' is re- 
markable, as it were, by different spokes of a wheel, extending from 
the hub toward the rim, and this whether you move directly by the 
chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closel}^ 
The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haj'market, and 
Fredericksburg ; and j-ou see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally 
the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meets you at all points from Wash- 
ington ; the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press 
closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. 

The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the 
following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit : Vestal's, 5 miles ; 
Gregory's, 13 ; Snicker's, 18 ; Ashby's, 28 ; Manassas, 38 ; Chester, 
45 ; and Thornton's, 53 miles. I should think it preferable to take 
the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important 
move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his 
forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to 
attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would 
be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Rich- 
mond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from 
here. When at length running for Richmond ahead of him, en- 
abling him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in 
the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such 
point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the 
enem5^ and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is 
in no sense an order. Yours truly, A. L,incoln. 

Major General McCleLLAN. 

When Burnside received Halleck's telegram, stating 
that the President consented to his plan, he at once put his 
army in motion for Fredericksburg, though keeping it on 
the north side of the river, contrary to the understanding 
that at least a large portion of it was to be thrown on the 
south bank above the confluence of the Rappahannock and 
Rapidan, 

The Rappahannock is a short river rising in the moun- 
tains, meandering its way down through Virginia ; it is not 
much more than a mountain stream until Warren ton is 
reached, then several tributaries assist in swelling it into a 



250 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

river, the principal one being tlie Rapidan. At Fredericks- 
burg it is quite deep below the falls, and cannot be crossed 
except by bridges. When the army started from Warren- 
ton, Sumner's grand division was given the advance ; the 
Second Corps arrived on the 17th at Falmouth, a little town 
on the left bank of the Rappahannock opposite the upper 
edge of Fredericksburg. They are river towns and, as a 
matter of course, are built facing it. 

The only particular enterprise in either place consisted 
of numerous flouring mills, old-fashioned stone mills that 
had been erected there in earlier days. A conduit or canal 
which tapped the river at the dam wound its way back of 
the city, and finally emptied into Hazel Run about a mile 
below it. The canal had been a feeder to mills on that 
side of the river, about four feet deep and the same in 
width. This stream proved a great source of annoyance to 
the right and center grand divisions when charging on the 
heights in the rear of the city. 

When Sumner arrived at Falmouth, Fredericksburg was 
occupied only by a small force commanded b}' Barksdale. 
As soon as the Union troops appeared on the Stafford 
Heights (Stafford County lies on the left bank), an artillery 
duel began between Pettit's battery, under the direction of 
General Couch, and L/Cwis' light battery, stationed in Fred- 
ericksburg. The enemy was soon driven from his guns ; 
as they stood there unmanned, it was a great temptation to 
cross the river and capture them. Burnside's orders were 
so imperative not to cross the river, that even Sumner 
would not permit a volunteer force to go over and get them. 

That night Sumner sent a note to Burnside asking per- 
mission to take Fredericksburg, if he (Sumner) could find 
a crossing. There is no doubt but that he could have 
crossed at the dam, or a few miles above it without trouble. 
He said afterwards that he knew where he could have 
crossed. 

Burnside, however, declined to give the desired permis- 
sion, stating that it was not advisable to take Fredericks- 



I 



FREDERICKSBURG, 251 

burg until he had fully established his communications. 
That ended the matter, and the troops went into camp 
waiting for orders until the pontoons could be brought 
around from Berlin, on the Potomac, where McClellan 
crossed, east of Harper's Ferry. 

IMcClellan had issued an order for their removal to 
Washington before he was relieved. When Halleck visited 
Burnside it was agreed that they were to be raj^idly trans- 
ported south, to be used in crossing the Rappahannock ; as 
the bridges were burned when the army arrived opposite 
Fredericksburg, they were still at Washington, Burnside 
supposing that Halleck would forward them without delay. 

Halleck returned to Washington and resumed the duties 
of his office, evidently not understanding that he was to 
charge himself with this special duty, therefore an apparent 
unaccountable delay occiirred in forwarding them, A 
part of them arrived at Bell Plain, near Aquia Creek, on 
the iSth, but the teams to convey them to Fredericks- 
burg were still in Washington. Had Burnside been 
aware of that fact he could have sent wagons from the 
army to haul them over, but he was entirely ignorant of 
their arrival. General Woodbury, who w^ould have had 
them in charge when they arrived, was an officer of great 
zeal and intelligence, but it does not seem that he was 
informed of the contemplated move of Burnside (though 
it seems he divined it), as he suggested to Halleck that 
the pontoons ought to arrive simultaneously with the 
army, to which suggestion he received no definite reply 
or instructions. 

As Burnside, in his march to Fredericksburg, was cut 
off from all communication with Washington for several 
days, it was impossible for him to superintend that mat- 
ter, unless he delegated an officer for that special purpose, 
which seemed entirely unnecessary, as General Woodbury 
understood his business thoroughly. The only valuable 
service that officer could have rendered would have been to 
telegraph to Washington for Burnside, which he could 



252 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

have done tlirougli Woodbury. If General Woodbury had 
been sent to Washington to superintend their transportation 
it would have saved much annoyance and great disappoint- 
ment. 

Had Burnside been able to cross on the 25th or 26th 
of November his chances of success would have been still 
quite good, as Lee was in great doubt as to what Burnside 
intended to do, and in fact he had not decided upon his plans. 
General Burns, who possessed the confidence of Burnside 
as much as any general, says that Burnside contemplated 
crossing the river at Hamilton's Crossing, while a portion 
of Lee's army was several miles below at Port Royal, which 
place was guarded by D. H. Hill's division. Jackson was 
still at Orange Court House waiting for developments. He 
could, from that point, dispute the passage of the upper 
or march to the lower Potomac, in case that point was at- 
tacked. Longstreet had not fortified the heights which he 
occupied, and if he had done so it w^ould have been an easy 
matter to have flanked him, as Sherman did at Atlanta. 

On the 26th Lee became so well satisfied of the ultimate 
intentions of his adversary that he ordered Jackson to come 
to Fredericksburg, which place he reached in about two 
days, and placed his troops on Longstreet' s right, extend- 
ing the Confederate line to the Massaponax, a tributary of 
the Rappahannock, some distance below Hamilton's Cross- 
ing. Longstreet' s left overlapped the plank road, leading 
to Salem Church and Chancellorsville. The cavalry 
guarded the river above and below the city. 

Thus, with a river swollen by heavy rains for the Army 
of the Potomac to cross in face of an intrenched enemy, 
seemed, as it proved, a forlorn hope ; in fact disaster was 
waiting to attend that effort with deep chagrin and sad disap- 
pointment. In front of Longstreet was a heavy stone fence, 
put there before the war, behind which his soldiers could 
crouch and be almost out of harm's wa}', while Jackson pre- 
pared his pits of death in case he was attacked. 

The Union armies in the West had defeated the enemy 



FREDERICKSBURG. 253 

at almost every point, while the countr}- witnessed the xA-rmy 
of the Potomac still near Washington. It had valiantly 
fought several battles, but as yet to no purpose ; the inju- 
ries it had received were greater than those inflicted on the 
enemy, a condition of things which caused a restless im- 
patience at the North, and an anxiety on the part of the sol- 
diers to again meet the foe in their front, and measure the 
standard of valor with them. South IMountain and Antie- 
tam had awakened their desire for another conflict, and 
they were anxious for the bugles to sound ' ' to arms. ' ' 

Burnside labored under the great disadvantage of being 
in the enemy's country, where every move he made was 
instantly reported to Lee. This fact was so apparent that 
Halleck telegraphed him not to report to Washington what 
he intended to do. Every conceivable and ingenious way 
was devised and used to secure news, which was at once re- 
ported to Lee, and the utmost diligence to prevent it was 
of no avail. A sutler's establishment occupied a little 
house at the edge of the river. On the main floor goods 
were kept and sold to the soldiers of the Union army. 
General Pleasonton conceived the idea that something was 
wrong there, and disguising himself in a citizen's suit one 
dark night, took some officers with him to investigate it. 

One of them ordered something for the party, while 
Pleasonton examined the floor. Finding a trap-door, he 
ordered it opened, when he descended into a basement filled 
with goods to be conveyed over to Fredericksburg after night 
to Lee's army. In one corner sat a man at a telegraph in- 
strument sending information to the enemy on the other 
side of the river. He was sending a message when Pleas- 
onton suddenly entered the room by means of the trap- 
door, which had remained a secret to the alleged sutlers. 
Pleasonton asked him what was the message he was send- 
ing ? He attempted to deny that he was engaged in that 
nefarious business, but he soon learned that the cavalry 
commander was not to be trifled with ; then he owned up. 

"Then," said Pleasonton, "you send this message 



254 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

over " — which he did : " The great number of recruits are 
rapidly swelling Burnside's army, and he will soon have a 
larger one, and better equipped, than McClellan advanced 
up the Peninsula with." He sent over several messages 
dictated by Pleasonton, when they wired back to know 
what was the reason of the sudden change in the communi- 
cations. Being compelled to tell the general what they 
asked, Pleasonton said, "Send this to them," which was 
in effect that another great victory had been won in the 
West by Rosecrans. They immediately answered : ' ' That 
is a lie." Pleasonton then ordered the wires cut, the men 
arrested, and the establishment placed in charge of an offi- 
cer ; then he reported all the facts to Burnside. 

The hum and activity before a battle began to be felt 
in the army, for Burnside had resolved to attack Lee in his 
most strongly-fortified position, which he had given him 
due notice of from the 17th of November to the nth of 
December. Did he want more time ? 

It is an approved maxim in war never to do what the enemy- 
wishes 3'ou to do, for this reason alone— that he desires it. A field 
of battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoi- 
tered should be avoided, and dotible care should be taken where he 
has had time to fortify or intrench. One consequence deducible 
from this principle is never to attack a position in front which 5'ou 
can gain by turning. — Napoleon. 

The following report of General Burnside states quite 
clearly his idea of the crossing of the Rappahannock, and 
in justice to him it is given in full : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
November 22, 1S62. 
General : — By reference to my plan of operations, submitted 
by order of the Commander-in-Chief, it will be found that one of 
the necessary parts of that plan was to have started from Washing- 
ton at once pontoon trains sufficient to span the Rappahannock at 
Fredericksburg twice ; and I was assured that at least one train 
would leave as soon as the General-in-Chief and General IMeigs re- 
turned ; and I proposed that if an escort was recpi.ired, and I was 
informed of the departure of the train by telegraph, 1 would furnish 



FREDERICKSBURG. 255 

it from my cavalr}-. Receiving no information of its departure, I 
ordered Lieutenant Comstock to telegraph in reference to it. It is 
very clear that my object was to make the move to Fredericksburg 
very rapidh', and to tlirow a heavy force across the river before the 
enemy could concentrate a force to oppose the crossing, and sup- 
posed the pontoon train would arrive at this place nearl}^ simulta- 
neously with the head of the column. Had that been the case, the 
whole of General Sumner's column — 33,000 strong — would have 
crossed into Fredericksburg at once over a pontoon bridge, in front 
of a city filled with families of rebel officers and sj-mpathizers with 
the rebel cause, and garrisoned b}^ a small squadron of cavalr}' and 
a battery of artiller}- which General Sumner silenced within an 
hour after his arrival. 

Had the pontoon bridge arrived on the 19th or 20th, the army 
could have crossed with trifling opposition, but now the opposite 
side of the river is occupied by a large rebel force under General 
Longstreet, with batteries read}^ to be placed in position to operate 
against the working parties building the bridge and the troops 
crossing. 

The pontoon train has not yet arrived and the river is too high 
for the troops to cross at any of the fords. 

You can readily see that much delay may occur in the general 
movement, and I deem it ni}' dut}' to la}'' these facts before you, and 
to sa}' that I cannot make the promise of probable success with the 
faith that I did when I supposed that all the parts of the plan would 
be carried 02it. Another verj- material part of the proposition, which 
I understood to be approved as a whole, was that all the surplus 
wagons that were in Washington were to be loaded with bread and 
small commissar}' stores and sent to this place at once, which would 
probably have supplied our army with from five to ten days' provi- 
sions. 

These trains could have moved with perfect safety, as they 
would have been protected by the movements of this army. I do 
not recall these facts in any captious spirit, but simply to impress 
lipon the General-in-Chief that he can not expect me to do as much 
as if all the parts of the plan had been carried out. In fact a force 
can be arrayed against us at this place that would materially re- 
tard us. 

The work of the Quartermaster's and Commissar}' Departments 
at Aquia Creek, or Bell Plain, has been most completely accom- 
plished, and I am not prepared to say that every effort has not been 
made to carry out the other parts of the plans, but I must, in hon- 
esty and candor, say that I cannot feel that the move indicated in 
my plan of operations will be successful after two very important 



256 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

parts of the plan have not been carried out, no matter for what 
reason. 

The President said that the movement, in order to be successful, 
must be made quickl}^ and I thought the same. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

A. E. BURNSIDE. 

General G. W. Cui^ivUM, Chief of Staff, 

Washington, D. C. 

Tlie pickets of both armies were along the banks of the 
river, watching each other's movements closely ; sometimes 
they would chat where the river was narrow enough to be 
within hailing distance of each other. 

As the enemy held the Fredericksburg side of the Rap- 
pahannock, it was evident that the river would not be 
spanned by the pontoons without a desperate struggle. 
There were many stone houses near the river where Barks- 
dale could secrete his men ; thus shielded they could carry 
on their work of death to those engaged in putting down 
the pontoons, and be comparatively safe themselves. Fred- 
ericksburg was full of their soldiers, and it seemed impos- 
sible to get the pontoons down. That situation of affairs 
called General Hunt into action with the reserve artillery ; 
he soon lined Stafford Heights with all of the available 
guns at his command. On the right he placed Battery E, 
2d United States; A, 4th United States; G, ist Rhode 
Island ; L, 2d New York ; a Pennsylvania battery under 
Captain Durell ; B, ist New York ; and D, 5th United 
States. These batteries composed the right, and were 
under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel Hays. 

The 4th New York; K, ist United States; G, 4th 
United States ; K, 5th United States ; D, ist New York ; 
C, ist Rhode Island ; and H, ist Ohio, were the right 
center under Colonel Tompkins. 

B, 1st Connecticut; M, ist Connecticut; A, ist New 
York ; B, ist New York ; 3d New York Battery ; G and D, 
1st Pennsylvania, constituted the left center, commanded 
by Col. R. O. Tyler. 



FREDERICKSBURG. 257 

The 5th New York ; C, ist New York ; B, ist ]\Iary- 
land ; 2d Maine; ist New York; L, ist New York; 4tli 
Pennsylvania ; F and G, ist Pennsylvania, was the left, 
nnder the command of Capt. G. A. DeRussy. 

On the morning of the nth of December, the construc- 
tion of the bridges commenced before day. There was no 
attempt to disturb the men at that work until they had 
reached near the middle of the river ; then they were in 
safe range, and the deadly work of their concealed sharp- 
shooters began, and continued until the remaining few who 
had not found a grave in the bottom of the river were 
hastily brought back. Those who were wounded or killed 
and fell in the boats were rescued after night by their 
comrades. 

Then General Hunt ordered his batteries to play on the 
enemy, especially on the houses along the bank of the 
river. That to a great extent silenced their fire ; but 
another attempt to continue putting down the pontoons was 
the signal for them to renew their attack on the men in the 
river. 

When all of those batteries were pouring in their shot 
and shell, it seemed as if no human being could live in the 
town, yet the sharpshooters along the shore were concealed 
so well that it was impossible to complete the work until 
they were dislodged. To accomplish that General Hunt 
suggested that the batteaux be filled with volunteers ; that 
as soon as they started he would have every gun belching 
its fiery flame and smoke so the sharpshooters could not see 
to execute their work so well ; when they neared the other 
shore the artillery was to cease, and before the smoke 
cleared away enough for them to be seen, they would be so 
near the shore that they could not be beaten back again. 

The honor of that forlorn hope was awarded to the 7th 
Michigan and the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, of How- 
ard's division of the Second Corps, and the 89th New 
York, of Hawkins' brigade of the Ninth Corps. They 
soon cleared not only the river front, but drove the enemy 
xvir 



258 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

well back into the town, tliongli not without a fearful loss 
of their own numbers. Those regiments made a fame that 
day that will last as long as the nation has an existence. 

The opposition at the crossing below the city was not 
so stubborn, as the valley along the right bank of the river 
did not afford so much protection to the sharpshooters ; 
though the passage of the river was disputed to the last 
extremity, yet the grand division of Franklin, composed of 
the First and Sixth Corps, readily effected a landing on the 
other shore, and were ready to meet the foe even in his 
stronghold on the heights back from the river. The First 
and Sixth Corps crossed over on the 12th inst. ; the divi- 
sions of Sickles and Birney of the Third Corps were held as 
a reserve on the left bank of the Rappahannock. 

It must be remembered that there were only two corps 
in Lee's army — Longstreet's and Jackson's — but at the 
same time it must not be forgotten that a division of their 
army almost corresponded to a corps in ours. In that re- 
spect their army was better organized for effective work. 
In our army there were so many corps that it gave a chance 
for some one to misunderstand the orders and not move in 
conjunction with the others, thereby paralyzing the move- 
ments, perhaps at a vital time. We have just seen how the 
vexatious delay in the arrival of the pontoons utterl}- ruined 
all of Burnside's plans, for he aimed to cross ten days be- 
fore Jackson joined Lee. If our army had crossed even by 
November 25, Longstreet would have been unable to seri- 
ously oppose the passage of the river, nor could he have 
held his position on Marye's Heights, for Franklin crossed 
some three miles below him and would soon have been able 
to cut off his communication with Richmond, forcing him 
back in the direction of Chancellorsville. But on the morn- 
ing of the 13th of December, when our army lay along the 
river in the dense fog, Jackson was well intrenched on the 
heights with four divisions, D. H. Hill's division having 
been added to his connnand tliat morning. 

In order to facilitate their movements a militarv road 



FREDERICKSBURG. 259 

had been cut just back of the crest so that troops could be 
speedily sent from one part of the line to the other unob- 
served from our position, which not only gave Jackson a 
better chance to handle his own troops to advantage, but 
also to get reenforcements from Longstreet if he was heavily 
pressed, for Longstreet' s position was so strongly fortified 
behind the stone wall and the parapet on the crest of the 
heights above and to the rear of the stone wall, that he 
needed but a scanty number of infantry, with his aitiller}- 
frowning along his whole front, to beat back and destroy 
any column that might be hurled against him. 

Longstreet said in a speech, delivered from his former 
headquarters on Marye's Heights, in May, 1884, when the 
First Corps was making a historical examination of the 
field, that just prior to the battle Lee came along and saw a 
section of a battery not in position, and called his attention 
to it. Longstreet said to him "that he had no place for it ; 
that with his artillery already in position he could rake the 
ground in front as if with a fine-tooth comb. ' ' Longstreet 
needed but a small infantry force behind the stone wall to 
assist his artillery. * 

* During the war there was a very intense secession element in 
Fredericksburg. 

When the historical visit was made there in i\Iay, 1SS4, under 
the auspices of the First Corps, the city did ever^-thing in its power 
to welcome the veterans of the Army of the Potomac, members of 
Congress, and others to the place where a great battle had been 
fought. The mayor had convened the council, which not onh- 
officiall}' welcomed us, but in addition provided for a grand ban- 
quet. 

The special train passed through the cit}' without stopping, un- 
til it reached Hamilton's Crossing, where Franklin fought on the left. 
After that part of the field was full}- examined where Jackson occu- 
pied the ridge, and the vallej^ below where Reynolds advanced, the 
train moved back to the town, where Mayor Sener in a very elo- 
quent speech welcomed us to their historic city. General Rosecrans, 
as Chairman of the Congressional Committee, replied in a ver}' 
appropriite and brief address. Then we were escorted to the new 
opera building, there to partake of the banquet in waiting for us. 



260 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

When Burnside ordered Franklin to attack the enemy 
on the left with a division, it was his judgment that the 
position of the corps would indicate 'that it should be made 
by the First, and its commander was so notified. 

It was but natural that General Reynolds should select 
the Pennsylvania Reserves to make the attack on our ex- 
treme left. He came out in command of a brigade of the 
Reserves and commanded the division at the second battle 
of Bull Run, and then when he was in command of the 
First Corps it was his duty to give them the position of 
honor. 

On entering the hall we were welcomed by the committee and greeted 
by loo ladies, who had volunteered their service for the occasion. 

The Chairman of the Committee, who owned the Opera build- 
ing, was a Sixth Corps man of the name of Hunter, who settled 
there after the war, and had amassed quite a little fortune in the 
foundry business. 

The newspaper men were especially gracious to us, and the 
friendliness of S. J. Quinn, R. B. Merchant, and J. W. Woltz was of 
the most cordial character. 

The address of welcome was made by Judge Goolrich, who had 
served in the Confederate army. Hon. George B. Loring, of Massa- 
chusetts, was called on to reply to him. Congress was represented 
by addresses from Belford of Colorado, Herbert of Alabama, and 
Cutcheon of Michigan. Generals Longstreet, Newton, and Rose- 
crans were called on and loudly applauded. Among the guests 
were Generals H. J. Hunt, x\bner Doubledaj', George J. Stannard, 
Roy Stone, James S. Robinson, H. W. Slocum, W. W. Dudley, 
and John C. Robinson ; also Colonels Bliss and Jackson of New- 
ton's staff, Kniffin, Tichenor and Thompson ; ]\Iajor Craig of 
General Hunt's staff, IMaj. Isaac Hall, Major Cranford, Capt. A. 
H. Van Deusen, Drs. Little and Donohue, D. W. Cleaver and many 
other officers and veterans and meml:)ers of Congress — nearly a 
hundred members of the House were present. 

vSenator Dolph, of the Senate, accompanied b}- his family, was 
quite an interested spectator. Ex-Governor Dingley, of Maine ; 
Major Havnes, of New Hampshire ; Bagley, of New York ; Murray, 
of Ohio, and Hon. W. \V. Brown, of Pennsylvania, formerly of the 
Bucktails, were deeply interested in the review of the field. The 
press of the country was represented from Washington and other 
cities. 



FREDERICKSBURG. 261 

They had fought so valiantly on the right of South 
Mountain that General Hooker was filled with admira- 
tion, and said, as they struggled up the mountain, "That 
it was as splendid a line of battle as the world ever 
saw." 

They opened the battle of Antietam under Meade, and 
won distinction on that field that will always be a bright 
gem in the history of the State. Now they were to open 
another great battle under two of their old brigade com- 
manders, one commanding the corps, the other the division. 
No wonder they had every confidence of success, considering 
that their tried and capable generals were to lead them. It 
w-as like Charlemagne's troops, when he galloped to the 
front, none doubted the result. 

The First Brigade was commanded by Colonel William 
Sinclair, of the 6th Regiment. It was composed of the 
Bucktails, Capt. C. F. Ta}'lor ; the ist. Col. Wm. C. Tal- 
ley ; 2d Col. Wm. McCandless, and 6th Regiments, Maj. 
W. H. Ent, of the Reserves, and the 121st Pennsylvania, 
\vhicli was a new regiment, and had recently joined the 
army. 

It may be well here to briefly explain the Pennsylvania 
Reserves' organization : 

Recognizing the danger to which Philadelphia, by its 
long line of border on States seriously disaffected, was ex- 
posed, and finding that adequate provisions did not exist by 
law to make the military power of the State available for 
its protection. Governor Curtin issued his proclamation on 
the 20th of April, 1861, calling the Legislature to convene 
in extra session on the 30th instant. In his message, 
which was delivered at the opening of the session, the Gov- 
ernor said : 

•'The time has passed for temporizing or forbearing with the 
rebellion, the most causeless in history. * * * The insurrection 
must be met by force of arms ; and to reestablish the Government 
upon an enduring basis by asseiting its entire supremacy ; tore- 
possess the forts and other Government property so unlawfully 



262 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

seized and heid . to insure personal freedom and safety to the people 
and commerce of the Union in every section, the people of the lo3'al 
States demand, as with one voice, and will contend for, as with one 
heart, and a quarter of million of Pennsylvania's sons will answer 
the call to arms, if need be, to wrest us from the reign of anarchy 
and plunder, and secure for themselves and children, for ages to 
come, the perpetuity of this Government and its beneficent institu- 
tions. * * * 

It is impossible to predict the lengths to which the madness 
that rules the hour in the rebellious States shall lead us, or when 
the calamities wliich threaten our hitherto happy country shall ter- 
minate * '"' * To furnish ready support to those who have gone out, 
and to protect our borders, we should have a well regulated military 
force. I, therefore recommend the immediate organization, disci- 
plining and arming of at least fifteen regiments of cavalry and in- 
fantry, exclusive of those called into the service of the United States. 
As we have already ample warning of the necessity of preparing for 
any sudden exigency that may arise, I cannot too much impress 
this upon you. 

This message from the patriotic Governor of the grand 
old State v/as immediately referred to a select committee 
of the House. In compliance with the recommendations, 
a bill was leported on the 2d of May to create a loan and to 
provide foj arming the State, which, in the usual course of 
legislation, became a law on the 15th. 

The Reserves were very desirotis of retaining their or- 
ganization as a division, and were permitted to do so after 
they entered the army. 

In compliance with the provisions of this act, Governor 
Curtin issued his call for men to compose the corps, and 
apportioned the number that would be received from each 
county, according to its population, in order that every sec- 
tion of the State and every class of its people should be 
duly represented in it. Great enthusiasm was everywhere 
manifested to enlist, and a .strong desire was felt to be ad- 
mitted to its ranks. Four camps of instruction were estab- 
lished : Easton, West Chester, Harrisburg and Pittsburg. 

George A. McCall, a graduate of the West Point Mili- 
tary Academy, was appointed a major general to comniand 



FREDERICKSBURG. 263 

the corps, and Brig. Gens. John F. Reynolds, George G. 
Meade, and E. O. C. Ord were placed in command of the 
three brigades. Thus was officered and equipped 15,000 of 
as fine men as ever marched out of the State to defend their 
country. 

The 1st Regiment of the Reserves was the 30th from 
the State, consequently the Bucktails, which was the i3tli 
in the division, was the 42d from the State. It will be ob- 
served that there were two 1 1 tli Pennsylvania Regiments 
in the First Corps at Fredericksburg ; the other nth was 
in the Third Brigade of the Second Division, under Gene- 
ral Gibbon; the last-mentioned one was the regular nth. 
This account of the Pennsylvania Reser\'es is made to 
avoid confusion by the reader years hence, when all the par- 
ticipants have passed away, leaving no one to explain. 

The Second Brigade, -under the command of Col, A. L. 
Magilton, of the 4th Regiment, was composed of the 3d, 
4th, 7th, and 8th of the Reserves, with the i42d Pennsyl- 
vania under Col. Robert P. Cummings. The Third Bri- 
gade was the 5th, 9th, loth, nth, and 12th Reserv^es, com- 
manded by Gen. C. F. Jackson. 

When ]\Ieade crossed the Rappahannock on the after- 
noon of the 1 2th, the Bucktails were thrown forward as 
skirmishers, and the 2d Regiment was detailed to occupy 
the buildings and outhouses of Smithfield. Batteries A, B, 
and G, of the ist Pennsylvania Light Artillery, were posted 
in front of Meade's First Brigade. The other battery of the 
division, Battery C of the 5th United States, had been sent 
to Captain De Russy. The Second Brigade was placed 
three hundred paces in the rear of the First Brigade, 
while the Third Brigade occupied a position in rear of the 
Second in column by regiments. 

Early on the morning of the 13th, ]\Ieade accompanied 
Reynolds to Franklin's headquarters, when Franklin indi- 
cated where Burnside desired the attack to be made, and 
informed Meade that his division had been selected to 
make it. 



264 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The heavy fog along the river was clearing away, when 
Meade returned to his division to prepare for the impending 
assault on the enemy's position on the hills back some dis- 
tance from the river. He made some minor changes in the 
disposition of his troops — the 6th was thrown forward as 
skirmishers, while the rest of the First Brigade was moved 
in front of his artillery. The Second Brigade held its posi- 
tion three hundred paces in the rear. The Third Brigade 
came by the flank well up to the First Brigade. The 9th 
Regiment, of this brigade, was deployed as skirmishers on 
the flank — this made three regiments on the skirmish line, 
Bucktai-ls, 6th and 9th, of the Reserves. 

The enemy was keenly observing all of these movements 
from the heights above, and seeing the impending attack, 
opened a heavy artillery fire from a battery posted on the 
Bowling Green road, down toward the Massaponax and 
Prospect Hill, giving it an enfilading fire on the left and rear 
of Meade's division. The general at once faced the Third 
Brio-ade to the left, thus forminof with the first two sides of 
a square. Simpson's battery was at once placed on the left 
of the Third Brigade, wliile Cooper's and Ransom's were 
ordered to occupy a position on the left of the First Brigade. 
These batteries, with some of Donbleday's, soon silenced 
the enemy's batteries, but in the mean time, under cover of 
the smoke and the quite dense copse on the slope of the hill 
in their front, sharpshooters had advanced to the Bowling 
Green road, but were soon dislodged by General Jackson, 
commanding the Third Brigade. 

Meade now decided to prepare for the attack, and or- 
dered the batteries to shell the woods in front. He changed 
Ransom's battery to the right of the First Brigade, but 
Amsden, who had just returned from detailed duty, took 
a position near Cooper. 

In about thirty minutes the guns of the enemy were 
silenced, as the well-directed shots from our batteries had 
caused a serious explosion. Meade's Third Brigade was 
still facing down the river. Reynolds directed him to put 



FREDERICKSBURG. 265 

it on the left of the First Brigade facing the enemy, in 
order to give Doubleday a chance to bring his division on 
the extreme left, extending as far as possible in the direction 
of the banks of the Alassaponax. 

General Burnside had sent General Hardie of his staff 
to General Franklin, so that he conld report the movements 
of the troops on the left — presumably with a view to giving 
Burnside an idea how to press the troops in the center and 
right. 

General Hardie' s telegrams to Burnside are given as 
they were written during the battle — describing the scene 
just as he saw it : 

11 A. M. — Meade advances half a mile, and holds on. Infantry 
of eneni}- in wood in front of extreme left ; also in front of Howe. 
No loss, so far, of great importance. General Vinton badlj-, but not 
dangerously, wounded. 

L.^TER. — Re3-nolds has been forced to develop his whole line. 
An attack of some force of enemy's troops on our left seems probable, 
as far as can now be judged. Stoneman has been directed to cross 
one division to support our left. Report of cavalry pickets from the 
other side of the river that enemy's troops were moving down the 
river on this side, during the latter part of the night. Howei's 
pickets reported movement in their front, same direction ; still they 
have a strong force, well posted with batteries here. 

12 Noox. — Birney's division is now getting into position. That 
done, Reynolds will order Meade to advance. Batteries over the 
river are to shell the eneniy's position in the wood in front of Rey- 
nolds' left. He thinks the effect will be to promote Meade's ad- 
vance. A column of the enemy's infantrj^ is passing along the crest 
of the hills from right to left, as we look at it. 

12:05 P- ^i — General ^Meade's line is advancing in the direction 
you prescribed this morning. 

I p. M. — Enemy opened a battery on Reynolds, enfilading 
Meade. Re3'nokls has opened all his batteries on it. No report yet. 
Reynolds hotly engaged at this moment. Will report in a few mo- 
ments again. 

I :i5 p. M. — Heavy engagement of infantry fenemS' in force) where 
batter}' is. jNIeade is assaulting the hill. Will report again in a 
few moments. 

1 :25 p. M. — Meade is in the wood, in his front. Seems to be able 
to hold on. Reynolds will push Gibbon in, if necessary. The bat- 



266 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

tery and wood referred to must be near Hamilton's house. The in- 
fantry firing is prolonged and quite heavy. Things look well enough. 
Men in fine spirits. 

1 :4o p. M. — Meade having carried a portion of the enemy's posi- 
tion in the wood, we have 300 prisoners. Enemy's batteries on our 
extreme left retire. Tough work. Men fight well. Gibbon has ad- 
vanced to Meade's right. Men fight well. Driving the enemy. 
Meade has suffered severely ; Doubleday, to Meade's left, not en- 
gaged. 

Col. William Cooper Talley, in command of the ist Regi- 
ment of the Reserves, was on the right of the First Brigade, 
with the 2d on the left of the brigade, and the 121st Penn- 
sylvania, under Col. Chapman Biddle, in the center. 

In this charge, which was longer and equally as bril- 
liant and daring as that of the famous Pickett charge at 
Gettysburg, or McDonald's celebrated charge at Wagram, 
the command was exposed to a heavy artillery fire not only 
in front, but from the flanks. Col. William Sinclair was 
wounded, and Colonel McCandless of the 2d took com- 
mand of the brigade, when Colonel Talley on the right 
struck the railroad ; he at once came tinder a severe infan- 
try fire. 

Colonel Talley was a young officer, of unpretending 
manners, and was not ambitious for promotion. C. H. 
Ingram of Talley's regiment said to me that he kept his eye 
on the pale face of the young colonel as they advanced. 
Ingram again looked at Colonel Talley as the regiment 
reached the slope to make their charge on the enemy's 
works ; he said Colonel Talley was one of the coolest men 
he ever saw in action. He guarded his right against a 
surprise, and at the same time with intrepidity led the 
charge in front. 

Bates, in his valuable history of " Pennsylvania Volun- 
teers," in speaking of Colonel Talley in the celebrated 
Fredericksburg charge, says : 

In the battle of Fredericksburg, the ist Regiment of Pennsylva- 
nia Reserves, commanded by Colonel Talley, the regiment occupied 



FREDERICKSBURG. 267 

the right of the brigade, and moved in stead3^ unwavering line 
across an open plain, under a heavy enfilading artillery fire ; and 
when the order was given, charged the enemy with resistless energ}% 
crossing the railroad and ditches, driving him two hundred yards 
beyond the intrenchments. Colonel Talley, finding his regiment 
outflanked on the right, with the enemy strongl}- reenforced in 
front, and no support coming up in rear, was compelled to retire, 
after having opened the way to victory. In this engagement Colonel 
Talley led the regiment with great gallantry. * * * The signal 
advantage gained in the whole battle, was gained by this part of the 
line ; and had the successful assault here made been vigorousl}' fol- 
lowed up it would doubtless have resulted in a brilliant victor}-, in- 
stead of that bloody repulse which filled the land with gloom. 

We give the following graphic description of Meade's 
charge, from "Burnside and the Ninth Cor]3s : " 

By twelve o'clock, most of the dispositions on our side were 
made, and General Meade began to advance with earnestness and 
vigor. His division consisted of three brigades (of Pennsylvania 
Reserves), of which the Third was on the left, the First on the riglit, 
closely followed by the Second. General Gibbon's division was or- 
dered to hold itself ready as a support. The troops went forward 
with great spirit and resolution. In handsome stjle they charged 
up the road, regardless of a hot fire from the enemy, crossed the 
railroad, ascended the heights beyond, broke through the enem5f's 
first line, under General Taliaferro, and gained a position near Cap- 
tain Hamilton's house, capturing and sending back three hundred 
prisoners and more. Nothing could be better than this gallant 
charge. It was made in the midst of a destructive fire of artillerj^ 
and for a time carried everything before it. Finding an interval in 
the enemy's line, between the brigades of Archer and Lane, General 
Meade took advantage of it, and wedged his advance in turning the 
flanks of both brigades and throwing them into confusion. He next 
struck Gregg's brigade and broke it to pieces, with the lo.ss of its 
commanding officer. Gen. A. P. Hill's line was then pierced, and 
General Meade's ne.xt duty was to break the line of General Talia- 
ferro. But that was not so easy. For an hour and a half had the 
gallant little division pushed forward in its successful career. But 
it was now bearing the brunt of a contest with the entire corps of 
General Jackson, which had been ordered to meet the audacious at- 
tack, and it could not maintain it.self without continued support. * * 

General Meade had come within a hair's breath of achieving a 
great success. His attack had been so vigorous as to be almost a 



268 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

surprise. His troops had come upon the eneni}-, in some cases, be- 
fore he had time to take the muskets from the stacks. 

Biddle's new regiment caught the enthusiasm of war, 
and in that charge exhibited the coohiess of veterans of 
long experience ; in fact, they were quite loath to retire, 
when they were being surrounded by the enemy on all 
sides. But the 2d Regiment of the Reserves, under com- 
mand of Captain Meally, was forging well to the front ; A. 
P. Hill's first line of battle was routed; Archer's left was 
forced back, and Lane's right brushed aside ; the First 
Brigade of the Reserves advanced rapidly on iV. P. Hill's 
second line commanded by Gregg and Thomas, and the 
19th Georgia surrendered a few minutes afterwards to Ad- 
jutant Woodward of the 2d Regiment of the Reserves. 
Gregg was mortally wounded, and his command thrown 
into great confusion. Gregg was a young man of great 
valor, and was the Governor elect of Sotith Carolina. 

The Third Brigade was fighting desperately on the left, 
and suffered so terribly from the artillery fire on the heights 
on Jackson's extreme right that it was unable to make the 
headway that the First Brigade did. 

Meade was watching the progress of the battle on the 
left and sent Lieutenant Delion of his staff, with orders to 
General Jackson "to move to the right flank till he could 
clear the open ground in front of the battery, and then, 
ascending the heights through the woods, sweep round to 
the left and take the battery. Unfortunately, Lieutenant 
Dehon fell just as he reached General Jackson, and a short 
time after the latter officer was killed." Of these two 
officers General Meade thus feelingly speaks in his report : 

The loss of Lieutenant Arthur Dehon, 12th Massachusetts 
Regiment, my aid, is greatly to be deplored, as he was a young 
man of high promise, endeared to all that knew him for his manly 
virtues and amiable character. The public ser\-ice has also to 
mourn the loss of Brig. Gen. C. Feger Jackson, an officer of merit 
and reputation, who owed his position to his gallantry and good 
conduct in previous actions. 



FREDERICKSBURG. 269 

Col. Joseph W. Fisher, of the 5th Regiment, assumed 
command of the Third Brigade when Jackson fell mortally 
wounded. The brigade was unable to execute the move- 
ment Meade desired it to. The Second Brigade of the Re- 
serves followed the First Brigade promptly. Col. A. L. 
Magilton commanding, gave orders to press the First as 
closely as possible, and led the advance in person. The 4th 
Regiment, on the right of the brigade, suffered so severely 
from an enfilading fire from the right that Lieutenant 
Colonel Woolworth, commanding the regiment, faced 
to the right to meet it. He succeeded after a stubborn 
fight in driving the enemy back. The 8tli Reserves and 
the I42d Pennsylvania were blocked off at the railroad — 
they were suffering from a heavy oblique fire and could not 
advance. The 3d Regiment, under Colonel Sickel, which 
was on the left of the brigade, obliqued over to the left, to 
meet the heav\' musketry frqm that direction. The 7th 
Regiment, under Colonel Bolinger pulled, up by the side of 
the 3d, and during the time the Reserves Division was on 
the crest of the hill, it entertained the enemy in a 
manner decidedly interesting. 

A. P. Hill's division of six brigades was not sufficient 
to prevent the advance of the Reserves, but when Early's 
and Taliaferro's divisions both joined in the assault on 
them, with assistance from D. H. Hill's division still 
farther in reserve, that Spartan band of soldier patriots, 
known as the Pennsylvania Reserves, sullenly retired down 
the hill " from whence they came." 

The Third Brigade again changed commanders, and 
Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson, of the 9th, withdraws the 
brigade, because they are heavily pressed and the last round 
of ammunition is exhausted. Meade repeatedly sent back for 
assistance, but none arriving in time, he fell back this side of 
the railroad, and then rallied the remnant of his division 
with the assistance of Sickel, Talley, IMcCandless and 
others. 

It was in vain to attempt to charge that hill again with 



270 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the Reserves, tliey were too mucli exhausted by the valorous 
deeds they had performed that morning. Meade in person 
called on Birney for reenforcements, and was given Ward's 
brigade, but it was too late. Why Meade was not sup- 
ported in his grand charge which resulted in such terrible 
loss of life is a disputed question. 

General Birney, in his report, says : 

The enemy's batteries commanded the open field, and my loss 
being heavy, General Ile3'nolds ordered me to retire my command 
from the field, holding it in hand behind the embankment. When 
the movement consequent on this order was half completed, General 
Meade's division was being soreh' pressed, and he sent to me for as- 
sistance. I immediatel3' reversed the movement of Ward's brigade, 
placing the 99th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Leidy ; 
57th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Campbell, and 
55th New York Volunteers, Colonel De Trobriand, in support of 
Meade's batteries, ordering forward the 30th Regiment of New York 
Volunteers, lyieutenant Colonel Birney; 40th New York Volunteers, 
Lieutenant Colonel Gesner, and 4th Regiment, INIaine Volunteers, 
Colonel Walker, under General Ward, to the support of the troops 
in front. 

That enabled Meade to extricate his command from the 
maelstrom which threatened its destruction. 

Gen. John C. Robinson, of Birney' s division, had just 
crossed the river as Meade was retiring. Seeing that Liv- 
ingston and Randolph's batteries were in danger of being 
captured. General Robinson hurried two of his regiments, 
the only two he had in line, to the support of these batteries. 
These two reofiments delivered a voUev, and then made a 
charge, hurling the enemy back into his intrenchments. 
His other regiments getting into line, Robinson advanced 
his line of battle to the crest of the hill, and throwing for- 
ward a strong skirmish line succeeded in capturing a col- 
onel, a captain, Lawton, a.ssistant adjutant general to 
General Early, and some sixty men. Gibbon's divi- 
sion was on the right of the First Corp^, with the Third 
Brigade in front, commanded by Gen. Nelson Taylor, and 



FREDERICKSBURG. 271 

that supported by the Second Brigade, commanded by Col. 
Peter Lyle. 

The First Brigade, commanded by Col. Adrian R. Root, 
was formed in close column by regiments, and supported 
Hall's battery, which was on the left of Taylor's brigade. 
Taylor ordered the 13th IMassachusetts forward as skir- 
mishers, and formed the brigade in line of battle in the fol- 
lowing order from right to left : The 88th Pennsylvania on 
the right, then the 97th New York, with the 83d New 
York next, and nth Pennsylvania on the left. 

The valley on the right bank of the Rappahannock at 
that point being quite wide and rather level, all of Rey- 
nolds' troops were greatly exposed to the artillery of the 
enemy. When Taylor advanced, the fury of their batteries 
was turned on his brigade. 

The 88th Pennsylvania was advanced to the front under 
cover of a slight elevation, from which point it was hoped 
their muskets would reach the battery that was doing such 
great damage ; they were successful, and the battery was at 
once silenced. General Taylor was then ordered, to ad- 
vance his line of battle, which he did to near the railroad, 
when the enemy concentrated such a heavy fire on the two 
regiments on his left — the nth Pennsylvania and 83d New 
York — that the general in his report says: "They were 
soon melted away." Col. Richard Coulter, of the nth 
Pennsylvania, was wounded, and Capt. Christian Kuhn 
took command of the regiment. The fire on the 83d New 
York was so severe that the regiment changed commanders 
three times in a very few minutes, in the following order : 
Capts. John Hendrickson and Joseph A. IMoesch, and Lieut. 
Isaac E. Hoagland. The heavy losses of these two regi- 
ments caused General Taylor to halt. Lyle's brigade was 
ordered up to relieve these two regiments, and the 97th 
New York and 88th Pennsylvania were marched a short 
distance to the right to give Lyle a chance to un- 
mask. The brigade formed with the 136th Pennsylvania 
on the left, then the 90th Pennsylvania, with the 26th 



272 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

New York on the right. The 12th Massachusetts was 
unable to take a position between the 26th and 97th New 
York Regiments, on account of the retiring troops of Tay- 
lor's brigade, whom they were relieving; but the regiment 
was commanded independently by Colonel Bates. It was 
no difference how they fought, so the leaden hail was fired 
at the enemy. 

In the mean time the 1 3th Massachusetts, having ex- 
hausted all of its ammunition, had been withdrawn to the 
right and left of the brigade ; Colonel Leonard remained 
with four companies on the left in support of Hall's bat-, 
tery, which had advanced beyond the Bowling Green road. 
When Lyle's brigade advanced, the 136th Pennsylvania 
was given a very responsible position, the left flank of the 
brigade ; and although it was a new regiment it fought with 
a valor unsurpassed. It forged its way across the railroad 
into the wood, and held that position for two hours and 
forty minutes, and having exhausted all of its ammunition, 
60 rounds, and having no support on the left, it had to 
defend itself against a force which presented a front 
twice its length, occupying a chosen position, protected by 
a dense wood and supported by a battery. Colonel Bayne 
though seeing the enemy was overlapping him and would 
soon endanger his. flank and rear, still held his position, 
hoping that the advance of the enemy would be checked by 
troops coming to his assistance, but finally, seeing the great 
peril his regiment was in, he retired until he could join 
other troops of the division, who were fighting somewhat 
at will, as the brigades were mixed up by that time more 
or less, for Colonel Root's brigade had been ordered up by 
General Taylor to make a charge — Gibbon had been 
wounded, Taylor was in command of the di\asion, and 
Colonel Leonard took command of Taylor's brigade. As 
Colonel Root was sweeping down like a mountain eagle to 
make his charge, he passed the 12th IMassachu setts going 
to the rear for ammunition. Colonel Root said to Colonel 
Bates, " Don't retire." Colonel Bates told him their con- 



FREDERICKSBURG. 273 

dition. " Never mind," said he, " I am going to make a 
charge. ' ' Colonel Bates at once gave the order to fix bay- 
onets and file to the right of Root's brigade, and the gal- 
lant 1 2th Massachusetts again went into the fight on 
the right flank with not a single cartridge — but the reg- 
iment that had followed Fletcher Webster until he fell 
mortally wounded at second Bull Run, would follow any 
officer who had the courage to lead them, and Colonel 
Bates was brave to a fault. 

Colonel Root, in his report, says : " I wish to acknowl- 
edge my obligations to Colonel Bates, 12th IMassachusetts 
Volunteers, for his prompt and generous response to my 
request for his cooperation. He promptly united his reg- 
iment with my brigade and charged upon the enemy's 
position with fixed bayonets and empty cartridge boxes. ' ' 
Colonel Root arranged his brigade as follows for the 
charge : the 107th Pennsylvania on the left, with the 105th 
New York in the center, and the i6th Maine on the right. 
These regimerits were deployed to the right of Hall's bat- 
ter}^, and were supported by the 94th and I04tli New York 
Regiments. That was as grand a charge as was ever made, 
and the troops engaged in it deserved the highest credit for 
their work there. Colonel McCoy, commanding the 107th 
Pennsylvania, knew he had a regiment that was steeled 
against danger, so he concluded he would lead the bri- 
gade. 

The 1 6th Maine, under Colonel Tilden, rushed to the 
front like the foaming waters of a cataract ; the 105th New 
York, under Major Sharp, was abreast of the 107th Penn- 
sylvania, while the 12th Massachusetts was crowding the 
1 6th Maine ; the 97th New York, under Colonel Wheelock, 
was forging its way well to the front, and the 88th Penn- 
sylvania held a good alignment, while the 90th Pennsyl- 
vania contributed to the charge. 

But here are two regiments disobeying orders — the 94th 
and 104th New York had been directed to support the charge, 
and they now are mingling with the front line, and there 
xvni 



274 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

is no support to Root's line of battle. As that determined 
line was almost on a dead run when it struck the enemy, it 
forced the Confederate line back up the hill. 

The 1 6th Maine crossed bayonets with the enemy, and 
the awful carnage of death began. Taliaferro's line 
yielded with sullenness — the two lines were yet near each 
other. Otis Libby, of the i6th Maine, was so badly clubbed 
over the head with a musket that he was crazed with pain, 
and rushing at their line pierced two soldiers through with 
his bayonet. Monroe Layford, seeing his brother killed, 
rushed at the one who killed him, saying, " Curse you, you 
killed my brother," ran his bayonet through him in an 
instant. The shock was too heavy for the enemy to with- 
stand, and he recoiled like the retiring movement of a 
powerful gun. For the time being Reynolds' right divi- 
sion had cleared its front, but there were no troops within 
supporting distance, and the enemy soon, heavily reen- 
forced, again cautiously coming down the hill covered with 
timber which afforded shelter and protection, and gave 
him great advantage, it seemed rash to remain there. Gen- 
eral Taylor, who accomj)anied the charge and greatly 
cheered the boys by his presence, told Colonel Root to 
withdraw his command whenever he deemed it advisable. 
Colonel Root says : 

It was with real pain that I gave the order for the brigade to 
fall back. The ofl&cers and men received it with surprise and grief, 
and retired so reluctanth' that the enemy was enabled to close up on 
the rear of the brigade and inflict a loss exceeding that incurred 
during the charge itself 

He further adds : 

I am happy in being able to bear testimony to the gallant man- 
ner in which the regimental commanders took their men into action, 
and I deem it a duty no less than a pleasure to make especial men- 
tion of the i6th Maine Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Tilden com- 
manding. This regiment is a new one, and here fought its first bat- 
tle, and I felt some apprehension lest the terrible fire from the ene- 
my's concealed rifle pits would be too severe a trial for its men. But 



FEEDER ICKSB UR G . 275 

the gallant manner in which this regiment charged the enemy's po- 
sition excited mj^ surprise and admiration, and reflected the highest 
honor upon its ofl&cers. Previous to the battle 38 men of this regi- 
ment had volunteered to do duty with Hall's battery, and their con- 
duct is represented by Captain Hall to have been creditable in the 
highest degree. The 94th New York Volunteers, Major Kress com- 
manding ; the 104th New York Volunteers, Colonel Prey ; the 105th 
New^ York Volunteers, IMajor Sharp commanding, and the 107th 
Pennsj'lvania Volunteers, Colonel McCoy, are comparatively vet- 
eran regiments, and have been tried upon a number of hard-fought 
battlefields. In doing their entire auty during the recent engage- 
ment they did what I expected of them. 

He also especially mentioned Lieut. Charles E. Scoville, 
94tli New York Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant gene- 
ral, and Lieut. Abner R. Small, i6th Maine, acting aid-de- 
camp. 

There were two regiments of Taylor's brigade on the 
front line all the time — the 97th New York and ■ the 88th 
Pennsylvania — they retired only with Root's brigade. In 
the charge IMajor Sharp, commanding the 105th New York, 
was wounded. Capt. Isaac S. Tichenor then assumed 
command and led the regiment gallantly, until a shell 
burst near him ; he fell to the ground unconscious, and was 
left for dead. Then it fell to Captain Moore to command 
the regiment and take it off the field. 

General Hardie sent the following dispatches to Burn- 
side : 

215 P.M. — Gibbon and Meade driven back from the wood; 
Newton gone forward. Jackson's corps, of the enemj', attack on the 
left. General Gibbon slightly wounded, Bayard mortally, by a 
shell. Things do not look so well on Reynolds' front ; still, we 
will have new troops in soon. 

2:25 p. M. — Dispatch received. Franklin will do his best. New 
troops gone in. Will report soon again. 

3 p. M. — Reynolds seems to be holding his own. Things look 
better somewhat. 

3:40 p. M. — Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up, 
and I fear another advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made 
this afternoon. Doubledaj^'s division will replace Meade's as soon 



276 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

as it can be collected, and if it be done in time, of course another 
attack will be made. 

The enemy are in force in the wood on our left, toward Hamil- 
ton's, and threatening the safety of that portion of our line. They 
seem to have detached a portion of their force to our front, where 
Howe and Brooks are now engaged. 

Brooks has some prisoners, and is down the railroad. Just as 
soon as the left is safe our forces here will be prepared for a front 
attack ; but it may be too late this afternoon. Indeed, we are en- 
gaged in front now, anyhow. 

Notwithstanding the unpleasant items I relate, the morale of 
the troops is generally good. 

P. S. — Engaged now heavily in front. 

4:30 p. M. — The enemy is still in force on our left and front. An 
attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed. A new attack has 
been opened on our left, but the left is safe, though it is too late to 
advance, either to the left or front. 

Meade had been relieved by Birney, Sickles took the 
place of Gibbon, and these two divisions of the First Corps, 
that had stood the brunt of the battle all day, were re- 
lieved. 

We now turn to Doubleday's division on the left of the 
First Corps. While the troops of the corps were crossing 
the lower bridge, Reynolds directed Doubleday to station 
Colonel Gavin's brigade at the bridge to guard it. In ac- 
cordance with this order Gavin ordered the 7th Indiana 
and 76th New York to the right bank of the river, while 
the 95th New York and 56th Pennsylvania remained on 
the left side. 

Doubleday, with the other three brigades of his division, 
faced down the river and marched until he gained a position 
a little to the left of Bernard's house, nearly three-fourths of 
a mile from the crossing, where he halted for the remainder 
of the day and the night. As he was in reserve, he placed 
his command in column by regiments, 100 paces apart; 
thus parking in rear of ]\Ieade and Gibbon. 

Doubleday says: "While thtis posted we were shelled 
by enemy's long-range guns." Jackson had 47 guns on 
his front — 14 on his right and 2^2) '^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ — ^^ Bernard's 



FREDERICKSBURG. 277 

Cabin. In addition to this. J. E. B. Stuart's command was 
on Jackson's right, with all of his artillery posted as near 
his right as possible. The combined artillery of Stuart and 
Jackson could rake the whole valley to the right of Smith's 
corps. 

On the morning of the 13th Colonel Gavin reported 
with his brigade to Doubleday, having been relieved from 
duty at the pontoon bridge. The enemy held a wood along 
the river bank which was intersected with ravines, and was 
quite a strong position, as it not only concealed him, but at 
the same time shielded well his troops from our artillery 
and sharpshooters. Captain Gerrish's New Hampshire 
Battery was placed on the right of Doubleday' s line, .vhile 
Lieutenant Stewart's battery, B, 4th United States Artillery, 
was posted on the left for the purpose of shelling this wood. 
After these two batteries had shelled it sufficiently. Double- 
day ordered General IVIeredith to take the wood with his 
brigade. 

The 2d United States Sharpshooters was directed to 
deploy as skirmishers. As usual, that regiment ad- 
vanced to its work with as much alacrity as if preparing 
for a dress parade or to be reviewed by the President. 
Grand soldiers ! they were the pride of the division. The 
24tli Michigan and 7th Wisconsin advanced in line of 
battle, with the 2d Wisconsin and 19th Indiana supporting, 
followed by the 6th Wisconsin in the second line in good 
supporting distance. In the wood were masked batteries of 
eight guns with which to sweep the river. Quite a number of 
soldiers and horses were captured here by the Iron Brigade. 
General Doubleday was greatly pleased with the conduct of 
the 24th Michigan, and took occasion to highly commend 
it to General Re^-nolds. This was its maiden fight, and its 
action was watched by the veterans with considerable solic- 
itude. It was commanded by Col. Henry A. JMorrow, who 
won distinction later in the war, and served after the war as 
colonel of the 21st United States Infantr\'. 

The 7th Wisconsin was commanded b\' Col. W. W. 



278 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Robinson. That regiment came out early in 1861, and its 
colonel was an old officer who was capable of a much 
higher command — he afterwards commanded the Iron 
Brigade, and as an officer stands high in the estimation of 
the Army of the Potomac. Col. W. F. Rogers, command- 
ing the Third Brigade of the First Division, advanced and 
took a position on Meredith's right, advancing to the Bowl- 
ing Green road. The sharpshooters of the enemy were 
holding that road, and clung to it with great tenacity when 
Rogers moved forward. A battery some 500 or 600 yards 
in rear of them was doing considerable damage, but was 
compelled to retire by this brigade. Gerrish's battery was 
then moved to a position at the intersection of a road with 
the Bowling Green road, when Colonel Rogers threw out 
skirmishers to protect the battery, and then retired his 
brigade some distance to the rear to support it. 

Col. Walter Phelps, Jr. , commanding the First Brigade, 
moved forward and took position on the right of Colonel 
Rogers, placing three companies on the Bowling Green 
road as skirmishers. Colonel Gavin, commanding the 
Second Brigade, moved forward on Phelps' right ; Double- 
day's division was now all in line of battle. Reynolds' 
battery was taken from the left of the command and placed 
between Phelps and Gavin. 

It is certain that Doubleday's division was handi- 
capped by Stuart clinging to the Rappahannock this side 
of the Massaponax, and preventing his advance by that 
means so as to assist Meade's charge. 

After the battle Jackson inquired of one of our officers 
who accompanied a flag of truce what division that was on 
the left. He highly complimented its marching under the 
heavy artillery fire it was subjected to. 

Doubleday all the time had to refuse his left to guard 
against an attack in the direction of the Massaponax. 

Burnside or Franklin ought to have given Reynolds 
enough troops to have swept the left bank of the Massa- 
ponax from its confluence with the Rappahannock : then a 



I 



FREDERICKSBURG. 279 

simultaneous attack of all of Reynolds' divisions, Double- 
day's, Meade's, and Gibbon's, might have broken through 
Jackson's troops. Doubleday would have been able to evade 
to a certain extent the fourteen guns of Jackson on Prospect 
Hill, though he would have suffered some from them, and, 
in addition, would have felt the whole power of Stuart's 
artillery and cavalry. The Conite de Paris thus speaks of 
Jackson's position : 

The one on the right was almost as formidable as the first, for 
its defenders being concealed among the woods and able to move 
about unperceived by their adversaries, were admirably posted for 
observing the latter at a distance in the plain, and crushing them 
with the fire of their artillery so soon as they should cross the rail- 
way track to climb the acclivities which rose to the margin of the 
wood. In the wood itself the chances would have been more equal, 
but the knowledge of the roads which traversed it was a great ad- 
vantage to its defenders. 

Hon. W. C. Oates, a member of Congress from Alabama, 
who was in Hoke's brigade and with his command came 
forward to assist in repelling Meade's attack, said to me 
that "If Franklin had made the attack with 40,000, it is 
my opinion that he could not have driven Jackson from his 
strong position. I think it was the wisest thing to do — to 
retire across the river." 

Oates is a very candid man and avoids all appearance of 
prejudice, but certainly is mistaken in the "40,000" matter, 
as the troops on each side displayed equal determination at 
that part of the line. Yet Jackson and Stuart evidently 
commanded from 40,000 to 50,000 — the evidence in my 
possession fully confirms that. Then, taking into considera- 
tion their strongly intrenched position on those heights, 
honeycombed with roads made by them, perhaps it was 
well that the Army of the Potomac was quietly withdrawn 
under the somber shades of night. 

Late in the afternoon Doubleday drew in his left wing, 
under Meredith and Rogers, as there were strou"- indications 



280 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

of an attack by the enemy, and his center was then being 
very hard pressed. 

Jackson determined late in the afternoon to attack Frank- 
lin, but after a careful reconnoissance of the Union line he 
desisted. Had he advanced over that valley to drive 
Franklin into the river, he might have deeply regretted it, 
and given Franklin a chance to follow his defeated troops 
to the crest of the hill with a good chance of victory. It 
was a safe plan to quietly remain in their positions and 
await the attacks of the Union Army. 

Doubleday had another reason for contracting his lines 
on the left. If a night attack was made, he had a better 
opportunity to handle his command and could more easily 
reenforce any point that was furiously assailed. If the 
enemy had made an attack at night it would have been of 
a most determined character. 

The shattered divisions of Meade and Gibbon were in 
reserve, where they could come to Doubleday's assistance. 
But the night wore away and the light of another Sunday 
morning came with its "olive branch of peace," its morn- 
ing greeting to all mankind, to pay due homage on that 
blessed day to the Lord God of Hosts. Although Jackson 
had the reputation of being a devout Christian, yet there is 
no evidence of his being religiously inclined that day, ex- 
cept through the thunderings of his cannon as they 
belched forth their missiles of death at the boys in blue 
in the valley below. 

It is seldom, in this country at l^ast, that the artillery 
played such an important part in a battle as it did at 
Fredericksburg. In my humble judgment there never 
was a better artillery officer than Gen. H. J. Hunt, chief of 
artillery of the Army of the Potomac. He had picked his 
subordinate officers with great care, so that that arm of the 
service was well prepared for the great struggle between the 
two armies. 

Col. C. S. Wainwright, chief of artillery of the First 
Corps, displayed the qualities of an excellent officer. He 




GEN. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD. 



FREDERICKSBURG. 281 

was present wherever danger threatened, to post the artil- 
lery where it could do the greatest execution. If Meade 
and Gibbon were engaged in a charge, he was there. If 
Doubleday was pressed on the flank and in front with a 
heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, Wainwright was at 
the side of the artilleryman who fired the first shot in the 
war. 

Believing that the artillery deserve great credit for their 
services in that battle, and thinking that the highest praise 
that can be bestowed on them is to quote from General 
Reynolds' report what he said of the artiller}', it is here 
given with great cheerfulness : 

To Captains Ransom, Cooper and Simpson, commanding batte- 
ries of Meade's division ; Captains Reynolds, Hall, Gerrish, and 
Lieutenant Stewart commanding those of the other divisions as well 
as Captain Wolcott, commanding a battery of Smith's corps, great 
credit is due for the intrepidity with which the^^ maintained their 
positions, and the coolness and judgment with which they managed 
their command under the severe fire of the enemy's batteries, so 
advantageously posted during the whole day of the 13th. 

Captain Cooper and Lieutenant Stewart maintained the most 
advanced position with the steadiness for which their commands 
had been noted on former fields. To Colonel Wainwright, ist New 
York Artillery, chief of artillery, I am indebted for the excellent 
judgment he displayed in the management and disposition of the 
whole artillery of the corps, and for the admirable manner in which 
the damages it received were repaired on the field and the guns 
again brought into action under his supervision. 

What General Reynolds then said of the artillery is 
simply a cold fact, which is the highest tribute that can be 
paid to Wainwright and his command. The general over- 
looked the fact that the 5th IMaine, under Capt. George F. 
Lippien; Battery C, Pennsylvania Light, imder Capt. 
James Thompson, and Battery G, of same regiment, under 
Capt. Frank P. Amsden, had also been engaged, but Wain- 
wright acknowledges their services. Captain Lippien was in 
command of the artillery of Meade's division. Although 
the troops were yet on the south side of the Rappahannock, 



282 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the battle would not be renewed, for Jackson had industri- 
ously employed all of the time, since the charges of Meade 
and Gibbon, to deepen his rifle-pits and otherwise strengthen 
his position, so that he was much better prepared to with- 
stand an attack now than he was yesterday. 

Jackson had had twenty-four hours to come down 
in the valley and drive Franklin into the river, but so far 
not even a sign of a move indicated that he would pay the 
fraternal visit he was so enthusiastic over yesterday ; time 
and a good observation of Franklin's lines had cooled his 
fiery ardor. 

Franklin was well prepared to take care of his host, if 
he would only "Come into my (valley) parlor." Burns' 
division on the right, under the gritty little general, was 
hoping for a chance to display its mettle ; Smith's corps 
on his left was ready any moment, with Sickles and 
Birney of the Third Corps, two splendid divisions, com- 
manded by able generals, who resting on their arms, while 
Doubleday on the extreme left had his division well in hand 
for any emergency, even a night attack. 

With this magnificent line of battle in full view of Jack- 
son, there was no danger that he would attack. 

Reynolds highly commends Lieutenant Rogers of 
Doubleday' s staff for his skillful manner of withdrawing 
the pickets in front of Doubleday. 

Reynolds returns his thanks to Doubleday, Meade 
and Taylor, who succeeded Gibbon, after the latter was 
wounded. 

Doubleday says : "I was much indebted to Surg. Ed- 
ward Shippen, medical director, for his care and attention 
to the wounded. He also exposed himself a great deal on 
the field." He speaks highly of the behavior of his staff, 
Major Livingston, Captains Bloodgood and C. F. Noyes, 
Lieuts. J. B. INIartin, L. A. Bartlett, H. T. Lace, and W. H. 
Wilcox. Meade thanks his brigade commanders, and "To 
Colonel Sinclair particularly, who had command of the ad- 
vance during the whole day, and who was severely wounded, 



FREDERICKSBURG. 283 

I desire to express my obligations for assistance rendered 
me." 

Reynolds' staff was constantly in the saddle until the 
battle was over, and so was his escort, Company L, ist 
Maine Cavalry, under Capt Constantine Ta)4or, but this 
company was noted for its good discipline and readiness to 
go at once, regardless of danger, or else it would not have 
been selected by Reynolds, who never was rash, but fear to 
him was a stranger, and he quietly impressed those around 
him with a courage that made them court danger, if neces- 
sary. 

Taylor performed quite important service in connection 
with the pontoon trains, as will be seen by the following 
report : 

HaIvFway between Dumfries and Occoouan, 
On the road to Alexandria, Va., 

November 21, 1862 — 5 p. m. 
General : — The pontoon train commenced crossing the Occo- 
quan this morning. I am within five miles of the Occoquan, but 
no pontoon train has been met with. I send this as the first news 
from our train. I shall continue moving until I meet the train. 
I am, very respectfull}', your obedient servant. 

C. Taylor, 
Capt. ist Maine Cavalry', Commanding Battalion. 
To General Franklin, 

Stafford Court-house. 

Gibbon speaks in complimentary terms of his staff, and 
personally mentions Captains Wood and L,ee, and Lieu- 
tenants Haskell and Moale, 

General Taylor acknowledges his indebtedness to his 
two aids. Captain Hartz and Lieutenant Post. Colonel 
Magilton, commanding the Second Brigade under ]\Ieade, 
says: "Lieutenants Wilson and Campbell deserve great 
praise for the manner in which they conve}'ed orders under 
such a terrific fire, showing great coolness and courage, 
although both were slightly wounded." 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Anderson, who took the 
Third Brigade of ]\Ieade's off of the field, does not forget 



284 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

his staff — Captain Swearingen, and lyieutenants Bemus and 
Chamberlain. Colonel Lyle commanding Gibbon's Second 
Brigade says : 

I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the coolness and bravery 
of Colonel Bates, commanding i2tli Massachusetts; Colonel Baj-ne, 
commanding 136th Pennsylvania Volunteers ; Lieutenant Colonel 
Jannings, commanding 26th New York Volunteers (who was 
wounded in the early part of the action) ; L,ieutenant Colonels Allen 
and Wright ; Majors Sellers and Wetmore, and to the line ofi&cers of 
the several regiments of the brigade. The steadiness and good be- 
havior of the men, in my opinion, have never been excelled. 

Colonel Adrian R. Root, who commanded the First Bri- 
gade in Gibbon's division, that so heroically charged the 
enemy, says : 

I desire to render a general tribute of honest praise and gratitude 
to the officers and soldiers of my brigade. 

Meredith in his report, speaks in commendable terms 
of his staff— W. W. Dudley, J. D. Wood, J. W. Shaefer, 
Samuel H. Meredith, and J. M. Howard, Jr. 

Colonel Rogers, of Doubleday's Third Brigade, closes 
his report by saying : 

I take pleasure in referring to the promptness with which I was 
supported b3^ Colonels Hofmann and Lord, Lieutenant Colonel 
Hardenbergh and Captain Layton. 

I take pleasure also in testifying to the ver}- efficient service 
rendered by the 2d United States Sharpshooters, under Major Stough- 
ton, of Colonel Phelps' Brigade. 

Of his staff, Lieutenants Taylor, Cook and Bridges, he 
says : 

They performed their duties with great coolness and bravery 
under the severe artillery fire to which all were subjected. 

Colonel Gavin, commanding Doubleday's Second Bri- 
gade, says : 



FREDERICKSBLRG. 285 

Officers and men behaved admirably on the retreat, as they did 
during the entire fight. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct 
of both officers and men during the severe cannonading. I can only 
say that the brigade sustained fulh' its well-earned reputation. IMen 
all behaved so well I shall not attempt to speak of individual good 
conduct. 

On our left it might well be termed a drawn battle — 
while Franklin was unable to carry Jackson's strongly for- 
tified position, yet he was master of the valley, and it was 
equally as hazardous for Jackson to attack him, although 
Franklin had no breastworks, but the unalloyed valor of the 
troops would have vigorously met the enemy in an open 
field contest. 

Let us now see how the tide of battle has raged on the 
right — has our artiller\^ been successful in making a breach 
in the stone wall, or has our infantry been able to take it 
by storm? 

General Sumner, in command of the right grand divi- 
sion, gave the order to Couch, commanding the Second 
Corps, to attack with his command and carry IMarye's 
Heights. Couch directed French to take the lead with his 
division. He advanced with Kimball's brigade, supported 
by Andrews', and that in turn by Palmer's. 

The following telegrams announced the fact that French 
was marching : 

12 M. — The advance has started. D. N. CouCH. 

To General Sumner. 

From the signal station in the top of the courthouse 
steeple came the second dispatch : 

12:45 P- ^i- — Our infantrj'have advanced, and are hotlj- engaged. 
The enemj^ hold their own ; they have about two batteries in action 
on a hill and are playing into our infantry. 

To General Burnside. B. F. 

Kimball with great courage and bravery led his brigade 
on the enemy's works amid a storm of canister from the 



286 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

batteries concentrating their fire on him as he steadily ad- 
vanced, besides a deadly fire from Cobb's and Cook's 
brigades. When within fifty paces of their works the 
sheet of flame was so terrible that his brigade was com- 
pelled to halt. Their commander being severely wounded, 
had a depressing effect on the men, but Colonel Mason 
of the 4th Ohio assumed command in Kimball's place and 
valiantly fought the brigade. Andrews and Palmer were 
unable to push any farther to the front, and there the divi- 
sion stood and received the deadly fire of the enemy, 
which is thus described by the Comte de Paris : ' ' When 
within two hundred meters of the enemy, they were re- 
ceived by discharges of musketry, every shot of which, 
aimed at leisure, made sure of a victim." Their ranks 
melting away like snow on a southern hillside from 
the sun at noonday, they fired a volley at the enemy and 
retired. 

The third dispatch from the court house steeple says : 

I p. M. — Our troops are under a severe cross fire, but stand firm. 
To General Burnside. B. F. 

Hancock was then ordered to French's assistance, ad- 
vancing with Zook in front, then Meagher and Caldwell 
two hundred paces apart. Long before Hancock reached 
the outskirts of the city his division was suffering severely 
from Longstreet's artillery. As Hancock swept past the 
remnant of French's division at the head of Zook's brigade, 
Kimball's men joined him ; but he was able to go only 
some twenty-five paces farther when Zook's brigade was 
threatened with annihilation if it advanced. 

Then Meagher, the impulsive Irish patriot, attempted 
to pass to the front, but his brigade fell like grass before 
the reaper. 

After Zook's and Meagher's brigades lay stranded, Han- 
cock turned to Caldwell to have him try his luck. He 
advanced with a determination to scale the enemy's works, 



FREDERICKSBURG. 287 

but the third and last brigade of Hancock was sacrificed 
without even disturbing the enemy. 

1:30 p. M. — Two of otir divisions are now engaging the enemy. 
To General Burnside. 

1 :35 p. M. — Send the ammunition to the Lacy House ; Hancock 
and French are so hotly engaged, I need reenforcements. 

To General Burnside. D. N. Couch. 

If you can send a good division, I think the left flank of the 
enemy can be turned ; it will only be necessary now, I have not a 
division for the purpose. 

To General Burnside. D. N. Couch. 

Couch undertook to use Howard's division for that pur- 
pose, but when French and Hancock were so badly cut up 
he was compelled to order Howard to their support. 

Howard directed Owen's brigade to advance, followed 
by Hall's, with Sully remaining near the edge of the city. 
Although these troops fought with great valor, their efforts 
were all in vain. While the enemy had lost General Cobb, 
and General Cook was wounded, their casualties so far had 
been little more than those of a hea\^^ skirmish, while the 
gallant corps of the Army of the Potomac had suffered a 
loss that was sickening to behold — the ground was covered 
with the wounded and dying. When Meagher made his 
charge, two brothers of the 88th New York lay clasped in 
each other's embrace, dead in each other's arms; no one 
knows whether they spoke after they put their anns lov- 
ingly around each other — nor does it matter now. 

So far Cobb's and Cook's brigades, with the artillery, 
were the troops engaged under Longstreet. The desperate 
fighting of the Second Corps made it advisable for these 
two brigades to be strengthened ; consequently Ransom's 
and Kershaw's brigades were advanced to their assistance, 
Kershaw assuming command. Willcox attempted to relieve 
the right by pushing Sturgis in on the left of Hancock, x^c- 
cordingly Ferrero's brigade, under cover of Dickenson's bat- 



288 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

tery, marclied rapidly over the open space and up the hill, 
which checked the advance of the enemy, as his infantr}' had 
sallied over their works and were attempting to assail Han- 
cock's left. Ferrero compelled the enemy to retire behind 
his works, but that drew a concentrated fire on Dickenson's 
battery. Of Ferrero' s troops Willcox says: "But the 
gallant Dickenson gloriously fell at his post, and his 
battery suffered considerably in men and horses, under a 
concentrated fire of artillery and some musketry." While 
Ferrero was advancing under a galling fire, it was evident 
that his troops would be overpowered soon, and Gen- 
eral Nagle's brigade was ordered to his support. General 
Whipple seeing that Sturgis' small division was struggling 
up the slope in face of a concealed foe, sent him Carroll's 
brigade. 

But the hour demanded more victims, and Getty's divi- 
sion, which had been held near Hazel Run as a reserve, 
where observations could be made of the battle on the left 
and right, advanced. Willcox, as a last resort, to save his 
own troops under Sturgis and to relieve the Second Corps 
on the right, ordered Getty forward. He advanced with 
Hawkins' brigade until it nearly reached the enemy's 
works, when his infantry oj^ened such a well-aimed fire 
that Hawkins' brigade soon lost heavily and was badly 
crippled. Harland's brigade coming to their relief fought 
with great valor, but Getty was finally compelled to fall 
back in front of such a destructive fire — where it was noth- 
ing but sacrifice to remain. 

General Griffin is relieving General Sturgis, who is holding on 
in spite of everything until he is relieved. 

To General Sumner. Willcox. 

The left and right grand divisions had been engaged, 
and it now devolved on Hooker to bring up the center, 
composed of the Third and Fifth Corps. But Birney's 
and Sickles' divisions of the Third Corps had taken 
the place of Meade and Gibbon on the left ; while Car- 



FEEDER I CKSB UR G . 289 

roll's brigade of Whipple's division of that corps had 
been sent to the aid of Willcox, leaving only Piatt's brigade 
of Whipple's division of the Third Corps. 

Griffin's division of the Fifth Corps had gone to relieve 
Stnrgis, so it left Hooker with Piatt's brigade of the Third 
Corps, and Humphrey's and Sykes' division of the Fifth 
Corps to make his charge, but Piatt's brigade was too 
far to the left to be of any service in that trying ordeal. 
As he calmly looked over the work of the day — for it was 
then late in the afternoon — Hooker regarded it as a forlorn 
hope to lead two divisions against the enemy's works, 
which several corps had attempted to storm and signally 
failed. It is true that Smith's corps, and Burns' division, 
on Smith's right, had not been fighting very hard, but 
Reynolds, on the left, with Birney's and Sickles' divi- 
sions, had been heavily engaged, while the Second and 
Ninth Corps, on the right, had suffered great losses. Hooker 
saw nothing but disaster in another assault under the cir- 
cumstances. 

From the engagement at Williamsburg, where Hooker 
fought Longstreet, to the battle of Antietam, which he 
opened on the right, and electrified his troops by riding 
where danger seemed the greatest, no one doubted Hooker's 
anxiety to fight a battle. He had won, and justly so, too, the 
soubriquet of "Fighting Joe." For the first time in the 
war he was averse to fighting, and dispatched an aid to Burn- 
side, at the Phillips House, begging him to desist from 
a further attempt to carry a position which it was utterly 
impossible to take. The aid reported to Burnside Hooker's 
message, but the commander-in-chief was inflexible, and 
declined to consider Hooker's suggestion. When the 
officer returned with Burnside's answer. Hooker resolved to 
go and tell Burnside in person what he thought of again 
attempting to charge the enemy's works. 

Pleasonton, who had been with Burnside nearly all day, 
looked out and saw Hooker ride up on his white charger. 
When he dismounted Pleasonton said to me he thought 

XIX 



290 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Hooker was the maddest man that he ever saw. Burnside 
was not aware that he was coming, so Pleasonton slipped 
out and went into another part of the house, as he did not 
want to be present when they met, for he knew there 
would be a high time, Pleasonton said Hooker made the 
air blue with adjectives over the management of the battle. 
But Hooker was unable to make Burnside yield, and he re- 
turned to his command to carry out the imperative orders 
of his superior. 

Hooker's report is such a clear and condensed descrip- 
tion of the battle that it is here given ; 

At 1:30 o'clock, or thereabouts, I received orders to cross this 
corps and attack. Before the corps had fully crossed, I was directed 
to send a division to support General Sturgis. General Griffin's 
division, the largest of the three, being nearest the position, for the 
purpose, was assigned to this duty. General Butterfield was then 
left with the two smaller divisions of his corps to make an attack 
upon the right, where General Sumner's (Second) and a portion of 
the Ninth Corps, greatly outnumbering this force, had been at work 
all day without making any impression. 

A prisoner, in the morning, had given to General Burnside, 
General Sumner and myself full information of the position and 
defenses of the enemy, stating that it was their desire that we should 
attack at that point, in rear of Fredericksburg on the Telegraph 
road ; that it was perfectly impossible for any troops to carry the 
position ; that if the first line was carried a second line of batteries 
commanded it. 

The result of the operations of General Sumner's corps, which 
had made a determined, spirited attack, without success, fully con- 
firmed the statements of this prisoner. I carefully surveyed the 
poiijt of attack, and, after conversation with several of the general 
officers of Sumner's and my own command, I was convinced that it 
would be a useless waste of life to attack with the force at my dis- 
posal. I dispatched an aid to General Burnside, to say that I ad- 
vised him not to attack. The replj' came that the attack must be 
made. Under ordinar}' circumstances I should have complied at 
once, but so impressed was I with the conviction heretofore stated, 
that I determined it to be my duty to the troops under my command 
to give General Burnside a fuller explanation and dissuade him, if 
possible, from what I considered a hopeless attack, especiall}' as the 
few moments it would take for this purpose could not possibly affect 



I 



1 



FREDERICKSBURG. 291 

the result of the attack in the slightest degree. Accordingly I did 
so. The general insisted upon the attack being made. I returned 
and brought up every available batter3% with the intention of break- 
ing their barriers, to enable Butterfield's attacking column to carry 
the crest. This artillery fire was continued with great vigor until 
near sunset, when the attack with ba3-onets was made hy Humphrey's 
divi.sion, General Sokes' division moving on its right, to assault 
echelon and support. This attack was made with a spirit and de- 
termination seldom if ever equaled in war. The impregnable posi- 
tion of the enemy had given them so strong an advantage that the 
attack was almost immediately repulsed, and Sykes' division re- 
called, without having fully assaulted, to cover the withdrawal of 
Humphrey's. This movement was a necessit)-, for the loss and re- 
pulse of the attacking columns had been so severe that, should the 
enemy have followed up their advantage, without this precaution, 
the result could not have failed to be of the most disastrous char- 
acter. 

This is a fair and orraphic description of the battle on 
the right and center. 

When Sinnner's and Hooker's men assailed Longstreet 
— the annals of history do not furnish an instance ^yhere 
greater heroism was displayed on a battlefield than that 
shown by the gallant soldiers of these two generals — less 
than i,ooo of Longstreet' s men stiffered any injury, because 
even cannon could not make a breach in the w^orks behind 
which they were ensconced. 

Btirnside, as he paced up and down the veranda of the 
Phillips House while the battle was raging, said: "That 
height mtist be carried this evening," 

He became desperate as the day wore away. Hooker, 
with only two small divisions, was ordered in the center, 
while an order was sent to Franklin to attack on the left 
with his whole command. That was an impossibility — it 
could be done only by massing his columns, when his flanks 
would have been exposed ; then, again, there was no time to 
execute this hasty order. Franklin's front was fully two 
miles long, and the columns could not be massed hi time to 
make an attack that evening. Had General Burnside 
adhered to Lincoln's urgent request for him to cross the 



292 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan, where 
his troops could ford the river, with no troops strong enough 
to dispute its passage, he would have occupied Fredericks- 
burg without having to fight the great battle which had just 
terminated. Then if he had met the enemy, it would have 
been on a field where he would have had nearly equal chances 
— not attacking a Gibraltar. Furthermore, he solemnly 
promised that he would obey the wishes of the President in 
that matter, but utterly failed in its execution. It was the 
mistake of his life. He did not want to fight a battle that 
late in the fall, but if he had occupied Fredericksburg, and 
repaired his railroad to Aquia Creek, there is scarcely a 
doubt that he would have had a chance to meet the enemy. 
Lee would, in all probability, have taken a position some 
distance from him, and before the two armies could have 
met, the winter would have forced an armistice until 
spring, when Burnside would have been in excellent con- 
dition to pursue his adversary. Since the war, referring to 
the repulse of Humphreys and Sykes, who were forced 
back with fearful loss. General Burns observed to General 
Rosecrans and myself, that Hooker said " that he had lost 
about as many men as he was ordered to sacrifice," then 
gave the signal to retreat. And the Comte de Paris attrib- 
utes the verv same language to the irate general. 

The great struggle had ended. It was an awful night 
for the Army of the Potomac — the wounded and the dying 
lay on the frozen ground, while those who had been for- 
tunate enough to escape unharmed stood in groups, cold 
and hungry, without any fire, wondering whether the 
battle was to be renewed again in the morning. It was 
known that Burnside was anxious to renew the battle, and 
that he was going to lead his old corps, the Ninth, and 
storm the enem^^'s works. 

The battle had been so badly managed that both officers 
and men were opposed to its renewal. There were not 
half a dozen officers who shared Burnside's opinion on that 
question. 



FREDERICKSBURG. 293 

Longstreet said : "They fully expected Burnside would 
renew the battle the next day. They knew that another 
da)' would nearly ruin the Army of the Potomac. If 
Burnside would attack such a strongly fortified position, it 
was reasonable to suppose that he would repeat his folly 
the next day ;" but, thanks to Sumner, Hooker and other 
officers who had the nerve to tell him of the fatal conse- 
quences of another defeat, he was forced to yield. He was 
unyielding in his purpose until he was told that the 
officers and men were all opposed to it ; and even then he 
would not be satisfied until he had visited some of the 
troops. 

Some have censured Lee for not attacking the Union 
Army, and that astute general has given to the world the 
reason he did not. It was because he fully expected 
Burnside to renew the attack ; he never had a serious 
thought of risking the great victory that he had gained by 
advancing on the Army of the Potomac in the open plain. 
It was enough to state after the battle that he thus lost 
a golden opportunity that deeply pained him the remainder 
of his life. His artillery might have done some damage, 
that was all. If his infantry had advanced, the joy of Sum- 
ner, Hooker, Franklin, Reynolds, Meade, Doubleday, 
Smith, Burns, Willcox, Couch, Humphreys, Hancock and 
French would have known no bounds, while the Union 
troops would have made a charge that would have paled 
the desperate assaults of the French at Waterloo. 

Besides, Hunt's artillery was admirably posted on Staf- 
ford Heights to warmly greet any advance. The only 
thing that Lee could do was to patiently remain behind 
his fortifications and destroy Burnside's columns as they 
advanced. 

When Burnside determined to give up the contest the 
order was issued for the troops to quietly retire, on the eve- 
ning of the 15th, across the same bridges that they had 
marched over to offer battle to the enemy. The retreat 
was made in good order, which fully showed that there was 



294 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

no demoralization in the army. It suffered great losses, 
but it retained its unwavering faith in the final triumph of 
the Union cause, though every one seemed to realize the 
fact that a great mistake had been mad§. 

On the 2ist of December Generals Franklin and Smith 
sent a plan to the President to take the old Peninsular route, 
but advised that the army march up both banks of the 
James River with the aid of the gunboats in the river. 
Franklin had been quite a confidant at the White House on 
former occasions, and that may have stimulated them to 
prepare and send their views. It is evident from Lincoln's 
laconic reply that he did not greatly relish it ; and it may 
have been against Franklin's interest that he assisted in it, 
as it was not long before he was relieved of his command. 
There is no doubt of their honest intentions, and that the 
plan was very good, but it seems that the Peninsular route 
had greatly annoyed the President. The following is the 
President's reply : 

Executive INIansion, 
Washington, December 22, 1862. 
Yonrs of the 21st, suggesting a plan of operation for the Army 
of the Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan and shall 
yet try to give it more deliberate consideration with the aid of mili- 
tary men. Meanwhile let me say it seems to me to present the old 
questions of preference between the line of the Peninsula and the 
line you are now upon. The difficulties you point out pertaining to 
the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. But now, as 
heretofore, if you go to the James River a large part of the army 
must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line to protect Wash- 
ington. It is the old difficulty. When I saw General Franklin at 
Harrison's Landing on James River, last July, I cannot be mistaken 
in saying that he distinctly advised the bringing of the anny away 
from there. Yours, very truly, A. Lincoln. 

Major General Fr.\nklin and Major General Smith. 

To which Franklin made the following reply : 

Headquarters Left Grand Division, 
December 26, 1862. 
I respectfully acknowledge the receipt of j'our letter of the 22d 



FREDERICKSBURG. 295 

inst. In arguing the propriety of a campaign on the James River, 
we supposed Washington to be garrisoned sufficiently, and 
the Potomac impassable, except by bridges. The fortification of 
Harper's Ferry is another important requisite. These matters were 
considered as of course, and did not enter into discussion of the two 
plans of campaign. I presume you are right in supposing that I 
advised the withdrawal of the army from James River in July last. 
I think that under the same circumstances I would give the same 
advice. 

The army was debilitated by what it had already gone through, 
was in an unhealthy position, its sick list was enormous, and there 
was a prospect that we would have to remain in that position during 
the two worst months — August and September. The effect of this 
would have been to ruin the army in health. Circumstances are 
ver}- different now. The anny is in good health, and the best 
months of the 3^ear are before us. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

W. B. Franklin, Major General. 

To the President. 

It will be seen by this correspondence that there was an 
active antagonism to Burnside ; it was widespread and gen- 
eral, though he apparently knew nothing about it. In the 
mean time the commander-in-chief set to work to try to re- 
trieve his fast-waning popularity as a general. 

His next idea was to prepare to cross his army lower 
down the Rappahannock, and by that means gain Lee's 
rear and cut off his communications with Richmond. That 
was a good plan, except that it involved the crossing of the 
river in face of the enemy ; for it is presuming too mu^h to 
suppose Lee would not have watched his movements close 
enough to have been fully aware of the design the moment 
it was commenced in earnest. 

The cavalry, under Averell, was to pass the Rappahan- 
nock at Kelley's Ford, then cross the Rapidan, strike the 
railroad in Lee's rear and tear it up ; then proceed in the 
direction of Suffolk. Averell arrived at the lord on the 
30th of December, and the infantry was preparing to march, 
when Burnside received a telegram from the President not 
to make the move until further orders. 



296 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Then lie became aware that his subordinate officers were 
undermining him at Washington. He then asked the 
President to permit him to make a move or relieve him. 
Mr. Lincoln consented, and Burnside prepared to cross the 
river above Fredericksburg, and he lent all of his energies 
to achieve success. He placed Couch on the lower Rappa- 
hannock to again draw the attention of the enemy in that 
direction, as if that was his real point of attack. Sigel 
was posted at Falmouth. The weather was fine, and the 
troops cut new roads back from the river so the enemy 
could not observe their movements, and hope seemed to 
crown the movements of the general-in-chief, and had he 
been successful the rautterings against him would have died 
away like the receding noise of a passing storm. 

Franklin's and Hooker's grand divisions bivouacked on 
the 20th near Banks' Ford, where Burnside intended to 
cross. That ford was easily passed in summer, but in 
winter it was quite deep and very rapid ; hence the pontoons 
had to be put down for the army to cross on. As the river 
was narrow at that point it would have taken only a short 
time to throw a bridge across it. So far the enemy w^as de- 
ceived as to his real movements and designs. Couch had 
been vigilantly watched, for Burnside had a weakness for 
crossing several miles below Fredericksburg. He strongly 
contemplated that before the battle ; then he thought he 
could cross some three miles below the city and get posses- 
sion f)f the Telegraph road before Lee's forces could arrive 
from Port Royal. His design to cross his whole army 
about Port Royal or Skinker's Neck on December 30, when 
the President stopped him, was well known to Lee, so his 
move up the river a few days later took the enemy by 
surprise. 

Up to the evening of the 20th the weather had been 
perfectly splendid, and if Burnside had had three more days 
of good weather, or if he had moved three days earlier, he 
would have been able to cross the river and fight a battle in 
the open plain between Salem Church and Chancellorsville, 



FREDERICKSBURG. 297 

where Hooker intended to fight when he crossed, and fought 
the ill-fated battle of Chancellorsville. Even at this late 
date, a quarter of a century after the war, it seems strangely 
cruel that Burnside, with such well-laid plans, which would 
have given him a victory beyond a doubt — for the army 
would have fought with a desperation never excelled — 
should so suddenly be enveloped in a storm that raged with 
a fury as if two storm centers had met. 

During the night of the 20th the rain began, and by the 
morning of the 21st the earth was soaked and the river 
banks had the appearance of a quagmire. Already fifteen 
pontoons were on the river, nearly spanning it, and five 
more were amply sufficient. Burnside began at once to bring 
up his artillery, which had the effect of making a perfect 
mortar bed for a considerable area around the ford. All 
day the men worked in the rain, but to little purpose. 
Quite a number of cannon were advanced near the ford, but 
the 22d only added to the storm, and the artillery, caissons, 
and even wagons were swamped in the mud. 

The storm had delayed Burnside' s movements, giving 
L/ce ample time to line the other shore with his army, 
though there was no attempt to interfere with his crossing 
except from the sharpshooters, who peppered away on all 
occasions. No doubt Lee was hoping Burnside would effect 
a crossing, with a swollen river in his rear. It would have 
been a sorry predicament for the Union Army indeed. But 
Burnside finally became resigned to his fate and gave the 
order for the army to retire to its quaiters, and thus ended 
the famous mud march. 

His last ill luck was too much for his heretofore appar- 
ent good nature. Up to that time he had paid no attention 
to the criticisms made on him, but then he let loose the 
flood-gates of his resentment and issued an order peremp- 
torily dismissing Generals Hooker, Brooks, Newton, and 
Cochrane from the service of the United States, and depriv- 
ing Generals PVanklin, Smith, Sturgis, and Ferrero, an^ 
Colonel Taylor of their respective commands. This most 



298 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

extraordinary order had to have the approval of the Presi- 
dent. Mr. Lincohi as usual looked the matter over with a 
view to best serve the interests of the country. I said to 
Rosecrans on this subject that I did not think Lincoln had 
a particle of jealousy against a living being, and that he 
was so in earnest to preserve the Union, that if it had de- 
pended on his place as Chief Executive of the nation he 
would have left the White House promptly and without a 
regret. 

After due deliberation over the remarkable paper pre- 
sented by Burnside to dismiss several prominent generals, 
and deprive several others of their commands, or accept his 
resignation, the President decided to relieve him as com- 
mander-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac, but not to 
accept his resignation ; and on the 26th of January he 
severed his connection with the army as its commander, 
although he continued to the close of the war as a corps 
commander. The fact that Burnside never sought the 
position of commander-in-chief, and had twice before de- 
clined it on the ground that he did not consider himself 
competent to command it, was greatly in his favor with the 
army, the authorities at Washington, and the country ; 
though he lost the battle of Fredericksburg by mistakes, 
yet he never lost a due respect with the authorities or the 
countr}-. 

But few generals have the peculiar ability to command 
great armies like the Army of the Potomac ; though Meade 
did it, and that other Pennsylvania soldier, who fell at 
Gettysburg on the first day, was able to command any army. 

Burnside stands well in history as a corps counnander, 
but as commander-in-chief, a position thrust on him against 
his judgment and wishes, if guilty of errors or lacking in 
judgment, the mantle of charity should cover all. 

An unpleasant duty presents itself in recording the fact 
that General Meade is about to leave the First Corps — his 
a'bility attracted the attention of his superiors, and he is 
assigned to the command of the Fifth Corps. But the news 



FREDER ICKS BURG. 299 

of his promotion was by no means a surprise after the bat- 
tles of South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg, 
where he distinguished himself so notably, and displayed 
great capacity. He was selected as a corps commander, 
where his sphere of usefulness was extended. 

In the following farewell order to the Pennsylvania 
Reserves he justly gives them great credit for his rapid 
advancement : 

General Orders, ) Headquarters Third Division, 

No. loi. ) December 25, 1862. 

In announcing the above order, which separates the command- 
ing general from the division, he takes occasion to express to the 
officers and men, notwithstanding his just pride at being promoted 
to a higher command, he experiences a deep feeling of regret at 
parting from them with whom he has been so long associated, and 
to whose services he here acknowledges his indebtedness for what- 
ever reputation he may have acquired. 

The commanding general will never cease to remember that he 
belonged to the Reserve Corps ; he will watch with eagerness for the 
deeds of fame which he feels sure they will meet under the com- 
mand of his successors ; and though sadly reduced in numbers from 
casualties of battle, yet he knows the Reserves will always be ready 
and prompt to uphold the honor and glory of their State. 

By command of Major General Meade : 

(Signed) Edward C. Baird, A. A. G. 

The ranking officer of the division was Colonel Sickel, 
of the 3d Regiment, and to him was intrusted, through 
General Meade, the command of the Reserves. Sickel had 
highly deserved the star for his gallant conduct on more 
than one field, and his being placed in command of the 
division was evidence enough of that fnct. 

But the loss of General Meade to the First Corps, which 
was a heavy blow, did not fill the measure of its .sore 
trial, for it was rumored that Governor Curtin, Generals 
Reynolds and Meade, were again requesting that the Re- 
serves be returned to the State, or at least to Washington, 
to have their depleted ranks recruited to their full comple- 
ment. And on the 5th of February a telegram from Gen- 



300 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

eral Doubleday, directed Colonel Sickel to repair with the 
division to the defenses of Washington, and conseqnently 
the three brigades encamped at Fairfax Court House, 
Upton's Hill, and Alexandria for the remainder of the 
winter. 

It was one of the original divisions of the First Corps. 
It had not only been the stepping-stone of Reynolds and 
Meade to fame, but it placed a crown of glor}^ on the First 
Corps that will be as enduring as the existence of the nation. 
While its services in the future are not to be identified 
directly with the First Corps, yet we will keep its place 
vacant, hoping some time to welcome it back. 

The First Corps at this time underwent a reorganization 
in a certain sense. A new division was added to it, com- 
posed of two brigades. This new division took the number 
made vacant by the Pennsylvania Reserve Division, and 
consequently was No. 3. 

Gen. Abner Doubleday, who commanded the First 
Division, was assigned to the command of the new Third 
Division. But before entering into detail of this new 
division, Doubleday's farewell order to his old division is 
given, because the general was warmly attached to the 
officers and men of that connnand. His old brigade was 
in the division, and his devotion to it knew no bounds : 

In taking leave of this command I desire to say one word of 
farewell. Wherever the service may call me, and whatever may be 
my future lot, I shall never forget the ties which bind me to this 
brigade, and this division. I shall never cease to remember the 
brave men who stood by my side in some of the most stupendous 
battles the world ever saw. Men who fought against such heavy 
odds at GHinesville, ard the first day at Bull Run; who stormed the 
heights at South Mountain, took eight standards from tl:e enenn' at 
Antietam, and held their ground so bravely at Fredericksburg, have 
won my admiration and regard. I am happj^ to have fought by 
their side, and proud of the honor of having commanded them. I 
wish them now at parting, individually and collectively, all honor 
and success. 

Thus spoke the brave general to his old connnand, 



FREDERICKSBURG. 301 

which was a good guaranty that he would be faithful to 
the new one of which he was about to assume command. 
Time proved that he extended the same care, ability, and 
devotion to them ; and in return they loved, respected, and 
followed him in battle wherever he went. To this day his 
name fills them with delight. 

This new division, infantry and artillery, was solidly 
from Pennsylvania. The First Brigade, commanded by 
Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, was composed of the 121st, 
135th, i42d, and 151st Pennsylvania. The Second Brigade, 
made up of the 143d, 149th, and 150th, was under the 
command of Col. Roy Stone. Maj. Ezra W. Mathews was 
chief of artillery of the division, with Batteries B, F, and 
G, P'irst Pennsylvania Light Artillery. Such was the or- 
ganization of the new division that ere long made its mark 
on the field of battle. 

Gen. James S. Wadsworth — that grand old man whose 
hair was then as white as the driven snow, and with his 
millions came out to share the lot of a common soldier, 
was assigned to the command of the First Division. There 
was no duty assigned to him that he did not cheerfully 
perform, and no danger that he did not defy for the sake of 
his country. * 

* General Wadsworth turned his salary over for the benefit of our soldiers in 
Southern prisons. 

He not only took his boys — except James W., who was then a mere lad, — 
but his son-in-law into the service with him. The general was killed in the Wilder- 
ness, on the Lacy farm, by Longstreet's corps. 

It was thought at the time by the enemy that Grant was killed, and cheer after 
cheer rolled down their lines several times with great joy, but Longstreet at once 
recognized Wadsworth and sent his body to our lines under a flag of truce. 

Craig Wadsworth, his son, a fine officer, died of disease contracted in the serv- 
ice. So did his son-in-law. When James W. was sixteen, the general was going 
to put him in the ranks as a private soldier, but Major Kress and Captain Hal- 
stead of his staff, remonstrated with the general, tjiat he was too young for such 
heavy service. So the general desisted from his purpose. However, in the winter 
of 1864 he voluntarily entered the army, and was appointed captain and aid-de- 
camp on Gen. G. K. Warren's staff, remaining in the service until after the battle of 
Five Forks. He has since the war served in Congress, and is now one of the lead- 
mg men of the Empire State. 



302 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The First Brigade, Phelps', remained the same, with 
the exception that it had been deprived of the 2d United 
States Sharpshooters ; while to the Second, then com- 
manded by Gen. Lysander Cutler, the 147th New York 
was added. 

General Patrick took his brigade with him to the head- 
quarters of the Army of the Potomac when he was made 
Provost Marshal General, and in its place came a new 
brigade composed of the 22d, 29th, 30th, and 31st New 
Jersey Regiments, with the 137th Pennsylvania, under the 
command of that gallant hero who lost his eyes in the 
battle of Gettysburg, Gabriel R. Paul. The Fourth, the 
Iron Brigade, stood the same, with General Meredith in 
command. The artillery of the division was the ist New 
Hampshire Light, Battery L, ist New York, and Battery 
B, 4th United States, with Capt. John A. Reynolds chief 

The Second Division had been commanded by General 
Gibbon, who was succeeded by Gen. John C. Robinson 
of New York. His division stood the same, with the ex- 
ception that Gen. Henry Baxter succeeded Colonel Lyle 
in command of the Second Brigade. The only change 
made in Robinson's artillery was, that in place of Battery 
F, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, he was given Bat- 
tery C, 5th United States, with Captain Ransom acting 
chief of artillery of the division. This completed the 
reorganization of the First Corps before it entered upon the 
campaign of 1863. 

There are many incidents of real worth which would 
be interesting to note concerning nearly every regiment, 
but the length of this chapter admonishes us to bring it 
to a close. 

Captain Smith, in his history of the 76th New York, 
graphically relates an account of such cheerfulness, by a 
member of that regiment, as he lay mortally wounded on 
the field, that it is here given in order that generations yet 
unborn may know what sacrifices were made for the sake 
of the perpetuity of the Union, by vouchsafing to them the 



FREDERICKSBURG. 303 

unity of a happy country with all the rich blessings of 
peace. He says : 

During this engagement, Henry McFall, of Company F, fell 
mortall}' wounded in the thigh, by the bursting of a shell. Colonel 
Wainwright says of him : "He was attended to very bravely, under 
fire, by a little assistant surgeon of the 95th New York. Probably 
he sank under the shock, for he died very shortly. On leaving, the 
brave fellow called out cheerfully, 'Good bj^e, Colonel,' evidently, 
as I thought, with the intention of keeping up the spirits of his 
comrades. I have always admired him, and should like to know 
how his family are doing." 

Truth is stranger than fiction, and the pathetic account 
of this soldier's tragic death could be duplicated in every 
company in the Army. Years hence the people will little 
know how dearly their freedom was saved with the precious 
lives of men just budding into manhood, they voluntarily 
gave up ' ' That the nation under God should have a new 
birth of freedom." 

But all the sacrifice, devotion and heroism cannot be 
justly claimed by the men. The devotion of the women 
on both sides was very intense. However, but few of the 
gentler sex went squarely into battle ; but an instance is 
given by Major Small, in his history of the i6th Maine, 
where a girl disguised her sex and attired in a soldier's 
uniform, joined Company I of that regiment, and fought 
until she was captured in the charge on Taliaferro's divi- 
sion. She is thus spoken of by the Richmond Whig: 

Yesterday a rather prepossessing lass was discovered on Belle 
Isle, among the prisoners of war held there. She gave her real 
name as Mary Jane Johnson, belonging to the i6th INIaine Regiment. 
She gave as an excuse for adopting soldier's toggery, that she was 
following her lover to shield and protect him when in danger. He 
had been killed, and now she had no objection to return to the more 
peaceful sphere for which nature, by her sex, had better fitted her. 
Upon the discovery of her sex. Miss Johnson was removed from 
Belle Isle to Castle Thunder. She will probably go North by the 
next flag of truce. She is about sixteen years of age. 



304 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Return of casualties in the Union forces, commanded 
by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. A. at the battle 
of Fredericksburg, Va. , December 11-15, 1862. 

FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj. Gen. J. F. Reynolds. 
First Division, Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday. 

First Brigade — Col. Walter Phelps, jr 30 

Second Brigade — Col. James Gavin 26 

Third Brigade — Col. William F. Rogers 67 

Fourth Brigade { ^'"^S ^'="- ^ol- Meredith | ^^ 

I Col. I^ysander Cutler J 

Artillery — Capt. Geo. A. Gerrish and Capt. J. A. Reynolds 26 

General Headquarters Escort 3 

Total First Division, including Escort 217 

Cx-.,„,T^ r\,,„ , , f Brig. Gen. John Gibbon. 
Second Division i ^ ■> 

L Brig. Gen. Nelson Taylor. 

First Brigade — Col. Adrian R. Root 475 

Second Brigade — Col. Peter Lyle 460 

Third Brigade— Col. S H. Leonard 314 

Artillery — Capt. George F. Leppien 17 

Division Staff i 

Total Second Division 1)267 

Third Division — Maj. Gen. George G. Meade. 

First Brigade (*^°^-^^''"'^'"''^^"'=''^''' "I .jo 

i. Col. William McCandless J ^ 

Second Brigade — Col. A. L. Magilton 632 

{Brig. Gen. C. F. Jackson, (killed) . . . ^ 
Col. Joseph W. Fisher l 681 
Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson ) 

Ai-tillery 30 

Total Third Division i>853 

Total First Army Corps 3>337 

SECOND ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch. 
First Division — Brig. Gen. W. S. Hancock. 
Corps and Division Staff 4 

First Brigade i^"§^^^"-J°^"'^-C^^^^'^" \ oC2 

\ Col. Geo. W. Von Schack J 952 

Second Brigade — Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher 545 

Third Brigade — Col. Samuel K. Zook 527 

Artillery— (4th U. S., Battery "C") 5 

Total First Division . , 2,033 



FREDERICKSBURG. 305 

Second Division — Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard. 

Staff I 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully 122 

Second Brigade — Col. Joshua T. Owen 258 

Third Brigade -Col. N. J. Hall and Col. \Vm. R. Lee . . . 515 

Artillery 18 

Total Second Division 914 

Third Division — Brig. Gen. Wm. H. French. 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. N. Kimball, Col. J. S. Mason . . 520 

Second Brigade — Col. O. H. Palmer 291 

Third Brigade — Col. J. W. Andrews, Lt. Col. Marshall . . . 342 

Artillery 7, and Artillery Reserve 7 ; total 14 

Total Third Division 1,167 

Total Second Army Corps 4,114 

THIRD ARMY CORPS— Brig. Gen. George Stoneman. 
First Division — Brig. Gen. D. B. Bimey. 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson 146 

Second Brigade— Brig. Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward 629 

Third Brigade — Brig. Gen. Hiram G. Berry 165 

Artillery — Capt. George E. Randolph 10 

Total First Division 950 

Second Division — Brig Gen. D. E. Sickles. 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr 81 

Second Brigade — Col. George B. Hall 16 

Third Brigade — Brig. Gen. Joseph W. Revere 2 

Artillery— (4th U. S., Battery "K ") I 

Total Second Division loo 

Third Division — Brig. Gen. A. W. Whipple. 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. A. S. Piatt, Col. E. Franklin . . 9 

Second Brigade— Col. Samuel S. Carroll 1 18 

Artillery i, and Division Staff I, total 2 

Total Third Division 129 

Total Third Army Corps 1,179 

FIFTH ARMY CORPS— Brig. Gen. Daniel Buttcrlield. 
First Division — Brig. Gen, Charles Griffin. 

First Brigade — Col. James Barnes 500 

Second Brigade — Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer 222 

XX 



306 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Third Brigade Col. T. B. W. Stockton 201 

Artillery 3, General Staff 2 ; total 5 

Total First Division 928 

Second Division — Brig. Gen. Geo. Sykes. 

First Brigade —Col. Robert C. Buchanan ........ 5 1 

Second Brigade — Maj. G. L. Andrews, Maj. C. S. Lovell . . I40 

Third Brigade— Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren .... 36 

Artillery— (5th U. S. Battery"!") I 

Total Second Division 228 

Third Division — Brig. Gen. A. A. Humphreys. 

First Brigade -Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler 454 

Second Brigade— Col. Peter H. Allabach 562 

Division Staff 3, Cavalry (4th Pa.,) i 4 

Total Third Division 1,020 

Total Fifth Army Corps 2,176 

SIXTH ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Smith. 
First Division — Brig. Gen. Wm. T. H. Brooks. 

First Brigade— Col. Alfred T. A. Torbert 162 

Second Brigade — Col. Henry L. Cake 17 

Third Brigade— Brig. Gen. D. A. Russell 10 

Artillery 8 

Total First Division 197 

Second Division — Brig. Gen. A. P. Howe. 

First Brigade— Brig. Gen. Calvin E. Pratt . 26 

Second Brigade — Col. Henry Whiting • . . . I44 

(Brig. Gen. F. L. Vinton -i 

Col. Robert F. Taylor I 15 

Brig. Gen. F. H. Neill ) 

Artillery— (5th U. S., " F ") I 

Total Second Division 186 

Third Division — Brig. Gen. John Newton. 

First Brigade Brig. Gen. John Cochrane 24 

Second Brigade— Brig. Gen. Charies Deven, Jr 17 

Third Brigade— Col. T. A. Rowley, Brig. Gen. F. Wheaton . 12 

/- , T> • if Brig. Gen. G. D. Bayard ■. 

Cavalry Brigade ^^.-r^..,., ^, \ 4 

•' " I Col. D. McM. Gregg / ^ 

Artillery— (2d U. S., " G ") lo 

Total Third Division 67 

Total Sixth Corps 45° 



FREDERICKSBURG. 307 

NINTH ARMY CORPS— Brig. Gen. O. B. Willcox. 
First Division — Brig. Gen. \Vm. W. Burns. 

First Brigade— Col. O. M. Poe 13 

Second Brigade — Col. Benjamin C. Christ 8 

Third Brigade — Col. Daniel Leasure 3 

Artillery — (ist New York, Battery " D ") 3 

Total First Division 27 

Second Division — Brig. Gen. S. D. Sturgis. 
Staff I 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. James Nagle 500 

Second Brigade — Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero 49 1 

Arlillery— (1st Rhode Isl'd, "D," 2; 4th U.S., "E," 13) 15 

Total Second Division • 1007 

Third Division— Brig. Gen. G. W. Getty. 

First Brigade — Col. Rush C. Hawkins 255 

Second Brigade — Col. Edward Harland 41 

Total Third Division 296 

Total Ninth Army Corps ^2)2fi 

Engineer Brigade — Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury 59 

Artillery Reserves — Lieut. Col. William Hays 8 

RECAPITULATION. 
Right Grand Division — (Second and Ninth Corps) .... 5444 

Center Grand Division — (Third and Fifth Corps) 3355 

Left Grand Division — (First and Sixth Corps) 37^7 

Engineers and Artillery Reserve 67 

Total Casualties Army of the Potomac 12,653 

Return of casualties of the Confederate forces at the 
battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 11-15, 1862, com- 
manded by Maj. Gen. R. E. Lee, as shown by the "Offi- 
cial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies." 

FIRST ARMY CORPS. 
McLaws' Division. 

Cobb's Brigade 234 

Barksdale's Brigade 242 

Kershaw's Brigade 373 

Washington Artillery 26 

Total McLaws' Division 875 



308 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Stuart's (Cavalry) Division. 
W. H. F. Lee's Brigade 13 

Anderson's Division. 

Perry's Brigade '. 89 

Fealherston's Brigade 43 

Wright's Brigade . 3 

Wilcox's Brigade 9 

Mahone's Brigade 159 

Total Anderson's Division 3°3 

Pickett's Division. 

Kemper's Brigade 46 

Jenkins' Brigade 8 

Total Pickett's Division 54 

Ransom's Division. 

Cook's Brigade 380 

Ransom's Brigade 154 

Total Ransom's Division 534 

Hood's Division. 

Law's Brigade 3^5 

Toomb's Brigade 12 

Robertson's Brigade 6 

Anderson's Brigade lo 

Total Hood's Division 343 

Total First Army Corps 2,122 

SECOND ARMY CORPS. 
(As corrected returns, by brigades, are not given, for the Second Corps, this 
list can only be shown by Divisions). 

A. P. Hill's Division 2,120 

D. H. Hill's Division 173 

Swell's Division 932 

Taliaferro's (Jackson's) Division I90 

Total Second Army Corps 3>4I5 

Total First and Second Army Corps 5 ,537 



CHAPTER X. 

CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

T T seems eminently fit and proper to begin the chapter 
-*- on the battle of Chancellorsville with the order 
assigning Hooker to the command of the Army of the 
Potomac, and Lincoln's letter to him. They are both a 
part of the history of the country : 

Executive IMansion, 
Washington, D. C, Jan. 25, 1S63. 
My Dear Sir : — Please meet General Burnside here at ten 
o'clock this morning. Yours, truly, 

A. Lincoln. 
Major General HallECK. 

General Orders, 1 War Dept., Adj't Gen.'s Office, 

No. 20. I Washington, D. C, Jan. 25, 1863. 

I. The President of the United States has directed : 

ist. That Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be 
relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac. 

2d. That INIaj. Gen. E. V. Sumner, at his own request, be 
relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac. 

3d. That Maj. Gen. W. B. Franklin be relieved from duty in 
the Army of the Potomac. 

4th. That Maj. Gen. J. Hooker be assigned to the command 
of the Army of the Potomac. 

II. The officers relieved as above will report in person to the 
Adjutant-General of the Army. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

E. D. TOWNSEND, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Executive ^Mansion, 
Washington, D. C, Jan. 26, 1863. 
General : — I have placed you at the head of the .\rmy of the 
Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to 

309 



310 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that 
there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied 
with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which of 
course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your pro- 
fession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, 
which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are am- 
bitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than 
harm ; but I think that, during General Burnside's command of 
the Army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted 
him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the 
country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I 
have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying 
that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of 
course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you 
the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up 
as dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will 
risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the 
utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has 
done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit 
which you hive aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their 
commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn 
upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. 
Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any 
good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now 
beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go for- 
ward and give us victories. Yours, very truly, 

A. Lincoln. 
Major General Hooker. 

lyincoln's letter fully confirms what was said in the 
preceding chapter of the jealousies, bickerings and distrust 
that prevailed among the officers of the Army of the 
Potomac, while the rank and file had obeyed every order 
with promptness. Failure after failure, with the famous 
"Mud March" as a closing melodrama, was too much for 
the morale of the troops. They were disheartened, for 
from the time the army crossed the Long Bridge over the 
Potomac to the time Hooker took couimand, misfortune 
had pursued it like an evil spirit, and many soldiers began 
to believe that the generals of the Confederate army over- 
matched ours ; the prophetic statement that the war would 
last only ninety days had been already lengthened into 



CHANCELLORSVI LLE. 311 

years, with only one decisive victory in its favor — South 
Mountain. It is a great wonder that more were not dis- 
couraged at the gloomy j^rospects. Suits of clotliing were 
sent by friends at home to soldiers, who, on receiving them, 
walked out of camp as citizens. They were loyal to the 
Government, but one victory in so many battles was not 
winding up the war very fast. At that rate the Confeder- 
acy would win its independence. 

Another thing that added to the misfortunes on the 
field, was the fact that Lincoln was not supported by all the 
leaders, even in his own party. There were prominent 
men who did not consider him aggressive enough, while it 
was a well-known fact that Chase, one of his Cabinet 
officers, was seeking a nomination against him. The high 
games of political chance in Washington could not be 
played without the world knowing them ; and the army was 
keenly watching every move that affected the final settle- 
ment and the end of that terrible internecine war, where 
neighbor met neighbor, and brother was arrayed against 
brother. It was heartrending to soldiers, but perhaps 
the wire-pullers were not annoyed by any such unpleasant 
occurrences, as brave men were between them and the 
enemy. In the midst of the war every hand should have 
upheld the President, and statesmen above all men should 
have warmly and unitedly supported him. Fortunately a 
large number did support him. The writer was a Chase 
man, but not as against Lincoln ; Chase was an eminent 
statesman, but his ambition led him into a grave error. 
Lincoln exhibited one of his many noble traits of char- 
acter when he appointed him Chief Justice, after the treat- 
ment he had received from him while he was Secretary of 
the Treasury. But Chase is gone, "peace to his ashes." 

Hooker visited the regiments, and made a thorough 
inspection. The officers were required to have all ab- 
sentees return to their commands. A regular system of 
furloughs was established by which the officers and men 
of each company and regiment were entitled to a given 



312 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

number, and when tliey returned others were to be allowed 
the privilege of going home. Lincoln sustained Hooker by 
issuing a proclamation on the loth of March, granting am- 
nesty to all deserters who returned by the ist of April. 
The people at the North took new heart, and instead of 
encouraging desertions, recruits began to arrive, and the 
busy scenes in camp once more betokened a healthful state. 

Hooker reorganized his army, and abolished the grand 
divisions. Gen. John F. Reynolds remained in command 
of the First Coi-ps, Couch of the Second, while Sickles was 
assigned to the Third. Meade had taken the place of But- 
terfield in the Fifth, Sedgwick retained the Sixth, while the 
Ninth, Burnside's old corps, was detached and sent to Suf- 
folk, and in its stead came the Eleventh and Twelfth. The 
Eleventh had been Sigel's, but Howard now assumed the 
command. 

That corps was mainly composed of Germans, and it is 
not quite certain that a change in the commanders by tak- 
ing away a German and substituting a man of the religious 
principle of Howard, was the best for the service. Howard 
was a devout Christian, while the Germans had their own 
views of religion, which may be said to have been alto- 
gether different from his, so they had no interest in common 
with him. Braver men never marched to battle than the 
Germans, but they are a peculiar people, and if opposed too 
much in their ideas they become refractory. They were 
greatly disappointed when Sigel was relieved, and came 
near taking it as a direct affront to them. 

No American could command that corps with the same 
success as one of their own nationality, and Howard, as 
the Havelock of the army, certainly was not the man. 

Hooker put the cavalry under Stoneman, an officer of 
ability, but certainly no great cavalry leader, as he lacked 
the das!i of vSheridan or Buford. 

A new spirit was infused into the army. Activity was 
exhibited everywhere. Men were returning under Lincoln's 
proclamation, and Hooker found himself at the head of a 



CHA NCEL LORS VIL L E. 313 

large army, which he styled "the finest army on the 
planet. ' ' Bnt there were some drawbacks. The time of 
some of the regiments would soon expire, and if there was 
no favorable opportunity to offer battle to the enemy in the 
near future, he would lose the trained men of eioht reg-- 
iments from Pennsylvania, enlisted only for nine months ; 
two regiments from Maine, and thirty-three from New York ; 
the latter being two years' troops. That would take away 
from him over 20,000 effective soldiers. Their time expired 
on the ist of May. A majority of these had signified their 
intention of reenlisting, but desired to go home to see their 
friends, and get the bounty offered by the different States. 
So Hooker had to offer battle to the enemy early in the 
spring, or lose the assistance of forty-one regiments, equal to 
a large corps. It was advisable for these troops to return to 
their States, for they would not only reenlist, but would 
induce other young men to join their ranks. 

Lincoln visited the anny and reviewed the troops, which 
gave them new cheer, and every visit he made to the army 
was equal to the addition of a new brigade. The troops 
knew he was an earnest, honest man, and their friend in 
time of trouble. When the officers were too severe he 
would interpose clemency in a mild way, and save them ; 
and for that they loved him. If he had been stern and 
harsh the history of this country might have been different. 
He listened to all complaints patiently, and then usually 
made his decision. Respectful and kind to all, he won the 
esteem and affection of his countrymen, and his name is 
linked with Washington's in history, the highest honor 
that could be conferred. While he was hurling great 
armies at the South to compel its people to obey the laws, 
he nightly prayed that they would see the error of their 
ways, and return in peace. He "would save the Union 
with or without slavery." And when the assassin's bullet 
ended that great man's life tiiere was mourning in the 
South. 

There was another great reason why Hooker should 



314 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

make an early move ; General Longstreet with two divi- 
sions, Hood's and Pickett's, of his corps, had been tempo- 
rarily detached, and was appearing before Suffolk, to lay 
siege to it. Then was the time to strike Lee, when he was 
weakened by the absence of that great general, as it was 
far better to fight Lee without him. Lee was recruiting his 
army with the utmost vigor, as he had now a general to 
face who had won distinction on every field in which he 
enoraged. He knew he was a bold officer in battle, and 
led his forces with the enthusiasm of a Marshal of 
France. And now that Hooker was at the head of 
the army, if he continued to infuse his troops with the 
same spirit, he would be as dangerous to meet as Prince 
Eugene, who crossed the Theiss, killed 20,000 of the 
enemy, and drove 10,000 into the river at the battle of 
Zentha. 

Lee's cavalry was badly worn down and jaded by the 
hard service of making raids in the rear of the Union 
Army during the winter. It greatly needed rest and re- 
cruiting, for it had been used to its last physical endurance. 
The Confederate commander was endeavoring to fit it for 
the ensuing campaign, as he knew it would be a desperate 
one. 

The work of our artillery at Fredericksburg, under 
General Hunt, must have made an impression upon Lee, for 
his batteries had been, independent of each other, assigned 
to the different divisions. After that battle he organized 
his artillery into one command, and placed it under General 
Pendleton. 

The authorities at Richmond, in the meantime, were not 
idle by any means. New conscription laws had been en- 
acted, which were enforced with a rigor that would have 
made Russia bow to their mandates. The patrols sys- 
tematically scoured the country, leaving no chance for 
deserters to keep in concealment, as the women of the 
South, true to their cause, aided by informing them 
where deserters were located. Indeed, so earnest were the 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 315 

women in this work, that their information was given with 
great care and exactness, and men hid in caves were readily 
found. As an illustration in point, one man was living on 
a hill by the side of the road. He went into his cellar, and 
dug a tunnel leading under the road ; and, coming out in a 
grove on the other side, he could get air, and watch the 
movements of the patrol at the house. He was successful 
in evading them for a long time ; but one da}- he was spied 
by a neighboring lady, who made haste to give the news. 
When the patrol visited there again, a file of men were 
stationed close to the opening, while others proceeded to 
the hoilse to scare him out. When he appeared at his sup- 
posed secure place of observation, he found himself in the 
clutches of the men left there to capture him. From these 
two elements, added to the sick and wounded, who had 
recovered enough to rejoin their regiments, Lee found his 
army rapidly swelling. If that had not been the case, he 
could not have spared Longstreet to attack Suffolk ; for he 
had a river front of about twenty-five miles to guard, from 
Skinker's Neck, below Fredericksburg, to United States 
Ford, just below the confluence of the Rapidan and Rap- 
pahannock — which was a very extended line in the face of 
an army like Hooker's, with an able commander ; and he was 
liable to have his lines pierced at any given point, and 
driven from his base. Such an attack really was made ; for 
Lee's position was suddenly turned by four of Hooker's 
corps pressing down on his left and rear before he was 
aware of it. 

The exigencies of the service required great activity on 
the part of the Confederates before the spring campaign 
opened, in the way of garnering supplies, Guiney Station, 
where Stonewall Jackson died, after Chancellorsville, being 
the principal depot. 

But few changes were made in the general officers of 
Lee's armv. D. H. Hill was sent to North Carolina to 
superintend matters there, and his di\'ision was given to 
General Rodes. Early, who commanded Ewell's division 



316 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

in the battle of Fredericksburg, still retained command, 
while Trimble was assigned to Jackson's old division. 

A new excitement spread over the country at that time. 
Mosby at midnight wound his way through our lines, 
evaded the pickets, entered General Stoughton's room, and 
in person waked him up and informed him that he was a 
prisoner of war to be abducted through our lines and taken 
to Richmond. General Stough ton was in command at Fair- 
fax Court House, and had no right to occupy quarters 
where he was in danger. He was a very promising officer, 
and those who knew him well expected much from him. 
He was colonel of the 4th Vermont Infantry, and had been 
nominated to be a brigadier general by Lincoln on the 5th 
of November, 1862, but the Senate did not act- on his case ; 
consequently, on the 4th of March, 1863, his appointment 
as brigadier general expired by limitation, four days before 
he was captured. The late General Stannard said to me : 
' ' Stough ton was one of the most capable officers in the serv- 
ice, but sacrificed his future by allowing women to con- 
trol him." 

The following version of Stoughton's capture was given 
to me by General Stannard, a short time before his death, 
in Washington, D. C. He gave Stoughton's idea of it, as 
related by him to Stannard only a short time before 
he died : 

Stoughton's headquarters were at a residence where lived a 
lady whom he permitted to visit a lad}^ cousin outside of our 
lines. He also permitted this lady cousin to visit the famil}- where 
he had his hcadcj^uarters ; that young damsel from beyond the lines 
made a diagram of the house, and the position of the troops, so that 
Mosby could evade the camps, and reach Stoughton's room unob- 
served ; this he did with such great confidence that he boldly walked 
into Stoughton's room without hesitation or molestation. 

The family declared their utter ignorance of the matter; 
but it is unreasonable to suppose that Mosby, wnth his 
great caution, would have attempted so bold and hazard- 
ous a movement without being well advised, as he had 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 317 

only 29 men with him, and near Stough ton's headquarters 
was his brigade well on the alert, and ready at the least 
alarm to move at once. 

Mosby also attempted to capture other officers, but in 
that he failed, which is conclusive evidence that he was 
well advised. 

Colonel Mosby has personally informed me that he was 
not assisted by those young ladies but by a sergeant,* who 
had deserted from the Army of the Potomac because he 
had been severely punished. 

* This innocent plea of the family recalls the case of the dashing young lieu- 
tenant of the 24th Wisconsin, serving in Sheridan's division of Rosecrans' army. 

He was young and not a little fond of having his picture taken. His servant 
had one in his possession one day when he was out in search of something for his 
table. He called at the house of a spruce young widow, to see if there were any 
chickens for sale there. She plied her questions to Sambo to know whose servant 
he was. He was very proud of his dashing master, who afterwards commanded a 
brigade with great credit. The colored man was not long in exhibiting his picture. 
She at once declared that he was the handsomest officer she ever saw, and she 
would be ever so much delighted to have him dine with her. This was eagerly 
conveyed to him by his loyal valet. He told Sheridan of it. Quick as a flash the 
General saw through it, and said, " She simply wants to beguile you, so that you 
can be captured." Said Sheridan, " Don't you think of going to dine with her un- 
less you take about three companies with you to surround the premises, concealing 
them from view." That just suited him, so he sent the fair widow word that he 
would accept her pressing invitation to dine with her. The day was fixed and the 
order received from Sheridan to make a reconnoissance; that enabled him to take a 
part of the regiment with him. 

When he reached the house he halted in the woods and gave instructions that 
placed his men in full pcssession of the secret. Then they deployed to the right 
and left, encircling the premises at a distance far enough from the house to be un- 
observed, but where they could see every movement there. He told them if he 
fired his revolver it was a signal of distress to them, and they were to rapidly ad- 
vance to his assistance. He then mounted his horse and proceeded alone to the 
house, where he was greeted in the most winsome manner by the young and fasci- 
nating widow. They soon sat down to an elegant dinner prepared for the occasion. 
When they were about half through a rap came at the door, which she affected 
not to hear. Then the door was opened by a major of the Confederate army, ac- 
companied by about fifteen men. 

He turned to the Confederate officer and asked him if it was not a little in- 
trusion on his part, and added that he was greatly enjoying his diimer. Tiie major 
admitted that it did seem as if it was a slight intrusion, but that he could not help 
it. He was compelled to request him to quit the table. 



318 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Jones, who commanded a brigade of Confederate cavalry, 
was remarkably active during the latter part of the winter 
and spring. He made a raid through West Virginia in 
the latter part of January ; failing to force his way through 
Greenland Gap of the Alleghanies, he passed through Bev- 
erly and Philippi, continuing as far as Morgantown, levying 
heavy contributions on the country through which he 
passed. Doubling back through the mountains at Fair- 
mont, he encountered a detachment of Union soldiers 
guarding the bridge over the Monongahela, whom he cap- 
tured, and then destroyed the valuable railroad bridge of 
the Baltimore and Ohio. Again he is in the Shenandoah 
Valley, where he surprised two regiments of Milroy's cav- 
alry sent to dispute his advance. The encounter took 
place near Strasburg, where he disjDcrsed those regiments 
and took about 200 prisoners. A part of his brigade pushed 

In the yard, before they started with their prisoner, he declared he was the 
best shot in the Army of the Cumberland, and that he could shoot a chicken's head 
off when it was running. The major said if he could do that he would escort him 
to the Union lines, and set him free ; if not he was to remain a prisoner. The 
chicken was started up, when he drew his revolver and fired at it — he not only 
missed the chicken's head, but was not sure he came within three feet of the 
chicken. He said he believed they were greatly in hopes he would shoot its head 
off, for a look of disappointment settled on their countenances when he missed it. 
The major said that decided it, he would be compelled to retain him as a prisoner. 
When he fired his men began to close in on the house with their arms at a trail. 
Soon the Confederate major looked up and saw their line advancing— he took in 
the situation, and acknowledged the matter as being very clever. When the Union 
soldiers surrounded the house with the Confederates in the yard, the widow was 
standing in the door, strongly protesting her entire innocence in the matter ; he 
said to her that it might be so, but it smacked of suspicion in his opinion, and he 
added he had half a mind to take her with the soldiers to Sheridan's headquarters. 
But he finally decided to permit her to return to the meal he had been so rudely 
taken away from. It is scarcely to be presumed that she enjoyed it after her con- 
federates were marched away in triumph, " who never would return." This is an 
authentic example, what treachery sometimes lurked beneath the charms of the 
gentler sex, to ensnare the susceptible, like Stoughton, who fell through weakness, 
and some years ago died in New Vork City a broken hearted man. Ceneral Stan- 
nard saw him a short time before his death, when he unbosomed himself, and gave 
vent to his deep chagrin and mortification over the unfortunate affr.ir which clouded 
his military career so early in the war and really comiicllctl him to leave the service. 



CHA N CELL OR S VIL LE. 319 

on to the Potomac, and crossing the river in a boat, they 
surprised a detachment of Union troops, nearly a company 
strong, and took them prisoners, near Poolesville, Mar)'land. 

Gen. W. H. F. Lee's brigade attempted to surprise and 
take Gloucester Point, on the York River, failing in which 
they turned north and shelled the Union gunboats in the 
Rappahannock, while Fitzhugh Lee crossed the river and 
surprised and captured a post of lOO men at Leedstown. 

The activity of the Confederate cavalry only spurred up 
the Union cavalry to increased effort ; and the former soon 
had to pay pretty dearly for their bold and daring raids. 
They attempted to appear at several places at the same time 
in order to create the impression that they were numerically 
strong, whereas that arm of the service was much depleted. 
The Union cavalry were compelled to go in large bodies, 
being in the enemy's country, where their movements and 
strength were closely observed by the citizens, who were 
ready to convey any intelligence to the Confederates that 
would give them the advantage. Besides, they were in 
almost continual danger of ambuscades. As the ides of 
March approached, the Union cavalry prepared to measure 
skill and strength with their enemy in the saddle ; so 
Averell's division, composed of Duffie's and IVIcIntosh's 
brigades, with two regiments, the ist and 5 th Regu- 
lars, under Captain Reno, quietly took up the line of 
march for the upper Rappahannock. When he reached 
the Rappahannock, at Kelley's Ford, Averell found that 
the passage of the river was to be stubbornly contested, 
the Confederate cavalry being dismounted and lined the 
south bank as sharpshooters. Lieut. S. A. Brown, of the 
ist Rhode Island, was ordered to charge across the river 
and endeavor to clear the right bank of the enemy so that 
the division. could cross. Brown and his men made a gal- 
lant charge ; not only did they clear the bank, but they 
captured about 25 prisoners. The enemy then made great 
efforts to secure their horses before Averell could get his 
command over. The river was so hiq-li that it took a 



320 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

long time for the whole division to cross ; so long, in fact, 
that it gave the enemy time to gain their horses and send 
word back to Lee that the Union cavalry was on the south 
bank of the Rappahannock in force, Averell being now 
on the right bank, threw out skirmishers to avoid an am- 
buscade and advanced the division, moving very cautiously 
and slowly. Fitzhugh Lee knew of the proposed advance 
the day before, no doubt through some kind friend in citizen's 
suit, who started off post haste to Culj^eper to tell the Con- 
federate commander of his impending danger. The river 
was thought to be too high for the Union forces to cross ; 
hence there was no especial preparation made to dispute its 
passage, except to line its banks with sharpshooters. The 
Union cavalry had scored one bold and aggressive move, 
however, much to the discomfiture of their opponents. 

As soon as Lee learned of the passage of the Rappahan- 
nock he hastily advanced his. brigade to meet Averell. 
The two forces met more than a mile from the river. Lee 
imagined that he was meeting only the advance guard, 
which he intended to vanquish before a support could arrive, 
and in that wa}- defeat his adversary in detail, so he at once 
ordered a charge. But Averell's men were well posted at 
the edge of a wood behind a stone wall. As Lee's troops 
advanced over the fields the telling fire of the L^nion forces 
made them retreat in disorder. 

Averell had drawn up his command with Dufifie's brigade 
on the left, the 5th Regulars in the center, and INIcIntosh's 
brigade on the right, with the ist Regulars in reserve. 
The 3d Virginia was hurled against the 5tli Regulars in the 
center. The regiment dashed up to the stone wall in the 
face of a severe fire and were attempting to make a break 
in it, when Duffie directed the ist Rhode Island to charge 
in reverse and rear. Seeing that move the 2d Virginia ad- 
vanced to the assistance of the 3d, but both were compelled 
to retire, with the loss of the commander of the 2d, who 
was captured. 

Lee evidentlv was not aware of the strength of the force 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 321 

in his front, because, immediately after the repulse of the 
2d and 3d Virginia, he ordered Colonel Bower, of the 5th 
Virginia, to charge Mcintosh's brigade on the right, but it 
received such a heavy fire from the artillery, advanta- 
geously posted to support Mcintosh, that he retreated at 
once. Lee seeing he was badly beaten began to retreat. 
Averell thought that he was engaged with a much 
heavier force than he actually was, and it required an 
efifort on the part of Stuart and Lee to keep their forces 
well enough organized to deceive Averell as to their 
strength. If he had charged with one brigade Lee's com- 
mand w^ould have been seriously crippled, if not captured. 
]\Iajor Pelham was mortally wounded. He was a fine 
young artillery officer, and had scarcely passed twenty-one 
years of age. 

The enemy w^ere driven to Brandy Station, a distance 
of eight miles, where Lee made another stand behind a 
stone wall, where he placed all the men that he could col- 
lect, some 300 or 400. It was the most favorable place for 
Lee to make a fight with a small number, and if Averell 
w^as allowed to pursue him much farther, not only Culpeper, 
but Gordonsville, with its immense stores for Lee's army, 
would fall into Averell' s hands, and the railroad to Rich- 
mond by that route be destroyed. It was a case of despera- 
tion with the Confederate cavalry commander. After Lee 
had placed this line behind the stone wall, with his artillery 
posted just in the rear, he headed the 3d Virginia, and, lead- 
ing the charge in person, came down on Averell wath great 
fur}^ The 5th Regular Cavalr>' lay in ambush, and re- 
ceived them with a volley, while Mcintosh ordered the 3d 
Pennsylvania to charge them in flank and rear, forcing the 
Confederates to retire, but leaving the impression on Averell 
that Fitzhugh Lee had been reenforced with a brigade of 
infantry. Laboring under that delusion Averell decided to 
return to the Rappahannock. This was gratifying to the 
enemy, who had thus adroitly deceived him. Had he pur- 
sued at this opportune moment Lee's force would have been 

XXI 



322 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

badly cut to pieces. It was Averell's golden chance to 
achieve greatness, but he let it pass. Fortune knocks once 
at a door, but seldom returns. Had Averell pressed Lee 
with courage, and either captured his force or scattered it, 
and taken Gordonsville, he would have ranked with Sheri- 
dan at Winchester. As it was, he really accomplished 
nothing of importance to present to Hooker on his return. 

The rainy season prevented any more movements until 
the second week in April, when Hooker directed Stoneman 
to take his cavalry and proceed to the upper fords of the 
Rappahannock, where Averell had crossed a short time 
before. Stoneman, with his three divisions, could have 
crossed the country and taken Gordonsville had there been 
celerity in his movement. One division had crossed the 
river, and advanced to Brandy Station, but a heavy rain 
compelled it to beat a hasty retreat, as the Rappahannock 
was rising rapidly and would soon be impassable. 

What Lincoln thought of this movement is given in 
the following letter to Hooker : 

Executive Mansion, 
Washington, D. C, April 15, 1863. 
It is now 10:15 p. m. An hour ago I received your letter of this 
morning, and a few moments later your dispatch of this evening. 
The latter gives me considerable vmeasiness. The rain and mud, of 
course, were to be calculated upon. General S. is not moving 
rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has 
now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather, 
and all three without hindrance from the enemy. Bj^ arithmetic, 
how many days will it take him to do it ? I do not know that any 
better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. 
Write me often. I am very anxious. A. Lincoln. 

To Major General Hooker. 

It had proved just what Lincoln predicted, a gigantic 
failure. He never even crossed the Rappahannock until 
the infantry did, and then broke up into such small guer- 
rilla bands that he accomplished nothing. Pleasonton did 
more by far with his skeleton brigade. 



CHANCE LLORSVILLE. 323 

It was now about the 20th, and the waters were still too 
hisfh for an advance. Stoneman's intention was to throw 
cavalry around by the way of Gordons vilie, and, after tearing 
up the railroad there, to rapidly march in the direction of 
Hanover Court House, there to strike the only line of com- 
munication Lee had with Richmond, destroy that, and 
march north to join Hooker, who was to cross his army 
below, at or near Hamilton's Crossing and Skinker's 
Neck. 

Py that move Hooker intended to turn Lee's right and 
take possession of the Telegraph road leading to Rich- 
mond, thus compelling Lee to abandon his strong position 
on the heights back of Fredericksburg. The two armies 
would then meet on a field selected hastily, without any 
fortifications, which would at least give Hooker an equal 
chance. The only danger would have been the crossing of 
the Rappahannock in the face of the enemy. It is barely 
possible that, had he held a portion of his army in its posi- 
tion in front of Fredericksburg, he could have crossed at 
Skinker's Neck, back from the river, and effected a land- 
ing on the right bank before he would have been seriously 
opposed. The river there is quite wide, and might be 
called an arm of the sea. 

As a matter of history this intended move of Hooker's is 
given for the benefit of those who may desire to study all the 
maneuvers of the war, and to show what great strategic 
movements were made by our generals to save the nation. 

The river continued so high that-Hooker abandoned this 
plan, and began a series of feint movements in order to 
deceive Lee. Doubleday, on the 19th of April, was sent 
with a part of his division to make a reconnoissance to Port 
Conway. On the 23d, the 24th Michigan and 14th Brook- 
lyn, under Colonel INIorrow, crossed the river and took pos- 
session of that town, captured a number of prisoners, horses 
and mules, and a large Confederate mail. The regiments 
recrossed the river that evening, and proceeded to their 
quarters at Belle Plain. These two demonstrations indi- 



324 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

cated that Hooker was still feeling his way, with a view to 
crossing there with his whole army in the near future. 

Stoneman was still on the north side of the Rappahan- 
nock, where he had arrived on the lytli. 

Hooker determined to divide his army, and throw a 
heavy force under Sedgwick below the city, while two divis- 
ions of the Second, with the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth 
Corps were to follow Stoneman on the upper Rappahan- 
nock and make a detour back from the river, so that the 
maneuver could not be observ^ed by the enemy occupying 
the right bank. As the river was still very high there was 
not much probability that a citizen would give the alarm. 
Besides, Hooker had kept his counsel so well that but few 
officers were aware where and how the real movement was 
to be made. He knew how disastrous it had been to Mc- 
Clellan and to Burnside that their plans were so publicly 
known, and he resolved to keep his movements as secret as 
possible. The corps commanders only knew his plans 
when they received their orders to march. The President 
was notified by General Butterfield, Hooker's chief of 
staff", in person. * 

* WTien General Butterfield arrived at the White House, and sent his card to 
Lincoln with the request that he desired to see him alone, he was at once 
ushered into the room where the President was, surrounded by members of his 
Cabinet, Senators and IMembers of Congress. 

When General Butterfield glanced at those present he gracefully said to 
the President that he bore a message from Hooker, under strict orders not to 
impart it to anyone but the President of the United States ; that under those 
positive instructions he would be compelled to withdraw until he could see hira 
alone. Thereupon the President requested those present to retire. It was with 
great reluctance that some of them complied with the request made by Lincoln — 
especially was it the case wtth the Secretary of War, whose eyes flashed as he 
turned them on General Butterfield, as if to say that there was no secret or im- 
portant move of the army that ought to be kept from him. 

Soon the room was cleared with the exception of a distinguished Senator from 
New England, whose majestic eloquence had channed the nation on many occa- 
sions. He sat still, holding a large bundle of papers in his hand, with his eyes 
intently fixed on General Butterfield. Lincoln glanced at the Senator, and asked 
if there was anything he could do for him. " Yes," said the statesman, drawing 
out one of the papers, " I would like to have this appointment." " It is granted," 



CHANCELLORS V I LLE. 325 

Hooker gained great credit in the army for his soldierly 
manner. The army only asked to be led against the enemy 
with reasonable skill on the part of the commander-in- 
chief, and had learned to look up to Hooker as a general 
whom it could follow and have confidence in. Aside from 
his service in the war of the rebellion, he had been in the 
Mexican war, where he served on the staff of General 
Pillow with considerable distinction. 

It was the intention of the enemy to take Suffolk, and 
have the forces under lyongstreet rejoin Lee before Hooker 
could move. As Longstreet conceived the idea of going to 
the assistance of Bragg, when he fought Rosecrans at 
Chickamauga, it is to be presumed that it was one of his 
deep-laid plans to lay siege to Suffolk, while the army were 
in winter quarters, with a river between them. * 

That both armies appreciated that fact, is well supported 
by the following correspondence : 

Suffolk, Va., April 21, 1863. 

General Halleck has just left my headquarters. General Long- 
street is here, waiting Hill or other troops. I hold everything yet. 
How do you get along ? John J. Peck, Major General. 

Major General Hooker, Army of the Potomac. 

April 21, 1863 — 10 p. m. 

Am glad to hear good tidings from j'ou. You must be patient 
with me. I must play these devils before I can spring. Remember 
that my army is at the bottom of a well and the enemy holds the 
top. Joseph Hooker, Major General Commanding. 

Major General Peck, Suffolk, Virginia. 

said the President, " Is there anything else ?" He proceeded with a long list of 
business, and succeeded in getting more favors granted in a few minutes than he 
could have secured in a year. He finally wanted to make an argument before 
the President on a war measure, but Lincoln shrewdly parried that move, 
and bowed his distinguished guest out, so that he could hear General Buttedield's 
report. 

* I had it from Longstreet that he urged Lee for a month, before he would 
consent to his letting his corps go, as he fully expected then, " to crush Rose- 
crans" at Chickamauga. 



326 THE ARaMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Thus matters were on a strain at every point. Hooker 
was making great haste to throw his army across the 
Rappahannock to relieve Peck at Suffolk. On the 26th 
of April Hooker directed General Williams to issue the 
order to the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps to "Begin their 
march at sunrise to-morrow morning, the former to encamp 
as near Kelley's Ford as practicable, without discovering 
itself to the enemy, and the latter as nearly in the rear as 
circumstances will permit." 

General Butterfield sent a similar order to the Fifth 
Corps to follow. On the same date Hooker wrote General 
Peck, at Suffolk, saying : 

Your dispatch received. I have been delayed in my operations 
by the severe storm. I have communicated to no one what my in- 
tentions are. If you were here I could properly and willingly im- 
part them to 5'ou. So much is found out by the enemy on my front 
with regard to movements that I have concealed n\y designs from 
my own staff, and I dare not intrust them to the wires, knowing as 
I do that they are so often tapped. 

Joseph Hooke;r, Major General. 



Couch, of the Second Corps, was directed to leave one 
division opposite Fredericksburg, as Gibbon held the posi- 
tion most exposed to view that remained ; the other two 
divisions, French's and Hancock's, were to march opposite 
Banks' Ford. One brigade was to be detached and sent to 
United States Ford, which is situated below the confluence 
of the Rappahannock and Rapidan opposite Chancellors- 
ville. General Hunt was to remain with the Second Corps 
to direct the artillery, as it was supposed there might be a 
stubborn resistance to the attempt to cross at Banks' Ford, as 
it was less than three miles above Fredericksburg, and Lee 
could easily throw a force there on short notice. 

The Rappahannock being a very swift river, there was 
no other place at which it could be crossed until United 
States Ford was reached, some six miles above Banks' 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 327 

Ford. The former ford takes its name from a mine in that 
vicinity, once worked by the Government. 

When Slocum, Howard and Meade had crossed the 
Rappahannock they were in a narrow peninsula between 
the Rappahannock and Rapidan, varying from two to five 
miles in width. There were two fords across the Rapidan, 
Ely's and Germanna ; the first is about four miles above the 
confluence of the two rivers, while the latter is about ten 
miles. The brigade of the Second Corps sent to United 
States Ford was only intended to keep a vigilant watch on 
the movements of the enemy, as that ford would be cleared 
the moment Slocum, Howard and Meade marched down 
the right bank of the Rapidan in the direction of Chan- 
cellorsville. It also prevented sympathizers from cross- 
ing there, or signaling information of Hooker's move- 
ments. 

When Slocum arrived at Germanna Ford with two 
corps he found the engineer of Lee's army constructing a 
trestle bridge at that place. Pleasonton at once dashed 
across with his cavalry and captured some prisoners, while 
the rest escaped by scattering in different directions. Stuart 
was waiting to be attacked, but Slocum passed to his left 
and was not aware of his presence. When Stuart learned 
that a very heavy force had passed southward, he at once 
understood the movement, and attempted by all possible 
haste to get possession of Germanna Ford, and delay if not 
prevent the passage of the river at that point. He seems 
to have been taken wholly by surprise ; had he been suc- 
cessful in preventing the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from 
crossing at Germanna Ford, while Meade was crossing 
unopposed at Ely's Ford only a few miles below, Slocum 
could have marched down the left bank of the Rapidan 
until he reached that point, leaving a force large enough 
to deceive Stuart. Nor was even that necessary, for Stuart 
only had the brigades of the two Lees. Stoneman, with 
his three divisions, was still in the rear. If he had exhib- 
ited one-tenth of the energy of Stuart, he would have j^ur- 



328 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

sued him, and either captured or dispersed his command, 
which would have greatly crippled Lee at that critical 
time. Fearing Stoneman's heavy force of cavalry, Stuart 
directed W. H. F. Lee to watch his movements, and keep 
between him and Gordonsville, where heavy supplies were 
stored for Lee's army, while he (Stuart) took Fitz-Hugh 
Lee's brigade and attempted to go round the right flank of 
Slocum's advancing columns, and inform Mahone and 
Posey, of Anderson's division, posted opposite United 
States Ford, for fear they might slumber in blissful ignor- 
ance of the strategic movement that was being successfully 
executed and suffer the loss of a part of their commands. 
Then, again, it was all-important that Gen. Robert E. Lee 
should be notified of the great efforts being made to gain 
the rear of his army. 

If Stoneman had pursued Stuart and broken up his com- 
mand, Lee could not have been able to learn the situation 
of affairs on the upper Rappahannock. Even with the 
tardiness and great delay at Chancellorsville, the Union 
army, in all probability, would have passed out of the 
wilderness into the plateau, reaching as far as Salem Church 
on the plank road and Banks' Ford on the river, where two 
divisions of the Second Corps were ready to cross and join 
Hooker's advancing columns. No power could have saved 
Lee then. The soldiers would have marched victoriously 
on the works they stormed in vain a few months before with 
such heavy loss. But Stoneman failed even to annoy 
Stuart or retard his movements. Driven almost to despera- 
tion with chagrin and mortification at permitting a heavy 
column of the enemy to pass him without his knowledge, 
which imperiled Lee's position, Stuart pressed forward at 
the head of a single brigade and on sight attacked the 
Union army with ferocity and impetuosity. It is true that 
he made the charge near IMadden's farm, where he had had 
his headquarters a sliort time before and, from that fact, 
knew the ground well ; but that advantage was not of much 
value in such an undertakinij. One of Stuart's reofiuients 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 329 

made the circuit of the Union army and attempted to pass 
in front of Slocum, Howard, and IMeade over the river to 
warn Alahone and Posey of impending danger. Stuart 
attempted to force his way along the plank road, but he 
soon found the Union forces too strongly posted there, and 
he turned and took the Brock road to Todd's Tavern. 
There he left Fitz-Hugh Lee, as the Catharpin road starts 
from Todd's Tavern, on the Brock road, and intersects the 
Plank road west of the Tabernacle Church, and it was im- 
portant for Stuart to retain possession of it to watch the 
movements of Hooker's advance. Then taking a regiment 
with him he started, by the way of Spottsylvania Court 
House, to inform Lee that Hooker was coming from the 
west. 

In the mean time Pleasonton had sent a regiment, the 
6th New York Cavalry, to Spottsylvania to make a recon- 
noissance in that direction. While Stuart was proceeding 
on his way to Lee in the night, he met the 6th New York 
Cavalry, under the command of the bold and high-mettled 
Lieut. Col. Duncan ]\IcVicar. 

Although Stuart had with him a regiment, and the 6th 
New York only numbered about 200, he sent back to Lee 
for another regiment, but finally changed the request and 
ordered forward the brigade. The two commands met and 
fought by moonlight. It was one of the most tragical 
affairs of the war. The Union cavalry was surrounded, but 
they cut their way out with the loss of their commander, 
who was mortally wounded. 

We now turn to the movements of Sedgwick on the 
left, for he has the First, Third, and Sixth Corps — nearly 
half of the Army of the Potomac. The Sixth Corps was 
marched to Hamilton's Crossing, where two bridges 
were put down for Brooks' division to cross on, while 
Howe's and Newton's divisions were held in close readiness 
on the left bank to cross at a moment's notice. Reynolds' 
corps was directed to. move below some distance, near Pol- 
lock's mill, where bridges were to be put down for Wads- 



330 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

worth's division to pass over ; Doubleday's and J. C. Robin- 
son's divisions were held in readiness on the Stafford side to 
support Wadsworth. The Third Corps, under Sickles, occu- 
pied a position where it could easily reenforce either or 
both corps without delay, in case of an engagement or a 
bold feint might lead to a heavy battle. 

The engineers were directed to put down bridges 
across the Rappahannock during the night of the 28th, 
but some orders had not been received which evidently 
had been issued, so that it was near morning when the 
work of putting down the bridges for Reynolds really 
began. The enemy were on the alert and quickly per- 
ceived the movement, and at once opened a severe fire on 
the troops of the First Corps as they approached the bank 
of the river. 

In the mean time Col. Charles S. Wainwright, chief of 
•artillery of the corps, posted his batteries in the best 
possible manner to cover the crossing. Reynolds', Hall's, 
Amsden's, and Cooper's above, and Edgell's, Thompson's, 
and Ricketts' batteries below Pollock's mill. Ransom's 
was posted on a rise between the road and the river. Col. 
Walter Phelps, Jr., commanding First Brigade of the 
First Division, was directed to have the boats taken to the 
river, and, in accordance with that order, he detailed 
the 22d, 24th, and 30th New York Volunteers to carry 
them by hand to the crossing. His other regiment, the 
I4tli Brooklyn, was thrown forward as skirmishers. After- 
wards the 30th was relieved from the duty of assisting in 
carrying the boats to the river, and the regiment was 
directed to remain in reserve. Colonel Fairchild, of the 
2d Wisconsin, detailed Companies B, E, and D of that regi- 
ment to run the pontoon wagons to the river. The other 
companies of the regiment were directed to advance and 
engage the enemy on the opposite bank of the river while 
the boats were being launched. It soon became evident 
that the bridges could not be put down while the enemy 
held the other bank. It was simply a repetition of the cross- 



I 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 331 

ing under Burnside in the noted battle a few months before. 
So the order was given for the 6th Wisconsin, under Colonel 
Bragg, and the 24th Michigan, under Colonel Morrow, to 
cross the river in boats and take possession of the other 
bank. 

The infantry opened fire to distract the attention of the 
enemy from the two regiments crossing the river in boats. 
The artillery also trained its guns on the rifle-pits and pre- 
vented reenforcements. A regiment was broken up in 
confusion as it advanced, and was compelled to retreat. 
Though the 6th Wisconsin landed first, it was but a moment 
until the 24th Michigan was bounding up the bank and 
pursuing the enemy. The boats then returned to convey 
over the 2d and 7th Wisconsin and 19th Indiana. In this 
movement General Wadsworth, who commanded the divis- 
ion, occupied a seat in one of the first boats that went over 
and swam his horse by the side of the boat. I have been 
told since the war by Confederates that they so admired 
that gallant act in General Wadsworth that they refrained 
from firing at him. 

The general was so delighted over the conduct of the 
brigade that he caused the following order to be issued : 

General Orders ] Hdqrs. ist Division, ist Army Corps, 

No. 40. i May 9, 1863. 

The general commanding, availing himself of the temporary re- 
pose now enjoyed by his command to review the operations of the 
past few days, deems it proper to express his thinks to Colonel 
Bragg, 6th Wisconsin Volunteers ; Colonel INIorrow, 24th IMichigan 
Volunteers, and the gallant men under their command, for the 
heroic manner in which they crossed the Rappahannock and seized 
the heights on the opposite shore on the 29th of April ; and likewise 
to Brigadier General Meredith and the whole of the Fourth Brigade, 
for the promptness with which they followed in this daring enter- 
prise. The skill and courage with which Captain Reynolds' Bat- 
tery L, 1st New York Artillery, returned the enemj-'s fire, the bold- 
ness exhibited by the i4tli New York State Militia as skinnishers, 
and the steadiness of the whole command during the advance and 
retreat, have afforded the general commanding the highest gratifi- 



332 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

cation, and inspired him with entire confidence in the troops of this 
division. By command of Brigadier General Wadsworth ; 

John A. Kress. 
Ivieutenant Colonel and Acting Assistant Inspector General. 

The Second Brigade of Wadswortli's division, under 
Cutler, was engaged in putting the bridges down. When 
the bridges were completed the three remaining brigades of 
the division marched over and formed as follows : Mere- 
dith on the left, Phelps in the center and Cutler on the 
right, with Paul's New Jersey Brigade supporting. 

Stewart's battery was advanced to a position in front of 
Phelps. The enemy threatened to mass in front of ]\Iere- 
dith, and Phdps was moved over close to him to assist in 
repelling the expected attack, as Stewart was supported by 
Paul. The enemy evidently by that time understood the 
mission of Sedgwick, and the threatened movement on the 
left was simply checkmating Sedgwick, for Lee, having 
learned of Hooker's move at Chancellorsville, lightly re- 
garded Sedgwick in the valley below the city. Ransom's 
battery, which had crossed the river with Stewart's, was 
withdrawn, and Reynolds took his place. A section of 
Taft's was posted on the road above Traveler's Rest, where 
it did good service. On May i Amsden's battery was 
moved down to Traveler's Rest to replace a battery of 
the reserve artillery, which had been ordered to Banks' 
Ford. 

Wadswortli's division had made a brilliant passage of 
the river in the face of the enemy, and seriously threatened 
his left and greatly annoyed him, while the troops on the 
left bank of the Rappahannock, and Robinson's division 
of the First Corps, with Newton's and Howe's of the Sixth 
Corps, as well as the Third Corps, under Sickles, were dis- 
played to advantage by Sedgwick, This was intended to 
create the impression in Lee's mind that Hooker really in- 
tended to cross there and fight his battle where Franklin's 
grand division had made its attack in the previous battle. 
Added to these commands was Gibbon's division, of the 




GEN. DANIEL E. SICKLES. 



CHANCE LLORSVILLE. 333 

Second Corps, still in camp in full view from Stafford 
Heights. It was an important but unsatisfactory service that 
was performed by the First and Sixth Corps on the left. On 
May I Sickles, who had been ordered to join Hooker, 
taking a route unobserved by the enemy, rapidly marched 
to Chancellorsville. Reynolds says : 

On April 30 the troops remained in position, the division 
across the river throwing up some light defense, rifle-pits, etc., and 
during the day two batteries (Ransom's and Stewart's) were crossed 
and placed so as to cover the bridges. 

About five p. m. the enemy opened fire from their battery on 
the hill, near Captain Hamilton's, on our working parties and the 
bridges, which was replied to by our batteries on the north side of 
the river. The fire was kept up until nearly dark, during which 
time it became necessary to move the Second Division (massed in 
the ravines, where it sustained some loss) to the shelter of the 
river road. One boat of the bridge was struck and disabled. It 
was, however, promptly replaced. The engineers received orders to 
take up one of the bridges at dark and move it to Banks' Ford. 
The 136th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers was placed at the dis- 
posal of the engineer officer for that purpose, and accompanied the 
train to the ford, returning about noon the next day. At dark Ran- 
som's battery was replaced by Reynolds', of rifled guns. 

May I was passed with the troops occupying the same position. 
The enemy's force opposite to us was very much diminished, though 
still strong on their extreme right, where their battery was posted. 
The pickets along the Bowling Green road showed the same. The 
order for the demonstration at one o'clock did not reach me until 
six p. m. The troops were at once put under arms, and a division 
of the Sixth Corps moved in the direction of the lower bridge, the 
skirmishers on the left being advanced to the Massaponax, in which 
position they remained until dark. 

At seven a. m., on May 2, I received orders to withdraw the forces 
■ from the right bank of the river, take up the bridge, and proceed 
with my command to report to the commanding general, near 
Chancellorsville. 

Doubleday's and Robinson's divisions were at once put 
in motion for Chancellorsville. 

When Wadsworth's division began to cross the river the 
batteries of the enemy opened a vigorous fire, which was 
replied to by our batteries. Reynolds' battery, which was 



334 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

on the right bank, did effective service. As soon as their 
batteries were silenced, Reynolds rode forward to overtake 
the other two divisions of the corps ; Reynolds was under 
the impression he could cross at Banks' Ford, but there 
was no bridge there, and he was compelled to proceed to 
United States Ford. Leaving the column, he made great 
haste to report to Hooker in person. 

Chancellorsville is in the country called the Wilderness, 
which is bounded on the north by the Rapidan and Rappa- 
hannock Rivers, on the west by Wilderness Run, which 
rises near Major Lacy's farm, on which the battle of the 
Wilderness was fought later in the war. On the south the 
high table-land, which is nothing more than a watershed, 
forms the headwaters of the Ny River, near which Sickles 
followed Jackson when the latter was making his detour to 
strike Howard. Lewis Creek rises near the Catharine Fur- 
nace, and uniting with another stream coming from the 
south, west of the Catharpin road, forms the Ny River, 
which in turn is one of the four streams which unite and 
form the Mattapony. East of the Wilderness this ridge 
widens out into a beautiful plateau, dotted over with 
farms, and it is this open plain that Hooker must occupy 
in order to handle his large army against the forces of 
Lee. 

In the direction of Fredericksburg Hooker had three 
roads on which to move his army in order to reach the 
open plain referred to. The left one, called the River road, 
hugs the right bank of the Rappahannock River ; the mid- 
dle one is called the old turnpike road, and it is not over 
three-fourths of a mile to Absalom ]\IcGee's on this, which 
is the eastern, edge of that dreary forest ; the right-hand 
one is the Plank road, quite a distance before the open plain 
is reached. 

While Hooker's army mainly moved on these roads, the 
one leading to the west was the route by which he was to 
protect his right flank. Chancellorsville is located at the 
intersection of the road from Ely's Ford, United States 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 335 

Ford, and the roads leading to Fredericksburg, with the 
turnpike and Plank roads blending into one at this point 
in their westerly course, until they pass DowdalPs Tavern 
on the left and the Wilderness Church on the right ; then, 
when they ascend the next ridge, the Plank road bears a 
little to the left, and the old turnpike inclines to the right. 
In less than half a mile they both cross the Brook road, 
which starts at the old turnpike, crosses the Orange plank 
road, and intersects the Brock road about two miles distant, 
which is the direct route to Spottsylvania Court House. 
That road was of great importance to Hooker, for it enabled 
him to turn Lee' s left flank ; and at Todd' s Tavern, his 
troops could take the Catharpin road and strike the Plank 
road east of the Wilderness, which contains perhaps some 
20,000 to 30,000 acres, cleared off before the war to supply the 
furnaces in that vicinity. Spottswood, a Colonial governor, 
is said to have lived in this county not far distant from the 
noted battlefield. 

The following order was issued preparatory to advancing 
on the enemy from Chancellorsville : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
April 30, 1863 — 2:15 p. m. 
The general directs that no advance be made from Chancellors- 
ville until the columns are concentrated. He expects to be at 
Chancellorsville to-night. Daniel Butterfield, 

Major General, Chief of Staff. 
To Captain Comstock. 

In order to show Hooker's original design, where he 

fully expected to fight the battle, the following order issued 

by him is given : 

CHANCELLORSVIT.LE, Va., 
May I, 1S63 — II a. m. 

The Fifth Corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to 
the River road by most direct route, the head of it advanced to near 
midway betweer Mott's and Colin Runs, the movement to be masked 
by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at two 
o'clock. 

The Twelfth Corps, including its batteries, will be massed below 
the Plank road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle Church, and 



336 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

masked from the view of the enemy by small advanced parties, and 
the movement to be completed at 12 o'clock, to enable the Eleventh 
Corps to take its position. The Eleventh Corps, with its batteries, 
will be masked on the Plank road, about one mile in rear of the 
Twelfth. This movement to be completed at two o'clock. 

One division of the Second Corps, with one batter3% will take a 
position at Todd's Tavern, and will throw out strong detachments 
on the approaches in the direction of the enemy. 

The other divisions and batteries of the corps will be massed out 
of the road near Chancellorsville, these dispositions to be made at 
once. 

The Third Corps will be massed as fast as it arrives about one 
mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States Ford road, except- 
ing one brigade, with a battery, which will take position at Dow- 
dall's Tavern. 

.General Pleasontoti will hold his command, excepting those 
otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville. 

After the movement commences, headquarters will be at Taber- 
nacle Church. 

By command of Major General Hooker : 

William L. Candler, 
Captain and Aid-de-Camp. 

It seems that this order, although not revoked in orders, 
was changed materially. 

The division of the Second Corps designated to proceed 
to Todd's Tavern was French's, but it remained near Chan- 
cellorsville until it was moved forward to support the retir- 
ing troops. The Eleventh Corps, instead of supporting the 
Twelfth, moved to the right and took a, position at Dow- 
dall's Tavern, where a brigade of the Third Corps had 
been ordered. Meade advanced GriflEin on the river road 
with his left resting on the river, and Sykes on the old 
turnpike on Griffin's right, extending over to Williams' 
division of the Twelfth Corps, with Geary's division on 
Williams' right. " Humphreys was ordered to follow 
Griffin, to be held in reserve to recnforce Griffin or Sykes 
as the exigencies might require." 

It seems that the alignment was not well preserved. 
Sykes' left failed to connect with Griffin's right or Slocum's 
left under Williams, so that when he emerged from the 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 337 

Wilderness he found the enemy strongly posted and deter- 
mined to resist his advance. The enemy's line of battle 
overlapped his front, and was turning his flanks when 
Warren reported the condition of affairs to Hooker, and 
the army was ordered back to Chancellorsville. 

It was a great mistake, for Griffin, followed by Hum- 
phreys, had reached Decker's, within full view of Banks' 
Ford, without serious opposition, and Colonel Abbott, of the 
ist Michigan, who led Griffin's division, says, "We were 
almost to Banks' Ford." They were surprised to receive 
the order to retire and surrender the ground they had 
acquired. Thus it will be seen that Meade had forged the 
whole front of his corps from the river to Zoan Church on 
the old turnpike, out of the Wilderness, and held a good 
tenable position, with the exception of Sykes, who could 
have been reenforced by either Humphreys and Griffin or 
Hancock, as he was in no serious peril, though heavily 
pressed by Mcl^aws. * The left flank of Williams' corps 
was well through — having passed the swamp. Neither 
Sykes, Williams nor Geary suffered that afternoon a tithe 
of what they did afterwards in that battle. When the 
order was received Williams' left was abreast with Absa- 
lom McGee's, and advancing in an open field, while the 
right was still struggling in the dense and almost impen- 
etrable thicket. When the order came from Hooker to 
retire the line back in the direction of Chancellorsville the 
whole army deplored it, and several urgent requests were 
sent back to him to let them move ahead. Especially was 
this the case with Griffin and Humphreys, who were 
already in sight of Banks' Ford, and could have relieved 
Sykes' left by throwing a division on the enemy's right, 
and compelling him to fall back in the direction of Taber- 
nacle Church. Such a move -would have let S^'kes swinof 
out full into the cleared land with Griffin stretching to the 

* The swamp is but little more than a low, wide place in which rises Matt River 
formed just north of the Plank road, and winds its way through the forest, across 
the old turnpike just west of Absalom McGee's, and thence to the river. 

xxn 



338 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

left in command of Banks' Ford, leaving only Slocum on 
the extreme right to struggle through the dense forest, with 
three corps to assist him, the Second, Third and Eleventh. 
It was in vain that Humphreys and other officers begged 
Hooker to countermand his order. It is alleged that he 
was misinformed as to the real situation at the front, or 
else he would not have issued the order. 

Some of Hooker's friends claim that his plans were 
greatly disarranged by the irregular advance of his army. 
He seemed to place stress on following the Orange plank 
road, for in his circular order he stated that his head- 
quarters would be at Tabernacle Church, which is on the 
Old Mine road, only a short distance from the Plank road. 
But his troops had achieved marked success on the left by 
the river, enough to give him great encouragement. If he 
had permitted Grifhn and Humphreys to advance they 
would have secured Banks' Ford. Gibbon's division of 
the Second Corps, the First, and the Sixth Corps, under 
Sedgwick, could have hastily crossed there, formed on 
Grifhn's left, and swept forward in the direction of the 
Plank road, which would have compelled the enemy to form 
in line of battle facing north to meet Hooker's forces 
moving up from Banks' Ford. Then Slocum would have 
been operating on Lee's left flank as Jackson did on 
Howard's subsequently. Hooker only used Sedgwick 
below Fredericksburg to deceive Lee as to his real inten- 
tions, which is fully corroborated by the following order, 
and there was no necessity of retaining him there after 
Banks' Ford was in his possession, as it was ascertained 
that only Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, with 
a part of the reserve artillery under Pendleton, were 
left at Fredericksburg to watch Sedgwick with a large 
corps : 

Camp near Fat^mouth, Va., April 30, 1S63. 

General : — I am directed by the major g-eneral conimandins: to 
inform yon that his headqnarters will be at Chancellorsville to-night. 
It is proposed that the ami}- now at that point will assume the ini- 



CHANCE LLORSVILLE. 339 

tiative to-morrow morning, and will advance along the line of the 
Plank road, uncovering what is called Banks' Ford, where bridges 
will be at once thrown across the river, which route will then be- 
come the shortest line of communication between the two wings of 
the dsvL^y. Major General Butterlield will remain at the present 
headquarters, and will at once transmit to the major general com- 
manding any communications you may desire to send him. It is 
not known, of course, what effect the advance will have upon the 
eneni}', and the general commanding directs that you observe his 
movements with the utmost vigilance, and should he expose a weak 
point, attack him in full force and destro}' him. If he should show 
any symptoms of falling back, the general directs that you throw 
your whole force on the Bowling Green road, and pursue him with 
the utmost vigor, turning his fortified position by the numerous by- 
roads which you can make use of for that purpose. If anj' portion 
of his organized forces should pass off to the rear of the railroad, 
you will, b}- detachments, pursue until 3'ou destroy or capture him. 
Simultaneous with the advance of your column on the Bowling 
Green road, if at all, a column will also advance on the Telegraph 
road, and between you will sweep the country between the two high- 
ways and the railroad. You will be within easy communication, and 
both columns will spring to one another's assistance in case of en- 
countering anj- considerable resistance, which can best be judged by 
the magnitude of the fire. Keep your provisions and ammunition 
and forage replenished, leaving as much of your train to be brought 
afterwards as practicable. 

Trains will only embarrass and check your forward movement, 
and must not accompany you, unless it be the pack train. 

It may be expedient for you to join the right wing on the south 
bank of the river, and under cover of it to Fredericksburg. Be ob- 
ser\'ant of your opportunities, and when you strike let it be done to 
destroy. When you move forward, if you want all your artillery, 
the batteries of the reserve here can be called for. The enemy have 
at Hamilton's a pontoon train. The general expects that you will 
not permit them to cross the river. You will find an able com- 
mander in Major General Reynolds. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
D.-VNiEL BuTTERFiELD, ]\Iajor General, 

To Major General Sedgwick, Chief of Staff. 

Commanding Left Wing, Army of the Potomac. 

This order, which was issued on the eve of the contem- 
plated battle, showed the (^^reat importance of Banks' Ford, 
and if Hooker had permitted the troops to advance they 



340 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

would have SY*'ung around, as above indicated, and hurled 
Lee back in the direction of Spottsylvania, as his fortifica- 
tions in the rear of Fredericksburg were then untenable. 
The ground Hooker would have occupied was equally good 
with any position Lee could have chosen, unless he had 
retired to some line farther south than the Plank road. 
That position would have been quite as good for Hooker, 
for while he was pressing Lee from this direction of Banks' 
Ford, he could have thrown a force around on the Brock 
road at Todd's Tavern, and operated on Lee's left and rear ; 
as the force in Lee's front was equal in strength to the Con- 
federate commander's whole army, and, led by such generals 
as Meade, Reynolds, Sedgwick, Couch, Humphreys, Griffin, 
Sykes, Williams, Geary, and Slocum, there was no danger 
of disaster if the two armies should meet in an open field 
to measure strength and military science on an equal 
basis. 

As to the possibility of Hooker's left wing being able to 
gain possession of Banks' Ford, and receive reenforce- 
ments from Sedgwick, strong enough to meet any force of 
the enemy, the following, taken from General iVIeade's 
report, seems to be conclusive : 

The next day (May i), under the orders of the major general 
commanding, the corps was put en route to take a position to un- 
cover Banks' Ford, the left resting on the river, the right extending 
on the Plank road. For this purpose, Sykes' division was ordered 
to advance on the old Richmond turnpike until after crossing Mott's 
Run, when he was to move to the left, deploy, and open communi- 
cation with Griffin on his left and Slocum on his right, and, when 
all were in position, to advance simultaneously against the enemy, 
supposed to be in position from the Plank road to the river. Griffin 
was ordered to move down the river, or the Mott road, until in the 
presence of the enemy, when he was to deplo}', his left resting on 
the river and his right extending toward Sykes. Humphreys was 
ordered to follow Griffin, to be held in reserve to reenforce Griffin or 
Sykes, as the exigencies might require. 

These movements were commenced about eleven p. m Sykes 
moved out on the old pike, and, after proceeding over a mile, met 
the enemy'o skirmishers. Pic immediatel}' deployed, and, after a 



CHA NCELLORS VIL LE. 341 

spirited engagement, drove the enemy for a considerable distance. 
Finding the enemy in force and making dispositions to outflank him 
on both flanks, withont any communication either on the right or 
left with a supporting force. General Sykes reported the condition 
of affairs to the major general commanding the army, and by him 
was ordered to withdraw. This he did in good order, returning to 
Chancellorsville. 

In the mean time the column of Griffin and Humphreys pro- 
ceeded on the river road, and had reached Decker's house, within 
view of Banks' Ford, witliout any opposition from the eneni}-, when 
the order of recall was received, and the column returned to Chan- 
cellorsville. 

The advance of Griffin and Humphreys imperiled the 
enemy's right flank, and Sykes was not in great danger, 
as Meade conld have thrown Humphreys on the enemy's 
right and rear and relieved him at once. 

In support of the theory that if Griffin and Humphreys 
had been ordered, through Meade, to attack ]\IcLaws' right 
and rear, which would have forced him (McLaws) to 
retreat from his position and compelled Anderson also to 
have given way in front of Sloctim without being attacked 
by the latter, General Warren, in his report, says : 

In General Sykes' front the enemy deployed to the right and 
left, in line far outreaching the whole of ours, and I have never seen 
the steadiness of our troops more tried and proved. Captain Weed 
brought his battery into the front line on the ridge where it could 
operate against the enemj', and was able to reply to him within 
musket range, and used his guns with great effect. When the divi- 
sion had all been deployed to extend the line of battle, the lack of 
numbers compelled a regiment to be deployed as skinnishers. No 
connection, however, could even thus be made with our troops on 
the right, and my aid. Lieutenant James, in attempting to commu- 
nicate with the presumed position of General Slocuni, ran against 
the enemy's skirmishers, from which he fortunately escaped, though 
many shots were fired after him. A similar effort by one of General 
Sykes' aids was foiled in the same way. 

General Sykes bravely resolved to hold the position assigned 
him, which his command had so gallantly won from the enemy, and 
I set out with all possible speed to report the condition to the com- 
manding general. 



342 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

From information received since the advance began, the general 
decided to countermand it and receive the enemy in the line occu- 
pied the night before. Unfortunately, this line had been taken up 
the day before by tired troops toward the close of the day and with- 
out much prospect of fighting a pitched battle upon it. It was a 
bad line, and had several commanding positions in its front for the 
enemy to occupy. It was, perhaps, the best that could be designated 
for such a sudden change of programme in the face of an eneni}'. I 
carried to General Sykes the order to fall back, and he then with- 
drew his command in perfect order, bringing off his wounded, vi'ith 
tha exception of a few who were cut oft' on the extreme right of his 
extended skirmish line. All the other columns withdrew to the 
vicinity of Chancellorsville without having engaged the enemy. 
The enemy advanced cautiously till he came upon our new lines, 
and made some feeble demonstrations, easily repulsed, and the day 
closed without any real trial of strength. During the evening the 
Third Corps joined us at Chancellorsville. 

Two general plans of operations were now considered. One was 
to choose a position and intrench ; the other, to choose our point of 
attack, and advance with our whole force of five corps upon it. The 
saving of our men and the advantages of resuming the offensive 
after a successful repulse favored the one ; the increased elan of our 
men and the choice of our point of attack the other. I was in favor 
of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argu- 
ment. I thought, with our position and numbers, to beat the ene- 
my's right wing. This could be done by advancing in force on the 
two main roads toward Fredericksburg, each being in good sup- 
porting distance, at the same time throwing a heavy force on tha 
enemy's right flank by the river road. If this attack found the 
enemy in extended line, across our front, or in motion toward our 
right flank, it would have secured the defeat of his right wing, and 
consequently the retreat of the whole. 

Such was Warren'. s opinion how best to renew the 
battle after Hooker had ordered the army to fall back 
aronnd Chancellorsville when McLaws attacked Sykes on 
the first advance. If that was the better plan on the second 
day, it would have been wisdom to have permitted Meade 
to proceed' on the first day, as Grifiin had turned the right 
flank of Lee's army without firing a shot, and could within 
half an hour have uncovered Banks' Ford, when Sedgwick's 
force of three corps could have crossed that night, and 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 343 

formed on Meade's left in the open ccuntry, where the 
soldiers of the Union arnu' would have gained a glo- 
rious victory without a doubt. Sykes had only lost 28 
killed, 167 wounded, and 91 missing, 286 — not much more 
than the loss of a single regiment in some battles — when 
he was peremptorily ordered to retire. The above figures 
are from Sykes' official report. 

Mahone's and Posey's brigades, of R. H. Andersons 
division, were stationed near the United States Ford when 
Hooker's forces crossed at Germanna and Ely's Fords. 
As ]\Ieade marched down the south bank of the Rapidan, 
these two Confederate brigades retired in the direction of 
Fredericksburg, until they met reenforcements near Taber- 
nacle Church. At midnight, on the night of the 30th, 
McLaws marched with the rest of his command, Woflford, 
Semmes and Kershaw's brigades toward Chancellorsville. 
Jackson followed early the next morning, reaching the 
position of General Anderson near Tabernacle Church at 
eight a. m. At eleven a. m. the Confederate lines ad\'anced 
in the direction of Chancellorsville, evidently with the in- 
tention of intercepting Hooker's advance before it reached 
the eastern edge of the Wilderness, to prevent his maneu- 
vering his large army in the open country. It will be seen 
that both armies began their advance at the same hour. If 
Hooker had moved promptly in the morning, his right wing 
would have succeeded in arriving at iVldrich's, on the Plank 
road, where the Catharpin branches off to Todd's Tavern 
on the Brock road, while the center would have rested near 
Zoan Church on the old turnpike, with the left on the 
River road under Meade, farther advanced in the direction 
of Banks' Ford before he met the enemy. 

Wright and Posey advanced on the Plank road, while 
IMcUaws advanced on the old turnpike with Mahone's 
brisfade, of Anderson's division, in the advance. The 
brigades of Wilcox and Perry also assisted McLaws, which 
made six brigades on Sykes' front, with onh' three brigades 
in his command. In the action with Sykes, the brigade of 



344 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Semmes suffered most. In his report of the battle, Lee 
does not speak of losses in the other brigades, therefore they 
must have been comparatively few. Anderson took the line 
of the unfinished railroad to the left, with the hope of 
turning Hooker's right. 

When Hooker withdrew his army to a position near 
Chancellorsville, Lee did not follow him that night through 
the Wilderness ; he simply felt his position as best he 
could. By Hooker's retiring, Lee did not believe he would 
advance again, hence he began to study his position at 
Chancellorsville. The following, taken from his report, 
most clearly gives his views : 

It was evident that a direct attack upon the enemy would be 
attended with great loss, in view of the strength of his position and 
his superiority of numbers. It was, therefore, resolved to endeavor 
to turn his right flank and gain his rear, leaving a force in front to 
hold him in check and conceal the movement. The execution of 
this plan was intrusted to Lieutenant General Jackson, with his three 
divisions. 

The commands of Generals McLaws and Anderson, with the 
exception of Wilcox's brigade, which during the night had been 
ordered back to Banks' Ford, remained in front of the enemy. 

Just before dark, Jackson sent word to Lee that his 
advance was checked, which brought the Confederate com- 
mander to the front at once. They held a consultation at 
the point where the Catharine Ftirnace road diverges to the 
left from the Plank road. Two pines stand near each other 
where these two notable generals studied the situation, and 
finally decided on a plan that crowned their efforts with 
success. Colonel Long, who was on Lee's staff", and 
Captain Boswell "weie sent out to make a moonlight 
reconnoissance, the restilt of which was reported abotit ten 
p.m. and was not favorable to an attack in the front," 
Thus Long speaks in his Life of Lee. 

As Hooker's front was well protected, it seemed useless 
for Lee to attack an army superior in numbers. 

Lee questioned Jackson about Hooker's right. Ihe 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 345 

information indicated that Howard was badly posted. Rev. 
Mr. Lacy, a chaplain in Jackson's corps, was sent for, and 
he told Lee that he had preached in a church near Chan- 
cellorsville, and knew all the roads through the country. 
"That troops could be conducted to a designated point 
beyond Chancellorsville by a road sufficiently remote from 
the Federal position to prevent discovery." Long says 
that with that information Lee decided to turn the Federal 
position from a point where an attack was unexpected. 
Captain Carter was selected as a guide. But Jackson had 
several men who were raised in that vicinit}- and knew all 
the numerous byroads in that section. A son of j\Ielzi 
Chancellor also assisted Jackson that day. 

J. E. B. Stuart's adjutant general, Fitzhugh, was an old 
regular army officer, educated at West Point, who had re- 
signed before the war, and was living near United States 
Ford, consequently his services were of great importance 
in that battle. It was no vain boast of theirs to attempt to 
capture United States Ford, as Fitzhugh could have led 
them there beyond a doubt, but the chances v/ere they 
could not have held it. 

When Jackson reached a position opposite Hazel Grove, 
he turned toward the Brock road, and crossing it, followed 
a blind track where his march was shielded from the 
direction of Chancellorsville. Already his movements had 
been discovered, and Sickles had pursued him, attacking 
his rear guard vigorously ; Birney's division captured the 
23d Georgia. 

Williamson's brigade of Slocum's corps, and Barlow's 
brigade of Howard's corps had been sent to Sickles. 
Strengthened by these forces, and fully believing that he was 
between the forces of Jackson and those of Anderson and 
]\IcLaws, he prepared to pursue a contrary course to that 
of Jackson, which would throw him on the left flank of 
Anderson and roll him up on ]\IcLaws. If that move had 
been made and the rest of the line reaching to the river had 
moved forward simultaneously, Hooker's forces would ha\-e 



346 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

hurled the troops of Anderson and McLaws back in the 
direction of Fredericksburg, and would ha\-e compelled 
Jackson to beat a hasty retreat in the direction of Spott- 
sylvania Court House. Hooker had directed Col. Alexan- 
der Moore, of his staff, to go to Sickles and tell him to 
reconnoiter, but not bring on an engagement. When 
Sickles convinced Colonel ]\Ioore of the situation there, he 
returned to Hooker for orders. Hooker returned his aid 
with instructions for Sickles to make a vigorous attack, but 
before he could reach him it was too late. 

Hooker had overtaxed himself since he was placed in 
command of the army, and the vigorous intellect that he 
had exhibited up to that moment then seemed paralyzed. 
He knew the condition of affairs well, and really anticipated 
what came, as the following order evinces : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Chancellorsville, Va., May 2 — 9:30 a.m. 

I am directed by the major general commanding to sa}- that the 
disposition you have made of 3-our corps has been with a vievv to a 
front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon ^our 
flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the 
position you will take in that event, in order that 3"ou ma}- be pre- 
pared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that 
you have heav\' reserves well in hand to meet the contingency'. The 
right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial 
defenses worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to 
be a scarcit}- of troops at that point, and not, in the general's opinion, 
as favorably posted as might be. 

We have good reason to suppose that the eneni}' is moving to 
our right. Please advance your pickets for purpose of observation 
as far as \wa.y be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their 
approach. James H. Van Alex, 

Brigadier General and Aid-de-Camp. 

]\Iajor General Slocum and 

Major General Howard. 

Howard held the extreme right of Hooker's army, and 
to him this order was particularly addressed. His corps 
rested on the Plank road, with the right beyond Talley's 
and a brigade facing west to protect his flank, which 



CHA NCEL L O R S VIL L E. 3i7 

was not strong enough to oppose a heavy force. His 
headquarters were at Dowdall's Tavern or Melzi Chancel- 
lor's. Dowdall and Chancellor had both owned this hotel 
at diflferent times. From Chancellorsville to Dowdall's 
Tavern it is perhaps two miles. This was Howard's 
headquarters, while his right rested beyond Talley's house 
about a mile farther to the west. Von Gilsa's brigade held 
the extreme right in a dense woods where it was impos- 
sible to see over a hundred yards. There Jackson found 
Fitz Lee with his brigade of cavalry. Jackson asked him 
if he knew where Howard's position was, to which General 
Lee said, "Yes, come with me and I will show you his 
whole command." 

The above was fully confirmed by Gen. Fitz Lee, when 
he was Governor of Virginia, in a letter to tiie writer. 

Reaching the Orange plank road, General Jackson himself rode 
with General Fitz Lee to reconnoiter the position of Howard, and 
then sent the Stonewall Brigade of Virginia troops, under Brigadier 
General Paxton, to hold the point where the Germanna plank road 
obliquely enters the Orange road. Leading the main column of his 
force farther on the Brook road to hold the turnpike, the head of the 
column turned sharply eastward toward Chancellorsville. About a 
mile had been passed, when he halted and began the disposition of 
his force to attack Howard. 

Rodes' division, at the head of the column, was thrown into 
line of battle, with Colston's forming the second line and A. P. 
Hill the third, while the artillery, under Col. Stapleton Crutchfield, 
moved in column on the road, or was parked in a field on the right. 

Well trained skirmishers of Rodes' division, under ]\Iaj. Eu- 
gene Blackford, were thrown to the front. It must have been be- 
tween five and six o'clock in the evening, Saturday, ^Nla}- 2, when 
these dispositions were completed. 

Upon his stout built, long-paced little sorrel, General Jackson 
sat, with visor low over his eyes, and lips compressed, and with his 
watch in his hand. Upon his right sat Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the 
very picture of a soldier, and every inch all that he appeared. Upon 
his right sat Major Blackford. " Are you ready, General Rodes ? " 
said Jackson. "Yes, sir," said Rodes, impatient for the advance. 
"You can go forward, then," said Jack.son. 

A nod from Rodes was order enough for Blackford, and then 



348 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

suddenly the woods rang with the bugle call, and back came the 
responses from bugles on the right and left, and the long line of 
skirmishers through the wild thicket of undergrowth sprang eagerly 
to their work, followed promptly by the quick steps of the line of 
battle. For a moment all the troops seemed buried in the depths 
of the gloomy forest, and then suddenly the echoes waked and swept 
the countr}- for miles, never failing until heard at the headquarters 
of Hooker, at Chancellorsville, the wild "rebel yell" of the long 
Confederate lines. 

Never was assault delivered with grander enthusiasm. Fresh from 
the long winter's waiting, and confident from the preparation of the 
spring, the troops were in fine condition and in high spirits. The 
boys were all back from home or sick leave. " Old Jack " was there 
upon the road in their midst ; there could be no mistake and no fail- 
ure. And there were Rodes and A. P. Hill. Had they not seen and 
cheered, as long and as loud as they were permitted, the gay-hearted 
Stuart and the splendid Fitz L,ee with long beard and fiery charger ? 
Was not Crutchfield's arra}^ of brass and iron "dogs of war" at 
hand, with Poague and Palmer, and all the rest ready to bark loud 
and deep with half a chance .-' Alas ! for Howard and his unformed 
lines, and his brigades with guns stacked, and officers at dinner or 
asleep under the trees, and butchers deep in the blood of beeves ! 
Scattered through field and forest, his men were preparing their eve- 
ning meal. A little show of earth-work facing the south was quickly 
taken by us in reverse from the west. Flying battalions are not 
flying buttresses for an arm\-'s stability. Across Talley's fields the 
rout begins. Over at Hawkins' Hill, on the north of the road, Carl 
Schurz makes a stand, soon to be driven into the same hopeless 
panic. 

By the qviiet .Wilderness Church in the vale, leaving wounded 
and dead ever^'where, by ]Melzi Chancellor's, on into the deep thicket 
again, the Confederate lines press forward, now broken and all dis- 
aligned by the density' of bush that tears the clothes awaj- ; now 
halting to load and deliver a volley upon some regiment or fragment 
of the enemy that will not move as fast as others. Thus the attack 
upon Hooker's flank was a grand success, beyond the mo.st san- 
guine expectation. 

The writer of this narrative, an aid-de-camp of Jackson's, was 
ordered to remain at the point where the advance began, to be a 
center of communication between the general and the cavalry on 
the flanks, and to deliver orders to detachments of artillery still 
moving up from the rear. 

The above is an extract from the Rev. James Power 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 349 

Smith's account, in an able review in the Century^ of Jack- 
son's move around Hooker's army until he struck Howard. 
Smith served on Jackson's" staff as an aid, and after the war 
he became prominent as a divine at Fredericksburg. 

It will be observed that Jackson and Lee approached 
within three-fourths of a mile of Howard without being- 
seen. There is not a military man in the world but will 
say that Von Gilsa's front should have been protected with 
heavy picket guards to have prevented a surprise. On the 
approach of Lee's cavalry they would have been able to 
have given him a warm reception, as Von Gilsa was 
posted in the thick undergrowth, where his cavalry could 
not have charged. This would have warned the other 
picket posts, and sent alarm to Howard's headquarters. 
Then he could have received reenforcements and extended 
his line of battle farther to the west, and been prepared 
to face the enemy. 

In fact, a regular line of pickets should have been 
thrown around his corps at a distance far enough away to 
have prevented any surprise. The cattle were in the forest 
on the right of the road ; when Jackson made his advance 
they joined in the wild excitement of the hour and greatly 
added to the confusion. 

Howard had three divisions in his corps, each composed 
of two brigades. Gen. Chas. Devens, Jr., commanded the 
First Division, and occupied the right of the line, with his 
First Brigade, under Colonel Von Gilsa, on the extreme 
right. That brigade was composed of the 41st, 45th, and 
54th New York Regiments, and the 153d Pennsylvania. 
Only half of the brigade was refused back, facing west 
when the attack was made. The 54th New York was on 
the extreme right, while the 153d Pennsylvania was on its 
left, with the 41st New York holding the extreme front on 
the Plank road, and the 45th New York on its left. 
Devens' Second Brigade, under Gen. Nathaniel C. Mc- 
Lean, was the 25th, 55th, 75th and lojtli Ohio troops, with 
the 17th Connecticut. 



350 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

On Devens' left was Schiirz's division, with Steinwehr 
on the left in the direction of Chancellorsville as the corps 
held the road. But it must be remembered that only Bush- 
beck's brigade of his division was engaged, as Gen. Fran- 
cis C. Barlow's brigade, which had been on reserve, was 
sent to Sickles a short time before ; so Howard really had 
but seven brigades to resist Jackson's corps. General 
Doubleday and the Comte de Paris in their histories say 
that the first known of Jackson's premeditated attack was 
the wild game coming from that. direction. 

While these two distinguished authors correctly repre- 
sent Howard's headquarters, yet there were many in the corps 
who fully expected the attack and knew of the advance. 

Capt. David B. Castle, of the vSignal Service, sighted 
the column at quite a distance off, and sent the news to 
Howard, but he informed me that his information was not 
credited, and no attention was paid to it. 

Col. James S. Robinson, of the 82d Ohio, said he was 
aware of the advance of Jackson, and wondered why no 
precaution was taken to meet it. When Rodes' division 
(D. H. JHLill's) arrived at the turnpike he formed his com- 
mand with Colquitt on the right, Doles next, with his left 
resting on the turnpike. Rodes' old brigade (commanded 
by O'Neal) on the left of the turnpike, with its right rest- 
ing on it. Iverson w^as on the extreme left. As the troops 
advanced it was understood that the turnpike was to be the 
guide, while Iverson was to get possession of Talley's house, 
because that was supposed to command Howard' s headquar- 
ters at Dowdall's Tavern. 

Doles first struck Howard's outposts with two guns. 
Flanking with two regiments, he swept right over the 
Union troops. 

The position at Talley's was taken, where five more 
guns were lost ; which compelled Howard's reserve to retreat, 
as it suffered from a reverse as well as an enfilading fire, 
while his main line of battle was telescoped by Jackson's 
advance. Devens was hurled on Schurz suddenlv. 



CHAN CELLO RSVILLE. 351 

At Dowdall's Tavern Colston's division liurried forward 
and joined in the pursuit. Schurz attempted to stem the 
tide, but Rodes and Colston were both upon him, with A. 
P. Hill hurrying forward to assist in the attack. Bushbeck 
made a gallant stand, but lie was soon overpowered and his 
brigade swept back. 

Howard and Schurz had appeared on the scene and 
attempted to form a new line of battle. In the mean time 
Sickles had been apprised of the disaster, and he hastily 
marched back in the direction of Hazel Grove. Pleasonton, 
who was with Sickles, returned with his cavalry to Hazel 
Grove in advance of the latter. The flying battalions of 
Howard were forcing their way in the direction of Chan- 
cellorsville, unable to check the onward charge of Jackson's 
corps, retreat being their only safety. Howard sent to 
Pleasonton for assistance at that critical moment. Taking 
in Howard's trouble at a glance, Pleasonton saw that some- 
thing desperate must be done to stay Jackson's victorious 
columns. 

Hazel Grove is near a half mile south of the Plank road. 
From it a small road leads through the woods, * and inter- 
sects the Plank road near where Jackson fell. Pleasonton 
directed the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry to take that road 
and fall on the enemy at the first favorable opportunity. 
Every officer and man in the regiment well knew that 
meant a ride to death, but not a lip quivered or a voice 
trembled in the whole command. The regiment swept 
through the woods at a full gallop, scattering the advancing 
Confederates of Jackson's right. A small open field lies on 
the south side of the Plank road, just west of where Jack- 
son was wounded. When the 8tli Pennsylvania Ca\-alry 
struck that open field it turned to the left, and charged into 
the advancing columns of Confederate infantry, knowing 
full well that they were thrown into that maelstrom to save 

* Hazel Grove is the name of a farm west of Fairview. It takes its name 
from the hazel bushes growing along a small stream that skirts the farm, and is a 
branch of Lewis' Creek. 



352 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Hooker's army, every man of them resolved to sell his life 
as dearly as possible. This was, perhaps, their last day on 
earth ; and the command to charge lessened the time to min- 
utes and seconds for some of them to live. In a moment more 
they were on the infantry of the enemy, using sabers w^ith 
a valor that would have received the highest praise from 
Wellington. Of the five officers who led the charge three 
were killed — Maj. Peter Keenan, Capt. Charles Arrowsmith, 
and Adjt. John Hazeltine Haddock. The horse of Capt. J. 
Edward Carpenter was shot under him. Major Busy w^as 
the only officer who escaped unharmed. 

Pleasonton at once took command of all the artillery 
near him, and taking a good position, prepared to receive 
the enemy, who had quickly rallied after the fearful as- 
sault of the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Having an abiding 
faith in his double-shotted guns, he bade his gunners 
reserve their fire until the enemy was in safe range, 
and then directing the guns to be depressed, gave the 
order to fire. The awful carnage that followed would 
blanch the cheek of "the Lion-hearted." Although the 
enemy had suffered so fearfully from Pleasonton' s artillery, 
yet the gaps in their ranks were closed up and they were 
advanced again as if to get another taste of death. 
Hooker seeing the great disaster to his right, rushed from 
his headquarters, and, like Gustavus Adolphus at Lelitzen, 
brought up his old division, then commanded by Gen- 
eral Berry, to rush on the enemy and impale them on their 
bayonets if they could not otherwise break their lines. 

Berry and Williams advanced from Chancellorsville, 
hoping to assist in reforming the Eleventh Corps, and to 
check the advance of Jackson. Sickles, with his two divi- 
sions. Berry and Whipple, and Barlow's brigade of the 
Eleventh Corps, were making great efforts to counter- 
march, to attack the right flank of Jackson. It was 
a perilous place, and Hooker feared at one time that 
Sickles' whole command was lost, and told one of his officers 
to state his fears to Col. William Birney, who was a volun- 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 353 

teer aid on Hooker's staff during that battle. Colonel 
Birney, whose brother, David B. Birne}-, commanded one 
of Sickles' divisions, kept a faithful watch until the head 
of Sickles' column made its appearance in the direction of 
Hazel Grove. 

If Jackson had been able to force his way in the direc- 
tion of Chancellorsville until his right occupied Fairview, 
Gear}-'s right would have been untenable, which would have 
forced those on his left to give way ; and if Sickles' corn- 
mand had not arrived in time to have struck Jackson' s right 
and rear, there is no telling where disaster to Hooker's 
army would have ended that night. He might have been 
swept from Chancellor.-ville. His attack, however, was 
rather too late for that, and Pleasonton with great impet- 
uosity threw his small command on Jackson to make the 
impression that he was encountering a heavy force. That 
gave Sickles time to arrive andreenforce the " gallant little 
cavalr}' commander," and hold the enemy permanently in 
check. 

In his great haste to return, Whipple lost a part of his 
ammunition (mule) train, and caissons of his batteries, and 
two or three of his cannon, which were in the woods occu- 
pied by the enemy between Sickles' line of battle and the 
Plank road. Both Jackson and Sickles were preparing for 
a night attack at the same time. Sickles wanted to recover 
Whipple's lost cannon and ammunition, and he also anti- 
cipated an advance of the enemy. In fact there was a 
general expectancy all along the line that the battle would 
be renewed during the night. Berry, Williams and Birney 
formed two sides of a quadrangle as they prepared that 
night to advance on Jackson. Berry and Williams moved 
west, taking the Plank road as their guide, while Birney 
formed from Hazel Grove and advanced north toward the 
Plank road, striking the enemy on the right flank. Hooker 
had given permission to Sickles to renew the attack, so 
that when Colonel Hart, of Sickles' staff, returned from 
headquarters with the request granted, Sickles directed 



354 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Birney to prepare his division for an advance. Ward's bri- 
gade formed the first line, with Hayman's following a 
hundred yards in the rear. The guns were uncapped, and 
orders were given not to fire until the Plank road and the 
breastworks of Steinwehr, from which Bushbeck's brigade 
had been driven, were retaken. It was a beautiful night ; 
the moon, nearly full, made it light enough to enable the 
troops to advance. The forest was thick enough to prevent 
an alignment, but the veterans of the Third Corps were 
well disciplined for the perilous duty they were required to 
perform, and while the artillery of the enemy, and as they 
grew closer, the musketry in addition, stubbornly resisted 
the advancing columns of Birney, yet that division forced its 
way to the front until the enemy was compelled to attack 
Berry's division and Knipe's brigade of Williams' division, 
in the direction of Chancellorsville along the Plank road. 
Williams' division, of the Twelfth Corps, which was 
ordered back by Hooker when he gave up the advance on 
Fredericksburg, returned to the position it had previously 
occupied, its right resting on the Plank road with the left 
near Fairview. There it connected with Geary's right, 
which faced southeast, holding the same general direction 
it did in the advance. The two divisions formed a right 
angle near Fairview. In the evening the enemy approached 
that point, and made so strong a disposition to attack it, 
that Ruger, of Williams' division, was compelled to throw 
forward the 27th Indiana and 3d Wisconsin to protect the 
position. 

On the following morning. May 2, Williams fol- 
lowed Sickles in his advance beyond Hazel Grove. Wil- 
liams was strongly feeling Anderson's lines, and really 
pressing him back, when the news came that Jackson was 
crushing Howard. With all possible haste Williams 
marched back to take up his old position from Fairview to 
the Plank road in order to assist Howard. It was with 
difficulty that his command could form in line of battle 
because of the flying fugitives of Howard's corps. Ber- 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 355 

ry's division of the Third Corps had taken a position on 
the right of Williams, his left extending to the Plank 
road. Berry overlapped a little, but Williams relieved 
those troops. These two divisions hurried to the rescue of 
Howard. 

Ruofer with his brigade held the left of the line near 
Fairview. He had formed two lines of battle to save that 
point ; the 27th Indiana on the left, the 2d Massachusetts 
in the center, and the 3d Wisconsin on the right. The 
13th New Jersey and 107th New York were in the second 
line. 

Hooker's position at that moment was very critical, and 
Jackson came very near forcing him from Chancellorsville 
in the evening. A statement from John Bresnalian, a brave 
and gallant soldier of the 27th Indiana, who lost his arm 
there next morning, says : 

While approaching the scene just described, there was danger 
of our regiment being swept off the field by the fleeing multitude ; 
but Colonel Colgrove was equal to the emergency. The boys 
touched elbows and moved to the top of a cleared ridge, about six 
hundred yards to the left of our original works, where the regiment 
halted, facing a ravine and heav}^* woods beyond, abcut three hun- 
dred yards from our line, out of which the men of Howard's corps 
were pouring, with the enemy yelling after them. The enemy at 
this point was checked by a well-directed fire of shell and canister 
from Lewis' batter}^ which came very timelj' to our assistance. 

Thus ended the desperate combat between the two 
armies until Sickles began that famous night attack. 

The battle at night was described so graphically, just 
after it, by General Williams, that it is here inserted : 

A tremendous roll of infantry fire, mingled with yellings and 
shoutings almost diabolical and infernal, opened the conflict on the 
side of Sickles' division. For some time my infantr}- and artillery 
kept silent, and in the intervals of the musketry I could distinctly 
hear the oaths and imprecations of the rebel officers, evidently hav- 
ing hard work to keep their men from stampeding. In the mean 
time Sickles' artillery opened, firing over the heads of the infantry, 
and the din of arms and inhuman yellings and cursings redoubled. 



1 



356 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

All at once Berry's division, across the road on our right, opened in 
heavy volleys, and Knipe (commanding my right brigade next to 
the Plank road on the south) followed suit. Best (chief of artillery 
of the Twelfth Corps) began to thunder with his thirty-odd pieces. 
In front and on the flanks, shell, and shot, and bullets were poured 
into these woods, which were evidently crowded with rebel masses 
preparing for the morning attack. Along our front and Sickles' 
flank probabl}' 15,000 or more musketry were belching an almost in- 
cessant stream of flame, while from the elevation just in the rear 
of each line from forty to fifty pieces of artillery kept up an uninter- 
rupted roar, reechoed from the woods with a redoubled echo, from 
the bursting shells which seemed to fill every part of them with fire 
and fury. Human language can give no idea of such a scene — such 
an infernal and 3^et sublime combination of sound, and flame, and 
smoke, and dreadful j-ells of rage, of pain, of triumph, or of defiance. 
Suddenly, al*nost on the instant, the tumult is hushed ; hardly a 
voice can be heard. One would almost suppose that the combatants 
were holding breath to listen for one another's movements. But the 
contest was not renewed. 

Thus spoke one of the bravest generals in praise of 
others on the field. 

Then came a scene that has been well pictured in his- 
tory. Jackson was never himself when he was not per- 
forming some daring deed. Sickles was not only holding 
on to Hazel Grove, bttt Birney was pressing in Jackson's 
right flank. Then Jackson determined to attack Berry be- 
fore Birney could reach the Plank road, and ordered A. P. 
Hill's division, which had been in reserve, to advance and 
relieve the front line of battle, which was then in confusion, 
as the commands were badly mixed with each other and 
decimated by casualties in the action. Jackson knew he 
must continue his work that night, or the chances were 
that he would pay dearly in the morning for his dela}-, for 
Sickles was pressing his right flank from Hazel Grove with 
Williams' and Berry's divisions, and Hay's brigade of 
French's division confronting him, while Reynolds, with 
the First Corps, closing well on his left flank, placed him 
in an tmcomfortable position, though a mistake the next 
morning added fame to his name. 

As Jackson was advancing along the Plank road to 



CHAXCELLORSVILLE. 357 

reconnoiter the Union position, in order to direct A. P, Hill, 
who was moving forward his division to make an attack on 
Berry, he was mortally wounded. Doubleday says : 

Pending this movement he rode out on the Plank road with part 
of his staff and a few orderlies to reconnoiter, cautioning his pickets 
not to fire on his return. When he came back new men had been 
posted, and his approach was mistaken for the advance of Pleasonton's 
cavalr}'. His own men fired into him with fatal effect. Nearly all 
his escort were killed or wounded and he received three balls, which 
shattered both arms. His horse ran towards the Union lines, and 
although he succeeded in turning him back, he was dashed against 
the trees and nearl}- unhorsed. He reached the Confederate lines 
about the time our artiller3' again opened up the Plank road 
with a fire which swept ever3^thing from its front. Several of his 
attendants were killed and others wounded. 

The Rev. James Power Smith, an aid on Jackson's staff, 
says : 

Regretting the necessity of relieving the troops in front. General 
Jackson had ordered X.. P. Hill's division, his third and reserve line 
to be placed in front. While this change was being effected, impa- 
tient and anxious, the general rode forward on the turnpike, followed 
by two or three of his staff and a number of couriers and signal ser- 
geants. He passed the swampy depression and began the ascent of 
the hill toward Chancellorsville, when he came upon a line of the 
Federal infantry h'ing on their arms. Fired at by one or two musk- 
ets (two musket balls from the enemy whistled over my head as I 
came to the front), he turned and came back toward his line, upon 
the side of the road to his left. As he rode near to the Confederate 
troops just placed in position, and ignorant that he was in the front, 
the left company began firing to the front, and two of his part\^ fell 
from their saddles dead. 

Captain Boswell of the Engineers, and Sergeant Cunliffe of the 
Signal Corps, spurring his horse acro.ss the road to his right, he was 
met by a second vollc}^ from the right company of Pender's North 
Carolina Brigade. Under this volley, when not two rods from the 
troops, the general received three balls at the same instant. One 
penetrated the palm of his right hand and was cut out that night 
from the back of his hand. A second passed around the wrist of 
the left arm and out through the left hand. But a third ball passed 
through the left arm, half wa\- from shoulder to elbow. The large 
bone of the upper arm was splintered to the elbow-joint, and the 
wound bled freely. 



358 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

His horse turned quickly from the fire, through the thick bushes, 
which swept the cap from the general's head, and scratched his 
forehead, leaving drops of blood to stain his face. As he lost his 
hold upon the bridle-rein, he reeled from the saddle, and was caught 
by the' arms of Captain Milbourne of the Signal Corps. Laid upon 
the ground, there came at once to his succor. Gen. A. P. Hill and 
members of his staff. The writer reached his side a minute after to 
find General Hill holding the head and shoulders of the wounded 
chief. Cutting open the coat sleeve from wrist to shoulder, I found 
the wound in the upper arm, and with my handkerchief I bound the 
arm above the wound to stem the flow of blood. Couriers were sent 
for Dr. Hunter McGuire, the surgeon of the corps and the general's 
trusted friend, and for an ambulance. Being outside of our lines, 
it was urgent that he should be moved at once. With difficulty lit- 
ter-bearers were brought from the line near by, the general placed 
upon the litter, and carefully raised to the shoulder, I m3'self bear- 
ing one corner. A moment after, artillery from the Federal side 
was opened upon us ; great broadsides thundered over the woods ; 
hissing shells searched the dark thickets through, and shrapnels 
swept the road along which we moved. Two or three steps farther, 
and the litter-bearer at my side was struck and fell, but, as the litter 
turned, Maj. Watkins Leigh, of Hill's staff", happily caught it. But 
the fright of the men was so great that we were obliged to lay the 
litter and its burden down upon the road. As the litter-bearers ran 
to the cover of the trees, I threw mj'self by the general's side, and 
held him firmly to the ground as he attempted to rise. Over us 
swept the rapid fire of shot and shell — grape-shot striking fire upon 
the flinty rock of the road all around us, and sweeping from their 
feet horses and men of the artillery just moved to the front. Soon 
the firing veered to the other side of the road, and I sprang to ni}- 
feet, assisted the general to rise, passed my arm around him, and 
with the wounded man's weight thrown heavily upon me, we for- 
sook the road. Entering the woods, he sank to the ground from 
exhau.stion, but the litter was soon brought, and again rall5-ing a 
few men, we essayed to carry him farther, when a second bearer fell 
at my side. This time, with none to assist, the litter careened, and 
the general fell to the ground with a groan of deep pain. Greatly 
alarmed, I sprang to his head, and, lifting his head as a stray beam 
of moonlight came through clouds and leaves, he opened his eyes 
and wearily said, "Never mind me, Captain, never mind me!" 
Raising him again to his feet, he was acccsted by Brigadier General 
Pender: "Oh, general, I hope you are not seriously wounded. I 
will have to retire my troops to reform tliem, they are so much 
broken by this fire." But Jackson, rallying his strength, with firm 



CHANCE LLORSVILLE. 359 

voice said, " You must hold your ground, General Pender ; j'ou must 
hold your ground, sir;" and so uttered his last command on the 
field. 

Charles W. Hath way, Company K, ist Massachusetts, 
says : 

Their version agrees with the ist Massachusetts', with one ex- 
ception — that is, which fired at the general first, they (the Confed- 
erates) or the Union troops. The Confederates claim that he and 
his guide were lost, and rode almost into our lines, but finding his 
mistake retreated, and was first fired upon by his own men, and 
some Union soldiers immediately in front returned the fire, and 
the firing then became general. 

We of the ist Massachusetts claim that he rode near our lines, 
and was ordered to halt by Sergeant Dan Kell}^ of Company K, 
when he wheeled his horse and rode into the woods upon the right 
of the Plank road, and a portion of the three left companies (H, K 
and F) fired upon him. 

The firing was immediately returned by the Confederate picket 
line, and then the firing became general upon both sides, and our 
artillery opened with double-shotted canister, which came too near 
us for comfort, as it went crashing through the woods just above 
our heads. It seems as if the woods were one sheet of flame for a 
few minutes, the musketry rolling forth from both Union and Con- 
federate lines. 

General Berry that night desiring to consult with Gen- 
eral Hooker, placed General Carr temporarily in command 
of the division. Colonel Michael Burns perceiving the fact 
that the enemy was massing on the front, sent for General 
Carr. On arriving there. General Carr became convinced 
that a night attack was contemplated soon ; he went to the 
rear, and gave Colonel Osborn an order to open with all of 
the artillery, which was promptly obeyed. General Carr 
said : 

Gen. Stonewall Jackson was killed in that night attack by our 
men, and not by his own troops. From what I could see when called 
to the advanced line by Colonel Burns, previous to the opening of 
our artillery fire, I am satisfied General Jackson could not get in 
front of his picket line without running into our lines. 

Now the evidence on both sides is impartially laid 



360 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

before the reader, and each one can arrive at his own con- 
clusions. 

After hearing and studying carefully both sides, it is 
difficult to decide which army wounded him. It seems the 
historians of the North have accepted the theory that he was 
killed by his own men. Both sides agree that he rode very 
near to our picket line, and the members of the ist Mas- 
sachusetts claim that they fired the volley that ended his 
life. This statement seems quite probable, and ordinarily 
would be accepted, but the Confederates so stubbornly 
claim it that many are disposed to concede it to them. 
They fully believe it, and the Conite de Paris, after weigh- 
ing the accounts on both sides, decided that Jackson was 
wounded by his own men. I have avoided prejudice in the 
matter, and there is new and positive evidence introduced 
here never before laid before the public. If I have an 
opinion at all in the matter, it is that Sickles' soldiers shot 
him. General Carr stated to me in a letter, that the two 
lines at that point were within twenty feet of each other. 
It will always remain a mystery, and perhaps be the subject 
of much discussion. 

A. P. Hill, while leaning over Jackson, was wounded 
by a shot from a section of Dimick's battery planted on 
the Plank road, and supported by Berry's division. Jack- 
son and A. P. Hill both being wounded in the night battle, 
it so discouraged the enemy that he withdrew to Dow- 
dall's Tavern, when our troops reoccupied the position that 
Bushbeck had been forced from, and Whipple recovered 
all of his lost cannon and ammunition, besides capturing 
some guns from the enemy. 

Thus ended the battle on the first day at Chancellors- 
ville. Tlie first great advantage of the enemy had been 
nearly overcome, and Jackson's corps, then without a com- 
mander, was in a very precarious condition. Reynolds, 
who had left his (First) corps at United States Ford, went 
in person to report to Hooker ; who, on learning the con- 
dition of affairs, sent an order to Doubleday, whom he 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 361 

had placed in temporary command, to march rapidly to the 
front, where he was assigned a position on the right of the 
troops of French's division, which was the extension of the 
line from Fairview, with Williams on the left. 

With the exception of occasional firing, the battle 
ceased, and the weary soldiers lay on their arms for much- 
needed rest. Hooker's dispositions for the battle next 
morning were most admirable. Meade had taken a posi- 
tion on the right of Berry, while Reynolds, with the First 
Corps, had arrived and occupied a position near the Bul- 
lock or White House on Meade's right, so that in the 
morning Jackson's troops had Birney and Whipple on 
their right flank, with Williams, Berry, Griffln, Sykes and 
Humphreys in support of and confronting them, and Rey- 
nolds in position to move on the left flank. This was a crit- 
ical position for Jackson's corps to occupy, but, as General 
Stannard said of some of the mistakes in the war, "If they 
had not been made the war would have been brought to a 
close before the object had been accomplished for which it 
was fought." 

Instead of holding his lines firmly and pressing Jack- 
son's troops on the morning of the 3d, at early dawn, 
before they had been reorganized by Stuart, who had 
taken command at the request of General Rodes and 
Jackson's adjutant general, and forcing them beyond the 
Brock road, so that Anderson's left would have been un- 
protected and Stuart compelled to go to Todd's Tavern to 
take the Catharpin road to reunite with Lee, Hooker 
made no attempt to destroy his adversary. If the course 
indicated had been taken Anderson and McLaws would 
have been pressed back toward vSalem Church, while Sedg- 
wick ^was rapidly advancing from Fredericksburg. IMcLaws 
and Anderson would have had to retreat either over the 
Catharpin or taken the road at the Tabernacle Church for 
Spottsylvania. But instead of using his army as it was 
established in line of battle, Reynolds was never required 
to advance or fire a gun. Sickles was ordered to bring 



362 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Birney and Whipple from Hazel Grove and surrender the 
ground they had so gallantly fought for at night. But that 
was not all ; the moment Sickles surrendered Hazel Grove, 
the key to the position was gone, and it was clear Hooker 
had made a fatal mistake. 

A. P. Hill, who had been wounded, was superseded by 
Heth. When the new commander of Hill's troops observed 
Sickles retire in the direction of Fairview, he followed him 
with the brigades of Lane, McGowan, Archer and Brock- 
enborough. Some have censured Stuart for not pressing 
more to the left the next morning, in the same direction 
Jackson was the evening before. It was well he did not, 
for Reynolds, with 17,000 men, lay there ready to receive 
him "with hospitable hands to bloody graves." But in- 
stead he pursued the much wiser course of pressing forward 
his right under Heth, which connected him with Ander- 
son, and at the same time gave him Hazel Grove, from 
where he could sweep Fairview with his artillery. When 
Sickles received orders, at daylight Sunday morning, to 
withdraw from Hazel Grove and proceed to Fairview, 
Graham's brigade was directed to cover the movement and 
bring up the rear. The enemy perceiving the movement 
pressed Graham very hard, when Graham directed Hunt- 
ington's battery to open fire, which proved so effective that 
the Confederates were handsomely repulsed. A battery 
from Fairview was also directed to open on the enemy, as 
Huntington's battery would again be attacked when it at- 
tempted to move. A brigade having also been instructed 
to assist Graham, the enemy having opened the fight with 
renewed zeal, Heth's troops leaving their breakfast and 
flying to their guns with the cry, "Let us remember 
Jackson." 

Hooker had more troops than could be used to advan- 
tage at Chancellorsville. If he had retinforced Sedgwick 
on the night of the 2d with two corps, Mar>'e's Heights 
could have been carried and held with ease. Hooker 
might then have retired across United States Ford, and 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 363 

taken command in person, left Lee in the Wilderness, 
where he could have been held or compelled to retreat in 
the direction of Gordonsville, when he could have fallen on 
his rear with his splendid army and harassed and damaged 
him as effectually as the Russians did Napoleon on his re- 
treat from Moscow. But he neither reenforced Sedgwick 
nor transferred his army. He did not even press Jackson's 
troops next morning.' 

Archer, rendered desperate, attacked the position of 
Fairview with maddened fury ; but Ruger's brigade, of 
Williams' division, met his attack with a firmness that 
hurled him back in the direction of Hazel Grove. Mc- 
Gowan then advanced, but he suffered a similar fate to that 
of Archer, and was compelled to retire. The artillery of 
Hooker at Fairview was doing effective work. Graham's 
brigade, of Birney's division, came to the assistance of Ru- 
ger, it being evident that the enemy was making great ef- 
forts to carry Fairview. Stuart was advancing in three 
lines of battle which, he says, became "more or less merged 
into one." Berry was pressing Stuart's left so hard that 
Colquitt was sent from the right to the left to suj)port Pen- 
der, while Iverson was ordered up to his assistance. 

When the mist cleared away sufficiently for Stuart to 
see the field, he observed that Hooker, in abandoning Hazel 
Grove, gave away the key to the situation, and he at once 
ordered 30 pieces of artillery to that point to concentrate 
their fire .on Fairview. Again Stuart ordered another as- 
sault all along the line. Why Hooker did not hurl Rey- 
nolds on Stuart's left flank, supported by Sykes and Griffin 
on his left, is strange. 

On the north of the road Berry had fallen and General 
Hays was wounded and a prisoner. The contest was again 
renewed at Fairview, and Whipple's division bore the brunt 
of the struggle. The enemy made a desperate assault on 
the. salient point, which was nearly carried, when Colonel 
Bowman ordered his brigade forward, and was again com- 
pelled to retire, though Bowman lost heavily. In the 12th 



364 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

New Hampshire, Colonel Potter, Lieutenant Colonel 
Marsh, Major Savage, Capt. A. J. Huntoon and others 
were severely wounded ; of 537 men who went into the ac- 
tion, only 2 1 2 could be mustered for duty after it was over, 
which shows the severity of the conflict. 

McLaws was on the extreme right of the Confederate 
line of battle, WofFord on the turnpike, with Kershaw on 
his left and Semmes on the Plank road leading to Fred- 
ericksburg. These brigades were hovering on Hancock's 
front, though unable to give him battle. Anderson pressed 
hard on Geary's front, which was all the assistance he was 
able to give the assaulting columns from Hazel Grove and 
Dowdall's Tavern, where Stuart was making such determined 
charges to force his way to Chancellorsville. Again had 
Hooker sent a division by the river road and turned Mc- 
Laws' right, and rolled him up on Anderson, who in' turn 
would have been compelled to retire in the direction of 
Hazel Grove, the victory would have been his, for the 
reason that he would then have been in possession of the 
roads to Fredericksburg, on which Sedgwick was ap- 
proaching. 

At Fairview Doles came around a hill and then follow- 
ing the bed of a small branch, was enabled to strike Wil- 
liams on the flank. A gap between Geary's right and 
Williams' left made a favorable point for attack. Doles 
was being driven back, when Paxton, in command of the 
old Stonewall Brigade, came to his support. 

Williams' division had been in the fight from early 
morn ; a good part of it was out of ammunition, and the 
men were faint from exhaustion. As his line wavered, it 
left Graham's brigade uncovered ; but Birney seeing Gra- 
ham's danger, took a portion of Hayman's brigade and led 
the charge in person to save him. Whipple's division had 
been ordered to support Berry, but that gallant officer had 
given his last command. When it was known that 
Whipple was mortally wounded. General Revere marched 
his brigade and a part of another out of the line of battle 




GEN. \V. J. SKWEUv. 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 365 

in the direction of United States Ford. He was a verj- 
brave officer, and his action on that occasion was most 
singular. Doubleday, in his work, says : "General Revere, 
probably considering further contest hoj)eless, led his 
men out of the action without authority." In the mean 
time Gen. J. B. Carr had assumed command of the division, 
and sent a staff officer to order Revere to return to his 
place in line of battle. But the break in the line had 
already produced serious results, as the enemy was on the 
alert to take advantage of every mistake. 

The division also suffered another severe loss. General 
Mott, who commanded the Third Brigade of the division 
was wounded. Before Capt. T. W. Eayre, the assistant 
adjutant general, could select a brigade commander, the 
two ranking colonels — Burling and Park, had been 
wounded; therefore Colonel Sewell, of the 5 th Newjerse}', 
was assigned to the command. It proved a very fortunate 
selection, as the .brigade came out of the battle with a 
record second to none in the history of the war. The 
enemy made desperate efforts at that point to break the 
Union line, and hurled regiment after regiment on young 
Sewell, only to sacrifice their colors. The 5th New Jersey 
took three stands of colors, and the 7th took five ; while 
the brigade took 1,000 prisoners. Such heroic sen-ice 
richly deserves and has obtained a place in histor}-. The 
brigade was composed of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th New 
Jersey, the 2d New York, and 115th Pennsylvania. Its 
ammunition was nearly exhausted, and the enemy turned 
Sewell's right flank, so that he was exposed to a strong en- 
filading fire. Hurrying to that point he requested Colonel 
McAllister, of the nth New Jersey, to come to his assist- 
ance, which was promptly responded to by a charge of that 
regiment. The enemy was forced back, but the position 
could not be long held without reenforcements, for which 
Sickles was appealed to by Sewell, but the general simply 
replied that every man of the Third Corps was in line of 
battle, and he could give him no aid. The line at that 



366 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

point was slowly retired behind the batteries, but Sewell, 
thinking that another attack might break the enemy's 
lines, again ordered a charge at double quick. He retook 
the works thrown up for the protection of our guns, and 
planted the colors of the brigade on the parapet. When 
the last round of ammunition was fired with no prospect of 
assistance, Sewell retired the brigade to the rear of the 
Chancellor House, where he reported to General Carr in 
command of the division. 

The artillery of the enemy posted on the Plank road 
was planting its shells all around the Chancellor House, 
while the enemy at Hazel Grove, prompted with a hope that 
victory would soon be his, was thundering away at Fair- 
view. Sickles seeing him make another advance, sent 
Major Tremaine again for assistance, but when he arrived 
he found the commander-in-chief had been stunned with 
a shell, and no one was at headquarters to hear his request. 
General Butterfield, his chief of staff, was' at Falmouth ; 
Warren had gone to Sedgwick ; General Van Alen thought 
he had no authority to act, and Couch, the senior corps 
commander, was not at headquarters. Perry's brigade, on 
the left of x\nderson, had ascended Lewis' Creek and joined 
with Archer in the attack on Fairview. General Lee had 
evidently been watching that vital point, as he accompanied 
Perry and Archer, and gave the order to renew the at- 
tack. Geary's right was forced back, and the whole Union 
line facing west gave way and retired in the direction of 
the Chancellor House, notwithstanding the last stubborn 
fight made by Carr, as well as by Graham and Whipple, 
who had gone to Carr's relief. The Union line was 
defeated and compelled to retire. Major Tremaine was 
again sent to headquarters for aid, but had no better suc- 
cess than before. Meade was present, and the request of 
Sickles, through Major Tremaine, was referred to him, but 
he felt a delicacy of assuming the responsibility at that 
critical moment ; perhaps for the reason that three corps, 
the First, Fifth and Eleventh, had remained idle all the 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 367 

morning to the full knowledge of tlie commander-in-chief, 
whereas, if the First and Fifth had been thrown on Stuart's 
left flank, he would have been crushed at once ; or, as 
General Sickles said to me, "In fifteen minutes." 

Meade w^as one of the junior corps commanders. It is 
true he had commanded the First Corps for twelve days, 
but that was a temporary assignment on the field, when 
Hooker was wounded at Antietam. Couch, Slocum and 
Reynolds all ranked Meade, and were on the battlefield, 
and his declination to virtually assume command was cer- 
tainly made in good taste, although the service greatly 
suffered by it at that critical moment. Couch afterwards 
declined to assume command pending Hooker's prospect of 
an early recovery. 

Hooker rallied enough to understand that his army was 
suffering a great defeat — that it was his Austerlitz — and he 
begged Gear}^ to retake the position he had retired from, 
and promised him if he would that he would give him sup- 
port at once. The soldiers of Geary's division once more 
advanced, and really retook their old position and held it 
for some time, but their ranks were melting away from a 
concentrated fire from the enemy, which finalh' compelled 
them to yield in their weakness, and they once more retired 
never to advance again. Even at that late and critical 
moment, if the First Corps, under Reynolds, and the Fifth, 
under Meade, had advanced on Stuart's left flank and rear, 
defeat would have been turned into victory. So anxious 
was Doubleday, who commanded a division of the corps, 
to assist, that he begged Reynolds to get orders to at- 
tack. Reynolds, who was a great soldier, was chafing for 
an opportunity to crush Stuart's left and thereby relieve 
Sickles and Slocum. Finally he ordered Doubleday to make 
a reconnoissance. Accordingly Doubleday directed Roy 
Stone to take his brigade and advance in the direction of 
the Plank road, which resulted in finding no enemy in force 
in their front, but the corps never received orders to 
advance. 



368 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Sickles, although he had been just placed in command 
of a corps for the first time, had fought with great valor and 
handled his corps with a skill that gave his men confidence. 
So the Third Corps, although it was forced back to the 
Chancellor House, would have rallied with spirit and dash 
and again retaken their works just abandoned and in the 
hands of the enemy, but for the fact that the spirit of 
Hooker was gone, and he mounted his horse and rode 
silently to the rear, where the new line was being formed 
by Couch, and thus abandoned the roads to Fredericksburg 
over which he had ordered Sedgwick to advance that morn- 
ing and form a junction with him. No one desired to in- 
form him of his real mental condition, though afterwards 
he said to Doubleday : "That for once he lost confidence 
in Hooker;" and there was no doubt that his injury was 
far worse than was supposed at the time. 

Anderson, Perry, and Archer rushed on to Fairview for 
the purpose of occupying that point, lest Hooker might 
attempt to retake it with fresh troops. 

The Confederate artillery was hastily brought from 
Hazel Grove and planted at Fairview, where it had a short 
and sweeping range on the Union troops around the Chan- 
cellor House, as a temporary line of battle was formed there 
to aid in directing the commands to the new position on a 
line with the Bullock or White House. The Chancellor 
House was on fire from the shells of the enemy, and even 
the woods, where our wounded lay unable to escape. 

Sickles, Knipe, and other ofiicers were attempting to 
prevent a panic, for the commands were all in confusion 
'and consequently uncontrollable. The Chancellor House 
was rapidly burning to the ground, while the woods in the 
front where our wounded lay were on fire, and the flames 
rapidly approaching them as they lay helpless on the 
ground. 

Great confusion prevailed in the ranks of both armies, 
and it took a considerable time for the soldiers to find 
their commands. The Confederate forces came on like 



CHAN CELLO RSVILLE. 369 

a mob, the three lines being merged into one. Couch had 
ample time to form on the new line selected, for the enemy 
was slow to pursue, even with the prestige of victory on his 
side, which was full evidence that the Confederate troops 
were exhausted. 

Reynolds held the right and Meade next, while Sickles 
occupied the apex between Meade and Couch, and Slocum's 
position was between Couch and Howard, the latter' s left 
resting on the Rappahannock. 

L-ee felt Hooker's new position cautiously. He pos- 
sessed a wily shrewdness that indicated danger, and while 
he had recklessly hurled his troops on Hooker at Chancel- 
lorsville, where he knew the Union commander was cooped 
up in a small area, with his lines of battle in almost every 
conceivable shape, he could neither successfully resist an 
attack nor with confidence advance ; he therefore moved on 
the Union position with timidity. While he was thus feel- 
ing Hooker's new line his attention was called to the battle 
at Fredericksburg between Sedgwick and Early. A new 
danger was threatening him in an unexpected quarter, for he 
knew that Sedgwick had, in addition to the Sixth Corps, the 
division of Gibbon of the Second Corps, while Early only 
had his division of four brigades — Hay's, Hoke's, William 
Smith's, and Gordon's, with Barkesdale's brigade of Mc- 
Laws' division. Wilcox was near Banks' Ford, from which 
point he could reenforce Early ; but with his assistance it 
would give Early only six brigades against four divisions, 
composed of eleven brigades, under Sedgwick, and, as a 
celebrated general once said, "God was always on the side 
of the largest army." Lee was a little afraid that Early 
might receive unkind treatment at the hands of Sedgwick ; 
so he desisted from pressing Hooker until he could hear from 
Fredericksburg. Warren had been dispatched by Hooker 
to go to Sedgwick in person and direct him to attack Early 
on the morning of the 3d and then make all possible haste 
in the direction of Chancellorsville. At this time Sedg- 
wick was at Hamilton's Crossing with his corps, ready 

XXIV 



370 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

to pursue Early on the Bowling Green road. The com- 
mander of the Sixth Corps was entirely ignorant of 
what had transpired on Hooker's right, and even then 
did not know that a most terrible battle was going on at 
night while he was reading the following order from 
Hooker : 

H^ADOUARTERS Army of the Potomac, 
May 2, 1863, 9 p.m. 
The major general commanding directs that General Sedgwick 
cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this 
order and at once take up his line of march on the Chancellorsville 
road until you connect with lis, and he will attack and destroj^ any 
force he may fall in with on the road. He will leave all his trains, 
except the pack-train of small ammunition, and march to be in our 
vicinity at daylight. He will probably fall upon the rear of the 
forces commanded by General Lee, and between us we will use him 
up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericks- 
burg. Be sure not to fail. Deliver this by your swiftest messenger. 
Send word that it is delivered to General Sedgwick. 

J. H. Van Alen, 
Brigadier General and Aid-de-Camp. 
To General Butterfield. 

General Sedgwick, in his report, says : 

The order to cross at Fredericksburg found me with ■m.y entire 
command on the south bank of the river, ready to pursue by the 
Bowling Green road. To recross for the purpose of crossing again at 
Fredericksburg, where no bridges had been laid, would have occu- 
pied until long after daylight. I commenced, therefore, to move by 
the flank in the direction of Fredericksburg, on the Bowling Green 
road ; General Newton taking the advance, followed by the Light 
Brigade and Howe's division. 

The enemy was on the alert, and resisted his advance 
with stubbornness, skirmishing, and falling back when 
compelled to, in the direction of Fredericksburg. At the 
Bernard House an attempt was made to surprise the Con- 
federate forces and capture the heights ; but it did not 
succeed. Then Sedgwick, when he reached Fredericks- 
burg, in the gray of the morning, attempted to carry 
Marye's Heights by surprise before the fog had lifted 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 371 

enough to disclose the advance of his troops ; but Early 
was fully alarmed by his night march, and was prepared for 
an assault at any moment ; consequently when Wheaton 
and Shaler advanced in the early morn they were allowed 
to approach within twenty yards of the enemy's works, at 
which point they received a sudden and destructive fire. 
The repulse of Wheaton and Shaler was a great disap- 
pointment to Sedgwick, who remembered the 13th of 
December, when charge after charge was made to carry the 
heights that were then frowning on him, as if to say ; "hurl 
not your soldiers against me again." But Sedgwick had 
Hooker's order to come to him, and his faithful friend. 
General Warren, was there watching and superintending 
every move with a view of aiding Sedgwick in his en- 
deavors to comply with that order. 

Two attempts had failed, but it was still hoped that the 
left flank of the enemy's position could be turned. Gib- 
bon, who had succeeded in getting a bridge thrown across 
the river at the Lacy House, had marched over, when he was 
directed to move to the right, which would have thrown 
him on the Confederate left, but that the bridge across the 
canal had been removed, and he was therefore compelled 
to repair it under heavy artillery fire. As the canal greatly 
impeded the advance of both the right and center grand 
divisions in the battle in December, it is a great wonder 
that the precaution had not been taken by Sedgwick or 
Gibbon to collect planks enough in Fredericksburg before 
the division started, carry them at the head of the col- 
umn, lay them almost in an instant, and then proceed. 
But instead of that, the column was halted, and men sent 
to the nearest house, some little distance away, to tear off 
its boards to make the bridge. Had a brigade, or even a 
regiment, of Gibbon's men crossed over the canal, it might 
have saved, or aided in saving, a direct assault in front, 
which cost Sedgwick a thousand men before noon. 

When the flank moveuient of Gibbon's failed, Newton 
was ordered to prepare to charge the heights in front, where 



372 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

our columns had suffered so much a few months before. 
Howe was ordered to move to the left of Hazel Run with 
his division, while Brooks remained near Hamilton's 
Crossing. 

But it fell to Newton's lot to bear the brunt of the 
battle, as Gibbon could neither advance on the right, nor 
could Howe on the left carry the heights in his front, as 
the enemy enfiladed him from the second line of works, 
while he advanced on the first. Newton's division was 
formed, Burnham's brigade being on the left, the right 
wing of the 5th Wisconsin, under Colonel Allen, advanced 
as skirmishers, closely followed the 31st New York on the 
left, and the 6th Maine on the right ; while the left wing 
of the 5th Wisconsin formed the third line. On the left of 
Burnham was the Vermont brigade of Howe's division 
under General Grant. Grant, an honor to the famous 
name, was appointed Assistant Secretary of War under 
Proctor, a deserved recognition of one of the most gallant 
Union soldiers. On the right of the Light Brigade, under 
Colonel Burnham, was the 7th Massachusetts, Colonel Johns, 
and the 36th New York, Colonel Walsh. The right col- 
umn of Newton's division near the Plank road was headed 
by the 6ist Pennsylvania, Colonel Spear; the 43d New 
York, Colonel Baker, supported by the 82d Pennsylvania, 
and the 67th New York (the ist Long Island). Doubleday 
says : 

Spear's cohinin, advancing through a narrow gorge, was broken 
and enfiladed by the artillery — indeed almost literally swept awa}'-, 
and Spear himself was compelled to advance up a broken, stony 
gulch, swept by two rebel howitzers. The head of his column was 
twice broken, but he rallied each time. He was then b.idh' wounded, 
and there was a brief pause, but Colonel Walsh, of the 36tli New 
York, rallied the men again, and they kept straight on over the 
works. 

Just as these two columns on the right received such 
a heavy volley from the enemy Colonel Burnham was 
wounded, and fell from his horse, when Colonel Allen, of 
the 5 til Wisconsin, assumed command of the brigade, and 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 373 

said to the men, "When the signal 'forward' is given, you 
will start at double quick, you will not fire a gun, and you 
will not stop until you get the order to halt. You will 
never get that order." The charge was then sounded, 
when every man in the first line, with a cheer which reechoed 
from the heights, sprang like a tiger from his lair, followed 
at thirty steps by the second and third lines. That was 
signal enough to set all the enginery of war in motion. 
The flanking batteries on Lee's Hill enfiladed the lines of 
the Light Brigade with shell and shrapnel ; the batteries on 
the right poured in their volleys of canister, while the rifle- 
pits, in front and on the flanks, threw torrents of leaden 
hail with deadly precision. 

As the right wing of the 5th Wisconsin passed over 
the fatal ground in December, the 6th Maine pressed 
them closely, and both regiments were rushing forward to 
plant their colors first on the enemy's works. In the mean 
time the left wing of the 5th Wisconsin made a dash and 
joined the first line and mingled with the troops of the 31st 
New York and 6th Maine. When the stone wall was 
reached a short rest was taken before the parapet above 
was attacked, then the 6th Maine had the honor of plant- 
ing its colors first on the enemy's redoubts. 

Grant's Vermont Brigade of Howe's division, at the 
time of Newton's advance, was a little to the left, with his 
right resting on Hazel Run, and in the attack one regi- 
ment — the 6th Vermont — obliqued to the right and became 
engaged with Newton's division, and was the second regi- 
ment that gained Marye's Heights. The rest of the Ver- 
mont brigade charged up the principal heights and cap- 
tured several pieces of artillery, and drove the enem\' from 
his commanding position. In this attack the 2d Vermont 
alone lost 106 killed and wounded. 

Howe carried the works in his front, and the heights 
that Burnside had attempted to take only a few months be- 
fore were in the possession of Sedgwick. 

Early was evidently surprised at the result, as he hastily 



374 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

retreated on the Telegraph road in the direction of Rich- 
mond with part of his command, while Hays and Wilcox 
took the Plank road in the direction of Chancellorsville. 

Sedgwick decided to order uj) Brooks from near Frank- 
lin's Crossing before he took the line of march to attempt 
to join Hooker. That gave Hays an opportunity to make 
a detour around Sedgwick, in order that he might join 
Early, and Wilcox retired toward Saleiii Church on the 
Plank road, to await the advance of Sedgwick. When 
Brooks came up he was directed to take the advance, as his 
troops had not been engaged. The many delays which oc- 
curred to annoy Sedgwick had greatly worn away the day, 
and the ad\'ance was made with great caution. 

In the third volume of the Comte de Paris, he thus 
speaks of the second battle of Fredericksburg : 

At half-past eleven Sedgwick w^as in possession of the famous 
heights which for three months the two armies had been ac- 
customed to look upon as impregnable. The assault had cost him 
about i,ooo men. The center of the enemy's line, too much ex- 
tended for the number of its defenders, had been broken, and the 
latter, having dispersed north and south, were hastily retreating, 
leaving prisoners, cannon, and what was still more precious, the 
possession of the Chancellorsville road, in the hands of the assail- 
ants. It was of great importance to take immediate advantage of 
this. The sound of Hooker's cannon was no longer heard, but this 
could afford no excuse for delay. Unfortunatel}^ Sedgwick insisted 
upon pushing Brooks' division to the front line, and as the latter 
was still near the bridges, this inexcusable maneuver made him lose 
nearly four hours. 

Gibbon's division, on the extreme right, was in very good 
condition, and as it was near the Plank road, over which 
Hays and Wilcox had retired with their brigades, he 
might have given a very harassing and damaging pursuit. 
Newton's division had suffered severely, and not only 
needed but deserved to be left at Fredericksburg perform- 
ing guard duty, a position assigned to Gibbon ; he left one 
brigade in the city with outposts on the heights ; the other 
two brigades returned to the left side of the river to protect 



CHANCELLORS VI LLE. 375 

Stores at Falmouth. With the exception of the Vermont 
Brigade, Howe's division had suffered but slightly. 

If Newton's division had been left at Fredericksburg 
and Gibbon had rapidly followed Ha}-s and Wilcox, with 
Howe closely supporting him, and Brooks making a forced 
march to sustain Gibbon and Howe, it seems hardly proba- 
ble that Wilcox could have made a stand at Landram's 
blacksmith shop, which is about half a mile east of Salem 
Church. In fact, it seems barely possible for Wilcox to 
lia\'e made a successful stand before McLaws had united 
with him ; and that would have been near the eastern edge 
of the Wilderness, with Sedgwick occupying a position in 
an open plateau, where he could have welcomed the enemy 
with no larger a force than McLaws' division and Wilcox's 
brigade, and he could not have been outnumbered if he 
used his artillery to advantage. 

The battle would have been so near to Hooker's left, 
under Howard, that it would have certainly been an incen- 
tive to press forward in the direction of the battle to assist 
Sedgwick, which would have revealed the fact that there 
was nothing in front of Hpward and Slocum but a thin 
line that afternoon while Sedgwick was fighting at Salem 
Church. When McLaws advanced to Salem Church An- 
derson's division was massed at the Mine Run and River 
road ; Heth took Anderson's position there and held it 
until the battle was over. Sedgwick resolved to put 
Brooks in the advance, with Bartlett's brigade on the left 
of the Plank road, in two lines of battle, and the New 
Jersey Brigade, under Col. Henry W. Brown, was formed 
on the right of the road in similar order. Brooks' ad- 
vance was stubbornly contested, and the first stand made 
was at Landram's blacksmith shop, which was seemingly 
to give Wilcox an opportunity to select a line of battle in 
the rear or west of Salem Church. This was the only posi- 
tion the enemy could select to give him the advantage east 
of the Wilderness. From Ivandram's shop the ground is 
quite level until the edge of a thick undergrowth and wood 



376 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

is reached, which is not more than a quarter of a mile wide, 
then there is a rise in front of the church, which faces east. 
The church itself was an assistance to the enemy, being 
built of brick and standing so far to the left that our bat- 
teries were unable to reach it. In addition a log school- 
house stood southeast of the church, which afforded shelter 
for the Confederate sharpshooters. 

A temporary breastwork had been hastily thrown up 
between the church and schoolhouse running north across 
the road. It was in front of this position that Bartlett 
formed his brigade, with the 5th Maine on the left, and the 
99th Penns>-lvania on the right of the 5th Maine, with the 
12 1st New York extending north in the direction of the 
Plank road, the 16th New York supporting. With this 
formation Bartlett advanced, when a most sanguinary strug- 
gle took place. 

Finding that the 23d New Jersey was failing under the 
deadly fire, Bartlett ordered in the i6th New York, and 
carried the log schoolhouse and was forcing back the enemy 
from the church when IMcLaws' troops arrived just in time 
to save the day on the left. 

The First Brigade of Brooks' division, under Colonel 
Brown, formed on the right of Bartlett, with the 23d New 
Jersey, under Colonel Grubb, on the left of the Plank road 
and the ist and 3d New Jersey on the right of it. The 2d 
New York had occupied the advance as a skirmish line 
until it reached the Tabernacle Church, where it was 
passed by the regular line of battle. This resistance 
brought Colonel Penrose with the 15th New Jersey and 
four companies of the 2d to the front. Sedgwick, seeing 
that Penrose had arrived, directed him to the right of the 
3d, hoping to turn the enemy's left if possible, but Colonel 
Brown, commanding the brigade, met Colonel Penrose and 
ordered him to support the 3d Regiment, as it was evident 
that it could not hold its position without assistance. Pen- 
rose moved up in support, and soon ordered his regiment— 
the 15th New Jersey— to take the place of the 3d on the 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 377 

front line of battle, the former line having been with- 
drawn. 

The New Jersey Brigade lost heavily in officers and 
men. Colonel Brown, commanding the brigade, was 
wounded, and Col. M. W. Collett, of the ist New Jersey, 
was killed. General Newton was closely supporting Brooks, 
though his division was marching by the flank, and when 
the engagement began at Salem Church it required time to 
get into position on the right of Brooks. 

The Second and Third Brigades of Newton, under Col. 
William H. Brown and Gen. Frank Wheaton, were en- 
gaged, and suffered heavy losses. It was not long before 
Brooks was wounded, when Eustis assumed command of 
the brigade. Shaler's brigade had suffered so severely in 
the charge on Marye's Heights that it was held in reserve. 

When jMcLaws arrived at Salem Church he found Wil- 
cox in line of battle across the Plank road. He immedi- 
ately placed Wofford on the right, with Kershaw between 
them. Malione, who came up on Wilcox's left, was di- 
rected to move more toward the river, so that Semmes 
could form on the left of Wilcox. This made a heavy line 
of battle for Sedgwick to face. Bartlett's brigade faced 
Wofford' s, Kershaw's, and a part of W^ilcox's commands, 
while the New Jersey Brigade faced Wilcox's left and 
Semmes' . INIahone faced Newton, and the determined attack 
made b\' the latter endangered Mahone so much that Mc- 
Laws ordered Wofford to send reenforcements to him. It 
was a short but sanguinary action, in which neither side 
gained the mastery. Night coming on put an end to the 
ensfaeement. The two armies lav on their arms facing^ 
each other, expecting to renew it early next morning. 
Everything being quiet along Hooker's front, the battle at 
Salem Church could be distinctly heard by the army h'ing 
idle under Hooker. If any effort had been made to feel the 
enemy on Howard's front, the fact would have been devel- 
oped that McLaws had gone to fight Sedgwick, leaving 
Stuart and Anderson alone on Hooker's whole front. Had 



378 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Howard taken the River road lie would have found no 
troops to oppose his advance but Anderson's division at 
the crossing of the Mine and River roads, which could 
have been easily brushed away with his whole corps. Then 
he could have continued on the River road until he arrived 
opposite Mahone ; then facing south, he could have struck 
him on the left flank, and rolled him upon Semmes and 
Wilcox, which would have enabled Newton and Brooks to 
renew the attack with new spirit and bright hopes, and 
forced Mclyaws and Wilcox from their strong position at 
Salem Church. Failing to attempt to assist Sedgwick, 
whose guns were loudly calling for help in close proximity 
to Hooker's left, it would seem as if the night would bring 
forth a strong resolution to act in some decided way, either 
to move forward and burst the fetters that environed his 
army, which Hooker could do by ordering the troops to 
make an attack all along the line, for Anderson had de- 
serted Hooker's front to go and assist in vanquishing Sedg- 
wick, leaving only Stuart to cover the whole of Hooker's 
front from Reynolds' right to Howard's left, a distance of 
miles, compelling him to make his line so thin that Kil- 
patrick or Custer with a squadron of cavalry could have 
pierced it at almost any point. Or Hooker could have 
transferred a part or the whole of his army to the aid of 
Sedgwick by the United States Ford, which was in his 
possession and in his rear, out of view of the enemy, 
and marching down the left bank of the Rappahannock, 
recrossing at Banks' Ford, and forming on Newton's right, 
have compelled Mahone to give 'way. The enemy was so 
weak on Hooker's front that even his whole army could 
have retired without opposition. The position of the 
United States Ford was such that troops could have 
quietly marched under cover of the darkness of the night 
and not been observed or discovered until the next morn- 
ing, for at that very moment Lee was preparing to with- 
draw Anderson for the purpose of environing Sedgwick at 
Salem Church. 



CHANCE LLORSVILLE. 379 

McLaws sent Maj. B. L. Costin to find Early, and inform 
him of the sitnation. When Sedgwick carried the works 
on Marye's Heights Early's force was cut in two. Hays 
retreated to the right over the Plank road, while Early, 
with the rest of his command, retreated down the Tele- 
graph road, supposing he would be pursued by Sedgwick, 
which was Hooker's original order. Being disappointed in 
this he halted and anxiously awaited developments. When 
Major Costin came to him with news from McLaws, he at 
once prepared to return to reoccupy Marye's Heights, which 
should have been held by Gibbon instead of leaving a 
brigade in Fredericksburg with simply outposts to occupy 
the works captured from the enemy, with the other two 
brigades placed on the north side of the Rappahannock. 
The order of the division should have been reversed, that 
is. Gibbon's division should have occupied the position de- 
serted by the enemy, and guards sent to Falmouth to pro- 
tect the stores. There was no danger of the enemy 
surprising and capturing them, for he had no transports 
with which to cross the river below ; Lee could not cross 
the Potomac below Washington after the second battle of 
Bull Run for the same reason, and was compelled to seek a 
crossing near Harper's Ferry, where the river was ford- 
able. Hooker not only wasted the night of the 3d without 
attempting to reenforce Sedgwick, but the next day wit- 
nessed the same inactivity. He was not himself. Though 
he could have withdrawn his troops better at night, there 
was really no time during the forenoon of the 4tli that he 
could not have retired at his own pleasure, with scarcely 
a feeble resistance. Only Stuart remained in his front 
with a corps that had fought two days, which, while it 
had been victorious, had suffered great losses, its commander 
lying dangerously wounded in the rear, and many of its 
soldiers wounded and killed. Stuart sought no battle with 
Hooker. He simply remained in his front to deceive him 
until Lee, who had gone with McLaws and Anderson, could 
drive Sedgwick across the Rappahannock, or, what was 



< 



380 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

better, capture him. Lee intended to hold McLaws at 
Salem Church with his division, with Wilcox's brigade 
facinof east. Anderson's division was to connect with 
Early's left and face north, there being a large gap between 
Anderson's left and McLaws' right, which it was thought 
would close up when the attack was made ; while Early 
faced west, forming three sides of a quadrangle, and the 
Rappahannock made the fourth. 

Sedgwick was fully aware of the critical condition he 
was in. Leaving Newton to face McLaws, he ordered 
Brooks to refuse back his left and face Anderson, while 
Howe was directed to face east and confront Early. 

Thus Lee labored assiduously to environ the position of 
Sedgwick, either for his destruction or expulsion from the 
south side of the river. 

Sedgwick, on his part, made every preparation possible 
to meet the attack from so vastly superior a force. The 
sun was low in the west, and no assistance had come to 
Sedgwick from Hooker, nor had there been any effort to 
relieve him by advancing on Stuart, who could have been 
swept out of existence the moment a forward movement 
had been ordered. Howard, on the left, could have taken 
the river road and forced Heth back and fallen on IMcLaws' 
left, while Slocum could have marched on the old turnpike, 
with Couch on the Plank road, leaving Sickles, IMeade, 
and Reynolds to pursue Stuart, for Reynolds alone with the 
First Corps could have defeated him. 

Those three corps — the First, Third and Fifth — would 
have sent Stuart back over the ground lost by Howard, 
while Howard, Slocum, and Couch would have relieved 
Newton and forced McLaws to retreat south toward the 
Brock road, and Hooker's great hopes would have been 
realized ; but he silently held his position near Chancellors- 
ville while Sedgwick was attacked and fought another 
desperate engagement on the evening of the 4th without 
assistance, although six corps lay within five or six miles, 
and half of them had neyer participated in the battle. 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 381 

Hooker not being attacked on the 4th, presumed or 
feared that Lee was planning to attack Sedgwick, and 
Griffin, with his division of the Fifth Corps, was ordered to 
make a demonstration to the right of Bullock's house. In 
this action Griffin lost about 500 men without accomplish- 
ing an\-thing of value to the commander. Reynolds, on the 
extreme right, remained idle, although his soldiers were 
chafing for orders to attack the enemy. He could have 
easily turned Stuart's left flank and compelled him to re- 
treat ; but one division of the Fifth Corps was ordered to 
advance with no support on the right or left. * 

Early advanced with Hoke on the left. Hays in the 
center, and Gordon on the right, followed by Barksdale and 
Smith. Early, thinking he could turn the left flank of 
Howe and cut him off from Banks' Ford, advanced Smith 
on the right for that purpose, but he met with a repulse, 
besides a heavy loss of prisoners. 

Grant's Vermont brigade was on the left of Howe's 
line. In his report, Grant says : 

While this was transpiring on the right, and the enemy were 
gaining the crest in front of the main line and endeavoring to get 
possession of the skirt of woods in our front, by direction of the 
general commanding the division I ordered Lieutenant Colonel 
Martindale to throw the 26th New Jersey to the front and right, to 
hold possession of the ravine, and to prevent, if possible, the enemy 
from gaining the woods ; and at the same time Colonel Walbridge, 
of the 2d Vermont, was ordered to move to the left, to the former 
position of the 26th New Jersej^ and Colonel Seaver, 3d Vermont, to 
take the position just occupied b3'the 2d Vermont, thus leaving the 
6th Vermont and the battery on the right. The efforts of Lieutenant 

* Fredericksburg, Va., February 26, 18S9. 
Sir: — Yours to hand and contents noted. In regard to the Bullock House, I 
would state that the Bullock House and the White House are one and the same, 
and was formerly owned by Col. Lorman Chancellor. He gave it the name of 
" Woodlawn," and sold it to a man by the name of E. F. Bullock, and it was called 
the Bullock House until the war, and to my knowledge was not known as the 
White House until after the battle of Chancellorsville. 

Yes Chancellor. 
To J. H. Stine, Esq. 



382 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Colonel Martindale at this juncture were not entirely successful ; the 
left of the regiment broke and came back in confusion. The enemy- 
gained the skirt of woods, and in great force bore directly toward 
the 2d Vermont, when that regiment rose, and poured a well- 
directed fire into the enem^-'s front, and continued it with remark- 
able rapidity. This regiment was supplied with new waterproof 
cartridges, and the firing was so rapid as to resemble a continuation 
of volleys. The 26th New Jersey passed awa\' from the front, so 
that the 3d Vermont opened, and with the 2d Vermont poured its 
terrible fire fall upon the already confused masses of the enemy. 
The enemy were here checked, broken, and held at ba3^ Still farther 
to the left, as the enemy advanced, the 4th Vermont became engaged. 
As the enemy appeared obliquely, the 4th Vermont would have been 
exposed to a cross fire, but Colonel Stoughton, with great coolness, 
threw back his right wing, presenting a bold front, and opened a 
murderous fire. The enemy still pressed forward, gaining the ravine 
in front of the 4th Vermont, and at the same time a force farther to 
the left threatened to turn our left and cut us off from the river. 
Colonel Stoughton now changed front forward to his original posi- 
tion and poured in fresh volleys, holding the enemy in check. In 
the mean time the 5th Vermont had arrived from the right, and been 
posted behind the crest to support the 2d and 3d Vermont ; but, per- 
ceiving that Colonels Walbridge and Seaver were able to hold their 
own, I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Lewis to take the 5th Vermont 
farther to the left, and to a position completeh* commanding the 
ravine and crest to the left, should the enemy succeed in flanking 
the 4th Vermont. 

At this time the enemy had a large force in front of oiir entire 
line, attempting with desperate vigor to turn it ; but the Vermont 
regiments remained firm and unbroken, closely hugging the crest 
and literally presenting a wall of fire. Baffled in his efforts to break 
our line, and perceiving that the battery on our right had changed 
its position, the enemy rallied, and made an attempt to turn our 
right, but the 6th Vermont was there. The enemy rushed desper- 
ately fonvard, and nearly gained the crest immediately in front of 
the 6th Vermont, when that regiment suddenlj^ rose and gave him a 
terrible volley, and immediatels' charged upon him down the slope 
and through the ravine and on to the crest which had been pre- 
viously held by the Third Brigade. In the mean time Lieutenant 
Colonel Martindale, with great gallantry and perseverance, rallied 
the 26th New Jersej'-, and then charged down on the right of the 6th 
Vermont. The enemy was utterl}^ routed. 

Thus is officially and grapliically told the struggle on 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 383 

the left of Howe's line, where the Confederates made des- 
perate attempts to get possession of Banks' Ford, and 
prevent Sedgwick from crossing to the north side of the 
Rappahannock. This was in accordance with the well-laid 
plan of lyce, who hoped to take Banks' Ford and captnre 
the Sixth Corps. To the valor of the Vermont Brigade is 
greatly due the frustration of the Confederate commander's 
bold plan. He had taken nearly that number at Harper's 
Ferry after the battle of South Mountain, and he believed 
that Hooker was unable to come to the rescue of Sedgwick 
if he (Lee) could cut him off from Banks' Ford. 

There can be no discredit attached to the 26th New 
Jersey when its left broke in confusion under the deadly 
fire of the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Martindale dis- 
played great coolness in handling his regiment, as was 
evidenced in the charge by the regiment made that after- 
noon. He highly commended Maj. William W. IMorris 
and Acting Adjutant Terhune, and particularly the con- 
duct of Sergt. Maj. Amos J. Cummings, whom he placed in 
command of Companies C and F, whose officers had been 
separated from the regiment. Since the war Cummings 
has been a noted journalist and is now a distinguished 
member of Congress from the Ninth District of New York. 

The folly of not holding Marye's Heights with Gibbon's 
division was then fully exemplified, for Early could not 
have retaken the works he had been forced out of the day 
before, and in addition he would have confronted two divi- 
• sions instead of one. Howe held a line of some two miles 
with his small division of two brigades, which when 
attacked was compelled to 5aeld before the combined 
assault of Early and iVnderson. Had Gibbon with his 
three brigades been in line with Howe it would have 
prevented Sedgwick being forced across the river that 
night. But, as before stated, one of Gibbon's brigades was 
stationed in Fredericksburg, while the other two had been 
ordered to the Stafford side, so that Gibbon was unable to 
render any assistance to Howe, except to prevent the enemy 



384 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

from advancing throngli the city in the direction of Banks' 
Ford. Lee directed Anderson's right and Early's left to 
attack the apex or right angle formed by Howe's right and 
Brooks' left, which was near the Dowman House. Wright 
and Hoke advanced, wnth Posey supporting on the left 
and Hays on the right. The Union forces yielded, and 
retired under cover of darkness in the direction of Banks' 
Ford. 

From the following dispatches, it will be seen that 
Hooker relied greatly on the judgment of Sedg-wick to 
control his movements : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
May 4, 1863, 
I have reported your sitiiation to General Hooker. I find that 
we contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and re- 
pulsed the enemy's last assault with ease. The troops are in good 
position. General Hooker says you are separated from him so far 
that he cannot advise you how to act. You need not try to force the 
position you attacked at five p. m. Look to the safety of your corps, 
you can retire, if necessary, by way of Fredericksburg or Banks' 
Ford. The latter would enable j^ou to join us more readily. 

G. K. Warren, Brigadier General. 
To General Sedgwick. 

May 4, T863 — 2:15 p. M. 
I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the bank of the Rap- 
pahannock until to-morrow. John Sedgwick, Major General. 
To General Hooker. 

Headquarters, Maj^ 4, 1863 — 7:15 p. m. 
The general directs a full report of 3'our position, the number of 
the enemy's forces opposed to you, and your dispositions. He wishes 
this report as soon as possible that he raa^' act advisedly. 

Daniel Butterfield. 
To Major General Sedgwick. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac 
May 4, 1863 — 7:40 p. m. 
The atmosphere being thick with smoke, it is impossible for the 
signal officers to see the movements of General Sedgwick or those 
of the enemy. The artillery firing is very heavj*. The musketry 
fire seems to have sensibly diminished. 

S. Williams, Asst. Adj. General. 
To General IIooker. 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 385 

Banks' Ford, Va., May 4, 1863 — 9:50 p. m. 
General Sedgwick is in direct communication with me, and is 
about half a mile south of my bridges, in the upper rifle-pits. I in- 
formed him in due time of when I expected my bridges to be shelled, 
but I presume he could not prevent it. 

Rebel skirmishers are reported to me now as on the left bank, 
below this, but I do not believe it. 

H. W. Benham, Brigadier General. 
To General Butterfield. 

F Signal Station, May 4, 1S63 — 10 p. m. 
I reported to headquarters what forces were engaged. The ene- 
my attacked Sedgwick. It was his right and center that they were 
driving. 

James S. Hall, 
To General Butterpield, Capt. and Signal Ofiicer, 

Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters, May 4, 1863 — 10:26 p. m. 
I am now going to General SedgAvick ; expect to see him in 
twenty minutes. Shot and shell flew all around my bridges several 
times ; most fortunately did not hit them. I had only one sergeant 
killed. Have two bridges ready at this moment. 

A strong infantry fire has just burst out to the right and front, 
apparently within one-half to three-quarters of a mile. 

H. W. Benham. 
To D. BuTTERFiELD, United States Ford, Va. 

Banks' Ford, Va., May 4, 1863 — 11:30 p. m. 
(Received May 5 — i a. m.) 
My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered b}^ the guns 
from the north side of Banks' Ford. If I had ovAy this arm3' to 
care for, I would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require 
that I should jeopardize it by retaining it here? An immediate re- 
ply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw. 

John Sedgwick, Major General. 
To General Hooker, United States Ford. 

May 5, 1863 — 12:30 a. m. 
Communication with General Sedgwick is at present full and 
open by two bridges and by messenger or telegraph. His main bod}- 
is, however, below the crest of the hill, opposite the ford, under 
full fire of artillery. 

I consider his command in great danger. 

R. O. Tyler, Brigadier General. 
To Major General BuTTERFiELD, Chief of Staff. 

XXV 



386 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Banks' Ford, Va., May 5, 1863. 
(Received i a. m.) 
I shall hold my position, as ordered, on south of Rappahannock. 

Sedgwick. 
To General Hooker. 

Headquarters, May 5, 1863 — i a. m. 
(Received 2 a. m.) 
Dispatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, 
and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge this. 
By command of Major General Hooker : 

DanieIv Butterfield. 
To General Sedgwick. 

Banks' Ford, May 5, 1863 — 2 a. m. 
General Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces im- 
mediately. 

John Sedgwick, Major General. 
To Major General Butterfiei,d. 

Headquarters, May 5, 1863 — 1:20 a. m. 
Yours received, saying you should hold position. Order to 
withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both. 

Hooker, General. 
To General Sedgwick. 

Headquarters Sixth Army Corps, 
May 5, 1863 — 3:20 a. m. 
Yours just received, countermanding order to withdraw. Almost 
my entire command has crossed over. 

John Sedgwick, Major General. 
To Major General Hooker. 

May 5, 1863 — 5 a. m. 
The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung and in process of being 
taken up. The troops are much exhausted. The dispatch counter- 
manding my movements over the river was received after the troops 

had crossed. 

John Sedgwick, Major General. 
To General Butterfield. 

Falmouth, Va., May 5, 1863 — 5:20 a. m. 
Have arrived with my command in rear of Falmouth. There is 
a dense fog. Everything is quiet, as far as I can ascertain. An 
officer of the Fifth Artillery reports that Sedgwick's corps has re- 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 387 

crossed at Banks' Ford, with the exception of one brigade, taken 
prisoners. 

A. Pleasonton, Brigadier General. 
To Major General Butterfield, 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 

Near CHANCELLORSVILLE, Va. 
May 5, 1863—6:15 a. m. 
The commanding general directs that as soon as your bridges 
are taken up at Banks' Ford they be removed immediately, and 
packed in the rear of the former camps of Sickles' corps. 
By command of Major General Hooker : 

Daniel Butterfield, Major General, 
To Brigadier General Benham. Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters Sixth Corps, 
May 5, 1863 — 7 a. m. 
I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, 
and am in camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges 
have been taken up. 

John Sedgwick, Major General. 
To General Butterfield. 

This practically ended the noted battle of Chancellors- 
ville, which will live in history for its brilliant conception 
and its unfortunate ending. 

Hooker failed to reenforce Sedgwick until it was too 
late. If he had withdrawn two of his corps and sent them 
to Sedgwick by four o'clock on the afternoon of the 4th, 
he could have defeated Lee with great ease. Gibbon's 
division held Fredericksburg, If a corps had crossed over 
the bridge at the Lacy House, and the other one crossed at 
Banks' Ford, and been ready to participate in the attack 
made on Sedgwick late in the evening, the Union forces 
could have held Marye's Heights, and the ridge extending 
west to Salem Church — a stretch of several miles, where a 
large army could have been operated. Then that night he 
could have transferred the other corps by the way of United 
States Ford, and then down the left bank of the Rappa- 
hannock to Banks' Ford, when Lee would have been per- 
fectly outgeneraled. Of the seven infantry corps under 



388 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Hooker's command, but three were engaged, as the follow- 
ing telegrams fully state : 

New York, Ma}' 6, 1863—3 P- '^• 
Nothing- will so cheer the hearts of all good men as the imme- 
diate reenforcement of General Hooker by troops from around Wash- 
ington, Fort Monroe and Suffolk. 

E. D. Morgan, Governor of New York. 
To His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

President of the United States. 

Washington, D. C, 
May 6, 1863. 
General Hooker has had, has now, and will have, everything 
he asks for by telegraph, which is always in full connection with the 
War Department. He knows best what he wants, and when and 
where, and directs everj^thing according to his own plans. He re- 
ports confidentially that only three corps of his army, all told, have 
been engaged. You need not be told that this is less than half the 
army in his command and actually with him. 

Further accumulation of troops, not called for by him, would 
exhaust his supplies and endanger his plans. Be patient. 

William H. Seward, 

Secretary of State. 
Governor Morgan, New York. 

• Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
May 6, 1863 — 4:30 p. m. 
Have this moment*returned to camp. On my way received 3'our 
telegrams of 11 a. m. and 12:30. The army had previously re- 
crossed the river and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its 
trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above I see no 
way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of suc- 
cess which I desire. Not to exceed three corps, all told, of ni}' troops 
have been engaged. For the whole to go in, there is a better place 
nearer at hand. 

Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a por- 
tion of the cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing. 

Joseph Hooker, 

Major General. 
His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

President of the United States. 

This dispatch of Hooker's states it in full, " There is a 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 389 

better place nearer at hand." That position was held by 
Sedgwick until five o'clock on the evening of the 4th, then 
he was forced down to Banks' Ford, which he crossed under 
cover of darkness. Gen. Martin McMahon, Sedgwick's 
chief of staff, superintended the crossing of the troops 
under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. Hooker 
closes his dispatch by an expression of gladness that the 
cavalry had finally turned up. Hooker made a mistake 
when he placed Stoneman in command of the cavalr}\ He 
lacked dash and foresight in such a degree, qualities so 
necessary for a cavalry leader, that his circuit around Lee's 
army really was a failure. If Hooker had held him closer, 
he might have made better use of him and, when Lee 
began to retreat, have ordered him to throw his cavalry 
in the advance to destroy the railroads, and intercept 
supplies and reenforcements for the Confederate army. 

Hooker knew that Longstreet might suddenly return 
from Suffolk with Pickett's and Hood's divisions, and his 
idea for Stoneman to approach as near Richmond as pos- 
sible and destroy the railroad for several miles, would have 
not only prevented supplies being sent to Lee, but would 
have prevented reenforcements either by Longstreet or by 
any other command that might be convenient to move for- 
ward to Fredericksburg. The dispatches of Hooker and 
Sedgwick crossed each other, which produced great con- 
fusion. When Hooker found that Sedgwick was on the 
left bank of the Rappahannock, and the Confederate forces 
were in full possession of Marye's Heights and the plain 
west of Chancellorsville, the only place where a great 
battle could be fought, and knowing that he was hemmed 
in on the right bank, where he could not maneuver his 
army without risk, he decided to withdraw immediately. 
Then he resolved to call a council of war, composed of his 
corps commanders, to decide the question whether battle 
should be offered to the enemy, or retire across the Rappa- 
hannock. But it seems that the matter was not fully 
settled at that consultation. Reynolds, Meade and Howard 



390 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

were for attacking the enemy, while Couch had not studied 
the situation full enough to desire to give a positive opinion, 
but inclined to support the position taken by Reynolds, 
Meade and Howard. Hancock testified before the com- 
mittee on the conduct of the war: " I understood from 
him (Couch) always that he was in favor of fighting them." 
Slocum came in late and apparently did not receive his 
notice in due time. 

Sickles was the only corps commander who seriously 
opposed an attack on the enemy. He was the only volun- 
teer in command of a corp. All the others were West 
Point graduates, though none had fought more skillfully or 
valiantly than he (Sickles). His night fight against Jack- 
son was one of the most gallant efforts of the war, and was 
certainly one of the most brilliant moves recorded in 
history. As a volunteer officer he modestly refused to pit 
his opinion against officers whose scientific training had 
especially fitted them to judge, but he based his reason on 
a political standpoint. He was fearful, if they persisted in 
still further keeping up the battle on a field where there had 
been four days of solid disaster to the Union arm}% that it 
would have a very depressing effect throughout the coun- 
try. It seems that this fear was shared by Governor 
Morgan, from his telegram to the President : 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 
May 22, 1863. • 
General : — An issue having been raised between the command- 
ing general and myself in regard to the construction to be placed 
on the language I used at the consultation of corps commanders 
held on the night of May 4, I would esteem it a personal favor if 
you would, at your earliest convenience, state your recollection of 
what I said, and the impression it made on you at the time. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Geo. G. Meade, 

IMajor General. 

Hdqrs. First Army Corps, Army of Potomac, 
May 24, 1863. 
General : — Your note of the 22d instant has been received. IM}' 
recollection of the substance of the remarks made b}' 3'ou at the 



CHAN CELLO RSVILLE. 391 

consultation of the corps commanders, held on the night of the 4th 
of May, is that you were decidedly in favor of an advance in the 
direction of Fredericksburg at daylight the next morning ; that you 
considered this army had already too long been made subservient 
to the safety of Washington, and you threw that out of the question 
altogether. This drew the remarks from General Sickles. I simpl}' 
said, as my corps was the only one which had not been engaged, I 
could not urge my opinion, but that I agreed with 5'ou. 

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

John F. Reynolds, 
Major General Volunteers. 
To Major General George G. Meade, 

Commanding Fifth Army Corps, Army of Potomac. 

If Hooker needed encouragement from his generals to 
attack the enemy, he most assuredly had it. Sickles alone 
opposed an advance. But if it had been decided to make 
an assault on the enemy, Sickles would have led the 
Third Corps as gallantly as Marshal McDonald did his at 
Wagram, when he pierced the Austrian center and won 
the victory. Hooker was discouraged, a^id decided to 
retire across the Rappahannock. But it was not advisable 
to begin the movement in daylight, lest the enemy might 
observe it and attack him when his columns were break- 
ing to the rear and illy prepared to repel an attack ; so 
every preparation was made to recross the river that night. 
In the mean time the heavy rain in the mountains had so 
swollen the Rappahannock that the bridges were greatly 
endangered and, btit for the good judgment of Gen. H. 
J. Hunt, chief of artillery, it is probable that all three 
would have broken from their moorings and left Hooker's 
army on the south bank. But there was no immediate 
danger, even if his bridges had been swept away, for Lee 
made no great haste to pres.s Hooker. It is true he made 
every preparation to strike him if an opportunity presented 
itself. After Sedg-wick crossed to the Stafford side of the 
Rappahannock at Banks' Ford, and Gibbon had retraced 
his steps over the bridge at the Lacy House, opposite Fred- 
ericksburg, Barksdale was placed in command of Marye's 
Heights, and Farly was directed to take a position opposite 



392 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Banks' Ford ; while Lee returned to Hooker's front at 
Chancellorsville, with McLaws and Anderson forming his 
right wing as before, and Stuart's corps was moved to the 
left, and the whole line strengthened. 

On the morning of the 5th the fog was so dense that it 
was impossible for Lee to make a good reconnoissance of 
Hooker's position, as his line mainly occupied a dense 
wooded front, and the heavy clouds retained the fog until 
late in the day. 

No attack was made that day, and at seven o'clock in 
the evening the artillery began to cross. When darkness 
came on the army was crowded around United States Ford, 
in a drenching rain, with the river rising at the rate of a 
foot an hour. Soon the bridges were entirely submerged 
and a delay occurred before the bridges could be repaired 
enough for the artillery to resume crossing. Meade, who 
had favored attacking the enemy in the council of war, 
and who had been charged with covering the rear, at- 
tempted to get the order countermanded when the bridges 
were submerged, and have the corps return to their posi- 
tion and be ready to meet Lee in the morning. But 
no communication could be had with Hooker, as his head- 
quarters were on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and 
the attempted signals of Meade failed to be understood at 
Hooker' s headquarters — at least they were not responded to. 

When the morning dawn of the 6th came the Army of 
the Potomac had nearly passed over the river, with the 
Fifth Corps bringing up the rear, and marched over with 
Sykes' Regulars, the last division to cross. 

The Confederate skirmishers soon appeared on the oppo- 
site bank and made but little resistance to the taking up of 
the bridges by the Engineer Brigade, and at four o'clock in 
the afternoon they were removed. 

The storm still raged with unabated fury, and Lee see- 
ing no chance farther to harass Hooker, marched his army 
back to Fredericksburg with the prestige of another battle 
in his favor. 



CHAN CELL ORSVILLE. 393 

Hooker retired more through the injury his brain had 
received by the blow at Chancellorsville than otherwise. 
On all previous battlefields he was like a raging lion, all 
the time leading and cheering his men ; at Chancellors- 
ville his courage failed him and he did not fight half of his 
army. Both armies reached their old quarters on the 7th 
and took some greatly needed rest. 

War Department, May 7, 1863. 
The President and General-in-chief have just returned from the 
Army of the Potomac. The principal operation of General Hooker 
failed, but there has been no serious disaster to the organization and 
efiiciency of the army. It is now occupying its position on the 
Rappahannock, having recrossed the river without loss in the move- 
ment. Not more than one-third of General Hooker's force was 
engaged. General Stoneman's operations have been a brilliant suc- 
cess. A part of his force advanced to within two miles of Richmond, 
and the enemy's communications have been cut in every direction. 
The Army of the Potomac will speedily resume offensive operations. 

Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War.* 
Major General Burnside, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
May 7, 1863. 

My dear Sir : — The recent movement of your army is ended 
without effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important break- 
ings of the enemy's communications. What next? If possible, I 
would be glad of another movement early enough to give us some 
benefit from the fact of the enemy's communications being broken ; 
but neither for this reason nor any other do I wish anything done in 
desperation or rashness. An early movement would also help to 
supersede the bad moral effect of the recent one, which is said to be 
considerably injurious. Have you in 3^our mind a plan wholly or 
partially formed ? If 3'ou have, prosecute it without interference 
from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incompetent 
as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for 
the army. Yours, as ever, A. Lincol,n. 

To Major General Hooker. 

Camp near Falmouth, Va., May 7, 1863. 
I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this 
date, and in answer have to state that I do not deem it expedient to 

*This letter was sent to Generals Grant, Rosecrans, Dlx, Pope, and Curtis, 
and the Governors of the loyal States. 



394 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

suspend operations on this line from the reverse we have experi- 
enced in endeavoring- to extricate the army from its present position. 
If in the first effort we failed, it was not for want of strength or con- 
duct of the small number of the troops actually engaged, but from 
a cause which could not be foreseen, and could not be provided 
against. After its occvirrence, the chances of success were so much 
lessened that I felt another plan might be adopted in place of that 
we were engaged in, which would be more certain in its results. At 
all events a failure would not involve a disaster, while in the other 
case it was certain to follow the chance of success. I may add that 
this consideration almost wholly determined me in ordering the 
army to return to its old camp. As to the best time for renewing 
our advance upon the enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity 
has been afforded to learn the feeling of the troops. They should 
not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no fault of theirs (if I ex- 
cept one corps) that our last efforts were not crowned with glorious 
victory, I suppose details are not wanting of me at this time. I 
have decided in my own mind the plan to be adopted in our next 
effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It has this to 
recommend it, it will be one in which the operations of all the 
corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal 
supervision. Very respectfully , &c. , Joseph Hooker, 

Major General Commanding. 
His Excellency the President of the United States. 

Thus ended one of the great struggles in the late war. 
The reports are quoted from quite freely to aid the reader 
in the future to form his own conclusion, for there are 
many reasons alleged why Hooker lost the battle. The 
prevailing opinion seems to be that with a quick move he 
would have had Lee in his grasp. There are many crim- 
inations and recriminations as to a lack of support. So it 
seems but fair, in a history where candor should reign 
supreme, that official papers made then should, to a great 
extent, decide the question at issue. 

There is no doubt but that Lee was a thorough military 
student, for he fought Grant in a similar manner only a few 
miles away in the Wilderness, the next year. Chancellors- 
ville no doubt aided him in making the fight of the 
Wilderness. 

Gen. H. J. Hunt was not satisfied with the manage- 



CHANCELLORS VILLE. 395 

ment of the battle, and more than once said so to me. He 
said: " Hooker would not listen to my suggestions. I did 
not want Hazel Grove evacuated, which gave J. E. B. 
Stuart an opportunity to place some thirty pieces there, 
which made the angle near Fairview untenable." Gen- 
eral Hunt said much more which I took down at the time, 
which is not given to the public. Hooker's telegram to 
the President that he had only fought three corps, states the 
whole matter. If at any time he had given the command 
to the whole army to "forward," Lee's army would have 
been not only defeated, but routed from the field. Espe- 
cially was that so on Sunday morning, when Reynolds with 
the First Corps, and Meade with the Fifth Corps, lay on 
Stuart's left flank with some thirty thousand men, and 
were never ordered to fire a gun. Reynolds was within a 
half mile of Stuart's left flank, and could have rolled him 
up on Hazel Grove any minute, where Sickles should have 
been held ; then an Austerlitz would have been in store for 
Lee's army. 

The history of this noted battle is concluded by Gen- 
eral Heth, who commanded a division in Stonewall Jack- 
son's corps at Chancellorsville, who made the following 
statement to me in relation to that battle, and what should 
have been the result of it. He said : 

M}^ reasons for thinking so are these : General Lee, Longstreet's 
corps being absent, when in front of Hooker, had between 40,000 
and 45,000 men in his command. He found that the position occu- 
pied by General Hooker was too strong to attack in front. This in- 
duced him to detach Jackson with from 20,000 to 25,000 men to make 
an attack on what may be termed Hooker's right. Hooker had sent 
his cavalry, under Stoneman, to break up the railroads leading into 
Richmond and destroy the James River and Kanawha Canal. Gen- 
eral Howard's (Eleventh) corps occupied a ver^^ strong position on 
Hooker's right. Now it is hardl}' possible that General Lee could 
have expected that Jackson's attack on Hooker's right — Howard's 
corps - would be an utter and entire surprise. Nevertheless this 
was so. None of the roads leading to the points where Jackson 
formed three lines of battle, the first line being within 500 or 600 
j'ards of Howard's position, were found to be picketed. Jackson's 



396 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

force ran over long lines of muskets, stacked, Howard's people 
being engaged in butchering beeves and in thus procuring their 
evening meal. Had these roads been picketed Howard would have 
been apprised of Jackson's approach, and would have been prepared 
to receive his attack in a position naturally very strong. He could 
with his corps certainly have held Jackson in check until he could 
have been reen forced by as many men as Jackson had under his 
command, for I have understood that there were 40,000 men in 
Hooker's army present at Chancellorsville who never fired a shot, or 
who, from the configuration of the ground, could do but little fight- 
ing. It has always been my opinion that with the superior numbers of 
Hooker that Jackson could have been crushed ; and the forces under 
General Lee should have met the same fate after Jackson was de- 
stroyed, as Hooker's army lay between these two forces, and which 
could or should have virtually ended the war. 

List of casualties of Army of the Potomac, Maj. 
Gen, Joseph Hooker commanding, at the battle of Chan- 
cellorsville, Va., May 1-3, 1863 (including skirmishes 
along the lines May 4-6, 1863) : 

FIRST ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds. 

First Division — Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth. 

First Brigade — Col. Walter Phelps, Jr. 

General Headquarters Staff I 

24th New York, Col. Samuel R. Beardsley I 

30th New York, Col. Wm, M. Searing i 

Total First Brigade 3 

Second Brigade — Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler. 

76th New York,, Col. William P. Wainwright 2 

95th New York, Col. George H. Biddle . 2 

Total Second Brigade 4 

Third Brigade — Brig. Gen. Gabriel R. Paul. 

29th New Jersey, Col. William R. Taylor 5 

30th New Jersey, Col. John J. Cladek • 5 

Total Third Brigade 10 

Artillery — Capt. John A. Reynolds. 
4th U. S., Battery B, Lieut. James Stewart 2 

Total First Division 19 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 397 

Second Division — Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson. 
First Brigade — Col. Adrian R. Root. 

94th New York, Capt. Samuel A. Moffett .....'... I 

104th New York, Col. Gilbert G. Prey 3 

Total First Brigade , -4 

Second Brigade — Brig. Gen. Henry Baxter. 

5th Massachusetts, Col. James L. Bates 7 

Total Second Brigade 7 

Third Brigade — Col Samuel H. Leonard. 

13th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. N. W. Batchelder 6 

83d New York (9th Militia) Lieut. Col. J. A. Moesh .... 4 

88th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Louis Wagner 2 

Total Third Brigade 12 

Artillery — Capt. Dunbar R, Ransom. 

Maine Light, 5th Battery E, Capt. Geo. F. Leppein 28 

Pennsylvania Light, Battery C, Capt. James Thompson ... 4 

Total Artillery 32 

Total Second Division 55 

Third Division — Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday. 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Rowley. 

1 2 1st Pennsylvania, Col. Chapman Biddle 3 

135th Pennsylvania, Col. James R. Porter 29 

151st Pennsylvania, Col. Harrison Allen 16 

Total First Brigade 48 

Second Brigade— Col. Roy Stone. 

143d Pennsylvania, Col. E. L. Dana I 

149th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Walton Dwight I 

150th Pennsylvania, Col. Langhom Wistar I 

Total Second Brigade 3 

Artillery — Maj. Ezra W. Matthews. 

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery G, Capt. F. P. Amsden ... Ii 

Total Third Division 62 

Total First Army Corps 135 



398 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

SECOND ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch. 

Staff I 

Escort, Companies D and K, 6th New York Cavalry .... 2 

Total Staff and Escort 3 

First Division— Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock. 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell. 

Staff I 

5th New Hampshire, Col. Edward E. Cross 25 

6ist New York, Col. Nelson A. Miles 27 

8lst Pennsylvania, Col. H. Boyd McKeen 61 

148th Pennsylvania, Col. James A. Beaver 164 

Total First Brigade 278 

Second Brigade — Brig. Gen. Thos. F. Meagher. 

28th Massachusetts, Col. Richard B>Tnes 16 

63d New York, Lieut, Col. R. C. Bentley 6 

69th New York, Capt. James E. McGee 10 

88th New York, Col. Patrick Kelly 46 

Ii6th Pennsylvania (battalion) Maj. St. C. A. Mulholland . . 24 

Total Second Brigade 102 

Third Brigade — Brig Gen. Samuel K. Zook. 

52d New York, Col. Paul Frank 43 

57th New York, Lieut. Col. Alfred B. Chapman 31 

66th New York, Col. Orlando H. Morris 70 

140th Pennsylvania, Col. Richard P. Roberts 44 

Total Third Brigade 188 

Fourth Brigade — Col. John R. Brooke. 

27th Connecticut, Col. R. S. Bostwick 29I 

2d Delaware, Lieut. Col. David. L. Strieker 61 

64th New York, Col. Daniel G. Bingham 44 

53d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. R. McMichael il 

145th Pennsylvania, Col. Hiram L. Brown 122 

Total Fourth Brigade 529 

Ariiliery—Capi. Rufus D. Pettit. 

1st New York Light, Battery B, Capt. R. D. Pettit 12 

4th United States, Battery C, Lieut. Evan Thomas 15 

Total Artillery 27 

Total First Division 1124 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 399 

Third Divisiox — Maj. Gen. William H., French. 
First Brigade — Col. Samuel C. Carroll. 

14th Indiana, Col. John Coons 64 

24th New Jersey, Col. Wm. B. Robertson 36 

28th New Jersey, Lieut. Col. John A. Wildrick 59 

4th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Leonard W. Carpenter 73 

8th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Franklin Sawyer 12 

7th West Virginia, Col. Joseph Snider 24 

Total First Brigade 268 

o J T> • J r Brig. Gen. William Ha5S. 
Second Brigades , ^ 

t. Col. Charles J. Powers. 

Staff 4 

14th Connecticut, Maj. Theodore G. Ellis 56 



12th New Jersey, Col. J. Howard Willets -^ 

Maj. John T. Hill 1^78 

lo8th New York, Col. Charles J. Powers ^ 

Lieut. Col. Francis E. Pierce J ^ 

130th Pennsylvania, Col. Levi Maish ■> 

Maj. Joseph S. Jenkins j " 

Total Second Brigade 319 

Third Brigade I ^''^- J°^° ^- ^^^^Gregor. 
J /lira ^rigaae<^^^^ Charles Albright. 

1st Delaware, Col. Thomas A. Smith 55 

I32d Pennsylvania, Col. Charles Albright -» 

Lieut. Col. Jos. E. Shreve j ^ 

Total Third Brigade 99 

Total Third Division 686 

Reserve Artillery. 
1st United States, Battery I, Lieut. Edmund Kirby 2 

Total Second Army Corps 1,815 

THIRD ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles. 
Staff I 

First Division — Brig. Gen. David B. Bimey. 
Staff 2 

„. . „ . , f Brig. Gen. Chas. K. Graham. 
First Brigade \ „ ° _, ... „ 

1. Col. Thomas W. Egan. 

57th Pennsylvania, Col. Peter Sides 7« 



400 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

63d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Wm. S. Kirkwood 



' ' j 118 



Capt. James F. Ryan .... 

68th Pennsylvania, Col. Andrew H. Tippin 75 

105th Pennsylvania, Col. Amor A. McKnight 1 

Lieut. Col. Calvin A. Craig j ' 

114th Pennsylvania, Col. Chas. H, T. Colhs .... 

Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Cavada. 
141st Pennsylvania, Col. Henry J. Madill 235 



I iSl 



Total First Brigade • . . 756 

Second Brigade — Brig. Gen. J, H. Hobart Ward. 

20th Indiana, Col. John WTaeeler 24 

3d Maine, Col. Moses B. Lakeman 28 

4th Maine, Col. Elijah Walker 28 

38th New York, Col. P. Regis de Trobriand 37 

40th New York, Col. Thomas W. Egan 70 

99th Pennsylvania, Col. Asher S. Leidy 26 

Total Second Brigade . 248 



Third Brigade — Col. Samuel B. Hayman. 

17th Maine, Lieut. Col. Charles, B. Merrill 

Col. Thomas A. Roberts 



} 



"3 



3d Michigan, Col. Byron R. Pierce 
Lieut. Col. Edwin S. 
5th Michigan, Lieut. Col. Edward T. Sherlock 



Lieut. Col. Edwin S. Pierce j '^ 



i^ieui. K^ov. iLQwara 1. :5neriocK •» 

Maj. John Pulford } ^^ 

1st New York, Lieut. Col. Francis L. Leland 80 

37th New York, Lieut. Col. Gilbert Riordan 222 

Total Third Brigade 566 

Artillery — Capt. A. Judson Clark. 

New Jersey Light, Battery B, Lieut. Robert Sims 10 

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E, Lieut. P. S. Jastram . . 17 

3d U. S., Batteries F and K, Lieut. J, G. Tumbull 8 

Total Artillery 35 

Total First Division 1,607 

SECOND Division j ^^^J" <^^"- ^"^''■^™ ^- ^^""^ (^'"'^*^)- 
I Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr. 

Staff I 



CHAN CELLO RSVILLE. 401 

T^- , r, ■ J { Brig. Gen. Toseph B. Carr. 
First Brigade \ *' ,,:.,,, 
* I Col. William Blaisdell. 

1st Massachusetts, Col. N. B. McLaughlen 95 

llth Massachusetts, Col. William Blaisdell -i 

Lieut. Col. Porter D. Tripp J ' 

l6th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Waldo Meniam 73 

nth New Jersey, Col. Robert McAllister 169 

26th Pennsylvania, Col. Benjamin C. Tilghman -^ 

Maj. Robert L. Bodine J ^^ 

Total First Brigade 504 

o J r> ■ J f Brig. Gen. Tos. W. Revere. 
Second Brigade \ ^ ^ ^ ^ ,\ ^ 

t Col. J. Lgbert r amum. 

Staff . I 

70th New York, Lieut. Col. Thomas Holt 32 

71st New York, Col. Henry L. Potter 39 

72d New York, Col. William O. Stevens -i 

Maj. John Leonard J 

73d New York, Maj. Michael W. 'Burns 38 

74th New York, Lieut. Col. William H. Lounsbury . . . ^ 

Capt. Henry M. Alles \ 40 

Capt. Francis E. Tyler J 

I20th New York, Lieut. Col. Cornelius D. W'estbrook ... 66 

Total Second Brigade 317 



T-r • J D • J S Brig, Gen. G. 1 

Third Brigade \ f .,,.,,. ^ 

t. Col. William J 



Mott (wounded). 
Sewell. 



Staff 2 

Sth New Jersey, Maj. Ashbel W. Angel 
Capt. Virgil M. Healy. 
6th New Jersey, Col; Geo. C. Burling 



I 121 



col; ueo. K^. rsurnng ■> 

Lieut. Col. S. R. Gilkyson / ^^ 

7th New Jersey, Col. Louis R Francine 



Lieut. Col. Francis Price 



} 



47 



Sth New Jersey, Col. John Ramsey 
Capt. J. G. Langsti 
2d New York, Col. Sidney W. Park 
Lieut. Col. William i 
115th Pennsylvania, Col. Francis A. Lancaster 



Col. John Ramsey -> 

Capt. J. G. Langston | ^25 

Lieut. Col. William A. Olmstead J ^^ 

Total Third Brigade 527 



Maj. John P. Dunne ^ 



XXVI 



402 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



Artillery — Capt. Thos. W, Osbom. 
1st New York Light, Battery D, Lieut. Geo. W. Winslow . . 14 
1st U. S., Battery H, Lieut. Justin E. Dimick .... 
Lieut. James A. Sanderson . . . 
4th U. S., Battery K, Lieut. Francis W. Seeley 45 



} - 



Total Artillery 80 

Total Second Division l>429 

Third Division j ^^^J* ^^"- ^- ^- Whipple (mortally wounded). 
I Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham. 

Staff I 

First Brigade — Col. Emlen Franklin. 

86th New York, Lieut. Col. Barna J. Chapin -» 

Capt. Jacob H. Lansing j ' ' 

124th New York, Col. A. Van Home Ellis 204 

I22d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Edward McGovern 102 

Total First Brigade 383 

Second Brigade— Co\. Samuel M. Bowman. 

I2th New Hampshire, Col. Joseph H. Potter 317 

84th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Milton Opp 215 

IlOth Pennsylvania, Col. James Crowther -> 

Maj. David M. Jones J ^^ 

Total Second Brigade 577 

Third Brigade — Col. Hiram Berdan. 

1st U. S, Sharpshooters, Lieut. Col. Casper Trepp 68 

2d U. S. Sharpshooters, Maj. Homer R. Stoughton 16 

Total Third Brigade 84 

. , ... f Capt. Albert A. Von Puttkammer. 
I Capt. James F. Huntington. 

New York Light, loth Battery, Lieut. Samuel Lewis .... 18 

New York Light, nth Battery, Lieut. John E. Burton ... 11 

1st Ohio Light, Battery H, Capt. J. F. Huntington 8 

Total Artillery 37 

Total Third Division 1,082 

Total Third Army Corps 4jII9 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 403 

FIFTH ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. George G. Meade. 

First Division — Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin. 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. James Barnes. 

2d Maine, Col. George Vamey 3 

l8th Massachusetts, Col. Joseph Hayes 13 

2d Company Mass. Sharpshooters, Lieut. R. Smith .... I 

1st Michigan, Col. Ira C. Abbott 15 

13th New York, (battalion) Capt. Wm. Downey 5 

25th New York, Col. Charles A. Johnson 3 

llSth Pennsylvania, Col. Charles M. Prevost 8 

Total First Brigade 48 

c J n ■ J f Col. Tames McOuade. 
Second Brigades ■' /^ 

I Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. 

9th Massachusetts, Col. Patrick R. Guiney 13 

32d Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Luther Stevenson 11 

4th Michigan, Col. Harrison H. Jeftbrds 20 

14th New York, Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Davies 3 

62d Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer -i 

Lieut. Col. James C. Hull j ' 

Total Second Brigade 62 

Third Brigade — Col. Thos. B. W. Stockton. 

Michigan Sharpshooters, Brady's company I 

1 6th Michigan, Lieut. Col. Norval E. Welch 6 

17th New York, Lieut. Col. Nelson B. Bartram 5 

44th New York, Col. James C. Rice 4 

83d Pennsylvania, Col. Strong Yincent 4 

Total Third Brigade 20 

Artillery — Capt. Augustus P. Martin, 
ist Rhode Island Light Battery C, Capt. R. \Vaterman . . , 8 

Total First Division 138 

Second Division— Maj. Gen. George Sykes. 
First Brigade — Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. 

3d U. S., Companies B, C, F, G, I and K 9 

4th U. S., Companies C, F, H and K 4 

12th U. S., Companies A, B, C, D and G, 1st Battalion, and 

Companies A, C and D, 2d Battalion 23 

14th U. S., Companies A, B, D, E, F. and G, ist Battalion, 

and Companies F and G, 2d Battalion 1 5 

Total First Brigade 51 



404 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Second Brigade — Col. Sidney Burbank. 

2d U. S., Companies B, C, F, I and K 28 

6th U. S., Companies D, F, G, H and I 28 

7th U. S., Companies A, B, E and I 16 

loth U. S., Companies D, G and H 12 

lith U. S, Companies B, C, D, E, F and" G, 1st Battalion, 

and Companies C and D, 2d Battalion 28 

17th U. S;, Companies A, C, D, G, and H, 1st Battalion, and 

Companies A and B, 2d Battalion 35 

Total Second Brigade 147 

Third Brigade— Co\. Patrick H. O'Rorke. 

140th New York, Lieut. Col. Louis Ernst 21 

146th New York, Col. Kenner Garrard 50 

Total Third Brigade 71 

Arlillery—Capt. Stephen H. Weed. 

ist Ohio Light Battery L, Capt. Frank C. Gibbs il 

5th U. S., Battery I, Lieut. M. F. Watson 5 

Total Artillery 16 

Total Second Division 285 

Third Divisio^i — Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. Erastus P. Tyler. 

91st Pennsylvania, Col. Edgar M. Gregory -> 

Lieut. Col. Joseph H. Sinex j ' 

126th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. D. W. Rowe 77 

129th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob G. Frick 42 

134th Pennsylvania, Col. Edward O'Brien 45 

Total First Brigade 240 

Second Brigade — Col. Peter H. Allabach. 

123d Pennsylvania, Col. John B. Clark 8 

131st Penn.sylvania, Maj. Robert W. Patton 4 

133d Pennsylvania, Col. Frank B. Speakman 11 

155th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Jno. H. Cain 14 

Total Second Brigade 37 

Total Third Division 277 

Total Fifth Army Corps 700 



CHANCE LLORSVILLE. 405 

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. 

First Division [ ^"S- ^«^"- Charles Devens, Jr. (wounded). 
1 Brig. Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean. 
Staff I 

First Brigade — Col. Leopold Von Gilsa. 

41st New York, Maj. Detleo von Einsiedel 61 

45th New York, Col. Geo. von Amsberg 76 

54th New York, Lieut. Col. Charles Ashby -i 

Maj. Stephen Kovacs J ^ 

153d Pennsylvania, Col. Charles Glanz ^ 

Lieut. Col. J. Dachrodt J ^ 

Total First Brigade 264 

o J r> ■ J S Brig. Gen. N. C. McLean. 
Second Brigade { " 

* I Col. John C. Lee. 

Staff . 3 

17th Connecticut, Col. Wm. H. Noble 1 

Maj. Allen G. Brady / '" 

25th Ohio, Col. William P. Richardson ■> 

Maj. Jeremiah Williams / -^ 

55th Ohio, Col. John C. Lee -i 

Lieut. Col. Charles B. Gambee j -'•' 

75th Ohio, Col. Robert Reily ^ 

Capt. Benj. Morgan J 

107th Ohio, Col. Seraphim Meyer 1 

Lieut. Col. Charles Mueller ] '^1>1 

Total Second Brigade 692 

Artillery — Capt. Michael Wiedrich. 
1st New York Light, Battery I 13 

Total Second Division 519 

Third Division — Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz. 
Staff I 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. Alex. Schimmelfennig. 

82d Illinois, Col. Frederick Hecker \ 

Maj. F. H. Rol-shausen I 155 

Capt. Jacob Lasalle -' 

68th New York, Col. Gotthilf Bourry 54 

157th New York, Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr 98 

6ist Ohio, Col. Stephen J. McGroarty 60 

74th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Adolph von Hartung .... 52 

Total First Brigade ■ • • 4'9 



406 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Second Brigade — Col. W. Krzyzanowski, 
58th New York, Capt. Frederick Braun 



Capt. l^redencK Jtsraun ^ 

Capt. Emil Koenig / ^ 

iigth Nev,' York, Col. Elias Peissner ■> 

> 120 
Lieut. Col. John T. Lockman / 

75th Pennsylvania, Col. Francis Mahler 59 

26th Wisconsin, Col. Wm. H. Jacobs 198 



Total Second Brigade 408 

Unattached. 
82d Ohio, Col. James S. Robinson 81 

Artillery. 
1st Ohio Light, Battery I, Capt. Hubert Dilger II 

Total Third Division 920 

Reserve Artillery — Lieut. Col. Louis Schirmer. 
1st Ohio Light, Battery K, Capt. Wm. L. DeBeck ..... 3 

Total Eleventh Army Corps 2,412 

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. H. W. Slocum. 
Provost Guard. 
lOth Maine (battalion) Capt. John D. Beardsley 3 

First Division — Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams. 
Stafi I 

First Brigade — Brig. Gen. Jos. F. Knipe. 

5 th Connecticut, Col. Warren W, Packer 

Lieut. Col. James A. Betts V 63 

Maj. David F. Lane J 

28th New York, Lieut. Col. Elliott W. Cook -, 

Maj. Theophilus Fitzgerald J 

46th Pennsylvania, Maj. Cyrus Strous 

' 99 



} 



Capt. Edward L. Witman 

Maj. Cephas W. Dyer J 

Total First Brigade 452 



128th Pennsylvania, Col. James A. Mathews 

•^ '212 



Second Brigade — Col. Samuel Ross. 

Staff 2 

20th Connecticut, Lieut. Col. Wm. B. Wooster ■> 

Maj. Pliilo B. Buckingham | ' ^ 

3d Maryland, Lieut. Col. Gilbert P. Robinson 85 



CHANCE LLORSVILLE. 407 

123d New York, Col. Arch. L. McDougall 148 

145th New York, Col. E. Livingston Price 1 

Capt. George W. Reid / 95 

Total Second Brigade 499 

Third Brigade — Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger. 

Staff I 

27th Indiana, Col. Silas Colgrove 150 

2d Massachusetts, Col. Samuel M. Quincy 1 38 

13th New Jersey, Col. Ezra A. Carman ^ 

Maj. John Grimes I 141 

Capt. George A. Beardsley ) 

107th New York, Col. Alex. S. Diven 83 

3d Wisconsin, Col. William Hawley loi 

Total Third Brigade 614 

• Artillery— C&Yii. Robert H. Fitzhugh. 

Staff I 

1st New York Light, Battery K, Lieut. E. L. Bailey .... 7 
1st New York Light, Battery M, Lieut. Charles E. Winegar-, 

L 22 

Lieut. J. D. Woodbury . / 

4th U. S., Battery F, Lieut. Franklin B. Crosby % 

Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg / ^^ 

Total Artillery 46 

Total First Division l6i2 

Second Division — Brig. Gen. John W. Geary. 
First Brigade — Col. Charles Candy. 

5th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Robert L. Kilpatrick ^ 

Maj. Henry E. Symmes j 

7th Ohio, Col. William R. Creighton 99 

29th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Thomas Clark 72 

66th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell 73 

28th Pennsylvania, Maj. Lansford F. Chapman -i 

Capt. Conrad U. Meyer / 

147th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Ario Pardee, Jr 94 



Total First Brigade 521 

Second Brigade — Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Kane. 

Staff I 

29th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Wm. Rickards, Jr 21 

109th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry J. Stainrook 

22 



Capt. John Young, Jr. 



} 



408 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

I nth Pennsylvania, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr 26 

124th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Simon Litzenberg 20 

125th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob Higgins 49 

Total Second Brigade 139 

Third Brigade — Brig. Gen. Geo. S. Greene. 

Staff I 

60th New York, Lieut. Col. Jno. C. O. Redington .... 66 

78th New York, Maj. Henry R. Stagg -s 

Capt William H. Randall ] T-l^ 

I02d New York, Col. James C. Lane 90 

137th New York, Col. David Ireland 54 

149th New York, Maj. Abel G. Cook . . . ^ ^ 

Capt. Oliver T. May I 186 

Lieut. Col. Koert S. VanVoorhis ... J 

Total Third Brigade 528 

Artillery — Capt. Joseph M. Knap. 

Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Lieut. C. A. Atwell . . . -» 

Lieut. James D. McGill . | 9 

Pennsylvania Light, Battery F, Capt. R. B. Hampton . . -> 

Lieut. James P. Fleming . j " 

Total Artillery 18 

Total Second Division 1,206 

Total Twelfth Army Corps 2,822 

Cavalry, First Division — Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. 
Second Brigade — Col. Thomas C. Devin. 

6th New York, Lieut. Col. Duncan McVicar 1 

Capt. William E. Beardsley J ^ 

17th Pennsylvania, Col. Josiah H. Kellogg 14 

8th Pennsylvania, Maj. Pennock Huey 102 

New York Light Artillery, 6th Battery, Lieut. Joseph W. 

Martin 6 

Total Second Brigade 141 

RECAPITULATION. 

General Headquarters I 

First Army Corps 135 

Second Army Corps 1,815 

Third Army Corps 4)ii9 

Fifth Army Corps 700 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 409 

Eleventh Army Corps 2,412 

Twelfth Army Corps 2,822 

Cavalry 141 

Grand Total 12,145 

Return of casualties at Fredericksburg (or Marye's 
Heights), and Salem Heights (or Salem Church), and near 
Banks' Ford, Va., May 3-4, 1863. 

SECOND ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch. 
Second Division — Brig. Gen. John Gibbon. 

{Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully, 
Col. Henry W. Hudson, 
Col. Byron Laflin. 

15th Massachusetts, Maj. George C. Joslin 2 

1st Minnesota, Lieut. Col. William Colville, Jr 9 

34th New York, Col. Byron Laflin 



L-oi. cyron i^anm -. 

Lieut. Col. John Beverly j ■^ 

82d New York, (2d Militia) Col. H. W. Hudson" . . 
Lieut. Col. James Huston 



} ^ 



Total First Brigade 20 

Third Brigade — Col. Nonnan J. Hall, 

19th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Arthur F. Devereux 9 

20th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Geo. N. Macy 17 

7th Michigan, Capt. Amos E. Steele, Jr 7 

42d New York, Col. James E. Mallon 9 

59th New York, Lieut. Col. Max A. Thoman 15 

127th Pennsylvania, Col. William W. Jennings ID 

Total Third Brigade • 67 

Artillery. 
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Capt. Geo. W. Adams . 23 
Total Second Division no 

SIXTH ARMY CORPS— Maj. Gen. Jahn Sedgwick. 
Staff 2 

First Division — Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks. 
Staff I 



410 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Provost Guard. 
4th New Jersey, Co.'s A, C, and H, Capt. Chas. Ewing . . I 

r Col. Henry W. Brown, (wounded) 

„. , „ . , Col. William H. Penrose, 
First Brigade -{ „ , ^, , t b 1 , a a\ 
I Col. Samuel L. Buck, (wounded) 

[ Col. William H. Penrose. 



1st New Jersey, Col. Mark W. Collett 

Lieut. Col. William 
2d New Jersey, Col. Saml. L. Buck 



Lieut. Col. William Henry, Jr / •* 



K^o\.. oaini. i^. J3UCK -> 

Lieut. Col. Charles Wiebecke J ^^ 

3d New Jersey, Maj. J. W. H. Stickney 95 

15th New Jersey, Col. William H. Penrose -i 

Lieut. Col. Ed. L. Campbell | ^54 

23d New Jersey, Col. E. Burd Grubb 108 

Total First Brigade 511 

Second Brigade — Brig. Gen. Jos. J. Bartlett. 

5th Maine, Col. Clark S. Edwards 96 

l6th New York, Col. Joel J. Seaver 142 

27th New York, Col. Alex. D. Adams 19 

1 2 1st New York, Col. Emery Upton 276 

96th Pennsylvania, Maj. Wm. H. Lessig 79 

Total Second Brigade 612 

Third Brigade — Brig. Gen. David A. Russell. 

l8th New York, Col. George R. Myers 34 

32d New York, Col. Francis E. Pinto 43 

49th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Thos H. Hulings 6 

95th Pennsylvania, Col. Gustavus W. Town -\ 

Lieut. Col. Elisha Hall I 153 

Capt. Theodore H. McCalla J 

119th Pennsylvania, Col. Peter C. Ellmaker 122 

Total Third Brigade 358 

Artillery — Maj. John A. Tompkins. 

Massachusetts Light, Battery A, Capt. W. H. McCartney . . 2 

New Jersey Light, Battery A, Lieut. A. N. Parsons .... 1 

Maryland Light, Battery A, Capt. Jas. H. Rigby 3 

2d U. S., Battery D, Lieut. E. B. Williston i 

Total Artillery 7 

Total First Division I»490 



CHANCELLORSVILLE. 411 

Second Division— Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe. 
Second Brigade — Col. Lewis A. Grant. 

26th New Jersey, Col. A. J. Morrison ■> 

Lieut. Col. Ed. Martindale } ^24 

2d Vermont, Col. James H. Walbridge 132 

3d Vermont, Col. Thomas O. Seaver -> 

Lieut. Col. Samuel E. Pingree / ^^ 

4th Vermont, Col. Charles B. Stoughton 53 

5th Vermont, Lieut. Col. John R. Lewis 23 

6th Vermont, Col. Elisha L. Barney 74 

Total Second Brigade 431 

Third Brigade— Bug. Gen. Thos. H. Neill. 

7th Maine, Lieut. Col. Selden Connor 92 

2lst New Jersey, Col. Gilliam Van Houten -. 

Lieut. Col. Isaac S. Mettler | 211 

20th New York, Col. Ernst von \^egesack 208 

33d New York, Col. Robert F. Taylor 221 

49th New York, Col. Daniel B. Bidwell 35 

77th New York, Lieut. Col. Winsor B. French 83 

Total Third Brigade 850 

Artillery — Maj. J. Watts De Peyster, 

5th U. S., Battery F, Lieut. Leonard Martin g 

Total Second Division 1,290 

Third Division— Maj. Gen. John Newton. 
First Brigade — Col. Alex. Shaler. 

65th New York, Lieut. Col. Joseph E. Hamblin 17 

67th New York, Col. Nelson Cross 29 

I22d New York, Col. Silas Titus 7 

23d Pennsylvania, Col. John Ely 61 

82d Pennsylvania, Maj. Isaac C. Bassett 46 

Total First Brigade . , . . 160 

Second Brigade i^"^- ^"^^ "• ^'■°^^'"«' (^^'"""ded). 
( Col. Henry L. Eustis. 

7th Massachusetts, Col. Thomas D. Johns -> 

Lieut. Col. Franklin P. Harlow . . , / ^5° 

lOth Massachusetts, I>ieut. Col. Jos. B. Parsons 69 

37th Massachusetts, Col. Oliver Edwards 16 

36th New York, Lieut. Col. James J. Walsh 26 

2d Rhode Island, Col. Horatio Rogers, jr 81 

Total Second Brigade 342 



412 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Third Brigade — Brig Gen. Frank Wheaton. 

62d New York, Lieut. Col. Theo. B. Hamilton 120 

93d Pennsylvania, Capt. John S. Long 79 

98th Pennsylvania, Col. John F. Ballier -. 

Lieut. Col. Geo. Wyncoop J ^ 

I02d Pennsylvania, Col. Joseph M. Kinkead 169 

139th Pennsylvania, Col. Frederick H. Collier 76 

Total Third Brigade 485 

Artillery — Capt. Jer. McCarthy. 

1st Pennsylvania, Light Batteries C, and D, Capt. J. McCarthy 9 

2d United States, Battery G, Lieut. John H. Butler .... 14 

Total Artillery 23 

Total Third Division ' 1,010 

Light Division — Col. Hiram Burnham. 

6th Maine, Lieut. Col. Benjamin F. Harris 169 

31st New York, Col. Frank Jones . 143 

43d New York, Col. Benjamin F. Baker 204 

6ist Pennsylvania, Col. Geo. C. Spear 

Maj. George W, Dawson .... 

5th Wisconsin, Col. Thomas S. Allen 193 

New York Light, 3d Battery, Lieut. W. A. Harn i 



} 



Total Light Division 798 

Total Sixth Army Corps 4)59° 

RECAPITULATION. 

Second Division, Second Army Corps IIO 

Sixth Army Corps 4,590 

Total Fredericksburg 4)7oo 

Total Chancellorsville 12,145 

Grand total Hookers and Sedgwick's losses l6>845 

Report of Surgeon L. L. Guild, Confederate States 
Army, medical director, of Confederate casualties at the 
battle of Chancellorsville and Marye's Heights, and Sa- 
lem Heights, (Fredericksburg) May 4-6, 1863, as modified 
and corrected by reports of officers commanding Confed- 
erate forces in Chancellorsville campaign : 



CHA NCELL ORS VIL L E. 413 

FIRST CORPS. 
McLaws' Division— Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws. 

Wofford's Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. T. Woflbrd 562 

Kershaw's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Jos. B. Kershaw 104 

Barksdale's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wni. Barksdale 592 

Semmes' Brigade, Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes 603 

Cabell's Artillery Battalion 28 

Total McLaws' Division ... 1,889 

Anderson's Division— Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson. 

Mahone's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wm. Mahone 217 

Perry's Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. A. Perry 109 

Wilcox's Brigade, Brig. Gen. C. M. Wilcox 535 

Posey's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Cai-not Posey 290 

Wright's Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright 296 

Total Anderson's Division 1,447 

Alexander's Artillery, Col. E. P. Alexander 40 

Lee's Cavalry Brigade, Stuart's Division 1 1 

Total First Corps 3,387 

SECOND CORPS. 

Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson. Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes. 

Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. 

A. P. Hill's Division. 

Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill. Brig. Gen. Henry Heth. 

Brig. Gen. W. D. Pender. Brig. Gen. J. J. Archer. 

General Headquarters Staff 4 

General's Escort 4 

Signal Corps I 

Heth's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry Heth 279 

McGowan's Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. McGowan 455 

Thomas' Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. L. Thomas 177 

Lane's Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. H. Lane 739 

Archer's Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. J. Archer 365 

Pender's Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. D. Pender 706 

Total A. P. Hill's Division 2,730 

D. H. Hill's Division. 

Rodes' Brigade, Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes 816 

Doles' Brigade, Brig. Gen. George Doles 437 

Colquitt's Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. H. Colquitt 449 



414 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Iverson's Brigade. Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson 486 

Ramseur's Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. D. Ramseur 7S8 

Total D. H. Hill's Division 2,976 

Early's Division — Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early. 

Gordon's Brigade, Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon i6i 

Smith's Brigade, Brig. Gen. William Smith 86 

Hoke's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Robert F. Hoke 230 

Hays' Brigade, Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays 369 

Total Early's Division 846 

Trimble's Division— Brig. Gen. R. E. Colston. 

Staff and Pioneer Corps 6 

Paxton's Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. F. Paxton 493 

Jones' Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. R. Jones 472 

Colston's Brigade, Col. E. T. H. Warren 802 

NichoUs' Brigade, Brig. Gen. F. T. Nicholls 463 

Total Trimble's Division 2,236 

Total Second Corps 8,788 

Total First and Second Corps 12,175 



CHAPTER XI. 

FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 

A FTER the battle of Chancellorsville was fought, it 
-^ ^ was well known to both Hooker and Lee that hos- 
tilities would soon be resumed between the two armies ; 
so both commanders began to prepare their campaigns. 

Lee knew that if Hooker crossed the Rappahannock 
again, he would probably strike Gordonsville, with its 
supplies, and attempt to beat him (Lee) to Richmond, and 
again environ the capital of the Confederacy, or take some 
other route that might prove disastrous to the Confederate 
cause. 

Lee also knew that Hooker had lost about a corps from 
his army by the expiration of their term of service, as 
Hooker had hastened the battle of Chancellorsville on that 
account. It seemed a most opportune time for Lee to 
again march North, and draw the Army of the Potomac 
away from Richmond. It might ruin Hooker's plan until 
autumn. It seemed to be Lee's idea to procrastinate the 
war as much as possible, in order to induce foreign inter- 
vention, and to strengthen the peace party in the North, 
which was the natural ally of the South. 

Lee plainly states to Jefferson Davis the above-named 
reasons for again marching North. So, on the 3d of June, 
1863, he directed Longstreet to move to Culpeper Court 
House. McLaws' division, then at Fredericksburg, was 
secretly marched away ; while Hood, who was on the Rap- 
idan, was also directed to move to Culpeper. Pickett's 
division joined with Longstreet there. 

The next morning Rodes' division of Ewell's corps 

415 



416 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

received orders to follow. It was the intention of Lee to 
withdraw his army quietly before Hooker was aware of it. 
On the following day Early and Johnson's divisions of 
Ewell's corps followed, leaving A. P. Hill's corps to hold 
the heights of Fredericksburg. Hooker was aware that 
Lee was making some important movement, and so noti- 
fied the authorities at Washington. On the 6th he threw 
Sedgwick across the Rappahannock at Hamilton's Cross- 
ing to feel the enemy. Lee, seeing the movement, sent 
orders to Ewell to halt until the real intentions of Hooker 
were developed. As Sedgwick did not attack in force, 
Lee saw that it was only for observation, gave orders to 
Ewell to continue his march, and left the next evening for 
Culpeper himself. 

As soon as Hooker learned that Longstreet and Ewell 
had disappeared, leaving only Hill in his front, he sus- 
pected that Lee was marching North again ; therefore he 
resolved to frustrate his designs by crossing over and crush- 
ing Hill with his army, and compel Lee to fall back. But 
Halleck again interfered, and directed Hooker to not 
attack Hill. Thus was lost another golden opportunity to 
seriously cripple Lee, whose army of three corps stretched 
from Fredericksburg to the headwaters of the Shenandoah — 
loo miles — with Longstreet in the center at Culpeper. 

Had Frederick the Great commanded the Army of the 
Potomac, Lee's army would have been defeated in detail, 
and the fragments scattered in the mountains in less than 
two weeks. Hooker was sensibly aware of the situation, and 
realized that it was his duty to cross his army over and 
surround Hill, as Ewell did Milroy a few days later. Hal- 
leck, seeing the determination of Hooker to attack Hill, 
reported the matter to the President, urging him to direct 
Hooker to move between Lee's forces and Washington. 
So Lincoln wrote one of his laconic letters to Hooker. He 
said : 

If Lee should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting' 
you to fall upon it, he would figlit you in intrenchnients, and have 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 417 

you at a disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that 
point, while his main force would, in some way, be getting an ad- 
vantage of you northward. In a word, I would not take any risk 
of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a 
fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, withoiit a fair 
chajice to gore one way or to kick the other. 

There is scarcely a doubt but that Lincoln, if he had been 
in the field, would have been a great general. That he was 
sensitive of the safety of Washington is a fact beyond dis- 
pute ; for if it had fallen into the hands of the enemy even 
for a short time, there was great danger of foreign recoguition 
of the Confederacy ; yet there were enough troops in and 
around Washington to have saved it from any such terrible 
fate. 

If Hooker had crossed his whole army over the Rappa- 
hannock, and surrounded Hill's corps, it could not have 
held out forty-eight hours. The rear of the heights was 
not intrenched, so an assault from that direction could 
easily have been made. Hooker could have crossed half 
of his army at Skinker's Neck, and then marched up the 
Telegraph road from Richmond, cut Hill off from retreating 
in that direction, until he arrived near Hamilton's Cross- 
ing, then by making a detour to the left his force would 
have been directly in the rear of Hill's position while the 
other half of his army could have ascended the left bank 
of the Rappahannock until it reached United States Ford, 
and there crossing and takiug possession of the road to Cul- 
peper Court House, moving eastwardly, and uniting with 
the other wing of his army, hold Hill in his position until 
he could crush him with his combined force before Long- 
street could have returned to his relief. If an}- number of 
Hill's troops had cut their way out through Hooker's lines, 
Pleasonton's three divisions of cavalry could have over- 
taken them with ease. Besides, our cavalry, by crossing 
first at United States Ford, could have prevented any in- 
formation being sent to Culpeper, by taking possession of 
Spottsylvania Court House and Todd's Tavern, at the 
xxvn 



418 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

junction of the Brock and Catharpin roads. But Halleck, 
whose military genius was only successful in opposing his 
own generals in the field, thought he knew the true 
situation, and was able to compel Hooker to take up his 
march in the direction of Washington, leaving Hill to 
follow lyongstreet at his pleasure. 

It is insinuated that Hooker's conversation with some 
of his officers was secretly sent to Washington. It is 
claimed that Hooker said : " If he (Lee) wants to exchange 
queen for queen, then all right." That is, Richmond for 
Washington. If Hooker had crushed Hill and then 
marched on Richmond, it would have been evacuated before 
he appeared before it, for Keyes was on the Peninsula 
with about 15,000 troops and would have cooperated with 
him. 

But Davis could have chosen another city for his cr.p- 
ital, and perhaps it would have made little difference to his 
government. Lee, on the other hand, if he had appeared 
before Washington, with the corps of Ewell and Long- 
street, would not have outnumbered the troops inside of 
the fortifications, including Schenck's force drawn from 
Baltimore and Harper's Ferry, Then Hooker could have 
arrived in Washington with a part of his forces, by 
steamer up the bay, almost as soon as Lee coiild have 
reached there and so have been ready to deal him a heavy 
blow. Thus it is alleged that Hooker soliloquized over the 
situation, which was written to Washington and greatly 
alarmed Halleck, and the fiat went forth for Hooker to 
march between Lee and Washington. 

The Comte de Paris in his work says on that point : 
"All that we propose to demonstrate at present is that 
Hooker's idea was correct and suggestive. He did not suc- 
ceed in convincing either the President or General Halleck. 

"He was told in reply not to mind Richmond, but to 
attend to Lee's army, and to pursue or attack the latter on 
the march or in its encampment ; as if the movement 
against Hill was not the best way to strike at the weak 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 419 

point of this army and to thwart all the projects of its 
chief?" 

Lee had not, as yet, developed his plans sufficiently for 
either Hooker or the authorities at Washington to under- 
stand them. Was he aiming to take the route of 1862, and 
make the field of Bull Run famous for a third battle there ? 
Twice had the Confederates scored a victory on that ground, 
and it would seem more likely for Lee to do that than for 
him to take the Shenandoah Valley route for the North, 
where he had suffered one defeat (South Mountain), fought 
a drawn battle at Antietam, and came so near having 
his army ruined and routed. It was Hooker's duty to learn 
what were the intentions of the Confederate commander, 
so he directed Pleasonton to ]proceed to the upper Rappa- 
hannock with his' whole cavalry force and three brigades of 
infantry, there cross it, and move in the direction of Cul- 
peper until he struck the enemy. 

On the 8th of June Stuart's cavalry, nearly 10,000 
strong, was reviewed by Lee near Culpeper, and witnessed 
by Longstreet's whole corps. Stuart was a fine cavalry 
commander, and, like Marshal Murat, was excessively fond 
of show. On the review he was not contented to pass 
before his commanding general, as is the usual custom 
on such occasions, but he went through all the different 
movements of a real battle — making dashes on the enemy 
with his cavalry, while artillery was brought into action, 
and the roar of cannon sounded in the distance like the 
fury of the hostile armies at Waterloo or Austerlitz. As 
Pleasonton marched up the left bank of the Rappahannock, 
he could hear the mutterings of Stuart's cannon, which 
convinced him that a heavy force was near Brandy Station, 
distant four or five miles from Rappahannock Station. 

Pleasonton decided to send Buford's division of cavalry 
and Ames' brigade of infantry up to Beverly Ford, two 
miles above Rappahannock Station, while the divisions of 
Gregg and Duffie, with Russell's brigade of infantry, the 
7th Wisconsin, two companies of the 2d Wisconsin, and 



420 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the 56th Pennsylvania, the whole detail under command of 
Col. W. W. Robinson, of the 7th Wisconsin, were left at 
Kelley's Ford, lower down, with instructions for Duffie to 
bear to the left, and see if there was any Confederate force 
on the road from Fredericksburg to Culpepeir. 

Gregg was to move between Duffie and Buford, with his 
infantry on his right flank, extending in the direction of 
Buford' s left. Russell's brigade of infantry moved on the 
immediate right of Gregg's cavalry, while Colonel Robin- 
son's command marched up the river about a mile, and 
then, turning to the left, touched Russell's right, while 
Colonel Hofmann, commanding the 56th Pennsylvania, on 
the right of Robinson's command, received orders from 
Buford at different times during the day ; recrossed the 
Rappahannock under his orders that evening, Gregg taking 
the direct road to Brandy Station, while Duffie, in bearing 
to the left, would strike the road from Ely's Ford to Ste- 
vensburg at Willis Madden' s. 

The column at Kelley's Ford was delayed in crossing by 
the failure of Colonel Duffie to arrive at the proper time, it 
being near nine a. m. when the head of his column was 
ready to cross. He had been ordered to rendezvous at Mor- 
risville the night before. When Duffie began to move in 
the morning he took the wrong road. Col. John I. Gregg, 
commanding one of his brigades, knowing Duffie was 
making a mistake, informed him of the fact ; he, however, 
took no notice of the information for some time, but con- 
tinued his march. It was then impossible for him to arrive 
at Kelley's Ford to cross at the appointed time. When 
Duffie' s division arrived. Gen. D. McM. Gregg, who com- 
manded the division, asked Col. John I. Gregg, what caused 
the delay, when he was told that Colonel Duffie took the 
wrong road. It was supposed that Russell, by taking a 
short cut, would arrive in time with his infantry brigade to 
be of valuable service in the battle. The river was crossed 
at daybreak by Buford' s force under cover of a heavy fog. 
Gregg and Duffie crossed Kelley's Ford without any opposi- 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 421 

tion, but the inoveinent was closely watched, and Captain 
White reported to Gen. B. H. Robertson, whose headquar- 
ters were on John Minor Botts' farm, that the enemy was 
crossing in heavy force, Robertson at once communicated 
the intelligence to General Stuart, who ordered him to ad- 
vance in that direction and check the enemy, so as to pro- 
tect the right flank of the forces engaged with Buford. 
Robertson advanced about two miles, when he met the 
enem}\ He dismounted part of his command, and formed 
a skirmish line to feel the force in his front, when the fact 
was developed that he was facing Russell's brigade of infan- 
try, while Duffie had taken the road by Willis Madden' s to 
Stevensburg, and Gregg had passed his right flank with his 
division of cavalry, and was marching in the direction of 
Brandy Station ; these facts were hastily forwarded to 
Stuart, who ordered him to fall rapidly back, as Gregg was 
gaining his rear. 

Colonel Davis' brigade of Buford 's division encountered 
the outposts of Jones at Beverly Ford, but they were easily 
driven back. Stuart was so elated over his grand review 
the day before, in the presence of General Lee, that he 
made no disposition of his troops for defense against a sud- 
den attack from the Union forces, and he came very near 
losing four batteries of his mounted artillery in the charge 
of Davis ; but for the fact that they were not observed by 
the Union cavalry, they would have all been captured, for 
the horses were picketed and the men on fatigue duty. A 
piece of woods shielded them from view as the Union 
cavalry pursued the Confederate pickets, thus pressing near 
the artillery. 

As it was Stuart's intention to cross the Rappahannock 
on the 9th, Jones was ordered to Beverly Ford, while W. H. 
F. Lee was bivouacked near Wellsford, and Fitz-Hugh Lee's 
brigade, under Munford, was encamped for the night at 
Oak Shade, the old-fashioned church built of brick brought 
from England, on the left of Hazel River. Thus Stuart's 
cavalry lay closely along the right bank of the Rappahan- 



422 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

nock on the morning of the 9th of June, when our cavalry 
on the left bank began crossing at daylight. It was a bold 
and unexpected move on the part of Pleasonton. For the 
first time our cavalry took the offensive, and charged well 
up to Lee's infantry ; Gregg was only a short distance from' 
Ewell's troops when he was at Brandy Station. 

As Buford advanced against Jones, his right flank was 
endangered from W. H. F. Lee and Munford, who w^ere 
higher up the river. Lee soon formed on the left of Jones, 
and attacked Buford' s right flank with considerable success. 
Stuart's headquarters were at Fleetwood Hill, the old 
homestead of John S. Barbour, the father of Hon. J. S. Bar- 
bour, who was elected United States Senator from Virginia 
in 1889. Near him was the brigade of Hampton. The 
firing in the direction of the river brought Jones' troopers 
to the scene of action, where they formed the pickets on 
foot, contesting the advance of Davies' brigade. The 8th 
New York was severely attacked, and the combatants met 
in a hand-to-hand encounter with sabers and pistols. In 
that struggle the Union troops displayed great valor. 

Stuart's force, in front of Buford, was greatly superior to 
that of Buford' s, however. The latter was hotly engaging 
Stuart until Gregg could arrive at Brandy Station and 
attack the Confederates in the rear. 

Pleasanton sent Hooker the following dispatch : 

Headquarters Cavalry Corps, 
June 9, 1863 — II a. m. (Received 12:45 p. m. ) 
General : — All the enemy's forces are engaged with me. I am 
holding them until Gregg can come up. Gregg's guns are being 
heard in the enem5''s rear. 

A. Pleasonton, 
Brigadier General, Commanding. 
To Gen. S. Williams, 

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Army of the Potomac. 

General Gregg had gained the rear of Stuart's position, 
and was directly between him and Lee's army near Cul- 
peper. He at once prepared to strike a hard blow at 



ii 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 423 

Stuart. Accordingly he sent a courier to DuflSe at Stevens- 
burg to hasten up with his division from that point, as 
Gregg had already succeeded in swinging around and 
striking the road from Brandy Station to Stevensburg, 
that the force was light in that direction, and as Dufifie was 
only sent to Stevensburg to learn that fact it was unneces- 
sar}' for him to remain there. There were only two regi- 
ments of the enemy in that vicinity — the 4th Virginia, 
under Colonel Wickham, and the 2d South Carolina, under 
M. C. Butler, now a distinguished member of the United 
States Senate. 

Butler's regiment was advantageously posted, with his 
right resting at Norman's mill-pond, on Mountain Run, 
which courses its way from beyond Culpeper, and flows 
into the Rappahannock below Kelley's Ford, after passing 
Jack Stone's mill. Quite a curious and interesting history 
is connected with the battle at that point. In early days a 
Miss Norman married Mr. Stanton, the father of Edwin M. 
Stanton, whose army, as Secretar}- of War, was then fight- 
ing where his mother in childhood days had played on the 
banks of that meandering and romantic stream. 

A shell burst and killed Lieut. Col. Frank Hampton, 
brother of Wade Hampton, Captain Farley, volunteer aid- 
de-camp to General Stuart, and carried away the foot of 
Col. M. C. Butler. That was a severe blow to the regi- 
ment, but it held its ground as well as possible until over- 
powered, then retired in the direction of Culpeper. 

Wickham's regiment faced John I. Gregg's brigade, but 
avoided an engagement. So in reality one regiment of the 
enemy detained Duffie's division there, while Gen. D. INIcM. 
Gregg was sending courier after courier to induce him to 
come to his (Gregg's) assistance at Brandy Station, where 
the two forces were engaged in a pitched battle of a most 
desperate character. 

Gregg longed for Dufiie to come in time to turn the tide 
of battle at Fleetwood Hill, which would drive Stuart on 
the forces of Buford, which were ready "to welcome them 



424 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

to hospitable graves." Arriving at Brandy Station, Gen. 
D. McM. Gregg saw heavy cohimns of the enemy at 
the Barbour House. Stuart had ordered Jones and Hamp- 
ton to retire from the front of Buford to meet the forces 
under Gregg that had turned his right flank and gained his 
rear. In addition to the commands of Jones and Hampton, 
Robeitson's brigade had returned from the direction of 
Kelley's Ford, and Stuart was again able to present a strong 
front where danger most threatened him. 

Gregg hesitated to attack without the assistance of 
Duffie' s division, but there was no time to be lost ; he must 
either charge with the troops at his command or retire, and 
as he had made such a successful circuit of Stuart's posi- 
tion, he felt compelled by his orders to attack at once and 
trust to Duffie' s arrival in time to support and assist his 
forces engaged. He therefore ordered Percy W}'ndham to 
charge. The enemy had a battery posted at the Barbour 
House. A section of artillery was hastily put in position 
and opened on it. At the same time Major Russell was 
directed to charge on the enemy's cavalry that was break- 
ing away to the left. 

As the battery at the Barbour House slackened its fire, 
the artillery of Wyndham was advanced ; at the same time 
he ordered the ist New Jersey to charge on the battery sta- 
tioned in the rear of the Barbour House. The ist Penn- 
sylvania Cavalry and the balance of the ist ]\Iaryland 
were thrown forward to support the charge of the ist New 
Jersey. 

' The 1st Maryland, led by Lieutenant Colonel Deems, 
charged the enemy posted behind the buildings in the 
garden and orchard. The ist Pennsylvania divided ; one 
wing, under Colonel Ta>-lor, struck the enemy in front, 
while the other wing, under the command of Lieutenant 
Colonel Gardner, dashed on the enemy's flank. This com- 
bined movement forced the enemy back on the plain below. 
Percy Wyndham led the ist New Jersey, assisted by Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Broderick. The eneni)' was driven from his 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 425 

guns. Then a desperate struggle was made to retake them, 
but Wyndham's forces were again successful in repelling 
the attack. 

Gregg seeing that W}'ndham would soon be overpowered, 
ordered Kilpatrick forward ou his right, who formed line 
of battle en echelon of regiments, directing a section of 
artillery on the right of the second regiment. Wyndham 
had just been forced from the hill. Kilpatrick directed 
Colonel Irvine, of the loth New York, who was on the left 
of his brigade, to advance and retake the hill if possible. 
Kilpatrick' s artillery then opened, and Colonel Davies 
with one battalion of the Harris Light was also ordered in, 
but Irvdne and Davies were at once met by two heavy 
columns of the enemy, and seeing this Kilpatrick ordered 
Colonel Douty, of the ist [Maine, to sweep to the right and 
charge the enemy on the flank. It was a new regiment, 
seeking maiden honors, and the record it made there that 
day was equal to that of any lancers in history. In 
the mean tihie Kilpatrick ordered Irvine and Davies to 
withdraw and rally their commands to the support of the 
1st ]\Iaine. Passing over the batteries and driving the 
gunners into a safe hiding place, the troops of that new but 
gallant regiment were forcing everything before them for 
more than a mile. 

Of that charge Adjutant E. W. Whitaker, of the 
Harris Light, said, "It was one of the grandes.t I ever 
witnessed on any battlefield." The bits of the adjutant's 
bridle broke and his horse ran away and kept with the ist 
Maine to the end of its charge, which ga\e him an oppor- 
tunity of ascertaining the facts. The gunners of the Con- 
federate batteries sprang to their places and began firing 
again with great rapidity, as if in revenge for being driven 
away. Their cavalry had collected and were ready to 
attack the brave ]\Iaine men. Receiving their orders to 
wheel and cut their way back, they gallantly began their 
ride, many of them to death, for they were suffering from a 
fire not only in front but from both flanks. 



426 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Just as the guns, heavily shotted, were ready to fire on 
the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Smith suddenly changed 
direction to the right, and the murderous fire passed harm- 
lessly in their wake, and before they could be reloaded the 
regiment had cut its way out. General Gregg seeing that 
there was no hope of Duffie coming on the field in time to 
assist him, while trains from Culpeper had already arrived 
with infantry to assist Stuart, decided to retire. 

Buford hearing the guns of Gregg, again attacked, 
hoping the combined assault would rout the Confederate 
cavalry, but a most stubborn resistance was made to his 
advance. Gen. W. H. F. Lee was severely wounded, 
which compelled him to leave the field. Pleasonton having 
accomjDlished all that Hooker desired, and feeling that he 
was unable to win a decisive victory because Duffie failed 
to support Gregg at Brandy Station at the proper time, 
gave the order to recross the Rappahannock. 

Thus ended a fierce and desperate struggle between the 
two cavalry commanders, which was only a prelude to other 
engagements where heroism and dash were displayed with 
great skill on both sides. Stuart was now opposed by a 
cavalry commander whose prowess on the field met the 
Confederate general with equal ability, supported by such 
gallant officers as Buford, the Greggs, Kilpatrick, Percy, 
Wyndham, Davies and others. The Union cavalry was 
officered and ready to meet the Confederate horsemen on 
the field. Stuart was well supported by officers who were 
trained and daring, Robertson^ Fitz Hugh Lee, W. H. 
F. Lee, Jones and Hampton were ever ready to follow his 
lead. 

It was Stuart's purpose to shield the movements of Lee's 
infantry on its march North, so that Hooker would not be 
able to concentrate his army at any given point and pierce 
his columns while on the march. As it was Pleasonton' s 
duty to learn the movements of the whole of Lee's army if 
possible, he was compelled to attack the cavalry, and get that 
out of the way to uncover what was going on behind the 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 427 

mountains. For that reason we will soon be compelled to 
record the battles in the valley between the Bull Run and 
Blue Ridge Mountains, beginning at Aldie. Lee's com- 
prehensive plan was to blind Hooker as to his real inten- 
tions, so he ordered General Imboden, with his brigade of 
cavalry, to go in the direction of Romney to cut the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad, in order that the Army of the 
Potomac could not be reenforced from the Northwest. 

Jenkins' brigade of cavalry preceded E well's corps, 
which began its march on the lotli of June, making 
forced marches so as to arrive at Winchester before the 
authorities at Washington would learn of the movement, 
and either reenforce Milroy or order him to evacuate, before 
he was attacked by an overwhelming force. Lee well knew 
that Hooker's cavalry was not sufficiently strong in num- 
bers to make a circuit of the Confederate forces then lying 
at Culpeper, and from which point the advance into the 
valley was to be made immediately. 

Ewell passed through Chester Gap in the Blue Ridge, 
and bivouacked on the night of the 12th at Front Ro}-al. 
There he turned Rodes' division down the Shenandoah in 
the direction of Berryville, to capture the Union force sta- 
tioned there as a sort of outpost to Winchester — it being 
near midway between the Shenandoah River and Win- 
chester, and cut off Milroy' s retreat to Harper's Ferry. 
The divisions of Early and Johnson marched direct upon 
Winchester until they arrived within a few miles of it. 
There Early bore to the left and attacked Milroy' s force at 
Kernstown, which was another outpost in that direction. 

It seems that the scouts and cavalry coming in failed to 
appreciate the actual strength of the approaching enemy, 
and led Milroy to believe there was no danger. It never 
once dawned on their minds that it was one-third of the 
Confederate army rapidly bearing down on a comparatively 
small command. 

On the evening of the 13th Ewell arrived within three 
or four miles of Winchester, and began to prepare to cap- 



428 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ture the whole force there. Ewell directed Early to send 
Gordon" s brigade square in front of the town to make a 
strong demonstration, as if that constituted the attacking 
party, while the brigades of Hays, Smith, and Hoke were 
to make a detour far enough away from the town not to be 
observed, and pass west of it until the woods leading to Rom- 
ney and Pughtown were reached and held. Then Colonel 
Jones was ordered to run his artillery into position by hand. 
The movement was shielded by a piece of woods, and 
twelve guns were placed in an orchard, while eight were in 
a cornfield north of the woods. After the artillery had 
pla}-ed about three-quarters of an hour on the outer works, 
Hays' brigade was directed to advance and carry them, 
which was quite easily accomplished. As the artillery did 
not begin firing until about an hour by sun, it was nearly 
dark when Ha5^s carried the works to the northwest. That 
ended the battle for the day. 

It was presumed by the Confederate generals that Mil- 
roy would evacuate the town during the night. Early held 
the roads to Romney and Pughtown, while Johnson was 
sent east of Winchester with his division. The latter was 
ordered to leave Jones to hold that position, while the 
brigades of Stewart, Nicholls, and Walker were directed to 
make a circuit and gain the Martinsburg road and fonn line 
of battle facing Winchester, so as to cut off any attempted 
retreat at night. Milroy, who was a brave soldier, had not 
been warned in time of the danger that then surrounded 
him, and resolved to cut his way out during the night (for 
it w^as impossible to do so by daylight) or sell his life as 
dearly as possible. 

Then came one of the most desperate night struggles of 
the war. Milroy struck the Confederate forces with mas- 
terly skill and cut his way out with a part of his command. 
The remainder of his troops were taken prisoners. 

Rodes appeared before Berryville, threw Jenkins' brigade 
of cavalry between that point and Winchester, and while 
he left one brigade in front he attempted to send the other 



I 



FREDERICKSB URG TO FREDERICK. 429 

three brigades around to the north and capture the whole 
force, but Col. A. T. McReynolds, who was in command 
there, had left a few soldiers at that point to make a bold 
demonstration, while he had quietly retreated before the 
snare was laid for him. That swept the valley of the 
Union forces, and Ewell Dressed on for ]\Iartinsburg with 
unprecedented zeal. 

The ease with which Lee concealed the movements of 
one-third of his army until it appeared before Winchester, 
and was ready within a few hours to surround and capture 
it, is proof positive that it was highly essential that a divi- 
sion of cavalr}' be stationed at Front Royal to impede the 
progress of a heavy force of the enemy suddenly issuing 
through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and descending on the 
forces stationed in the valley at Winchester, ]\Iartinsburg, 
and Harper's Ferr}-. 

In fact, the plan of General Rosecrans, which he made 
to the Secretary of War when he w^as directed to conduct 
Blenker's division to General Fremont, and on his return 
to report anything he might see that would benefit the 
service, was the better plan by far. In looking the matter 
over, it was his opinion that all commands in that section 
ought to be consolidated into one and thrown forward to 
Gordonsville, or some point in that vicinity, to protect the 
Shenandoah Valley and also constitute the right wing of 
the Army of the Potomac in its advance. This was a 
proposition of great military sagacity, and would have pre- 
vented several disastrous campaigns to our arms in the 
valley. 

No infantry' force stationed in the Shenandoah could 
protect itself from surprise except with the aid of a strong 
division of cavalry under the command of a general like 
Buford or Sheridan ; as General Heth said, "The cavalry 
of any army is its eyes and ears. ' ' 

When Milroy was attacked he fought with an iron will, 
but his pickets were too feeble in strength to pierce the 
movements of the advance to test its force. The reports to 



430 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

him were that it was the advance of the force which had 
been in his front. 

After the cavalry fight at Beverly Ford, Brandy Sta- 
tion, and Stevensburg, on the 9th of June, 1863, Pleas- 
onton fell back to the vicinity of Warrenton Junction, 
where he could watch the movements of the enemy and at 
the same time shield the movements of Hooker's infantry, 
which was ready to abandon its position along the Rappa- 
hannock and again retrace its steps in the direction of 
Washington. In making that movement the right wing of 
the army became the left in its reverse movement. 

On the 1 1 th the Third Corps marched from its quarters 
near Falmouth to Hartwood Church, which is nearly oppo- 
site the United States Ford. 

General Reynolds was directed the following day to 
break camp at Fitzhugh's plantation and White Oak Church 
and proceed to Deep Run, a tributary of the Rappahannock 
that empties into it several miles above the junction of the 
Rappahannock, while the Third Corps moved to Bealeton, 
with Humphreys' (Third) division advanced to the Rappa- 
hannock, the Eleventh Corps having moved from Brookes' 
Station to Hartwood Church. 

On the 13th the First Corps moved to Bealeton, while 
the Fifth marched from the vicinity of Banks' Ford to 
Morrisville, and the Eleventh to Catlett' s Station. Hooker' s 
left wing was composed of four corps — the First, Third, 
Fifth, and Eleventh, with Pleasonton's cavalry. 

The right wing began its movement on the 13th by the 
Sixth Corps leaving Franklin Crossing, below Fredericks- 
burg, and moving to Potomac Creek, while the Twelfth moved 
from Stafford Court House and Aquia Creek to Dumfries, 
where Hooker made his headquarters on the following day. 

The Sixth moved up and took the position the Twelfth 
had just vacated, while the artillery reserve, under General 
Hunt, moved from Stafford Court House to Wolf Run Shoal. 

The Eleventh Corps, leading the left wing, came up to 
Catlett' s Station. On the i5tli Hooker moved his head- 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 431 

quarters to Fairfax Station, directing Slocum to Fairfax 
Court House and Sedgwick to Dumfries. As yet the 
Second Corps was facing A. P. Hill on the Rappahannock, 
but General Couch on the nth had been ordered to Harris- 
burg to take command of the forces in defense of that city, 
in anticipation of Lee's movement into Pennsylvania. At 
the same time General Brooke was assigned to the Depart- 
ment of the Monongahela, with headquarters at Pittsburg. 
Hancock, who had succeeded Couch in command of the 
corps, was ordered to follow the right wing, moving to 
Aquia Creek. 

On the i6tli the Sixth Corps arrived at headquarters, 
Fairfax Station, while the Second marched to Wolf Run 
Shoals. The cavalry moved from Union ]\Iills and Bristoe 
Station to Manassas Junction and Bull Run. 

On the 17th Pleasonton was directed by Hooker to 
make a reconnoissance of the valley between the Blue 
Ride and Bull Run Mountains. D. McM. Gregg's divi- 
sion of cavalry moved to Aldie, a gap in the Bull Run 
Mountain. Kilpatrick's brigade had the advance, and on 
entering that quaint little hamlet encountered the pickets 
of the enemy, for the head of Stuart's forces had been ad- 
vanced to that place that morning. Fitz-Hugh Lee's bri- 
gade, commanded by Col. T. T. Munford, lay not far dis- 
tant near Dover. 

Robertson's brigade was at Rector's Crossroads, and 
W. H. F. Lee's brigade, commanded by Colonel Chambliss, 
was kept near Salem to picket Thoroughfare Gap, and to 
keep open communication with Hampton, who was still in 
the rear near the Rappahannock. Thus Stuart's cavalr>' 
occupied the valley between the mountains. Both sides 
were apparently surprised when they met, but instantly 
prepared for action. 

At Aldie the road divides, one branch running north- 
west in the direction of Snicker's Gap, while the other pur- 
sues a westwardly course through ]\Iiddleburg, toward 
Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Munford at once placed 



432 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

his brigade on the hill, between the two roads, which gave 
him quite an advantageous position for his artillery ; and 
dismounting a part of his cavalry behind a fence where 
quite a ditch had been cut, made his position almost im- 
pregnable, for he could then double his forces on the two 
roads where his flanks rested. Kilpatrick dismounted the 2d 
New York, and with drawn sabers attacked the Con- 
federates in that position ; while a number of prisoners were 
taken by this regiment it was almost impossible to dislodge 
Munford's men behind the barricade. 

On the right the 4th New York, under Colonel Di Ces- 
nola, who had been placed under arrest, charged unarmed 
at the head of his troops up the Snicker's Gap road. Seeing 
his great gallantr\^ Kilpatrick handed him his own saber in 
the midst of the fight. Pie was seriously wounded and fell 
into the hands of the enemy. 

Although the two opposing forces were about equal in 
numbers, Munford was so well posted that Kilpatrick was 
unable to dislodge him, and D. McM. Gregg sent the ist 
Maine to his assistance. As it came on the field Kilpatrick 
inquired what regiment it was, and when told it was the 
ist Maine, he said, "Forward, ist Maine; you saved the 
field at Brandy, and you can do it here ! Are there twelve 
men who will follow me ? " But instead of twelve men re- 
sponding to his request the regiment gave a deafening yell 
and charged up the Snicker's Gap road with such mo- 
mentum that Munford's left was swept back, and his posi- 
tion behind the fence endangered. 

It greatly pleased the Maine boys as they passed Kil- 
patrick in the charge ; the gallant general's horse had been 
shot in the neck and disabled. In that charge Colonel 
Douty and Captain Summat, two gallant officers of the ist 
Maine, were killed. The death of Colonel Douty was a 
great blow to the regiment, for he was a gallant and capable 
officer. 

The regiment had two other good field officers, Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Smith and Major Boothby, who distin- 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 433 

guislied themselves on that field, so that it was read)- for 
action at a moment's warning. However, the regiment 
was composed of such material that had it lost all of the 
field officers it would have moved right along, as it had 
many men in the ranks capable and brave enough to have 
led it. 

Munford retired from the field, and it was the impres- 
sion then of the Union officers that he had been compelled 
to retreat. His right, on the Snicker's Gap road, had been 
turned, but the road to Middleburg, around which the 
other brigades of Stuart's cavalry were concentrated, was 
open to him. But it was not our forces in his front that 
compelled him to leave the field, but an order from Stuart 
for him to hastily retire to Middleburg. When Pleasonton 
advanced with D. McM, Gregg's division to Aldie, Col. 
A. N. Duffie, commanding the ist Rhode Island Cavalry, 
had been directed to make a detour to the left, according 
to the following order: "You will proceed with your regi- 
ment from Manassas Junction by way of Thoroughfare 
Gap to Middleburg ; there you will camp for the night and 
communicate with the headquarters of the Second Cavalry 
Brigade. From Middleburg you will proceed to Union, 
thence to Snickersville, from Snickersville to Percyville ; 
thence to Wheatland, and passing through Waterford, to 
Nolan's Ferry, where you will join your brigade." 

The regiment moved out on the morning of the 17th of 
June, the anniversary of the battle of Bunker Hill, which, 
to a New England regiment, was enough to inspire it with 
sufficient patriotism to face death to save the country. 
And it had a full test before the sun rose the next mornino^. 

As it approached Thoroughfare Gap, the advance en- 
countered the pickets of Colonel Chambliss, but they re- 
tired in the direction of Salem, leaving the road open to 
Middleburg, whither Duffic\s orders carried him. It was a 
beautiful day, and as the regiment marched in the direction 
of Middleburg, the valley appeared most lovely, and the 
bluish tinge on the mountains made it an interesting and 
xxvni 



434 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

picturesque scene to behold. The birds sang their sweetest 
notes, and the boys were more than happy. 

It must be remembered that Gen. W. H. F. Lee's bri- 
gade, under the command of Colonel Chambliss, had been 
left in their rear — a force at least four times that of the ist 
Rhode Island, which only encountered Chambliss' pickets, 
and was not aware that a brigade was left to block its 
retreat next day. At about four p.m., the ist Rhode 
Island struck Stuart's pickets, and at once charged them, 
drove Stuart and his staff out of Middleburg on the gallop, 
who escaped capture only by reason of the superior speed of 
their fresh horses. At this time Fitz Lee's brigade, under 
the command of Colonel Munford, was fighting at Aldie, 
five miles away. Stuart had only a squadron of cavalry at 
Middleburg when Duffie charged on the town. It was 
strange to him that a mere regiment could penetrate the 
center of his command. His surprise induced him to send 
Capt. Frank Robertson of his staff with an order to Mun- 
ford to fall back to Middleburg. Duffie and the whole 
regiment knew that they had captured Stuart's head- 
quarters, but that it would be almost a miracle to escape 
with the brigades of Chambliss, Robertson and Munford 
closing in on them. Duffie' s orders were to remain at 
Middleburg that night, and report to Kilpatrick at Aldie. 
He was a French officer, and insisted on strictly obeying 
orders without regard to the change of circumstances. He 
was going to stay in Middleburg that night if it cost his 
life. Capt. George N. Bliss wanted the regiment to move 
at once to Aldie before the Confederates could surround 
them. He claimed it would save the regiment, and when 
the order was issued to remain in Middleburg that night 
no one supposed it was the point of concentration of 
Stuart's forces. 

If Duffie had moved on the road to Aldie it would have 
aided Kilpatrick in his struggle with Munford, for a reg- 
iment coming up in the rear would have decided the day 
against the Confederates, and placed our troops in better 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 435 

condition to have followed np Stuart the next day. But 
Diiffie decided to meet his fate, and sent Capt. Frank Allen 
with two men to Aldie to report to Pleasonton, while he 
barricaded the roads coming into the town. His reserve he 
placed on the road leading to Aldie. Before dark Stuart 
returned with the 4th and 5tli North Carolina Cavalry, and 
attacked Dufifie. The men at the barricades fought 
bravely, but were outflanked by superior numbers, and fell 
back on the reser\^e. Companies G and F were ordered to 
dismount and conceal their horses in a grove, and take a 
position behind a stone wall that bounded one side of the 
road. 

It was quite dark when the enemy charged down this 
road until he arrived at the stone wall, when a volley was 
poured into his ranks at short range. It produced great 
consternation and confusion by the wounding of the men 
and horses. The enemy retreated a safe distance and again 
charged, only to be discomfited by another voile}' from the 
carbines of Duffie's troops. The third charge was made, 
and resulted in the enemy being hurled back again with 
considerable loss. It was evident that the Confederates 
were endeavoring to flank the position, therefore Dufifie de- 
cided to withdraw from the town before all his forces were 
captured. In doing so Major Farrington, who was in com- 
mand of the men behind the stone wall, was ordered to 
retire. The next morning the Confederates again hotly 
pursued Dufifie and, as a matter of course, the regiment 
was compelled to divide into small squads, and escape as 
best they could on foot over the Bull Run Mountains. 
The following is taken from the "Campaign of Stuart's Cav- 
alry," by Maj. H. B. McClellan, Stuart's adjutant general : 

Early in the morning Col. A. N. Duffie had crossed the Bull Run 
Mountain at Thoroughfare Gap. His orders directed him to encamp 
at Middleburg on the night of the 17th and to proceed the next day 
toward Nolan's Ferry, extending his march to the west as far as 
Snickersville. These orders seem to have contemplated a somewhat 
extended scout by this regiment, on the left flank of General Gregg's 



436 THE ARMY OF THE PVTOMAC. 

division— a hazardous movement in the presence of an enterpr'sing 
endmy. Colonel Duffie reached Thoroughfare Gap at 9:30 a. m., and 
was somewhat delayed in crossing the mountain by the picket from 
Chambliss' command. By eleven o clock, however, he was fairly on 
his way toward Middleburg. At four o'clock, p. m., he struck the 
pickets which Stuart had established for his own safety outside the 
town, and drove them in so quickly that Stuart and his staff were 
compelled to make a retreat more rapid than was consistent with 
dignity and comfort. Having with him no force adequate to contest 
the ground with Duffie's regiment, vSttiart retired towards Rector's 
Crossroads. Munford was notified of his danger, and directed to 
withdraw from Aldie, and Robertson and Chambliss were ordered to 
move immediately upon Middleburg. The only hope for Dufiie's 
regiment now lay in an immediate advance upon Aldie, where he 
might have created considerable commotion by attacking the rear 
of the loth Virginia Cavalry on the Middleburg road. But he did 
not know this, and his orders were positive, requiring him to encamp 
for the night at INIiddleburg. He therefore made the best of his sit- 
uation by dismounting one-half of his regiment behind stone walls 
and barricades, hoping that he might be able to hold his position 
until reenforced from Aldie, whither he sent Capt. Frank Allen to 
make known his situation at brigade headquarters. Captain Allen 
reached Aldie, after encountering many difiiculties, at nine o'clock, 
p. m. He says in his report, "General Kilpatrick informed me that 
his brigade was so worn out that he could not send any reenforce- 
ments to Middleburg, but that he would report the situation of our 
regiment to General Gregg. Returning he said that General Gregg 
had gone to state the facts to General Pleasonton, and directed me 
to remain at Aldie until he heard from General Pleasonton. I re- 
mained, but received no further orders." Thus Colonel DufiBe was 
left to meet his fate. 

At seven o'clock in the evening he was attacked by Robertson's 
brigade. His men fought bravely, and repelled more than one charge 
before they were driven from the town, retiring by the same road by 
which they had advanced. Unfortunately for Duffie, this road was 
now closed by Chambliss' brigade, which surrounded him during 
the night, and captured, early the next morning, the greater part of 
those who had escaped from Robertson on the previous evening. 
Colonel Duffie himself escaped capture, and reached Centerville 
early in the afternoon of the next day, with four of his officers and 
twenty-seven men. He reports the loss in his regiment at 20 officers 
and 24S men. This, however, was an exaggeration of the calamity ; 
for other officers beside himself had taken to the woods, and suc- 
ceeded in making their way back to the Federal lines. On the iSth 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 4V 

and 19th, Major Farrington, who was separated from his regiment 
on the night of the 17th, in Middleburg, thus brought in 2 officers 
and 2T, men; Lieutenant Colonel Thompson brought in 18 men; 
Sergeant Palmer 12 men, and Capt. George N. Bliss 6 men. Color 
Sergeant Robbins, who was wounded and captured, was left in ISIid- 
dleburg, and fell into the hands of his friends when Stuart retired 
from that place. This reduces the loss to 200. 

This regiment was composed of good material, and it rapidly 
recuperated. 

On the 17th of August following it assembled 300 men at War- 
renton, and was attached to Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's division. 

This statement, made by the adjutant general of Stuart, 
IS as high an encomium as could be passed on the valor of 
the ist Rhode Island, and I deem it unnecessary to add 
more. 

Pleasonton followed Stuart as the latter suddenly retired 
tnrough Uppervdlle, where he made a stubborn stand, but 
was finally compelled to fall back through Ashby's Gap. 
Pleasonton then learned from some prisoners that Long- 
street was moving along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge. 

General Lee, in a report to Jefferson Davis, dated Jtme 
18, 1863, says : 

lyongstreet's corps has moved east of the Blue Ridge, with the 
view of creating embarrassment as to our plans, while Ewell, having 
driven the enemj^from Winchester and INIartinsburg, has seized upon 
the Potomac, so as to enable General Hill's corps to move up from 
Fredericksburg. 

Again, General Lee, on the 20th, says : 

General Longstreet's corps, with Stuart's cavalr\-, still occupy 
the Blue Ridge, between the roads leading through Ashby's and 
Snicker's Gaps, holding in check a large force of the enem}-, con- 
sisting of cavalry, infantry and artillery. 

General Ewell was then north of the Potomac at Sharps- 
burg, the battlefield of Antietam, Boonsborough and 
Hagerstown, with Jenkins' cavalry in his advance. Imbo- 
den was actively operating on the left flank of Lee's army. 
A. P. Hill's corps, following in the wake of Ewell, was 



438 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

coming up, and Longstreet was ordered to cross to the west 
side of the Blue Ridge and intrust the gaps to Stuart. 

Here begins one of the most interesting pieces of history 
in connection with the battle of Gettysburg, Lee says : 

General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with 
part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the 
Potomac, and, with the remainder, to cross into Mar3-land, and place 
himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the 
former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage 
of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and 
it was left to his discretion whether to enter ]\Iaryland east or west 
of the Blue Ridge ; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing 
his command on the right of our column as soon as he should per- 
ceive the enemj- moving northwest. 

Stuart at once started on his raid to get between Hooker 
and Washington, hoping thereby, to capture supplies on the 
way to the Union army. He had not much difficulty in 
making the circuit of our army ; but he utterly failed in 
intercepting any provisions or artillery, and was unable to 
rejoin Lee's anny. He finally succeeded in crossing the 
Potomac near Rockville, where he captured an immense 
train with supplies for Hooker's army, which he took with 
him. That compelled him to move so slowh^ that he was 
never able to unite with Lee's army. He was at Carlisle 
on the afternoon of the ist of July, and was not aware that 
a great battle had been fought at Gettysburg that da}\ 

We now turn to Ewell, who had the advance of Lee's 
arm}'. He (Ewell) took the divisions of Rodes and John- 
son, with Jenkins' cavalry brigade, and proceeded through 
Chambersburg to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th. 
Early's division was directed to march from Boonsborough 
to Greenwood, and thence to York. On the 24th Long- 
street and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and 
they arrived at Chambersburg when Ewell reached Carlisle. 
Thus the whole of Lee's army was in the State of Penn- 
sylvania, and the advance guard threatening Harrisburg. 
As yet Lee supposed Hooker was in Virginia. 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 439 

Early was to strike the Northern Central Railroad at 
York, tear it up, and proceed to Wrightsville. As he 
approached the latter place the militia of the State of Penn- 
sylvania retreated across the bridge and fired it, thus pre- 
venting the enemy from crossing to the left bank of the 
Susquehanna. Early then rejoined his corps. 

The movement on Harrisburg was arrested by informa- 
tion given Lee by one of his scouts, who learned that 
Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching 
South Mountain. 

When Pleasonton returned from his reconnoissance of 
the valley from Aldie to Ashby's Gap, and reported that 
Longstreet was on the east side of the Blue Ridge, it 
caused the perplexity that Lee desired and induced Hooker 
to move with great caution. He was all the time con- 
centrating his army near the south bank of the Potomac, 
to cross it rapidly if necessary, as will be seen by the fol- 
lowing : 

Headquarters Army op the Potomac, 
June 22, 1863. 

General Wadsworth is bridging Goose Creek near the pike. Can 
you bridge Goose Creek near the mouth, on a road that will conduct 
to Edwards' Ferry ? 

Daniel Butterfield, Major General, 

To Captain Turnbull, Edwards' Ferry. 

In order to fully express the great anxiety of Hooker 
over the situation, the following official paper is given in 
full: 

Camp near Fairfax Court House, 
June 24, 1863. 
General : — In accordance with your request, I present the fol- 
lowing reasons for moving our army at once to the neighborhood of 
Harper's Ferry : 

1. The whole of Lee's arm 5^ is reported to be on the Potomac, 
above that place, part of it across the river, and threatening an ad- 
vance upon Harrisburg. 

2. There we can protect Washington as well, and Baltimore 
better than here, and preserve our communications and wants of 
supply. 



440 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

3. It is the shortest line to reach Lee's army ; will enable us to 
operate on his communications, if he advances ; to throw overwhelm- 
ing forces on either portion of his army that he allows the river to 
divide ; and is too strong a position for him to attack us in, even if 
we make heavy detachments. 

4. It will enable us to pass South Mountain without fighting 
for the passes, if we wish to move upon him, and will thus destroy 
any advantages these mountains would give as a protection to his 
right flank. 

5. It will prevent Lee from detaching a corps to invade Pennsyl- 
vania with, as it would expose the rest of his army to our attack in 
superior force. 

6. These opinions are based upon the idea that we are not to try 
and go round his army, and drive it out of Mar3-land, as we did last 
year, but to paral3^ze all its movements by threatening its flank and 
rear if it advances, and gain time to collect reenforcements sufficient 
to render its the stronger army of the two, if we are not so already. 

Respectfully submitted. 

G. K. Warren, Brig. Gen. Vols., 
Chief Engineer, Arm}^ of the Potomac. 
Major General Hooker, 

Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

In accordance with the report General Warren made to 
Hooker, he immediately began his preparations to concen- 
trate the army on the north bank of the Potomac, and dis- 
patched General Butterfield to Washington and Baltimore 
to secure as many troops from these two points as possible 
to swell the Army of the Potomac ; when Butterfield ar- 
rived in Washington, he called on Halleck for assistance ; 
but receiving no encouragement from him, he then called 
on the President, who listened earnestly to his statement, 
and at once sent for Plalleck. Halleck said there were no 
troops which were not needed to take care of the property 
and other necessary duty in Washington. Lincoln seemed 
worried, but said to Butterfield : " You hear Halleck's an- 
swer." Butterfield then proceeded to Schenck's headquar- 
ters in Baltimore, where he received a warm reception, 
but was only able to get one brigade (Lockwood's) from 
the forces stationed there. As a matter of course, the force 
at Harper's Ferry Schenck was perfectly willing should be 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 441 

under the authority of Hooker ; but Halleck again inter- 
fered as he did before, when McClellan fought South 
Mountain and Antietam. Halleck then arbitrarily com- 
pelled Miles to remain, even when he knew his forces 
were in danger of being captured. 

It was natural to suppose that he would have yielded 
when the two armies faced each other again, in almost the 
same way they did before the battle of South Mountain ; 
yet he boldly interfered, though aware that Lee's army 
had been increased to its maximum strength. Longstreet's 
corps had received the addition of Pickett's division. Lee 
had urged Davis to strij) the other commands, in order to 
give him an army strong enough to defeat Hooker, with 
the hope that Washington, Baltimore, Harrisburg and 
Philadelphia would be at his mere}'. If he (Lee) could 
have taken Philadelphia, and established his headquarters 
in Independence Hall, the Confederacy would have been 
well nigh assured. Hooker, like IMcClellan, wanted the 
troops in Harper's Ferry subject to his orders, and to be- 
come a part of his army, and to temporarily abandon it 
after the stores were removed. He visited Harper's Ferry, 
and ordered General French, who was in command there, 
to have three days' rations prepared for his men, and be 
prepared on a moment's warning to move Vvath the arm\-. 

Hooker telegraphed Halleck that it was utterly useless 
to leave over 8000 men at that point, after Lee's whole 
army had passed to the north, when he so greatly needed 
the assistance of French in the struggle with Lee, well 
knowing that the two armies must meet and fight a great 
battle in a few days. General Gates, who commanded the 
Ulster Guard, says in his history : 

I have very conclusive evidence of the fact that some recnforce- 
ments arrived to General Lee after "the three corps" had marched 
from Chambersburg, and, in fact, during the battle. This I have in 
the record kept of the marches of the 14th Virginia Regiment, by 
its colonel, James M. Hodges, on the back of a pocket map of the 
State of Virginia, and whose regiment was in the final charge made 



442 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

by Pickett's division (Annistead's brigade), on the third day of July, 
and Colonel Hodges was killed within a hundred feet of me. 

This record shows that Colonel Hodges was at Richmond in ]\Iay. 
June 3 he was at Hanover Junction (Fredericksburg and Richmond 
Railroad). June 8 he left Hanover Junction and crossed the Poto- 
mac on the 25th. On the 2d of July he marched twenty -three miles, 
and "camped within three miles of Gettysburg." He was just in 
time to participate in the closing scenes, and he led his regiment up 
almost to the muzzles of the muskets of my men, through a fire that 
thinned his ranks at every step. 

There need be no further proof added that from nearly 
every point troops had been sent to Lee. This is fully 
demonstrated in the answer of Davis to Lee, when the lat- 
ter sucjo-ested that Beatireg^ard be directed to make a demon- 
stration in the direction of Culpeper to divert Hooker's 
attention from Lee, when Davis informed him that not 
enough troops were left to accomplish such a ptirpose. 

On the 25th the left wing of Hooker's army, composed 
of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, under General 
Reynolds, crossed the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry and 
bivotiacked at Barnesville, Edwards' Ferry, and Jefferson, 
Maryland. 

On the 26th the headquarters of the Army of the Poto- 
mac moved from Fairfax Court House, Virginia, to Pooles- 
ville, Maryland. The other corps rapidly followed the left 
wing across the Potomac, as Hooker then had definite in- 
formation as to the movements of Lee, and the great danger 
of Harrisbtirg being captured and the Pennsylvania Central 
destroyed by the enemy. 

On the 27th Hooker's headquarters were moved from 
Poolesville to Frederick. The First Corps was directed to 
move from Jefferson to Middletown, Maryland ; the Second 
Corps from near Edwards' Ferry to Barnesville, Maryland ; 
the Third Corps from Point of Rocks to Middletown, Mary- 
land ; tlie Fifth Corps to Ballinger's Creek, near Frederick 
City, Maryland ; the Sixth Corps from Dranesville, Virginia, 
to Poolesville, Maryland ; the Twelfth Corps from near the 
mouth of the Monocacy to Knoxville, Maryland ; Buford's 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 443 

cavalry division from Leesbiirg, Virginia, to near Jefferson, 
Maryland ; Gregg's cavalry division from Leesburg toward 
Frederick City, Maryland ; the artillery reserve from 
Poolesville to Frederick, Maryland ; Stahel's cavalry divi- 
sion reached Frederick City, Maryland, and Crawford's 
Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Goose Creek, Virginia, 
to the month of the Monocacy, Maryland. 

Thus, it will be observed that Hooker was rapidly press- 
ing on in the direction of Gettysburg, where the battle was 
fought inside of four days. 

Hooker was displeased that French, commanding a divi- 
sion of fresh troops, should remain idle at Harper's Ferry, 
and he accordingly telegraphed Halleck as follows : 

Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863. 

I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I 
find 10,000 men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of 
no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river ; and so 
far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing in it. As for 
the fortifications, the work of the troops, the}- remain when the 
troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of it for 
them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been 
secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have 
been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the rebels, should 
they return. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of 
War, and His Excellency, the President. 

Joseph Hooker, Major General. 

To Major General HallECK, General in Chief. 

To this dispatch Hooker received a negative answer. 
He then sent the following : 

Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863 — i p. m. 
(Received 3 p. m.) 
My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferr}^ and 
Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy 
in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, res- 
pectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition 
with the means at my disposal, and earnestl}'- request that I may at 
once be relieved from the position I occupy. 

Joseph Hooker, INIajor General. 
To Maj. Gen. H. W. Hali^eck, General-in-Chief. 



444 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Washington, D. C, June 27, 1863 — 8 p. m. 
Your application to be relieved from your present command is re- 
ceived. As you were appointed to this command by the President, 
I have no power to relieve you. Your dispatch has been duly referred 
for Executive action. 

H. \V. HallECK, General-in-Chief. 
To Major General Hooker, Army of the Potomac. 

General Orders, ) War Department, Adjt. Gen.'s Office, 

No. 197. I Washington, June 27, 1863. 

By direction of the President, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker is re- 
lieved from command of the Army of the Potomac, and Maj. Gen. 
George G. Meade is appointed to the command of that army, and 
of the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it. 
By order of the Secretary of War. 

E. D. Townsend, Asst. Adjt. General. 

That evening a special train was sent to Frederick, 
bearing Asst. Adjt. Gen. James A. Hardie with the double 
orders — one relieving Hooker, and the other appointing 
General Meade to the command of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

There were many officers in Washington extremely 
anxious to go to the army, and this was a most acceptable 
opportunity. Besides, it concealed the real motive of 
sending the special train to the army. Notably among the 
number was General Butterfield, who chatted with Hardie 
on the train, little dreaming that he had the order for his 
chief's removal. Nor did Generals Sickles, Marston, or 
any of the other officers have a suspicion that Colonel 
Hardie was on any such important mission. 

When the train arrived at Frederick, Hardie at once 
ordered a conveyance to take him to headquarters. Arriv- 
ing there he handed to Meade the order, and officially 
informed him that he was no longer a corps commander, 
but in supreme command of the Army of the Potomac. 
How steadily he was pressing Hooker's star of fame, and 
how events repeated themselves ! He then went to 
Hooker's headquarters and notified him that he was 
relieved. 



FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK. 445 

On the field of Antietam, Hooker commanded the First 
Corps, and Meade the Pennsylvania Reserves under him. 
When the battle was raging with fury on the right, Mans- 
field was mortally wounded, and Hooker was taken from 
his horse so badly wounded that he was compelled to 
leave the field, IVIeade assumed command of the First 
Corps. Hooker's confidence in Meade is indicated in the 
following farewell order to the Army : 

General Orders, ) Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

No. 66. i June 28, 1863. 

In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated 
June 27, 1863, I relinquish the command of the Army of the Potomac. 
It is transferred to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, a brave and accom- 
plished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of 
this army in many a well-fought field. Impressed with the belief 
that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac 
is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotion. 

The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so manj^ battles is 
relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army 
will never cease nor fail, that it will yield to my successor, as it has 
to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest praj^er that 
the triumphs of its arms may bring success worthy of it and the na- 
tion, I bid it farewell. Joseph Hooker, Major General. 

Hardie remained the next day with the arm}-, and sent 
the following telegram : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Frederick, Md., June 28, 1863 — 2:30 p. m. 
(Received 3:20 p. m.) 
I shall return to-night. I have been waiting for the fonnal is- 
sue of the order of the late commander, before telegraphing. This 
is now written. I have had a chance to ascertain the state of feeling 
and internal condition of the army. There is cause for satisfaction 
with it. The late commander leaves for Baltimore this afternoon. 
Jas. a. Hardie, Asst. Adj. General. 
To Maj Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief 

Hooker was ordered to Baltimore to await orders, 
whither he went immediately after issuing his farewell 
order to the Army of the Potomac. General Gates says, 
that while there on waiting orders he visited Washington, 
and was arrested by Halleck, but was soon released. 



446 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

This unexpected change in the command of the Army 
of the Potomac was made in a very quiet and soldierly 
manner. Great precaution was taken to prevent Hooker, 
as in the case of McClellan, from disobeying the order. 
Neither attempted or thought of anything but entire sub- 
mission to the ^orders from the War Department. Hooker 
was severely criticised for his rashness in tendering his 
resisfnation, and some critics have said that Hooker seized 
upon that pretense to avoid the responsibility of another 
battle with Lee, but that savors of enmity and jealousy. 
Hooker never turned his back on a foe in battle. He was 
goaded to desperation by an enemy in Halleck, who was 
bitterly opposed to his being placed in command of that 
army, and sought every opportunity to disparage and 
cripple his movements. When Hooker was advancing 
north, he was handicapped by orders from Halleck, and 
would have crossed the Potomac days before he did biit 
for the orders of Halleck, and he evidently took advantage 
of Hooker's impetuous request to be relieved with eager- 
ness and gratification, which was evidenced by the fact 
that on the evening of the same day that he received 
Hooker's dispatch, asking to be relieved. Colonel Hardie 
was sent on a special train with the double orders relieving 
Hooker, and placing Meade in command, lest Hooker 
might recall his request by dispatch. 

It is hard to rate Hooker's place in history as a gen- 
eral. He never fought a battle in which he did not only 
display great gallantry on the field, but was successful, 
except Chancellorsville, and in that his plans were equal 
to those of any generals recorded in the military history of 
the world. That they failed in execution is fully known 
to the world. His record in the West afterwards was of the 
most brilliant character. He fought among the clouds on 
Lookout Mountain, and won a fame that shines with a 
golden luster. If he had been victorious at the battle of 
Chancellorsville, he would have rivaled Prince Eugene 
and Turenne in history. 



i 



CHAPTER XII. 

GETTYSBURG. 

ON assuming command of the army Meade issued an 
order so charged with modesty that the excellence 
of his character shines like a diamond through it : 

General Orders, | Hdqrs. Army op the; Potomac, 

No. 67. i June 28, 1863. 

By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby as- 
sume command of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obej-- 
ing this order — an order totally unexpected and unsolicited — I have 
no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army 
to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. 
Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, 
let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests in- 
volved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an 
All-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. 

It is with jiist diffidence that I relieve in the command of this 
army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever 
appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements ; but I rely 
upon the heart}' support of my companions in arms to assist me in 
the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been 
confided to me. 

George G. Meade, 
Major-General, Commanding. 

Feeling the great necessity for active operations against 
the enemy, for Stuart, in command of Lee's cavalry, was 
on Meade's right flank and making desperate efforts to gain 
the head of the columns of the Army of the Potomac in 
order to reach Lee and impart the information he had 
gathered from being on its right flank from Fairfax Court 
House, Meade issued an order, dated the same day, direct- 
ing the army to move the next morning at four o'clock. 

'447 



448 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

As General Hetli, who opened the battle on the Con- 
federate side, has since said : "It was a great misfortune to 
us in that campaign not to have had the benefit of the cav- 
alry service, for it is the eyes and ears of every army." 
lyce was still in the dark as to the whereabouts of his cav- 
alry, or the movements of the Army of the Potomac, 

General Hetli also said : "If Lee had had his cavalry 
with him he would have known the movements of his ad- 
versary ; and if he had been compelled to meet him at Get- 
tysburg he could have concentrated his army there two 
days before and held the choice of positions. As it was, 
we stumbled in there, on the morning of the ist of July, 
when my division was hotly engaged almost immediately." 

It was remarkable foresight and great generalship on 
the part of Meade to throw his army forward with the left 
resting at Emmitsburg, the center at Taneytown, and the 
right at Frizellburg, Union, and New Windsor ; for Stuart 
was again foiled in his attempt to pass Meade's front, and 
was brushed to the right where he encountered Kilpatrick 
at Hanover. 

In the mean time Buford had been ordered by Pleasonton 
to advance to Gettysburg, a central and strategic place 
where the armies would be very likely to concentrate. 

Meade hastening to the front, arrived there the evening 
of the ist day of July, taking up his headquarters near the 
cemetery. Meade's strategy in keeping Lee's infantry and 
cavalry apart surpassed that of Hannibal and Scipio, for 
his achievements were of greater value ; and as the cycle of 
time revolves it will greatly add to his military fame. 

After assuming command of the army on the eve of one 
of the greatest battles recorded in histor}-, the military 
genius he displayed was most remarkable ; and his memory 
richly deserves a monument on that field. 

Hooker had taken the line on the east side of South 
Mountain, because that was the shortest one leading in the 
direction of Gettysburg, which is a little southeast of Cham- 
bersburg, where two of Lee's corps were, and some twenty 




GEN. J. B. CARR. 



GETTYSBURG. 449 

miles distant. He could protect Washington and Balti- 
more, and perhaps prevent Lee from attempting to march 
on Philadelphia, and at the same time more quickly relieve 
Harrisburg, for as yet Hooker had no positive information 
that Lee was concentrating his army at Cashtown, with a 
view of feeling for the advance of the Army of the Potomac. 
When jMeade assumed command he followed out the plans 
of Hooker for the same reasons. If the army had been de- 
bouched through passes in the South Mountain range into 
the Cumberland Valley, and cut off Lee's communication 
with Richmond, he (Lee) might have taken the route 
through Gettysburg to Baltimore, and not onh- endangered 
that citv but Washington. Meade directed the left wine 
under Reynolds, on the ist of July, to march to Gettys- 
burg ; the First Corps arriving about nine o'clock on the 
field where the great battle was fouo^ht. 

We now turn to the Confederate army, and give its 
movements. General Heth, who opened the battle by an 
attack on Buford, made the following statement for this 
history : 

In June. 1863, when Lee's army was moving north down the 
Shenandoah Valle}-, to invade ^Maryland and Penns3lvania, Long- 
street was ordered to hold the gaps in the Blue Ridge, and in turn 
to be relieved of that duty by Stuart, so as to permit him (Long- 
street) to cross the Potomac. Stuart went to Lee and urged him to 
modify his order, so as to permit him (Stuart) to go down the river, 
where he could strike the Federal arni}^ a heav}' blow and cripple 
him. After hearing the appeal of Stuart, he consented to his request, 
providing he would hasten back with what information he gained, 
and take his position on the right flank as it moved northward into 
Pennsylvania. All of which Stuart promptly assented to. When 
the cavalry commander evaded Hooker, and got between him and 
Washington, no opportunity seemed to present itself for him to im- 
pede, or even harass, the Army of the Potomac. When Sluart be- 
gan his movement to return to Lee's right flank, he encountered 
Hancock at Edwards' Ferry, where Stuart himself expected to cross 
the river. That compelled him to go lower down and cross at a ford 
nearer Washington. After he had gained the north bank of the Po- 
tomac, when he made another attempt to join Lee, he agnin struck 
the troops of the Army of the Potomac, and was again compelled to 

XXIX 



450 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

bear to the right in the direction of Hanover, where he came in con- 
tact with another portion of the Union forces causing him consider- 
able delay ; for he had with him an immense wagon train, captured 
near Rockville, which necessarily compelled him to march very 
slowly. He then resumed his march in the direction of York, where 
he hoped to find some of Ewell's command ; but he had suffered 
many delays and was again doomed to disappointment. Then he 
marched in the direction of Carlisle; arriving there he found it oc- 
cupied by State militia. The commanding officer refused to sur- 
render the city, although Stuart threatened to shell it. He was then 
far beyond Lee's army, it being at that time concentrated at Gettys- 
burg and fighting the battle. 

When General Hetli visited Lee's headqnarters, Lee 
asked him, "Harry, where is my cavalry? Where is Stuart? 
J hope nothing has happened to him." Heth said : 

It was a great misfortune tons in that campaign not to have the 
benefit of the cavalry- service, for it is the eyes and ears of every oxxay. 
I attach no blame to Stuart, for he went with the full consent of 
Lee— it is one of the fates of war. If Lee had had his cavalry with 
him, he would have known the movements of his adversar}^, and if 
he had been compelled to meet him at Gettysburg he could have 
concentrated his army there two da^'s before, and held the choice 
of positions. As it was, we stumbled in there on the morning of 
the ist of July, when my division was hotly engaged almost imme- 
diately. Lee was in the dark as to the movements of Hooker, and 
said to me, "If Hooker does not find me, I must find him." Lee 
wanted to fight the battle at Cashtown, with the mountain at 
his back, so his flanks would be well protected ; there he could have 
whipped any army in the world. But not knowing where Hooker 
was he became restive, and began to prepare to concentrate his 
army, for as yet he knew nothing of the movements of the enemy, 
but he well knew that great efforts were being made to bring on a 
battle, and that it must take place soon, so he desired to unite his 
forces at Cashtown. 

So far as the battle of Gettysburg is concerned, that battle was 
fought by my (Heth's) going there after shoes for my division. On 
the 30th of June I directed Pettigrew to take his brigade and go to 
Gettysburg and get some shoes. On arriving near Gettysburg he 
found it occupied by a Union force, so he returned without securing 
any shoes. When he made his report to me on his return I said to 
him there was no considerable force there. Just then Hill came up 
and I said to Pettigrew to repeat to the general what you said to me. 



GETTYSBURG. 451 

After it was stated again by Pettigrew, Hill and m3'self both said 
there were no troops there of an}' moment. I turned to Hill and 
said, " I will take my division and go down there and get the shoes 
myself," which was assented to by him. Arriving near the town I 
saw a few individuals, but yet presumed the enemy was not there 
in force. I ordered my batteries to whale away on the woods for 
half an hour and then stop. Then I ordered Davis to advance on 
the left of the road, while Archer was directed to move through the 
woods on the right. This advance was stubbornly resisted. In fact 
those two brigades suffered most severely. Archer on the right got 
cramped under the brow of a hill with Willoughby Run immediately 
in his rear. The Iron Brigade of Wadsworth's division charging 
down the hill, he was compelled to surrender with a part of his men. 
On the left, while Davis' brigade fought most gallantly, yet a part 
of his command was overpowered in a railroad cut, and were com- 
pelled to surrender. When these two brigades were repulsed I went 
back to my artillery and there found Generals Lee and A. P. Hill. I 
asked his permission to put in my whole division. But he said no, 
th^t Longstreet was not up, and that he did not want to bring on a 
general engagement that day. General Rodes, who was on his way 
to Cashtown heard my cannon, faced by the left flank, and came to 
my assistance. 

General Hill had followed Hetli, with Pender's division, 
and was on the field while Heth was engaged. 

On the 30tli of Jnne Longstreet, who was at Chanibers- 
burg, was ordered to take McLaws' and Hood's divisions 
and proceed to Cashtown, leaving Pickett's division at 
Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Iniboden, 
while Ewell was ordered to countermarch from Carlisle and 
join the army at Cashtown or Gett}sburg. So Lee was 
able, on the evening of the ist of July, to concentrate his 
army in the vicinity of Gettysburg, with the exception of 
Pickett. 

While the Confederate commander had thus thrown 
forward his army to Gettysburg, yet he hoped to lure the 
Army of the Potomac on while he withdrew to Cashtown 
to have the advantage of the mountain at his back, but the 
forces of Buford and Heth meeting on the morning of the 
ist of Jtily, and becoming hotly engaged, dispelled all of 
Lee's hopes of drawing the Union army to Cashtown. 



452 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Meade, on the other hand, while he advanced Reynolds to 
Gettysburg to support Buford, was hoping to fight at Pipe 
Creek. Both were disappointed at the unexpected turn in 
events, and both generals ordered their commands to march 
rapidly on Gettysburg. 

In the forenoon of June 30 Buford entered Gettysburg 
with Gamble's and Devin's brigades ; his reserv^e brigade, 
under General Merritt, was at Mechanicstown guarding 
trains. Soon Buford sighted the enemy, which was Petti- 
grew' s brigade of Heth's division, ordered to Gettysburg to 
get a supply of shoes for A. P. Hill's corps. But Petti- 
grew retired when he saw the forces of Buford, as given in 
the statement of General Heth. 

Early on the morning of July i Gamble's brigade, 
composed of the Sth Illinois, under Maj. John L. Beveridge, 
four companies of the 12th Illinois, and six companies of 
the 3d Indiana, under Col. George H. Chapman, and the 
8th New York, commanded by Lieut. Col. William L. 
Markell, was directed by Buford to move out on the Cash- 
town road to impede the progress of the enemy, wdiich was 
advancing from that direction. About eight o'clock Gam- 
ble's skirmishers notified him that the Confederates were 
advancing in heavy force. Gamble at once reported the 
fact to General Buford, who gave orders for Gamble to ad- 
vance his brigade in line of battle about a mile from the 
seminary in support of the pickets. Tidball's battery, 
2d United States Artiller)^, commanded by Lieutenant 
Calef, was placed in position with a section on each side of 
the Cashtown road, while the other section was placed on 
the right of the left regiment. This battery was composed 
of three-inch rifled guns. Buford says : 

It fought on this occasion as is seldom witnessed. At one time 
the enemy had a concentric fire upon this battery of twelve guns, 
all at short range. Calef held his own gloriously, worked his guns 
deliberately, with great judgment and skill, and with wonderful 
effect upon the enemy. 

Gamble dismounted the troopers of the 12th Illinois, 



GETTYSBURG. 453 

3d Indiana, and half of the Sth New York, and posted 
them behind a stone wall and under cover of trees ; from 
this position they poured a deadly fire into the advancing 
columns of Davis and Archer under Hetli. When the 
enemy pressed them so closely that their horses were in 
danger of capture, they mounted and retired to the next 
ridge in their rear, where the artillery was posted. The 3d 
Indiana remained and fought, with the Wisconsin boys, on 
the right of the Iron Brigade. Devin's brigade, composed 
of the 6th New York, under Maj. William E. Beardsley, 
the 9th New York, commanded by Col. William Sackett, 
the ijtli Pennsylvania, under Josiah H. Kellogg, and two 
companies of the 3d West Virginia, commanded by Capt. 
Seymour B. Conger, was directed to take a position on the 
right of Gamble's brigade. Devin formed with his right 
resting on the Mummasburg road. He sent forward a 
squadron of the 6th New York to the front and left as skir- 
mishers, and picketed the roads to Carlisle, thus establish- 
ing a continuous line from the York road on the extreme 
right. 

Devin held this position until forced back by the Con- 
federates coming up from Heidelberg. He dismounted all 
of his command except the 9th New York, which was 
placed in reserve, and held his position until the Eleventh 
Corps arrived ; then he was directed to mass his brigade on 
the right of the York road, and hold that approach to 
Gettysburg. 

Reynolds gave orders to Wadsworth to march his divi- 
sion as rapidly as possible, as the battle could be distinctly 
heard. Entering Gettysburg, he rode to the Eagle Hotel, 
where he met Peter Culp, a citizen of that place, who was 
acting as a scout for our army. After questioning him 
about the situation, he directed him (Culp) to take him to 
the Lutheran Seminary, where Buford was in the belfry 
watching the battle. Here these two noted genern Is exam- 
ined the field with their field-glasses for a short time, when 
they descended, and walked to the rear of the seminary, 



454 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

in the direction where Gamble was engaged. After a short 
consultation, Reynolds rode to the front as Wadsworth's 
division was arriving, preceding this division as it hurriedly 
passed the seminary to the front where Gamble was engaged. 
Several officers gathered around Reynolds and Buford, as 
they stood viewing the battle between Heth's division and 
Gamble's cavalry ; among the number was Maj. E. P. Hal- 
stead, of Doubleday's staff, and Captain Hall, of the 2d 
Maine Battery. The latter had rode forward with Reynolds 
to get instructions. Hall says : 

I was at Reynolds' side for some little time at the Seminar^' 
Ridge, having gone ahead of my battery at his request, and I rode 
from Seminary Ridge out to the position taken by my guns, some 
half mile beyond the ridge, by his side, and all his remarks and ap- 
pearance he gave me the impression that he had gone there to stay. 

Captain Weld, an aid-de-camp on Reynolds' staff", says : 

At eight o'clock Reynolds and his staff started to the front. On 
the crest of the hills beyond we could see the enemy's guns going 
into position ; a few hurried words from General Buford showed the 
condition of affairs. General Reynolds, turning to me (Weld), said, 
" Ride at once at your utmost speed to General Meade, tell him the 
enemy is advancing in strong force, and I fear he will get to the 
heights beyond the town before I can. I will fight him inch by inch, 
and if driven into the town I will barricade the streets, and hold him 
back as long as possible." 

Cutler's brigade had the lead, and he was directed to 
form his brigade on the right of the Chambersburg pike. 
Then he rode to the left, directed Meredith, who commanded 
the Iron Brigade, to face by the left flank and advance 
through an oak grove, to which Buford reported the enemy 
advancing to take possession. The 2d Wisconsin was in 
advance, and at once formed line of battle, and moved on 
the right of the woods overlapping into the McPherson 
farm, the 7th Wisconsin coming np on its left ; then the 
19th Indiana, with the 24th Michigan on the extreme left 
of the brigade. While the brigade was getting into posi- 
tion Reynolds rode into the edge of the grove, where a 




GEN. ABNER DOUBLEDAV 



GETTYSBURG. 455 

sharpshooter of Archer's brigade mortally wounded him. 
Maj. J. G. Rosengarten, of his staff, says : 

General Reynolds was personalh' attending to the hasty forma- 
tion for the charge of the Iron Brigade when he was fatally wounded 
by one of Archer's skirmishers, at a moment when his aids were 
riding to the various regiments carrying the instructions of the 
general to charge as fast as they arrived. He was immediately 
borne from the field by four of the 76th New York, who carried Rey- 
nolds back to a little stone house on the Emmitsburg road. His 
bearers were INIilo Morgan, Melvin Reed, France Brace, and B F. 
Taylor. He was taken to the seminar}^ first, then to the small brick 
house at the edge of the town, on the Emmitsburg road. 

The country had lost one of its ablest defenders. He had won 
high commendation as an artillery officer in the Mexican war. On 
the Peninsula he displayed great gallantry. In the Second Bull Run, 
in command of the Penns3-lvania Reserves Division, his generalship 
prevented Longstreet from crushing our forces near the Henry House. 

At Fredericksbtirg he commanded the First Corps under 
Franklin on the left, where he again displayed such marked 
military skill that the entire army united in praise of him. 

At the battle of Chancellorsville Reynolds' corps was on 
Stuart's left flank. Reynolds was anxiotis to attack Stuart 
and htirl him from the field, btit he received no orders to 
that effect. He never sought advancement, and twice when 
he was tendered the command of the Army of the Potomac 
he modestly refused it. His star of military fame rose 
evenly, but with remarkable rapidity. True to the inter- 
ests of his superiors, he was no less mindful of those below 
him in rank ; he received the humblest soldier with the 
utmost kindness and consideration. His name is deeply 
ingrafted in the hearts of his countrymen, while his martial 
deeds will be emulated and admired in foreign lands. He 
took in the strong and weak points of a battlefield with the 
keen perception of Charlemagne, although the latter had an 
experience of a thirty-two-year war with the Saxons, while 
Revnolds had only the advantage of the Mexican and some 
two years of the late war, yet his generalship impressed all 
with the fact that he was a great soldier. 



456 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Biiford and Reynolds are as much entitled to the honor 
of selecting- Gettysburg as the field on which to fight the 
battle as anyone else. Taking in the situation, they threw 
their forces in front of Lee's columns and stubbornly resisted 
the advance of the Confederate army. They had both 
passed over Pipe Creek and had noted its advantages. 
When they arrived at Gettysburg they saw the value of that 
position, and both resolved to compel Lee to fight there. 
If they had chosen the Pipe Creek position rather than 
Gettysburg, they would have slowly fallen back and allowed 
Lee to have followed to Pipe Creek, for Reynolds sent a 
message to Meade that he (Reynolds) was not ordered to 
bring on a battle, but that he had decided to hold the enemy 
in check until he (Meade) could come up and decide the 
matter himself. When Howard arrived on the field the 
First Corps had been fighting about three hours, and nearly 
two brigades of Heth's division had been captured with 
Generals Archer and Davis. When Reynolds fell Double- 
day, who was in command of the First Corps, carried out 
Reynolds' ideas and held the line where the dying general 
directed the First Corps to go into action. It would seem 
only fair to presume, therefore, that Doubleday was entitled 
to at least as much credit for selectins: Gettvsburg^ as 
Howard, who came on the field after Lee, Hill, Heth, and 
Pender were there, and two of Ewell's divisions close at 
hand. ]\Ieade was unaware of the situation at the front. 
He had the fullest confidence in Reynolds, whom he had 
placed in command of the left wing and given the advance. 
When Meade learned that Reynolds was killed he sent 
Hancock forward to select a place to fight the battle ; that 
at once was evidence enough that, while he considered Pipe 
Creek a good position to meet the enemy, he desired to ob- 
tain the best place. A position cannot be selected to fight 
a battle after it has been raging for three to four hours ; the 
time to .select it is before the armies meet. General Bank- 
head says, "No one selected Gettysburg; the two armies 
met there and immediately prepared for action." When 




Q/^ cr^y ], // ^7di^ <^-(/UU^J^ 



CCi^c^iJ 



:> 



GETTYSBURG. 457 

Reynolds fell he was in front of the Iron Brigade, nearly 
on a line with the left of the 2d Wisconsin and the right of 
the 7tli Wisconsin as they advanced. When he was borne 
to the rear in a dying condition a deep shudder passed over 
the troops, for they not only dearly loved him, but had 
great confidence in his ability. Gen. John C. Robinson, 
who commanded a division in the First Corps, said to me 
that, "If Reynolds had lived there would have been a differ- 
ent history of that battle." 

Col. Lucius Fairchild, who was in command of the 2d 
Wisconsin, observing the effect of Reynolds' death on the 
soldiers, sprang forward and led his regiment in the charge 
in obedience to General Reynolds' order, which had just 
been given. The regiment had advanced but a short dis- 
tance when Lieutenant Colonel Stevens was killed. A low 
place in the woods that bore off to the left in the direction 
of Willoughby Run was passed, and as the regiment was 
ascending the rise on the other side of that low place Fair- 
child was wounded in the right arm and was compelled, on 
account of great loss of blood, to leave the field and turn the 
command of the regiment over to Major Mansfield. Fair- 
child was taken back to Gettysburg, where his arm was 
amputated that afternoon. When our forces were driven 
back through the town Fairchild had the soldiers in the 
house with him carry him out in a chair on the porch, and 
as the 2d Wisconsin passed he waved his left hand and said 
to his regiment, "Give it to them, boys ; we must win this 
battle. " The 7th Wisconsin swept into the woods and soon 
came abreast with the 2d, while the 19th Indiana was com- 
ing up at a rapid pace. The last-named regiment had been 
on picket duty the night before and their guns were loaded, 
while the Wisconsin regiments and the 24th Michigan were 
compelled to load as they advanced. 

While the 7th Wisconsin was forming in the field east 
of the grove where Reynolds was killed, the first infantry 
soldier wounded on the Union side was Capt. L. E. Pond, 
Company E, of this command. He was a gallant soldier, 



458 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and has since served his State in its Senate, where he pro- 
cured an appropriation to erect monuments to tlie memory 
of those from Wisconsin, who fell at Gettysburg in that 
memorable battle. President Harrison selected him as the 
agent to pay the soldiers at the Milwaukee Agency. 

The 19th Indiana and 24th INIichigan had an open field 
to advance through, consequently they rapidly gained on 
the Wisconsin regiments on the right, because Archer's 
brigade was heavier in the front of the 2d and 7th Wis- 
consin, and was making a desperate struggle to hold the 
ridge in the woods on the right bank of Willoughby Run, 
but as the Iron Brigade rushed on, Archer's men were 
forced under the bluff, with the Wisconsin regiments 
closely pursuing them. The force in front of the 19th 
Indiana and 24th Michigan gave way and crowded under 
the bluff with the center and left of Archer's brigade. 
Then the 19th Indiana and 24th IMichigan were thrown 
forward on Archer's right flank. The brigade then formed 
in its new position two sides of a square, with Archer 
hemmed in the bend of Willoughby Run, which was at 
his back ; the Wisconsin regiments facing him and coming 
down the bluff, while the 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan 
were on his right flank ready to enfilade him at short 
range. Under these circumstances Archer decided to sur- 
render, as the movement had been made so quickly that 
he had been unable to notify Heth of his perilous posi- 
tion, and his surrender took place at once. Col. D. B. 
Dailey, then a lieutenant, and aid on General ]\Ieredith's 
staff was the person to whom Archer delivered his sword, 
and surrendered at Gett)sburg ; but to Private Patrick 
Maloney, of Co. G, 2d Wisconsin Infantr\-, belongs the 
credit of overtaking and capturing him. Dailey was an 
officer of Co. B, 2d Wisconsin Infantry, at the time. His 
company was on the right of the regiment, and the reg- 
iment on right of brigade, in that engagement. Just as 
Archer's men broke in front of his company, the lines were 
within fifteen paces of one another. General Archer was 



GETTYSBURG. 459 

with the left of his command. After the contest was over, 
his company had fairly reached the edge of the woods 
when General Archer's line gave way. They pursued 
them vigorously, and captured Archer with a number of 
his men, about thirty paces west of Willoughby's Run. 
Patrick Maloney, the brave, patriotic and fervent young 
Irishman, doubly risked his life for the capture of Archer, 
by going in advance of his comrades and among the fleeing 
Confederates, for the sake of his prize. Archer at first 
resisted arrest, but soon Maloney had help, and the sullen 
general was subdued. When Dailey arrived on the spot, 
General Archer appealed to him for j)rotection from 
Maloney. He then requested him to give him his sword 
and belt, which he did with great reluctance, saying that 
courtesy permitted him to retain his side arms. Dailey di- 
rected that he be taken back to General Meredith's head- 
quarters ; which was the last he saw of him. General 
Archer's sword being much lighter than his own, he put it 
on and sent his to the rear. About four o'clock in the 
afternoon of that day he was severely wounded, and was 
carried into the house of a Mr. Scott in Gettysburg, where 
he found the late Col. Henry A. IMorrow, of the 24th 
Michigan, who was also wounded. He could not have 
been in the house more than ten minutes before he heard 
the cry : "The enemy is coming." He immediately un- 
buckled his lately acquired trophy, and handed it to a 
young lady of the house, whom he afterwards learned was 
Miss Mary McAllister, and who did as much to alleviate 
the suffering of our soldiers during and after the battle as 
any lady in Gettysburg, where she still resides, with the 
request that she conceal it if possible ; telling her that it 
was General Archer's sword. With characteristic prompt- 
ness and fidelity, she took the sword and belt, threw them 
into a wood -box in the parlor; carelessly throwing a news- 
paper over them, where they lay until after the battle. 
Dailey and other wounded were taken from the house by a 
Confederate guard, and carried to their rear ; during Gen- 



460 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

eral Pickett's charge they were under the fire of our own 
artillery, and many of our men being wounded, they re- 
'quested Colonel Jenks, who had charge of the prisoners, to 
remove them farther back. His reply was that he could 
not do so without orders. On the night of the 4th, while 
in camp midway between Gettysburg and Millerstown, he 
made an arrangement with two of the 7th Virginia In- 
fantry, who were guarding them, to escape, but as the op- 
portune moment approached, the guard was doubled and 
their plans thwarted. On the night of the 5th, while the 
enemy was rapidly retreating over the ridge leading to the 
Hagerstown Valley, he eluded the guard by leaving the 
road and taking shelter in the dense timber and under- 
brush. There he remained until the afternoon of the 6th. 
When the rear of the enemy had entirely passed over into 
the valley, he made his way slowly, and with great diffi- 
culty, back to Gettysburg, and to the house of Miss Mary 
McAllister, who informed him that Colonel Morrow had 
taken his sword and belt, with the promise to her, that he 
should have them on his return. After remaining a few 
days at Gettysburg, he set out for his command and over- 
took it at South Mountain, where he received the sword 
from Colonel Morrow. In the fall of that year, while in 
the vicinity of Rappahannock Station, he presented the 
sword and belt to General Meredith, who commanded 
the Iron Brigade in its memorable and deadly combat with 
Archer, but it was returned to him after IMeredith's death 
and he still has it. 

General Doubleday rode up, and as he knew Archer 
well, he in his gentle and affectionate way, offered to shake 
hands, and said, "General Archer, I am glad to meet you." 
Archer refused Doubleday' s hand, and said, " I am not 
glad to meet you, sir." 

Tlic great success of the Iron Brigade liad thrown it far 
ahead of Cutler's brigvide on the right of tlie Chanibcrsburg 
pike. Captain Richardson, of the brigade staff, then brought 
the order from General Meredith to retire the two left regi- 




gp:n. r. r. dawEvS. 



GETTYSBURG. 461 

ments to the east side of Willoughby Run and to prolong 
the new line he was forming. In that movement the 7th 
Wisconsin took the right of the brigade, while the 19th 
Indiana changed position with the 24th Michigan, and took 
the left of the brigade. It was then back near midway in 
the grove, where it halted for orders. While the Iron 
Brigade had been successful in capturing Archer in the 
woods. Cutler's brigade had suffered severely. Cutler 
put the brigade in line of battle with the 76th New 
York on the right, the 56th Pennsylvania on its left, 
and the i47tli New York between the 56th Pennsyl- 
vania and the railroad cut and the Chambersburg pike, 
which runs through Cashtown, where Reynolds had 
posted James A. Hall's Maine Battery. The brigade 
was divided, and Colonel E. B. Fowler was sent to the 
left of the railroad cut with his own regiment, the 14th 
Brooklyn, and the 95th New York, under Colonel George 
H. Biddle. Thus five of Cutler's regiments were in line 
of battle, while the remaining regiment, the 7th Indiana, 
under Colonel Ira G. Grover, was guarding the train 
from Marsh Creek to Gettysburg ; it was not therefore on 
the field the first day of the battle. Hall, in his report, 
says : 

At nine a. m. marched, following the advance brigade of the First 
Division, First Corps, to the battlefield, about a half mile south and 
west of town, where we were ordered into position by General Re}'- 
nolds on the right of the Cashtown road, some 400 yards beyond 
Seminary Hill. The enemy had previously opened a balterj- of six 
guns directh' in our front at 1,303 yards distance, which they con- 
centrated upon me as I went into position, but with ver}- little ef- 
fect. We opened upon this battery with shot and shell at 10:45 
a. m., our first six shots causing the enemy to change the position 
of two of his guns and place them under cover behind a barn. In 
twenty-five minutes from the time he opened fire, a colunni of the 
enemy's infantry charged up a ravine on our right flank, within 
sixty yards of m}^ right piece, when they commenced shooting 
down my horses and wounding my men. I ordered the right and 
center sections to open upon the column with canister, and kept the 
left firing upon the enemy's artillery. This canister fire was very 



462 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

effective, and broke the charge of the enem}^ when just at this mo- 
ment, to my surprise, I saw my support falling back without any 
order having been given me to retire. Feeling that if the position 
was too advanced for infantry it was equally so for artillerj^ I or- 
dered the battery to retire b}- sections, although having no order to 
do so. The support falling back rapidly, the right section of the 
battery which I ordered to take position some seventy-five yards to 
the rear, to cover the retiring of the other four pieces, was charged 
upon by the enemy's skirmishers and four of the horses from one of 
the guns shot. The men of the section dragged this gun off by hand. 
As the last piece of the battery was coming away, all its horses 
were shot, and I was about to return for it myself when General 
Wadsworth gave me a peremptory order to lose no time, but get my 
battery in position near the town on the heights to cover the retir- 
ing of the troops. 

The force of the enemy which attacked HalPs battery 
also struck the three regiments under Cutler on the right 
of the railroad cut. The 76th New York, on the right, suf- 
fered so heavily from an enfilading fire from the right that 
Major Grover, in command of the regiment, ordered the 
right wing to change front to the rear to oppose the new 
force. Simultaneously with that he fell inortally wounded, 
and the brigade commander ordered the regiment to fall 
back. This was done in good order, and the line reformed 
on the railroad track near the seminar}'. Colonel Hofmanh 
retired the 56th Pennsylvania under the same order and at 
the same time. The 147th New York, on the left of the 
56th Pennsylvania, received the order to retire, but just at 
that moment Lieut. Col. Francis C. Miller, who was in 
command, was wounded and unable to repeat the order to 
]\Iajor Harney, who immediately asstimed command. Gen- 
eral Doubleday says the regiment lost 207 killed and 
wounded out of 380. At that time the regiment was un- 
aware that an order had been given to retire with the other 
regiments on the right. All the reports of the officers, in- 
cluding General Doubleday' s, assert that the regiment held 
its ground most bravely, and that it was hemmed in while 
thus fighting until relieved subsequently by the movement 
of the 14th Brooklyn, 95th New York, and 6th Wisconsin. 




gi-:n. j. v. pierce. 



GETTYSBURG. 463 

To these reports the surviving members of the regiment 
strenuously object. They claim they were never relieved 
as reported. Gen. J. V. Pierce, then captain in the regi- 
ment, made the following statement on the field in the pres- 
ence of General Dawes, who commanded the 6th Wiscon- 
sin, and to the latter regiment is given the honor and credit 
of securing the remnant of the 147th New York. At the 
time there was no official report made of the operations of 
that regiment at Gettysburg. I quote from General Pierce's 
statement, made at the railroad cut in 1888 in presence of 
hundreds. He says : 

The firing of the enemy in my immediate front slackened and 
the enemy retired toward the right. I moved my men forward with 
the men of Company C, and discovered a line of Confederate skir- 
mishers on our front advancing from the valley up a slope toward a 
rail fence, firing as they advanced into Hall's battery, while the bat- 
tery was fighting for dear life. A detachment of Confederates gath- 
ered in a fence corner a short distance beyond the cut. I imme- 
diately ordered, "Left oblique, fire " The order was responded to 
by the two left companies, G and C. Several rounds were fired into 
the skirmish lines. It became too hot, and I saw them return down 
the hill with several of their number stretched on the hillside. 
Hall's battery had been fighting that skirmish line in a death grap- 
ple. Artiller}^ against skirmishers is like shooting mosquitoes 
with a rifle. The Confederate skirmishers had the best of it up to 
the time the left of the 147th Regiment opened on them. The 
moment the battery was relieved from the force of the attack it be- 
gan to limber to the rear, and as the Confederate skirmishers fell 
back the batterj' disappeared in a cloud of dust up Chambersburg 
pike. While this was taking place on the left, the battle reopened 
on the right with redoubled fury, and the cry came. down the line, 
"They are flanking us on the right." The right companies, by 
Major Harney's orders, swung back on the south side of the rail 
fence ; the left front of the regiment was relieved of pressure from 
the eneni}-, who either la5' concealed close under the ridge near the 
west end of the railroad cut, or had passed toward our right to crush 
that. The fight was again fierce and hot ; the boys on the right were 
falling like autumn leaves ; the air was full of lead. Men fell all 
along the line. 

I saw an officer ride down from Oak Hill in our rear and wave 
his cap in retreat. To venture into this maelstrom between the rail- 



464 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 

road cut and that fence on the right was death. Fierce flamed the 
fire around the altar of the Union from the guns of the 147th New 
York. The smoke of carnage rose as an incense and wrapped the 
folds of the flag defended within its shortened lines. Not a man 
flinched; none left the field except the wounded; the untouched 
living and the dead remained. 

You may point to Thermopylae and its Spartans, but a greater 
Thermopylae was here, and a more than Spartan heroism stood 
within the dead angle on this ground. Never was a grander fight 
made against triple odds ; never greater readiness to do and die on 
duty's line; never greater results hung trembling in the balance than 
swaj-ed in the battle front of the 147th New York. Shall the battle of 
Gettysburg be fought ? vShall the high tide of the Rebellion ebb from 
these fields into the peaceful waters at Appomattox ? Shall foreign 
nations recogn ize the Confederacy ? Shall the great struggle be fought 
now and here to a finish ? The answer came back from the smoking 
guns of the 147th New York : " Our whole duty shall be done. We 
are here to staj-." 

Closer pressed the enemy. A regiment, the 55th North Carolina, 
was pressing far to our right and rear and came over to the south side 
of the rail fence, their colors drooped to the front. An ofiicer in front 
of the center corrected the alignment as if passing in review. It was 
the finest exhibition of discipline and drill I ever saw before or 
since on the battlefield. The battery was gone from our left; the 
signal was repeated by an aid-de-camp from Wadsworth's staff". 
Gallant Harney recognized the signal and gave the command, " In 
retreat, march!" As I started with my men to the rear I found 
Edwin Aylsworth mortally wounded, who begged me not to leave 
him. I stopped, and with the sergeant, Peter Sliuttz, assisted him 
to his feet and tried to carry him, but could not, and had to lay him 
down. His piteous appeal, "Don't leave me, boys," has rung in 
my ears and lived in my memory these five and twent}' years. 

Sergeant Shuttz was killed soon after near Oak Ridge. The 
time spent in assisting A^-lsworth delayed me so I was among the 
last to leave the field. 

Finding the enemy so close upon us and the wa}' open the route 
we came in by, I followed several of my men into the railroad cut. 
A squad of Confederates were at the west end of the cut behind 
some rails, and as we struck the bottom of that railroad cut saluted 
us with all their guns, and everyone loaded with bullets. I did not 
stay to dispute possession, for they cvidenth' intended " to welcome 
us Yanks with bloody hands to hospitable graves," and I climbed 
uj) the rocky face of the cut on the south side, and made my way 
with many of our men across the meadow between the railroad cut 




CAPT. L. E. POND. 



1 



/ 



GETTYSBURG. 465 

and the Chambersburg pike ; crossed the pike into a small peach 
orchard and overtook the colors in the hands of Sergt. \Vm. A. 
Wybern. Just as I joined him he received a shot and fell on the 
colors as if dead. I tried to remove them, but he held to them with 
true Irish grit; I commanded him to let go, and to my surprise 
he answered, " Hold on, I'll be up in a minute !" rolled over and 
staggered to his feet and carried them all through the fight, and 
was breveted for his courage. 

Both statements are given to the public, so that the his- 
tory will be entirely impartial. 

Col. E. B. Fowler, who was in command of the 14th 
Brooklyn and 95th New York, observed the retreat of Cut- 
ler to Seminary Ridge, retired his two regiments until on 
a line with the railroad cut, then, changing front, he marched 
in the direction of it. The Confederates changed front to 
meet him and gained the cut before Fowler did, and imme- 
diately occtipied it. In the mean time the 6th Wisconsin 
had been ordered to that point to assist Cutler in retaking 
the ground he had lost on the right of the cut. General 
Dawes says : 

We could see that the thin regiments of Cutler's brigade, beyond 
the turnpike, were being almost destroyed. The rebel line swayed 
and bent, and the men suddenly stopped firing and ran into the rail- 
road cut, which is parallel to the Cashtown turnpike. I now ordered 
the men to climb over the turnpike fences and advance upon them. 
I was not aware of the existence of a railroad cut, and mistook the 
maneuver of the enemy for a retreat, but was soon undeceived by 
the heavy fire which they began at once to pour upon us from their 
cover in the cut. Capt. John Ticknor, a dashing soldier, one of our 
finest officers, fell dead while climbing the second fence, and others 
were struck, but the line pushed on. When over the fences and in 
the field, and subjected to an infernal fire, I saw the 95th New York 
Regiment coming gallantly into line upon our left. I did not then 
know or care where they came from, but was rejoiced to see them. 
Farther to the left was the 14th Brooklyn Regiment, but we were 
ignorant of the fact. The 95th New York had about 100 men in ac- 
tion. Maj. Edward Pye appeared to be in command. Running 
hastily to the major, I said, "We must charge," and asked him if 
they were with us. The gallant major replied, " Charge it is," and 
they were with us to the end. " Forward, charge ! " was the order 
XXX 



466 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

given by both the major and myself. We were now receiving a fear- 
fully destructive fire from the hidden enemy. Men who had been 
shot were leaving the ranks in crowds. Any correct picture of this 
charge would represent a V-shaped crowd of men with the colors at 
the advance point, moving firmly and hurriedly forward, while the 
whole field behind is streaming with men who had been shot, and 
who are struggling to the rear or sinking in death upon the ground. 
The onl}' commands I gave, as we advanced, were "Align on the 
colors ! Close up on that color ! Close up on that color ! "' The regi- 
ment was being broken up so that this order alone could hold the 
body together. Meanwhile the colors were down upon the ground 
several times, but were raised at once by the heroes of the color 
guard. Not one of the guard escaped, every man being killed or 
wounded. Four hundred and twenty men started as a regiment 
from the turnpike fence, of whom 240 reached the railroad cut. Years 
afterwards I found the distance passed over to be 175 paces. Every 
oSicer proved himself brave, true, and heroic in encouraging the 
men to breast this deadly storm, but the real impetus was the eager, 
determined valor of the men who carried muskets in the ranks. The 
rebel colors could be seen waving defiantl}' just above the edge of the 
railroad cut. A heroic ambition to capture it took possession of 
several of our men. Corporal Eggleston, of Company H, a mere 
boy, sprang forward to seize it, and was shot dead the moment his 
hand touched the colors. Private Anderson, of his compan}-, furious 
at the killing of his brave 3'oung comrade, recked little for the rebel 
colors, but he swung aloft his musket and with a terrific blow split 
the skull of the rebel who had shot young Eggleston. This soldier 
was well known in the regiment as " Rocky Mountain Anderson." 
Lieutenant Remington was severely wounded in the shoulder while 
reaching for the colors. Into this deadly melee rushed Corp. 
Francis A. Waller, who seized and held the rebel battle-flag. His 
name will remain upon the historic record, as he received from Con- 
gress a medal for this deed. 

It would require many pages to justly recount the heroic deeds 
of all, but one incident is so touching in its character that it should 
be preserved. Corp. James Kelly, of Company B, turned from the 
ranks, and stepped beside me, as we both moved hurriedly forward 
on the charge. He pulled open his woolen shirt, and a mark where 
the deadly minnie ball had entered his breast was visible. He said : 
" Colonel, won't you please write to my folks that I died a soldier?" 

My first notice that we were immediately upon the enemy was 
a general cry from our men of : " Throw down your muskets. Down 
with your muskets." Running quickly forward through the line of 
men, I found myself face to face with at least a thousand rebels. 



GETTYSBURG. 467 

whom I looked down upon in the railroad cut, which was here about 
four feet deep. Adjutant Brooks, equal to the emergency, had 
quickly placed men across the cut in position to fire through it. I 
have always congratulated m3'self upon getting in the first word. I 
shouted : " Where is the colonel of this regiment ?" An ofiicer in 
gray, with stars on his collar, who stood among the men in the cut, 
said: " Who are j-ou ?" I said : " I am commander of this regiment. 
Surrender, or I will fire on you." The officer replied not a word, but 
promptly handed me his sword, and all his men, who still held them, 
threw down their muskets. The coolness, self-possession, and dis- 
cipline which held back our men from pouring in a volley saved a 
hundred lives, and as my mind goes back to the fearful excitement 
of that moment, I marvel at it. The fighting around the rebel colors 
had not entirel}- ceased when this surrender was demanded. I took 
the sword. It would have been the handsome thing to say, " Keep 
your sword, sir," but I was new to such occasions, and, when six 
other officers came up and handed me their swords, I took them also, 
and held the awkward bundle in my arms until relieved by Adjutant 
Brooks. I directed the officer in command, who proved to be Maj. 
John A. Blair, of the 2d ISIississippi Regiment, to have his men fall 
in without arms. He gave the command, and his men, to the num- 
ber of 7 officers and 225 enlisted men, obeyed. To our major, John 
F. Hauser, I assigned the duty of marching this bod}^ to the provost 
guard. Major Hauser, a thorough soldier, had been educated at a 
militar}' school at Thun, Switzerland, and he had served with Gari- 
baldi. His shout of " Forwarts, forwarts," as we charged, is well 
remembered b3- all of us who yet survive. 

Corporal Waller now brought me the captured battle-flag. It 
was the flag of the 2d Mississippi Volunteers, one of the oldest and 
most distinguished regiments in the Confederate army. It belonged 
to the brigade commanded by the nephew of Jefferson Davis. It is 
a rule in battle never to allow sound men to leave the ranks. Serg. 
William Evans, a brave and true man, had been severel}' wounded 
in the thighs. He had to use two muskets as crutches. To him I 
intrusted the keeping of the battle-flag. Wrapping the flag around 
his bod^', he started for Gettysburg. Weak and faint from loss of 
blood, he became exhausted in the street. Brave and faithful friends 
came to his relief Two 3'oung women assisted the wounded soldier 
to their home, and placed him upon a bed. The Union troops had 
then begun to retreat in confusion through the town, and the cheers 
of the victorious enemy could be plainly heard. Evans begged of 
his friends to hide the rebel flag. They cut a hole in the bed-tick 
beneath him. and, thrusting in the flag, sewed up the rent. The 
flag was soaked with Evans' blood, where he had lain upon it, but 



468 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

it was safely concealed until the enemy had retreated from Gettys- 
burg, and on the morning of July 4 he brought his precious trophy 
to Gulp's Hill. 

Adjutant Brooks buckled on one of the captured swords, but 
the other six were given to a wounded man to be delivered to our 
chief surgeon. The enemy, when they took the town, captured the 
hospital and the swords. No discredit to the doctor is implied, as 
his hands were full of work with wounded men. 

There was now a lull in the battle. Our comrades of the Iron 
Brigade, who had charged so brilliantly into the INIcPherson Woods, 
had been, according to their usual custom, completely victorious. 
They had routed Archer's brigade, capturing its commander and 
many of its men, and then changed front to move to the relief of 
Cutler ; but the charge upon the railroad cut, and its success, pre- 
vented that necessity. By this charge upon the cut Joseph R. Davis' 
brigade was captured or scattered. Wadsworth's division* had 
bravely opened the battle. They had fairly defeated, upon an open 
field, a superior force of the veterans of the army of General Lee. 
It was a short, sharp, and desperate fight, but the honors were with 
the boys in blue. In his official report General Doubleday says that 
when Cutler's regiments were overpowered and driven back "the 
moment was acritical one, involving the defeat, perhaps theutterrout, 
of our forces." Defeat was never more swiftly turned into victory. 

The general falls into the time-honored line of battle fiction, 
vi'hen he says that the cut was "carried at the point of theba3'onet." 
Not a single bayonet was fixed for use in the regiment. He saj^'S 
also that " two rebel regiments, with their battle-flags," were cap- 
tured. There was really only one regiment captured as an organi- 
zation, and only a part of that. One of our punsters, however, has 
said it was a " major " part. The 95th New York took prisoners, as 
did also the 14th Brooklyn. All the troops in the railroad cut threw 
down their muskets, and the men either surrendered themselves, or 
ran awaj^ out of the other end of the cut. Later in the day we 
marched throiigh this railroad cut, and at least one thousand mus- 
kets lay in the bottom of it. 

During the brief period of quiet on the battlefield, we moved 
into a piece of timber on the Seminary Ridge, just north of the deep 
railroad cut through that ridge, and here half an hour was spent in 
organizing the shattered companies. Seven of the twelve company 
commanders had been shot in the battle : 

*The activity, efficiency, and, if I may so express it, ubiquity, of Gen. James 
S. Wadsworth in the battle was remarkable. He was of venerable and command- 
ing appearance, and was absolutely fearless in exposing himself to danger. 




COL. GEORGE N. REICHARD. 



GETTYSBURG. 469 

Capt. John Ticknor,* Company K, killed ; Lieut. O. D. Chap- 
man, Company C, killed ; Lieut. Howard F. Pruyn, Company A, 
wounded ; Lieut. W. M. Remington, Company K, wounded ; Lieut. 
John Beeley, Company H, wounded ; Lieut. Lloyd G. Harris, (now a 
banker in St. Louis, Mo.) Brigade Guard No. i, wounded ; Lieut. 
Levi Showalter, Brigade Guard No. 2, woixnded. 



When the nephew of Jefferson Davis was captured, that 
gave Cutler a chance to reform his lines. But it was evi- 
dent to Doubleday that he could not hold that ridge with 
only two brigades which had already suffered greatly, and 
as heavy lines of the enemy could be seen advancing, 
Doubleday directed Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, who then 
commanded the Third Division after Dotibleday assumed 
command of the corps, to put Col. Roy Stone's brigade in 
between Meredith and Cutler. That was a small brigade, 
composed of three regiments : the 143d Pennsylvania, under 
Col. Edmund L. Dana, 149th Pennsylvania, commanded by 
Lieut. Col. Walton Dwight, and the 150th Pennsylvania, 
under Col. Langhorne Wister. Col. Roy Stone had been a 
captain in the Bucktail Regiment in the Pennsylvania Re- 
serve Division, and was given permission by the Governor 
to recruit a brigade of a similar organization, the 149th and 
150th Regiments, the members of which wore bucktails on 
their caps the same as the original regiment of the Pennsyl- 
vania Reserves did. Until after the battle of Gettysburg 
there was considerable feeling over the regiments in Roy 
Stone's brigade wearing the distinguished insignia worn by 
the regiment which was enlisted early in the war, and the 
149th and 150th Regiments were dubbed by the First Buck- 

* The line officers, in addition to this list, were : Capt. J. H. Marston, com- 
manded Company E ; Lieut. Michael Mangan, Company E, lost a leg ; Lieut. Oscar 
Graetz, commanded Company F ; Capt. Thomas Kerr, commanded Company D ; 
Lieut. James L. Converse, commanded Company G ; Lieut. John Tlmmons, Com- 
pany G; Lieut. H. B. Merchant, Company H, wounded; Lieut. Earl M. Roger^, 
commanded Company I ; Lieut. Howard J. Huntington, Company A ; Lieut. Wm. 
Golterman, Company F ; Capt. R. P. Converse, commanded Company B ; Lieut. C. 
P. Hyatt, Company B. 



470 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

tails as the bogus Bucktails. The gallant and heroic part 
taken by Roy Stone's brigade in that famous battle was so 
fully recognized by their comrades who originally wore that 
conspicuous mark on their caps, that all asperities soon dis- 
appeared and nothing was thought of but the common good 
of the country. 

The First Brigade of the Third Division, under the 
command of Col. Chapman Biddle, was directed to take a 
position on the left of the Iron Brigade e7i echelon., with the 
following formation : The I42d Pennsylvania, commanded 
by Col. Robert P. Cummins, on the right ; the 20th New 
York, under Col. Theodore P. Gates, in the center ; and the 
12 1st Pennsylvania, commanded by Maj. Alexander Biddle, 
on the left. The 151st Pennsylvania, under the command 
of Lieut. Col. George F. McFarland, had been detached, 
like the 6th Wisconsin, and held in reserve near the semi- 
nary, lest another contingency might arise like the one at 
the railroad cut, where the 6th Wisconsin changed defeat 
into victory in a very few minutes. Capt. James H. Cooper's 
Pennsylvania Battery was directed to take a position on the 
left of the i42d Pennsylvania and on the right of the 20th 
New York. Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery of the 
First Corps, directed Cooper to open on a battery in the 
direction of the Cashtown road that was engaged with Hall's 
artillery. While Doubleday had thus put in these two divi- 
sions of the First Corps, the second one, under Gen. John 
C. Robinson, was in reserve near the seminary. 

A lull had come in the action for the reason that Heth's 
two brigades, which had been advanced, were badly cut up, 
and Archer captured. Lee, who was with Heth and Hill, 
hesitated to permit Heth to again attack, even with Pender 
in supporting distance. A new danger now began to 
threaten the First Corps ; Ewell, whose headquarters on the 
night of the 30th was at Heidelberg, received orders from 
General Lee to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg, as cir- 
cumstances might dictate. Rodes' division was at Heidel- 
berg, Early's three miles off, on the road to Berlin, and 



GETTYSBURG. 471 

Johnson's, with Colonel Brown's reserve artillery, between 
Green Village and Scotland. The next morning Ewell 
started with Rodes' division for Cashtown, and at the same 
time he ordered Early to move by the way of Hunterstown. 
When Ewell was near Middletown he received information 
from Hill that he was moving on Gettysburg. Ewell im- 
mediately changed direction and took the Middletown road 
for Gettysburg with Rodes, while he directed Early to take 
the Heidelberg road. Ewell, at the same time, notified Lee 
of his new movements ; he was answered by the latter that 
if he (Ewell) found the enemy in strong force he did not 
desire him to bring on a general engagement. While Ewell 
was receiving the message he could distinctly hear the 
engagement of Hill in the direction of Gettysburg. Lee's 
admonition to Ewell made him approach Gettysburg with 
due caution. After reconnoitering the position, Rodes 
formed line of battle with Iverson on the right. Colonel 
O'Neal, in command of Rodes' old brigade, in the center, 
and Doles on the left. Iverson and O'Neal were posted on 
Oak Ridge, while Doles was down in the plain. But there 
was a considerable gap between O'Neal's left and Doles' 
right. Into that Rodes had put the 5tli Alabama, of 
O'Neal's brigade. The brigades of Daniel and Ramseur 
were placed in reserve. To meet this force General Baxter, 
of Robinson's division, directed Colonel Coulter, of the 
nth Pennsylvania, to take his regiment and the 97th New 
York, under Colonel Wheelock, and move in the direction 
of Rodes' right. Coulter advanced about a quarter of a 
mile beyond the railroad track with his skirmishers. That 
left a wide interval between Cutler's right and Coulter's 
left. Robinson then ordered Baxter to advance with the 
other regiments of his brigade, which he did, and assumed 
command of the brigade, and formed it in line of battle 
from left to right, with the nth Pennsylvania on the left, 
the 97th New York and 83d New York next, then the 88th 
Pennsylvania and the 12th Massachusetts on its right, with 
the 90th Pennsylvania on the extreme right. 



472 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, had arrived from 
Kmmittsburg, and halting at the cemetery, which is the 
abrupt northern termination of the ridge, threw forward 
Schimmelfennig and Barlow. Col. Thomas H. Carter, who 
commanded Rodes' artillery, had hastily placed his batteries 
in position, and was enfilading the ridge occupied by the 
First Corps, and at the same time replied to Dilger and 
Wheelock's batteries, of the Eleventh Corps, posted on 
Schimmelfennig' s left. O'Neal had been directed to strike 
Baxter's right flank. One of his regiments, the 5th Ala- 
bama, had just been ordered to the left, and the 3d Alabama, 
by mistake, remained with Daniel's brigade in reserve, 
leaving O'Neal to advance with the 6th, 12th, and 26th 
Alabama Regiments to attack Baxter ; the latter, observing 
the movement, removed back his right behind a stone wall, 
and awaited O'Neal's advance until within a short range; 
then his (Baxter's) men delivered such a fatal fire that 
O'Neal was badly repulsed, although the 5th Alabama was 
sent to his support. Iverson was ordered to attack Baxter's 
left. 

In the mean time Cutler, who was facing west, saw Iver- 
son threatening his right flank, and not knowing that 
Robinson had moved Baxter to the left to connect with his 
right, faced north, which threw him on Iverson' s right 
flank, and as the latter advanced on Baxter, who was again 
occupying a position behind a stone wall, and well concealed 
from view, Iverson approached within a short distance 
without being aware of Baxter's presence, as he was but a 
few moments before farther to the right facing O'Neal, and 
driving him northward. Then his brigade faced west. 
When Iverson was close up to the wall, Baxtei's brigade 
rose and delivered a volley into the North Carolina brigade, 
composed of the 5th, 12th, 20th, and 23d from the "Tar- 
heel State." At the same time Cutler and Roy Stone's 
brigades poured an enfilading fire on Iverson's right flank. 
It was but the work of a few minutes. Baxter's men, at 
the opportune moment, sprang over the wall, and made a 




GEN. JUDSON KILPATRICK. 



GETTYSBURG. 473 

charge which resulted in capturing Iverson's brigade, with 
the exception of the I2th, which stole to the rear under 
a flag of truce carried by it. The other regiments hoisted 
white flags and surrendered. This was one of the most 
brilliant and successful feats in military history, 
Iverson says : 

I again sent Capt. D. P. Halsey, assistant adjutant general, to 
ask General Daniel, who informs me that he met his staff officer, 
and was told that one regiment had been sent, and no more could 
be spared. I then found that this regiment had been formed on the 
right of the 3d Alabama, which was on my right, and could not be 
used in time to save my brigade, for Colonel O'Neal's Alabama 
brigade had in the mean time advanced on my left, and been almost 
instantaneousl}' driven back, upon which the enemx', being relieved 
from pressure, charged in overwhelming force upon and captured 
nearlj^ all that was left unhurt in three regiments of my brigade. 
When I saw white handkerchiefs raised, and my line of battle still 
lying down in position, I characterized the surrender as disgraceful ; 
but when I found afterward that 500 of my men were left lying dead 
and wounded on a line as straight as a dress parade, I exonerated, 
with one or two 'disgraceful individual exceptions, the survivors, 
and claim for the brigade that they nobly fought and died without 
a man running to the rear. No greater gallantry and heroism has 
been displayed during the war. 

In the mean time Robinson had ordered Paul, who was 
on the reserve at the seminary, to advance and take a posi- 
tion on Baxter's right. That gallant brigade, composed of 
the 1 6th Maine, under Colonel Tilden, the 13th Massachu- 
setts, commanded by Colonel I^eonard, the 94th New \''ork, 
under Col. Adrian R. Root, the 104th New York, com- 
manded by Col. Gilbert G. Prey, and the 107th Pennsyl- 
vania, under Lieutenant Colonel McThomson, advanced 
with great spirit, and promptly took the position first occu- 
pied by Baxter's brigade, and took part in the repulse of 
Iverson. * 

* 107TH Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry at Gettyshurg. — On the 
march from Rappahannock to Gettysburg Col. T. F. McCoy took sick at Center- 
ville and did not march with the regiment. Lieut. Col. James McThompson was 
in command. It was understood between the lieutenant colonel and Maj. H. J, 
Sheafer that in case they got into action he, the lieutenant colonel, would take 



474 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Daniel, who had been unable to succor Iverson, whom 
he was supporting, moved to the right to endeavor to force 
his way down the Chambersburg pike, and in so doing 
encountered Roy Stone's brigade, when a most desperate 
encounter ensued. 

Roy Stone, when he moved to take his position between 
Meredith and Cutler, formed his brigade facing west with 
the 150th Pennsylvania on Meredith's right, the 143d 
Pennsylvania on its right, between McPherson's house and 
barn, while the 149th Pennsylvania was on the right of the 
brigade. Stone then detailed Capt. G. W-. Jones with his 
company, of the i50tli ; Capt. C. M, Conyngham, of the 
143d ; and Capt. J. C. Johnson, of the 149th, as skirmishers 
in the direction of Willoughby Run, from where A. P. Hill 
was advancing. These companies fought most gallantly, 
and greatly impeded the advance of Hill's troops. 

The brigade was so much exposed to the artillery of the 
enemy that Stone made the following change, which shel- 

care of the right and the major the left of the regiment. When the brigade and 
division halted on the night of the 30th of June at Marsh Creek, General Paul 
ordered the muskets emptied and cleaned. When the brigade was back of the 
seminary building waiting orders, Major Sheafer called the attention of the lieu- 
tenant colonel to the fact that the guns were empty. The lieutenant colonel said 
he would not take the responsibility of loading, as General Paul had given no 
orders. When the quick movement of the brigade to the right along Oak Ridge 
was ordered, the major rode to the head of ^he regiment and as each company 
passed over the railroad cut he ordered them to load, which they did on the run. 
When near the Mummasburg road, the regiment by the left flank went into line and 
charged with the brigade up the ridge at a low stone wall. The enemy was met, 
driven back, and our brigade captured many of Iverson's Confederate brigade. 

Here both Baxter's and Paul's brigades did splendid work. While the battle 
was raging the major saw Lieutenant Colonel Thompson spring from his horse on 
the right. His horse ran down the line and when close to the major's a bullet 
struck him in the neck and he fell forward. To prevent the horse falling on him, 
Major hiheafer pulled back his horse, and then the major was shot in the groin. 
He ran his horse down the hill and was taken in an ambulance to the Lutheran 
Church in the village. This was now used for hospital purposes. He would not 
go in, but remained in the ambulance. Shortly the enemy had the town and when 
they got to the square, a short distance from the church, the major asked to be 
helped on his horse and rode down the street through a shower of bullets. At the 
intersection of the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads he met General Wadsworth, 




GEN. ADRIAN R. ROOT. 



GETTYSBURG. 475 

tered his men from that fire : In this second position the 
150th faced west with its right resting on the Chambers- 
burg pike ; the 149th on the pike facing north, its left 
forming on the 150th ; the 143d on the right of the latter. 
The brigade then formed two sides of a right angle. When 
Daniel advanced the 149th and the 143d faced him. Being 
then in good range the brigade fired two vollej's, and then 
Colonel Dwight charged at the head of the 149th Pennsyl- 
vania, driving back Daniel's forces. 

Roy Stone being wounded turned over the command 
of the brigade to Col. Langhorne Wister, of the 150th, 
who directed Lieutenant Colonel Huidekoper to take com- 
mand of the regiment. Seeing that Daniel would soon 
return to the assault, the 150th Pennsylvania was divided 
into two wings. The left wing was placed under the com- 
mand of Maj. Thomas Chamberlin, which held its position 
facing west. Lieutenant Colonel Huidekoper posted the 
right wing on the left of the 149th on the Chambersburg 

of the First Division, who had with him two guns of battery and a remainder of 
his men. The major told him of the situation of the town, and they skirted the 
south part of the town and reached the foot of Cemetery Hill on the Taneytown 
road. There General Wadsworth said to the major, " For God's sake help me, if 
you can, to get these men into line " — soldiers then running in all directions. 
The major, in the excitement, forgetting his wound, did all he could and soon a 
line was formed along a stone wall on the right of Steinwehr's division of the 
Eleventh. 

Robinson's division held Oak Ridge until the enemy were getting in its rear, 
the Eleventh Corps having given way, and then fell back along the ridge and into 
the town, many being captured in the town, the 107th among them. In the evening 
the major met the remnant of the regiment, and lying on the grass on Cemetery 
Ridge, had a talk with the lieutenant colonel, adjutant, and others. The colonel 
said he was completely used up and could do no more and wished to go back- 
The major begged him not to do so and said, " Colonel, I cannot walk, and possi- 
bly on the morrow we may have another heavy battle, and that I cannot follow 
with my horse." 

The next morning (second day) the lieutenant colonel was yet unable to com- 
mand, and the major turned over the command to Captain Roath, in case certain 
movements were made, and Captain Roath was in immediate command of the 
regiment in the remainder of the second and third days' fighting, although the 
major did not leave the field until after Pickett's charge, most of the time being 
at division headquarters, in Zeigler's woods adjoining the cemetery. 



473 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

pike so as to strengthen the threatened point of attack by 
Daniel and Davis' remnant of Hill's corps which had not 
been captured, whom Daniel endeavored to persuade to 
unite with him in his first charge. By this time Daniel 
had prepared for his second advance, and had reached the 
railroad cut again, when Colonel Wister ordered the right 
wing of the 150th, under Huidekoper, and the 149th, under 
Dwight, to charge, and again Daniel was compelled to 
yield. Colonel. Huidekoper says : — 

One of the bravest men I ever saw was Sergt. Samuel Phifer, 
color-bearer of the 150th Pennsylvania. Three different times when 
we had been swept back, and it seemed impossible to live under the 
fire, he advanced, knowing it was certain death sooner or later, by 
my simply saying, " Sergeant, you must try it once more, for I can- 
not get the regiment up unless you do." 

During the last charge Lieutenant Colonels Dwight and 
Huidekoper, Major Chamberlin, and Adj. R. L. Ashurst 
were wounded. In five minutes Colonel Wister was wounded 
in the mouth, and compelled to retire from the field, so 
Colonel Dana, of the 143d Pennsylvania, assumed command 
of the brigade. Huidekoper would not leave the field iintil 
he received a second wound, when he was taken into the 
McPherson barn, but was soon removed to the Catholic 
Church in Gettysburg, where, while on the table to ha\'e 
an amputation performed, he, with the others in the 
church, was taken prisoner. 

Early, of Ewell's division, having arrived on the field, 
a combined attack all along the line was made. As the 
battle raged, color-bearers fell, only to have others take 
their places, meet the same fate, and give other patriots 
a chance to seize them. As the brigade was being forced 
back off the ridge, Color Sergeant Crippen, of the 143d, 
fell mortally wounded, and the regiment would have lost 
its colors, but vSergt. Patrick DeLacy saw them, and called 
out to Major Conyngham to rally the regiment on the 
colors, which was instantly done, and they were saved. 



GETTYSBURG. 477 

Colonel Dana said in his report : 

At about this point in the action, Colonels Stone, of the 149th, 
and Wister, of the 150th, having been wounded, I took command of 
the brigade. The contest soon became severe and close. Three suc- 
cessive assaults upon our line were repulsed, in which we sustained 
heavy losses in killed and wounded, but the enemy evidently, from 
the numbers left upon the ground at each repulse, suffered still more 
severely. 

General Doubleday says : 

I relied greatly on Stone's brigade to hold the post assigned 
them. M}' confidence in this noble body of men was not misplaced. 
They repulsed the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers at 
close quarters, and maintained their position until the final retreat 
of the whole line. I have said the losses were exceedingh^ heav}' ; 
more than half of those who went into the battle were killed or 
wounded. In the 2d Wisconsin, 69 came back out of 302 ; in the 
19th Indiana, 78 returned of 288. The 150th Pennsylvania lost 316 
men out of 400, and 16 ofiicers out of 17 ; the 149th Pennsylvania in 
the same proportion. 

The First Corps only consisted of about 8,200 when it entered 
the field. It was reduced, at the close of the engagement, to about 
2,400. My thanks are specially due to a citizen of Gettysburg named 
John Burns, who although seventy years of age, shouldered his 
musket and offered his services to Colonel Wister, of the 150th Penn- 
sylvania. He was wounded in three places. 

Colonel Wister advised Burns to go to the left and fight 
in the woods, which he did, with the Iron Brigade. This in- 
cident of Burns has been rendered in verse by Bret Harte 
in a poem entitled "John Burns at Gettysburg." 

Meredith having been wounded and taken to Gettys- 
burg by an aid on his staff (Gilbert M. Woodward), Colo- 
nel Robinson, of the 7th Michigan, succeeded to the com- 
mand of the Iron Brigade. 

When Daniel and Davis made the attack on Roy Stone, 
Brockenborough and Pettigrew advanced on the brigade, 
but failed to force it from its position in the woods. Mor- 
row was then severely wounded. 

Tidball's battery, under Calef, had again been ordered 
to the front line, and Reynolds' famous New York battery 



478 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

was directed to take a position on the same ridge near 
him. Reynolds had considerable difficulty in getting into 
position on account of the severe infantry fire. These bat- 
teries were soon compelled to retire. 

Captain Reynolds, receiving a severe wound, was no 
longer able to remain on the field, and Lieutenant Breck, 
an excellent artillery officer, assumed command of the bat- 
tery, and selected a position about 500 yards to the rear, 
where the battery opened. Lieut. B. W. Wilber was 
directed to take the right section farther to the left. 

General Wadsworth rode to the extreme left of the line 
of the First Corps, where Chapman Biddle's brigade was 
posted, and riding up to the Ulster Guard, directed Colonel 
Gates to throw a company of his regiment into the house 
and outbuildings of E. Harman, in a field on the farther 
side of, and some thirty rods beyond, Willoughby Run. 
Colonel Gates detailed Capt. Ambrose N. Baldwin, Com- 
pany K, who was killed on the last day of the battle, to 
perform that perilous duty. At this time the enemy occu- 
pied Harman' s buildings; but after a spirited contest, 
they were compelled to retire, when Baldwin took 
possession. Hill cautiously advanced, and, as his lines 
pressed forward, Baldwin reported that fact. Colonel Gates 
at once reenforced him with Captain Conyngham, who had 
to fight his way to get to the Harman buildings, where 
Baldwin was stationed. These two companies succeeded 
in holding the right of Hill's corps in check for two hours. 
In the mean time Doubleday, finding he was reduced to 
desperate straits, ordered his last regiment on reserve, the 
151st Pennsylvania, imder Lieutenant Colonel McFarland, 
to advance on the right of Biddle's brigade (the regi- 
ment belonged to that brigade), and assist in preventing 
the enemy from sweeping the First Corps from the ridge 
until he could send to Howard for assistance. Lieutenant 
Slagle was sent in great haste to Howard for a part of 
Steinwehr's division, then on reserve on Cemetery Hill, 
to assist Doubleday ; but Howard declined to send them. 



GETTYSBURG. 479 

While the left was thus sorely pressed, Early' s division 
was forming in line of battle on the hills along Rock Creek, 
north of the town. Gordon, on the right, relieved the pres- 
sure on Doles' from Schurz's division, while Hays, in the 
center, and Hoke, on the left, prolonged Ewell's line of 
battle far beyond Barlow's right, under Von Gilsa, who 
was again unfortunate enough to have the extreme right, 
the same as at Chancellorsville, when Howard was hurled 
from his position. Barlow, seeing the movement of Hoke 
to outflank him, made a desperate effort to force Gordon 
back on the right, which would compel Hays and Hoke 
to retire from his right. But Barlow falling severely 
wounded, his division yielded ground, but rallied on the 
reserve. This was a better position than the first, with 
the Almshouse buildings as a protection to his troops, and 
where he had a battery stationed. But Hoke and Hays 
had made too much progress for Barlow's division to re- 
form and make a successful stand. While attempting to 
ward off the attack of Hoke and Hays on the right flank, 
Gordon was pressing in front with great desperation, fol- 
lowed closely by Smith in reserve ; and the gallant Barlow 
was left on the field wounded several times and a prisoner, 
while the division retreated from the last position in which 
it could make a stand. That movement uncovered Schim- 
melfennig's right, and placed it in danger from Gordon on 
the left. Doles immediately advanced on Von Amberg's 
brigade, and forced it back on the Second Brigade, which 
was supporting Von Amberg en echelon. This last move de- 
cided the fate of the day north of the town, and the Elev- 
enth Corps at once began a retreat for Cemetery Hill, pass- 
ing through the streets of Gettysburg, closely pursued by 
Ewell. Doubleday says : 

I now sent my adjutant general (Halstead) to reiterate the re- 
quest for assistance, or to obtain for me an order to retreat, as it was 
impossible for me to remain where I was, in the face of the con- 
stantly increasing forces which were approaching from the west. 
Howard insisted that Halstead mistook rail fences for troops in the 



430 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

distance. The lorgnettes of his staff finally convinced him of his 
error ; he still, however, refused to order me to retire, bi:t sent Hal- 
stead off to find Buford's cavalry and order it to report to me. 

Pender's division was then moving forward, with Lane 
on the right, Colonels Perrin and Scales on the left. Scales 
struck Robinson, in command of the Iron Brigade, but was 
compelled to retire and wait for reenforcements. Pender 
and Scales were both wounded in that advance. Immedi- 
ately after, the attack was renewed on the Iron Brigade and 
a most desperate struggle took place between the two con- 
tending forces. Men seemed to seek death by rushing to 
raise a flaof. that had fallen from the hand of the color- 
bearer, who lay mortally wounded. Colonel Morrow, of 
the 24th Michigan, after he had lost the third color-bearer, 
directed the fourth one to stick it in the ground where he 
(Morrow) could rally the regiment on it, but he, too, was 
wounded. Then Morrow picked up the colors himself, 
but they were taken from him by Private William Kelley, 
of Company E, remarking as he did : "The colonel of the 
24th shall never carry the flag while I am alive. ' ' He was 
killed instantly. The colors then were taken by Private 
Lilburn A, Spaulding, of Company K, who carried them 
until Morrow took them to rally the regiment, when he 
was severely wounded. By this time eight color-bearers 
had gone down in the 19th Indiana. They were then 
seized by Lieut. Col. W. W. Dudley, who waved them 
with a cheer, when he fell wounded in the right leg. Since 
the war Colonel Dudley has been Commissioner of Pen- 
sions, and is one of the best known men in the country. 
He was one of the most gallant soldiers of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

Sergt. Maj. Asa W. Blanchard, a noble-hearted youth, 
took the colors and was mortally wounded, and died on the 
field. As the regiment retired Lieut. W. W. Macy saw 
that the colors were left and soon would be in possession 
of the enemy. He lan back under a heavy fire and secured 
them. Just then Captain Hollon Richardson rode tip, 




GEN. W. W. DUDLEY. 



GETTYSBURG. 481 

when Macy gave them to him to rally the brigade. As 
the enemy pressed the Iron Brigade, Perrin's brigade had 
forced back Biddle on the left of this command, which 
exposed its left flank, when Doubleday ordered the Iron 
Brigade, and Dana, in command of Roy Stone's brigade, 
to retire in the direction of the seminary. 

Buford had arrived on the left of Biddle, and by threat- 
ening to charge with Gamble's brigade of cavalry, which had 
done such heroic service in the morning, compelled Lane 
to form squares, which greatly impeded the advance of the 
enemy's right, which he had intended to swing around and 
thus cut off the retreat of the Iron Brigade, then fighting 
under Robinson, of the 7th Wisconsin, after Meredith was 
wounded. Buford deserves to have a monument erected on 
the spot where he defied Lane to advance, thereby greatly 
frustrating the well-conceived designs of the enemy. 

As Perrin rushed on he struck the 151st Pennsylvania, 
under Lieut. Col. George F. McFarland. It was that regi- 
ment's maiden fight, and it acquitted itself so gallantly that 
no praise bestowed on it can be fulsome. Fearing he could 
not control the regiment to fire by volleys, IMcFarland gave 
the order to fire at will, which was so splendidly executed 
that every patriot can rejoice over the work done by that 
gallant body of men. Colonel McFarland says : 

Not a man left the ranks, even to carry a wounded comrade to 
the rear. But the regiment had lost terribly, and now did not num- 
ber one-fonrth of what it did two hours earlier in the day. The 
enemy, on the contrary, had increased, and was now rapidly 
forming on my left. All support had left both flanks and were 
already well to the rear. Hence I ordered the shattered remnants of 
as brave a regiment as entered the field to fall back, and accom- 
panied it a few paces. 

In a few minutes Colonel McFarland was hit in both 
legs at the saine instant, which caused the amputation of 
his right leg and seriously injured his left one for life. 

Cutler, who had been the first on the field, was unable 
to hold out longer ; his decimated ranks too well told the 

XXXI 



482 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

great struggle he had made to maintain the position as- 
signed to him. One of his colonels rejoiced in the fact 
that his regiment was the first to fire in that noted battle. 
Colonel Hofmann, of the 56th Pennsylvania, was fully 
determined to do all in his power to repel the invasion of 
the Confederate army from the State of Pennsylvania, and 
as he ordered his regiment "forward into line, fire!" he 
was eagerly going at his work. Several years after the bat- 
tle he said tome: "My regiment fired the first volley at 
Gettysburg.'' The 2d Wisconsin also claims that honor, 
and that gallant soldier, diplomat, and statesman. Col. 
Lucius Fairchild, earnestly believes it. The 76tli New 
York, which was on the right of Cutler's brigade, and first 
into line, also claims the honor of firing the first volley, and 
thus opening the battle. Cutler's brigade was in the ad- 
vance, and formed line of battle before Meredith's did, 
which, it is claimed, rather gives the preponderance of evi- 
dence in favor of Cutler's brigade, but Fairchild crowded 
Cutler so closely in the matter that it is clear these three 
regiments should each have a medal of honor from Congress. 
The 76th New York, on the right of the 56th Pennsyl- 
vania, had suffered an extraordinarily heavy loss. Judge 
Smith, in his history of the regiment, says : 

All the regiments in this advance brigade were fearfull}^ cut up. 
The 76th went into the fight with 348 men and 27 ofiicers, and in 
half an hour it lost 2 officers killed, and 16 wounded ; 27 men killed, 
and 124 wounded; making a total killed and wounded in the half 
hour of 18 officers and 151 men, or over half the officers, and nearly 
half the men expended in that brief period. 

Among the number killed was Major Grover, who was 
in command of the regiment. General Cutler, in his report 
of the battle, says : 

Major Grover, commanding the 76th New York Volunteers, a 
brave and efficient officer, was killed early in the action of the ist 
instant, and the command devolved upon Capt. John E. Cook ; and 
most ably and faithfully did he perform the duty. With him lay on 
that part of the field Captain Story, Lieutenants Cahill, P. S. Clark, 



GETTYSBURG. 483 

Carter, and Button. Serg. i\Iaj. Thomas Martin was killed. Corp. 
C. H. Smith, of Company K, received four severe wounds, and was 
left on the field for dead. When he was found the surgeons had no 
hope of his living, and ministered only to his wants. 

Orderly Sergeant Henry Cliff, of Company F., fell 
severely wounded in the left leg. Of him Judge Smith says : 

And there, for five days, the sergeant lay with a broken limb, 
unable to stir, almost dying from thirst and hunger, and nearly 
roasting, while da}' after daj- he watched the cool shade in its slow 
journe}- around the tree, never quite reaching him, but advancing 
toward him and then retreating, as though tantalizing him for his 
loyalt}' ! He was finally found by our men, his limb amputated, 
and he still lives to tell his story. 

Baxter's brigade was nearly out of ammtniition when 
Paul's arrived, btit it remained on the field, getting what it 
could from the boxes of those who had been shot. While 
the brigade had hurled O'Neal's brigade back with heavy 
loss, and had captured Iverson's, yet it had stififered heavily. 
It held a position on the crest with fixed bayonets, with 
not a single cartridge. Colonel Bates commanded the 1 2th 
Massachusetts a part of the time, and so did Lieut. Col. 
David Allen, Jr. Col. Charles W. Wheelock, of the 97th 
New York, a brave and determined officer, got separated 
from his regiment on retiring from Seminary Ridge, and 
was taken prisoner in the house of Elias Sheads tinder the 
following circumstances : The enemy was so close that he 
entered Mr. Sheads' house, just under the brow of the hill, 
between the seminary and the town. A Confederate colo- 
nel and some men followed him in the house to capture 
him. While their attention was distracted Miss Carrie 
Sheads hid Colonel Wheelock's sword in the folds of her 
dress and thus concealed it. He was taken prisoner, but 
escaped after the battle. When the Confederates were re- 
treating, he returned, secured his sword and joined his 
command. The regiment was commanded by Maj. Charles 
Northup until the colonel returned. 

The nth Pennsylvania had three regimental com- 



484 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

manders : Colonel Coulter, Capt. Benjamin F. Haines and 
Capt. John B. Overmyer. In the 88th Pennsylvania Major 
Foust was wounded, whereupon Capt. Henry Whiteside 
assumed command and gallantly fought it to the close of 
the battle. This regiment captured the colors of the i6th 
Alabama and the 23d North Carolina Regiments in the 
surrender of Iverson's brigade. Bates says : 

The regiment lost 7 killed, 30 wounded, and about 40 prisoners, 
among whom were Captains Mass and Schell, and Lieutenants Grant 
and Boone. * * * The 90th Pennsylvania Regiment had two 
regimental commanders ; after four commanders of the First Brigade, 
of Robinson's division, had been wounded. Colonel Lyle was put in 
command of it, and Major Sellers commanded the 90th Pennsyl- 
vania. He was a brilliant young officer of fine military genius. 

Paul's brigade occupied the extreme right of the First 
Corps when the final attack came that compelled the corps 
to retire to Seminary Ridge. A sad calamity had just oc- 
curred to the brigade. General Paul received a wound that 
carried away both of his eyes. He lived many years after 
the war in Washington, but always had to be led. Colonel 
Leonard, then of the 13th Massachusetts, took command of 
the brigade, but soon being wounded, was succeeded in the 
command by Colonel Root, of the 94th New York, It was 
not long until Colonel Root was wounded, when Colonel 
Coulter assumed command, only to be wounded, and his 
place was filled by Colonel Lyle, of the gotli Pennsylvania. 
Four commanders of the brigade wounded shows the suffer- 
ing of the troops on that part of the field. The brigade 
was well up to the Mummasburg road, with the 13th 
Massachusetts facing north, and occupied the apex in 
the right angle formed by Hill's corps on the west, and 
Ewell's on the north. Baxter was out of ammunition, 
and on that account had to lead the retreat of Robin- 
son's division. Then came Paul's brigade, with the i6th 
Maine, bringing up the rear, slowly pursued by the ad- 
vancing foe. But the history of the world furnishe's no 
retreat that was conducted more masterly by the generals 




I.IEUT. COL. W. W. GROUT, M. C. 



GETTYSBLRG. 485 

nor more orderly by the troops than that of the First Corps 
as it retired back to Seminary Ridge to make another stand 
in the face of overwhehning numbers. A sight most grand 
to see was Doubleday, Wadsworth and Robinson guiding 
their men with a coohiess as if on dress parade. Robin- 
son had two horses shot from under him, yet he came up 
from the right, leading his valiant soldiers with a steady 
nerve. The 7th Wisconsin retired, with Capt. Hollon 
Richardson carrying the flag of the 19th Indiana on horse- 
back at the head of the Iron Brigade. The captain was on 
the brigade staff, and heroically performed his duty. 

The regiments of the corps would retire a hundred and 
fifty or two hundred yards, and then turn and deliver a 
volley into the front line of the Confederates as they ad- 
vanced, until Seminary Ridge was reached ; there the 
infantry took a position behind the temporary breastworks, 
hastily made in the morning by Robinson's division, and 
in support of the batteries posted on the ridge. The color- 
bearer of the 2d Wisconsin was shot while the regiment 
was retreating to Seminary Ridge, when Corp. J. J. Lit- 
tle ran back and got the colors, otherwise they would 
have been captured. General Meredith, who was badly 
injured in Gettysburg, on hearing of the gallant act of 
Corporal Little, said he would isSue an order commendatory 
of his bravery. Little has served many years since the 
war in the Architect's Office of the Treasury Department. 
Before the infantry retired from the line of McPherson's 
woods, Capt. James A. Hall sent back for the gun he was 
compelled to leave early in the day by order of General 
Wadsworth. 

Pender's and Heth's divisions were both in front of the 
First Corps when it retired from the position it had held 
from the time Reynolds put it there in the morning before 
he fell. The enemy did not hotly pursue Doubleday as he 
retired to Seminary Ridge, but halted to rearrange his lines, 
which gave Col. C. S. Wainwright, chief of artillery of the 
First Corps, time to arrange his batteries near the seminary 



486 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

before the Confederate infantry columns peered over the 
McPherson Ridge, stretching from the south nearly to the 
Fairfield road ; Hill's left rested beyond the Chambersburg 
pike, while Rodes' division, which had forced in Rob- 
inson on the right, came forward abreast with Hill's troops 
under Pender and Heth, their line reaching to the Mum- 
masburg road, where, making a right angle. Doles, Gordon, 
Hays, and Hoke were converging on Gettysburg from the 
north, in an endeavor to cut off the retreat of the First 
Corps to Cemetery Hill. Colonel Wainwright says : 

Having heard incidentally some directions given to General 
Doubleday about holding Cemetery Hill, and not knowing that 
there was such a place, while the seminary was called indiscrimi- 
nately " Cemetery " and " Seminary," I supposed the latterwas meant. 
I therefore directed Captain Cooper to take a good position in front 
of the professor's house on this ridge, and sent an order to Captain 
Stevens, of the 5th Maine Battery, to occupy the position first assigned 
to Lieutenant Stewart Soon after this the enemy filed in two strong 
columns out of the woods, about five hundred yards to our front, 
and marched steadily down to our left until they outflanked us 
nearly a third of a mile. They then formed in double line of battle 
and came directly up the crest. During this movement Batter}' L 
opened on the columns, but the firing of Lieutenant Breck's four 
guns was much interfered with by our own infantry moving in front 
of his pieces. As we had no regular line of battle on this crest, and 
the enemy outnumbered us five to one I withdrew Lieutenant Breck's 
two sections when their first line was within about 200 yards, and 
ordered him behind a strong stone wall on the seminary crest. 

Meantime General Doubleday had removed Captain Stevens' 
battery to the right of Captain Cooper's, and Lieutenant Wilber's 
section falling back with its support, came into position at the same 
point, thus concentrating twelve guns in so small a space that they 
were hardly five yards apart. Lieutenant Stewart's battery was also 
in position on the same line, half the battery between the Cashtown 
pike and the railroad, the other half across the railroad in the corner 
ot a wood. The enemy's lines continued to advance steadily across 
the space between the two crests, but when the first line was within 
about 100 yards of the seminary, Lieutenant Davison, commanding 
the left half of Stewart's battery, swung his guns around on the 
Caslitown pike, so as to enfilade the whole line. This, with the fire 
of the other batteries, checked them for a moment at this point, but 



GETTYSBLRG. 487 

it was only for a moment, as their second line did not halt, but 
pushed on, strongly reenforced by a third column deploN-ing from 
the Cashtown road. An order was now received by Captain Stevens 
from General Wadsworth to withdraw his battery. Not knowing- 
that he had received such an order, and still under the false impres- 
sion as to the importance attached to holding Seminary Hill, I 
directed all the batteries to remain in position. A few minutes, 
however, showed me that our infantry was rapidly retreating to the 
town. 

The above is an extract from Colonel Wainwriglit's offi- 
cial report of this engagement. He was a great artillery- 
officer, and especiall}- on this occasion greatly added to the 
fame of the First Corps by the skillful handling of his guns. 
The infantry aided the batteries by firing on the advancing 
columns of the enemy, and inflicted great damage to him 
as he neared the seminary, although, as N. B. Prentice, 
of the 7th Wisconsin, who was wounded there, and for 
his good record as a soldier made quartermaster of the 
37th Wisconsin, said to me : "We cut great gaps in their 
lines which were instantly closed up, yet their columns 
never faltered." Brave to a fault, it is to be hoped that 
these Southern soldiers will, if the occasion requires, defend 
the 'flag as heroically as they desperately endeavored to 
destroy it and ruin its supremacy on land and sea. 

Stewart had a brass battery of Napoleon 12-pounder 
guns, smoothbore, and effective at short range. Perhaps 
no battery ever did better execution on a battlefield than 
Battery B, 4th U. S. Artiller}^, that day. These brass guns, 
loaded with canister, hurled death and destruction through 
the columns of infantry as they advanced within a few 
yards. 

But the Eleventh Corps was no longer a hindrance to 
Ewell. He was rapidly swinging his left round in Double- 
day's rear to hem him in. Wainwright said, in his 
report, that their right had so overlapped our left that 
retreat from Seminary Ridge was inevitable. Although 
Howard had sent Custer's brigade to help save the Eleventh 
Corps, yet, even at that perilous moment, Doubleday 



488 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

had received no order to retire to Cemetery Hill. But 
seeing that to remain there longer was to sacrifice the 
whole corps, he gave the order to abandon the position on 
Seminary Ridge and fall back to Cemetery Hill, south of 
the town. The corps suffered greatly in passing through 
the town from the fire of Ewell. Early entered the town 
and occupied the Diamond, which is considered the center. 
The soldiers of both sides occupied the town at the same 
time. The First Corps obliqued to the right and evaded 
the center. Cemetery Hill lying south at the end of Balti- 
more Street. Many of the First Corps were captured in 
the town. Major Gerker, a staff officer in the First Corps, 
was so hotly pursued, that he dodged into the Lutheran 
Church, which had been turned into a hospital for our 
soldiers. The surgeons were all busy attending to the 
wounded, and therefore paid but little attention to Major 
Gerker as he entered. He spied a surgeon's sash, put it on, 
took a canteen and gave the boys water. Thus playing 
surgeon, he expected to soon quietly leave and join the 
corps. But just then in came Harry Gilmore, a Confed- 
erate officer of considerable fame. He and Gerker had 
been chums from boyhood. The Gerkers lived in Phila- 
delphia, and the Gilmores were Baltimoreans. Gilmore 
seeing Gerker with a surgeon's sash on, knew in a moment 
he was playing a game to get away, so he walked up to 
him and said, "Gerker, where in the devil did you study 
medicine?" Gerker said "his heart went down in his 
boots," for Harry Gilmore knew him well. In a minute 
Gilmore said to him in a low tone, "Gerker, play 5'our 
game, that is all right," and immediately left the church. 
In a short time Major Gerker put in an appearance on Cem- 
etery Hill, and inquired for the First Corps. 

While utter confusion reigned in Gettysburg, Early, 
who had rode forward to the town, where Ha}'s' brigade was 
capturing many Union soldiers, looked up Balti;nore Street 
at Cemetery Hill, where the F'irst and Eleventh Corps were 
being posted, with a view of pressing on and attacking that 




GEN. JOHN C. ROBINSON. 



GETTYSBbRG. 489 

position before the Union army had time to intrench it- 
self on the heights overlooking the city. But Hays' 
brigade was not strong enough to accomplish the purpose. 
Smith, who had been in reserve, had moved over to the 
York road, and sent word to Early that there were troops 
moving in their rear. Kilpatrick was facing for Carlisle to 
prevent Stuart from joining lyce. On receiving word from 
Smith, Gordon was sent to his (Smith's) support, so that 
Early only had the brigades of Hoke and Ha}s at hand to 
follow up the Union forces as they retired to Cemetery Hill. 
The Twelfth Corps was also sighted by the enemy, as it 
arrived about that time. Slocum directed Williams to take 
possession of Wolf 's Hill, until he (Slocum) could ascertain 
the position of the two forces engaged. It is quite probable 
that when Williams' division came in view on Wolf's Hill 
it was supposed that other commands would soon arrive over 
other roads. Rodes was in no condition to follow up and 
attack Cemetery Hill, for all of Iverson's brigade had been 
captured, except one regiment, and that had sustained con- 
siderable loss, and O'Neal's brigade had been so badly 
crippled that it was of but little service, leaving but Ram- 
seur and Daniel, who had also been fighting heavily. So 
Ewell waited for Johnson's division to arrive before attempt- 
ing to take Cemetery Hill. Johnson had about eighteen 
miles to march that day, and did not arrive until about 
sunset. Perhaps he could have arrived earlier, but Ander- 
son, of Hill's corps, had received peremptory orders to 
hurry forward, and Johnson was compelled to follow him. 
While Anderson halted at Willoughby Run with Hill's 
corps, Johnson moved to the left of Early, and took 
up position on Rock Creek, with the idea of taking pos- 
session of Culp's Hill, which almost joins Cemetery Hill on 
the east ; a mere depression separates them. Could John- 
son have secretly mounted a battery on Culp's Hill, and 
supported it, the Union position on Cemetery Hill, not 
much more than a quarter of a mile distant, would have 
been untenable. In the evening Lee visited Ewell to 



490 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

examine the position in his, Ewell's, front, and he was half 
inclined to draw him back on Seminary Ridge, which cer- 
tainly wonld have been a good niove. Ewell had stndied 
the Rock Creek line well, and thought he could push John- 
son up that stream and turn the Union position on Ceme- 
tery Hill by getting possession of Culp's Hill. 

We turn now to the movements of the Union generals, 
and see what disposition they made of their forces. Double- 
day was directed to occupy the cemetery with a part of the 
First Corps, while Wadsworth's division was sent to occupy 
Culp's Hill. Hancock, who had been very active in station- 
ing the troops after he arrived, surrendered the command 
to Slocum, when the latter came to the cemetery. In the 
mean time Howard objected to Hancock assuming command 
of the forces, for the reason that he, Howard, outranked 
him. It seems that Meade had, in reality, sent Hancock 
to the front invested temporarily with full powers as 
commander-in-chief of the army in his absence. 

General Hancock, in his official report, says : 

A few minutes before one p. m. I received orders to proceed in 
person to the front, and assume command of the First, Third, and 
Eleventh Corps, in consequence of the death of Major General Rey- 
nolds. Having been fully informed by the Major General Command- 
ing as to his intentions, I was instructed by him to give the neces- 
sary directions, upon my arrival at the front, for the movement of 
the troops and trains to the rear, toward the line of battle he had 
selected, should I deem it expedient to do .so. If the ground was 
suitable, and circumstances made it wise, I was directed to establish 
the line of battle at Gettysburg. 

Geary arrived with the two brigades of the Second 
Division of the Twelfth Corps, when Doubleday was falling 
back, and took a position on Cemetery Hill to prevent the 
enemy from turning his left flank, and planting himself 
farther south on that ridge. The Second Brigade, of 
Geary's division, was halted some two miles back from 
Gettv.sburg with a section of Battery K, 5th United States 
Artillery, pursuant to orders by General Slocum. At two 



GETTYSBLRG. 491 

o'clock Sickles received an urgent request from Howard for 
help, as the First and Eleventh Corps were being hard 
pressed by a superior force of the enemy. At that time 
Humphreys was making an examination of the country 
around Emmittsburg with a probable view of fighting the 
battle there. Sickles had received no orders to proceed to 
Gettysburg. As yet Meade was uncertain where the battle 
would be fought, and had strongly talked of the Pipe Creek 
line to his corps commanders ; thus Sickles was left in great 
doubt. When Howard implored him for assistance, he did 
not wait for Humphreys to return, but at once gave orders 
for the First and Second Brigades, of Humphreys' division, 
with two brigades and three batteries of Birney's division, 
to march immediately to Gettysburg, leaving de Trobriand's 
brigade of Birney's division, and Burling's brigade of Hum- 
phreys' division, to hold the position there and guard the 
supply trains. The roads were badly cut up by the passage 
of the First and Eleventh Corps, including artillery, and 
the supply trains which were ahead of the troops ; but 
Birney pressed forward and arrived on the field about half- 
past five that afternoon, while Humphreys, who received 
orders to come on direct to Gettysburg, encountered the 
enemy after dark, but not being observed, countermarched 
his division and took another road, which delaved him so 
much that he did not arrive until one o'clock the next 
morning. These were all the troops that arrived that 
night. 

Geary's division and Sickles' corps lay stretched on 
Cemetery Ridge in the direction of the Round Tops, The 
Second Corps arrived at Taney town at eleven o'clock on 
July I. Hancock now reported to Meade in person, when 
he was directed to proceed to the front and take com- 
mand, as General Reynolds, who was in command of the 
left wing, then in the advance, had been killed. When 
Hancock was directed by Meade to proceed to the front 
and assume command of the forces at Gettysburg, he (Han- 
cock) assigned Gibbon to the command of the Second 



492 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Corps. In the afternoon the corps marched to within three 
miles of Gettysburg, and halted for the night. At seven 
a. m., on July 2, it appeared on the field and was placed 
in position by General Hancock, who had joined his corps 
before it arrived. Before Hancock turned over the com- 
mand at Gettysburg to Slocuni, he sent Major Mitchell to 
Meade with the message that he would hold the position 
until night, and informed him of the state of affairs at the 
front. Shortly after that Hancock sent a second message 
to the general commanding, giving in detail the movements 
which had taken place, and his opinion that Gettysburg 
was a very strong position. Just after dark Hancock 
started to Taneytown to consult with Meade. Upon his 
arrival at headquarters he found that Meade had issued 
orders for the other corps in the rear to ad\'ance at once to 
Gettysburg, and was himself ready to go there in j^erson. 
Meade arrived at the cemetery about one o'clock that 
night, and at once consulted with the generals present on 
the situation. 

No movement took place during the night, except by 
the left wing of Ewell under Johnson. Ewell had im- 
pressed upon Lee that he could carry Cemetery Hill 
when Longstreet attacked the left of the Union line. If 
Ewell could gain a foothold on Culp's Hill during the 
night he imagined he would be in possession of the key 
to Meade's position on Cemetery Hill. In the night 
some of Johnson's officers and men attempted to recon- 
noiter Culp's Hill. When Wadsworth was directed to 
occupy it the evening before on his way there, he found 
on the Baltimore pike the 7th Indiana, which had guarded 
the First Corps train from Marsh Creek that day, and 
consequently had not been engaged in the battle. It 
was in good condition, and nearly as large as the two 
brigades which had been in action that day ; therefore 
he directed it to the right of the division on Culp's 
Hill. This hill faces north, and, like Cemetery Hill, over- 
looks the town, both being m close proximity. After it 



GETTYSBLRG. 493 

approaches near Rock Creek it abruptly breaks off to the 
west, facing easterly on the creek, with Wolf's Hill be- 
yond that historic stream. What few were left of Wads- 
worth's two brigades were worn out, and the 7th 
Indiana was assigned to picket duty, with Company B 
on the extreme right of the line. It was stationed near 
where the hill turns to the west. On the picket post on 
the extreme right of the line was Sergeant Hussey, 
with Privates Harshberger and W. S. Odell. A noise 
was heard as of men moving cautiously in the timber 
some distance to their right. As they advanced to in- 
vestigate, before the enemy discovered them, they got be- 
hind some bowlders, permitting the officer leading to pass 
them, when Sergeant Hussey dashed out and seized the 
officer, while Harshberger and Odell fired on the advancing 
body of troops. Other members of the company running 
up, poured in such a rapid fire that the enemy turned and 
fled in the direction of Rock Creek, where Johnson's divi- 
sion lay. Some prisoners were captured in that night's 
encounter. Ewell was greatly astonished to find a force 
on Culp's Hill and abandoned the project of trying to 
take it that night. The Comte de Paris says : ' ' These in- 
cidents exercised a powerful influence over the battle the 
following day." 

A noted general said that a linchpin might even de- 
cide a battle. There is no doubt but the rebuff of that 
small party from Johnson's division at that point was of 
great value, and it greatly aided in the success of our 
army in the ensuing battle. The 7th Indiana will ever 
have the proud distinction of the valorous work done that 
night. 

There was great activity at Meade's headquarters in 
establishing and connecting regular lines of battle. While 
Wadsworth held a firm position on Culp's Hill, with 
Stevens' 5tli Maine Battery on his left, yet there was 
quite an interval from his right to where Williams' di- 
vision, of the Twelfth Corps, bivouacked for the night. 



494 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The Eleventh Corps held a position just ontside and 
west of the cemetery, its left extending about to the south- 
west corner. Then came John C. Robinson's division of 
the First Corps on the left of Howard, which closely 
hugged a stone wall in front of it, crossing over the 
Taneytown road. Geary's division, which during the 
night was stationed on Cemetery Ridge, was in the morn- 
ing sent to the right of Wadsworth on Culp's Hill. Then 
Geary formed two lines of battle. Greene's brigade took 
a position on the right of Wadsworth' s division, of the First 
Corps, with his Second Brigade, under Kane, on the right 
of Greene, which was Geary's front line. 

In support of Greene and Kane, Candy's brigade was 
massed in double columns of battalions. Geary was facing 
east, and Wadsworth on his left faced north, thus forming 
a salient point at Wadsworth' s right and Geary's left ; yet 
the line was well protected from artillery by large bowlders 
and heavy timber. 

About nine o'clock General Ruger, who was assigned 
to the command of General Williams' division, the latter 
having been placed in the command of the Twelfth Corps, 
moved the division to the right of Geary, and posted the 
First Brigade, under Colonel McDougall, on the right of 
Kane, and in prolongation of the line occupied by Geary. 
Only a part of the brigade occupied the front line, while 
the other part was placed behind a stone wall, some 75 
yards to the rear, in support of the first line. The Third 
Brigade, under Colonel Colgrove, was directed to McDou- 
gall' s right, with the right of the brigade well refused 
back, facing southeast.^ With this completion of the line 
of battle on Culp's Hill, we now turn to Cemetery Ridge, 
and witness the movements there. 

The Second Corps, imder Hancock, arrived on the field 
at seven o'clock, and immediately moved to Cemetery 
Ridge. The division of Alexander Hayes relieved John 
C. Robinson, which placed Hayes' division on the left of 
the Eleventh Corps. Gibbon's division was assigned the 



GETTYSBURG. 495 

center, and Caldwell's division formed the left of the Sec- 
ond Corps. At seven a. m. Sickles directed Birney to re- 
lieve Geary and take a position with his left resting on 
Little Ronnd Top and his right thrown on a direct line 
toward the cemetery. 

In the mean time Meade had ordered de Trobriand and 
Burling up from Emmittsburg, where they had been left 
by Sickles the day before. Arriving about nine a.m., de 
Trobriand was placed in the center of Birney' s division, 
with Ward on his left, and Graham on his right. Hum- 
phreys was not ordered to put his division in line of battle 
until midday. Moving up to fill the space between Birney 
and Caldwell, Carr's brigade, with the 71st New York, 
under Colonel Potter, filled the space between Caldwell 
and Birney. The Second Brigade, commanded by Col. 
W. R. Brewster, was massed in line by battalions 200 
yards in rear of the front line, while the Third Brigade, 
under Col. George C. Burling, was massed 200 yards in 
rear of the second line. 

Birney' s picket line had been on the Emmittsburg road, 
with his sharpshooters some 300 yards in advance. The 
constant firing at. the front led Birney to believe that the 
enemy was massing in his front ; so he requested Sickles 
to permit him to strengthen the sharpshooters in order to 
ascertain the movements of Lee's troops in the timber 
beyond the Emmittsburg road. Birney sent Capt. J. C. 
Briscoe of his staff with Colonel Berdan, who was directed to 
take 100 of Berdan' s Sharpshooters, with the 3d Maine, 
and feel the enemy's right. Berdan advanced along the 
Millerstown road, and entered the woods to strike the right 
flank of the Confederates, which would unmask their 
movement. This heavy force of sharpshooters, drove 
the enemy's pickets in, and revealed the fact that three 
columns of their forces were marching to our left. Berdan 
was immediately attacked by a heavy force under Long- 
street, and driven back in the peach orchard, with a 
loss of about 60 killed and wounded. Berdan did very 



496 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

valuable service that day with his sharpshooters. It was 
equal to a much larger force with those repeating rifles in 
the hands of skilled marksmen ; his men could hit a Con- 
federate distant almost a half mile with exactness. Scattered 
as they were, and sheltered in every instance possible, the 
enemy was discomfited by their fire. 

When Berdan discovered heavy columns of the enemy 
moving on our left flank, he immediately reported it to 
Birney, who communicated it to Sickles. It was then that 
Sickles gave the order to Birney to throw forward his line 
of battle to the Emmitsburg road, which had been held by 
his skirmishers all forenoon. Birney' s left at this time rested 
on the northern slope of Little Round Top. Ward, on the 
left, was advanced five hundred }'ards, while de Trobriand 
in the center, and Graham on the right, were swung around 
so that Graham's right rested on the Emmittsburg road 
at the peach orchard. Along the northern bases of Little 
and Big Round Tops flows Plum Run, and immediately 
on its right is the Devil's Den, composed of large bowlders, 
behind which the enemy, comparatively safe, would be able 
to deliver such a deadly fire, if advanced upon, that would 
make it impossible to be taken. Smith's battery of rifled 
guns was placed at the Devil's Den so as to sweep the low 
depression made by Plum Run. Thus Smith held the ex- 
treme left position of the Third Corps. W^inslow's battery, 
from Hunt's artillery reserve, was placed on the right 
of Ward. The batteries of Clark and Ames were posted 
in the rear of the peach orchard. Graham,- at the peach 
orchard, had been strengthened by the 3d IMichigan from 
de Trobriand' s brigade, and the 3d Maine from Ward's. 
Near the Emmittsburg road Randolph's, Seeley's, and Turn- 
bull's batteries were placed. 

In front of Humj^hreys' center was a log house sur- 
rounded by an orchard between him and the Emmittsburg 
road, which he occupied with the 73d New York, com- 
manded by Maj. M. W. Burns. From that position the 
enemy were watched and held at bay. That regiment was 



GETTYSBURG. 497 

subsequently relieved by the i6tli Massachusetts. Hum- 
phreys then received an order to send Burling' s (Third) 
brigade to the support of Graham, About four p. m. 
Humphreys again received an order to move forward and 
occupy the Emmittsburg road with his first line under 
General Carr, while Brewster moved up in supporting 
distance. Birney faced south and Humphreys faced west. 
This position formed a salient angle at the peach orchard 
where Graham and Carr united. 

The Fifth Corps had arrived and took a position on the 
right of the Twelfth. In that position Sykes could easily 
turn Ewell's left flank, while Slocum, with Wadsworth's 
division of the First Corps, and the Twelfth, could attack 
him in front from Culp's Hill. Meade was seriously con- 
sidering an attack on Ewell as he lav stretched along Rock 
Creek like a snake, with the head of Johnson's division 
well up in front of Culp's Hill. But Slocum and Warren 
both urged that the ground was too rough, and the idea 
was abandoned. If that plan had been fully developed 
before S}'kes arrived, and he had been directed to form a 
line of battle, and advance over Wolf's Hill and Benner's 
Hill, he would have struck Ewell in the rear, and although 
the steep declivity down Culp's Hill to Rock Creek would 
have prevented any alignment of the troops under Slocum, 
yet Johnson would have had to hastily retreat back in the 
direction of the almshouse, where the Eleventh Corps 
fought on the previous day, which was a very poor position. 
It is but just to say that the Eleventh Corps, although it 
was compelled to make a hasty retreat from its position on 
the afternoon of the first day, fought bravely, considering 
the fact that it was enfiladed by the artillery on Oak Hill, 
and the infantry force in front occupied a far more advan- 
tageous position. Had Meade attacked Ewell, he would 
have been compelled to push him back from Oak Hill, or 
else have gained no permanent advantage by the move- 
ment. In that case the whole of IMeade's army necessarily 
would have been advanced to Seminary Ridge, which would 

XXXII 



498 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

have made the Union army the one to assault. It was a 
strange coincidence that while Meade was contemplating 
an attack on Ewell, Lee was studying the advisability of 
Ewell attacking Slocum on Gulp's Hill. Both command- 
ers abandoned their movements on that part of the field on 
the morning of the 2d. Then Lee, turning back, rode past 
his headquarters over to his right where Longstreet was 
posted, and carefully examined the Union line in his 
front. That seemed to him the best point to begin the 
main attack, though Ewell, when he heard the guns of 
Longstreet, was to assault Gulp's Hill, and in that way 
threaten Meade's center from the rear and endanger his 
reserve artillery and ammunition on Powers' Hill, beyond 
the Baltimore pike. A. P. Hill was to watch the progress 
of the battle, and if he could strike a favorable blow, he 
was to attack in the center. Lee could see the depression 
in the ground between Little Round Top and the eminence 
where Gibbon lay, and there he resolved to strike, and if 
possible to carry Little Round Top, which had been 
pointed out to him by moonlight the night before by 
Ewell. Longstreet looked on the work before him with 
deep forebodings of disaster, and was opposed to it. He 
wanted to march around Big Round Top, and, moving to 
the left flank of the Union army, take a position behind 
Pipe Greek, which had just been abandoned by Meade, or 
some other strong position, and then, being between Meade 
and Washington, compel him to attack the Gonfederate 
army in a position where it would have the advantage. On 
that point Longstreet says : 

As General Lee rode to the summit of vSeminary Ridge and 
looked down upon the town he saw the Federals in full retreat, and 
concentrating on the rock-ribbed hill that served as a burying-ground 
for the city. He sent orders to Ewell to follow up the success, if he 
found it practicable, and to occupy the hill on which the enemy was 
concentrating. As the order was not positive, and left discretionary 
with General Ewell, the latter thought it better to give his troops a 
little rest, and wait for more definite instructions. I was following 
the Tlurd Corps as fast as possible, and as soon as I got possession 



GETTYSBURG. 499 

of the road went rapidlj- forward to join General Lee. I found him 
on the summit of Seminary Ridge watching the enemy concentrate 
on the opposite hill. He pointed out their position to me. I took 
my glasses and made as careful a survey as I could from that point. 
After five or ten minutes I turned to General Lee and said, " If we 
could have chosen a point to meet our plans of operation, I do not 
think we could have found a better one than that upon which they 
are now concentrating. All we have to do is to throw our army 
around by their left, and we shall interpose between the Federal 
army and Washington. We can get a strong position and wait, and 
if they fail to attack us, we shall have everything in condition to 
move back to-morrow night in the direction of Washington, select- 
ing beforehand a good position into which we can place our troops 
to receive battle next day. Finding our object is Washington or 
that army, the Federals will be sure to attack us. When the}' attack 
we shall beat them, as we proposed to do before we left Fredericks- 
burg, and the probabilities are that the fruits of our success will be 
great." 

' ' No, ' ' said General Lee, ' ' the enemy is there, and I am going 
to attack him there." 

I suggested that such a move as I proposed would give us con- 
trol of the roads leading to Washington and Baltimore, and reminded 
General Lee of our original plans. 

If we had fallen behind INIeade, and had insisted on staying be- 
tween him and Washington, he would have been compelled to 
'attack, and would have been badly beaten. 

Lee -was not disposed to accept the reasoning of Long- 
street, although military men of far less fame -would have 
recognized its force at once. That move would have placed 
the Confederate army bet-ween Meade and his supplies at 
Westminster and greatly jeopardized Baltimore and Wash- 
ington. It is no -wonder Meade kept a jealous eye on his 
rear and was fully prepared for a retrograde movement if 
circumstances dictated. I consider the criticisms on him, in 
view of Longstreet's persistent attempts to have Lee move 
around Meade's left and gain his rear, far from just or laden 
with too much patriotism. Meade was anxious to meet Lee 
at Gettysburg or any other place where he could safely win 
a victory, but he did not desire to blindly have another 
defeat stamped on the escutcheon of the Army of the 
Potomac. 



500 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Lee well remembered the Peninsular campaign, First 
and Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, 
where he had been successful. Those victories inspired 
him with a confidence that he could win a victory wherever 
he met the Union army. His soldiers greatly shared his 
confidence and fully relied upon his judgment, and were 
read}' and anxious for battle at his command. The firm 
opposition of Longstreet to attacking the Union position 
nettled Lee, and he resolved to discard the advice of his 
hitherto trusted lieutenant. Perhaps he feared it would be 
a token of doubt and would lessen the morale of his army. 
There was another move he could make, viz, withdraw to 
the passes in the South Mountain range and there await 
Meade's attack ; but as he had just left Cashtown, where he 
desired to meet Meade, for him then to waver was to admit 
that disaster might follow a conflict between the two armies ; 
therefore he resolved to attack the position occupied by the 
Third Corps, and Longstreet was accordingly ordered to 
prepare for action. The attempt was then made to move 
his two divisions. Hood's and McLaws', around to the left 
through the woods and behind a ridge, so as to conceal the 
movement from the Union signal station on Little Round 
Top. If that could be accomplished the attack would be 
made a surprise, for there was then no cavalry on the imme- 
diate left of the Union army to observe the movements of 
the enemy or to give warning of his approach. Buford, 
who had suffered so severely on the morning of the first 
day, had been ordered from near Big Round Top to West- 
minster on the morning of the second, while Merritt lay at 
Emmittsburg, miles away. Kilpatrick and Gregg were on 
the right flank. But another reason other than his con- 
cealed movement influenced the delay of the attack by 
Longstreet, namely. Law's brigade of Hood's division, for 
which he was waiting, had not yet arrived. Law arrived a 
little before twelve o'clock, and was at once directed to 
move to the extreme right of the Confederate line, which 
was to sweep \v^ Plum Run. When Law moved to the 




BREVET COL. A. J. SELLERS. 



GETTYSBURG. 501 

place assigned him his right rested at the base of Big 
Round Top. Taking a hasty survey of the country around 
him, he saw no cavahy occupying the country south of that 
bold mountain and wondered at its absence, and then queried 
if the Union soldiers occupied that great natural fortifica- 
tion ; but as none were visible he decided to send a scouting 
party up its steep side to discover, if possible, the location 
and strength of the Union force there, if any. In a short time 
one of them returned to him with the information that they 
had ascended to the summit and found that it was not held 
by the Federals. Law made haste to communicate this im- 
portant information to Hood, who speedily sent it to Long- 
street. As no attention was paid to it, Law again called 
Hood's attention to the fact, and added that he (Law) had 
captured some Union soldiers, who claimed to be going to 
the rear in the direction of Emmittsburg on surgeons' cer- 
tificates. Law questioned them as to the position of the 
reserve hospital and reserve artillery, which they located, and 
said a road east of Round Top led there. Again Longstreet 
was urged to move farther to the right and at least occupy 
Big Round Top, but he sent word to Hood that Lee's 
orders were positive to make an attack where he (Long- 
street) had posted the two divisions, and that they must be 
obeyed. 

On the receipt of that order from Longstreet, Hood 
directed his division to prepare for action and directed his 
artillery to open on the Union left at the Devil's Den and 
to the right of it. The cannonading did not continue long 
before Hood was wounded in the arm, when Law succeeded 
to the command of the division. Law commanded an Ala- 
bama brigade, composed of the 4th, 15th, 44th, 47th, and 
49th Alabama. Colonel Sheffield, of the latter regiment, 
assumed command of the brigade when Law was assigned 
to the division. On the left of the Alabama Brigade was 
Robertson's Texas Brigade. This line was supported by 
the Georgia Brigades, commanded by Benning and G. T. 
Anderson. McLaws' line on the left was formed with Ker- 



502 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

shaw on the left of Robertson, and Barksdale on Kershaw's 
left, supported by Semmes and WofFord. Thus the Con- 
federate line was prepared to advance on Sickles, who was 
awaiting the assault. Each division had four batteries. 
Law says he had twenty guns in action. If this is true, it 
is fair to presume that McLaws had twenty, and thus Long- 
street opened the battle on the afternoon of the 2d with at 
least forty guns. 

Law advanced up the Valley of Death, through wdiich 
Plum Run flows, with his brigade on the right, which, instead 
of following in the valley, veered to the right to avoid the 
heavy and well-aimed fire of Smith's battery, stationed on 
the rocks of Devil's Den. An interval was thus left between 
that brigade and the right of Robertson's Texas Brigade. 
Benning's brigade was ordered forward to fill the interval. 
At the same time Anderson's brigade was directed to move 
to the left of Robertson, and Law hurled his whole division 
on the left of Birney's division with great force. 

Captain Smith had posted four of his guns at Devil's 
Den while he left the other section 150 yards in the rear. 
The 4th Maine supported his battery. General Hunt, 
chief of artillery, had just ridden along inspecting espe- 
cially the position of batteries. As he passed Smith, and 
saw his cannon on that advanced position, he remarked that 
the guns were well posted, but would be difficult to remove 
in case the enemy forced back our infantr}'. Smith knew 
it was a desperate fight, and worked his guns with great 
effect. 

Winslow's battery, on the right of Ward's brigade, 
opened at the same time, but these batteries were unable to 
check the advancing line of battle under Law. When 
it reached within 200 yards of Ward, he opened fire, which 
checked the enemy's advance long enough for Ward's 
men to reload. Ward ordered a second volley as soon as 
the guns were reloaded. This produced considerable dis- 
order and confusion for a time in the ranks of Law's divi- 
sion, and gave Ward a chance to advance his rioht and 



GETTYSBURG. 503 

center about i6o rods to the front, and occupy a stone wall 
which the enemy was endeavoring to secure. 

Our troops on the left being compelled to give ground, 
Ward sent to Birney for assistance. The 40th New York, 
from de Trobriand, was sent to him, and directed to the left 
of Smith's battery, where, under Colonel Egan, it fought 
most valiantly. Ward had been driven back several times, 
and as many times had he forced the enemy to retreat. 
De Trobriand was holding his own with two regiments, the 
5th IMichigan, and the iioth Pennsylvania. He had reen- 
forced the skirmish line at the peach orchard with the 3d 
Michigan, under Colonel Pierce, while the 17th Maine and 
40th New York had gone to Ward's assistance. De Tro- 
briand had a ravine in his front in a heavy forest, across 
which the enemy was unable to advance under the severe 
fire from those two regiments. 

The 5th Michigan suffered severely, losing more than 
half its members. Had de Trobriand been reenforced then, 
it is quite evident he could have turned Law's left, which 
would have endangered McLaws' right ; but troops not 
arriving in time, and the enemy advancing on his left and 
right, he fell back to avoid being surrounded. 

In the council of war, held about three o'clock, Meade 
directed Sykes to Little Round Top with the Fifth Corps. 
Longstreet began his attack while it was in session, and 
Sickles merely reported and immediately returned to the 
front. When Sykes arrived at the base of Little Round 
Top, he had been preceded by Warren, for the council had 
been speedily closed, and the generals prepared for action. 

When Warren arrived on the summit of Little Round 
Top the soldiers of the signal station were rolling up their 
flags to retire, as the enemy under Law were pressing so 
closely that their lives were already in great danger, and it 
was always understood that the signal stations were not to be 
exposed to the enemy's fire. Warren directed them to 
unfurl their flags and continue their work of signaling with 
Meade's headquarters. Seeing Vincent's brigade, of Barnes' 



504 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

division, of the Fifth Corps, approaching, Warren rode up 
to Sykes and Barnes, and requested that Vincent be moved 
on Little Round Top, and hold it, as the Alabama Brigade 
was hurrying up its side from the direction of Plum Run 
to take possession of the summit. Vincent's men seized 
two guns of Hazlett's battery and dragged them to the crest, 
where they were placed in position to bear on Law near the 
Devil's Den. Sykes hurried forward, and seeing Smith's 
battery at the Devil's Den was in peril he (Sykes) galloped 
to Birney and explained to him the necessity of protecting 
Smith's guns, as they swept " the Valley of Death," from 
which the enemy was approaching and endeavoring to 
take the Round Tops. Sykes said to Birney: "Your 
troops are nearest at hand ; close to the left in the rear 
of Devil's Den, and I will fill the gap made on your 
right with the brigades of Sweitzer and Tilton of Barnes' 
division. ' ' Sweitzer moved to the position assigned to him 
with the 62d Pennsylvania on the left, 4th Michigan in the 
center, and the 3 2d Massachusetts on the right. His other 
regiment, the 9th Massachusetts, was on picket duty. Tilton 
arriving, deployed his brigade to the right of Sweitzer, with 
the 22d Massachusetts on Sweitzer' s right, the ist Michigan 
in the center, supported on its right by the iiSth Pennsyl- 
vania, with its right refused back at a right angle. The 
1 8th IVIassachusetts was posted in rear of the center as a 
reserve. 

The enemy attacked Tilton 's whole front and the 
32d Massachusetts. Sweitzer' s left and center not being 
pressed, he directed the 62d Pennsylvania and 4th Michi- 
gan to form lines in the rear of the 32d Massachusetts to 
aid it and Tilton. In the mean time the enemy was moving 
around Tilton's right flank, beyond the 11 8th Pennsylva- 
nia ; consequently Tilton retired about 300 yards to the 
right and rear. Sweitzer, on his left, at the same time fell 
back. 

Caldwell's division of the Second Corps having been 
ordered to that part of the line, the First Brigade, under 




MAJ. E. P. HALSTKAD. 



GETTYSBURG. 505 

Colonel Cross, was directed by Caldwell to advance through 
the wheat field, the Second Brigade, under command of 
Col. Patrick Kelly, formed on the right of the First Bri- 
gade, while General Zook, commanding the Third Brigade, 
still extended Caldwell's line to the right in the direction 
of the Emmittsburg road at the peach orchard. Colonel 
Brooke, commanding the Fourth Brigade, was held in re- 
serve. Colonel Cross, coirunanding Caldwell's First Bri- 
gade, fell mortally wounded, and Colonel McKeen, of the 
8 1st Pennsylvania, assumed command. The brigade having 
exhausted its ammunition, Colonel Brooke was ordered to 
its relief. 

Cross had fought his way through the wheat field under 
a very heavy fire. Zook, on the right, had driven the 
enemy back, who now occupied a woods at the farther' side 
of the wheat field, and was partially protected, while the 
Union troops, as they crossed the field, were fully exposed 
to a deadly fire. Caldwell, seeing the frightful carnage of 
his division, called on Barnes for assistance. Sweitzer's 
brigade being then near the head of the "Valley of Death" 
on the crossroad running from the Tane}town to the Em- 
mittsburg road, he was directed to assist Caldwell. Brooke 
was attempting to seize the crest of a hill in front, which 
Caldwell greatly coveted, hoping to stay the tide of battle 
there. Caldwell rode to the left to see Ayres, whose divi- 
sion of the Fifth Corps was coming on the field. Weed's 
Third Brigade was directed to Little Round Top, where 
Vincent, of Barnes' division, had been. Ayres directed 
Col. Sidney Burbank, commanding the Second Brigade, 
to advance across Plum Run and connect with Sweitzer, 
who had been ordered on Caldwell's left. The First Bri- 
gade of Ayres, under Colonel Day, was directed to support 
the Second. 

Ayres' division was known as Sykes' regulars, notwith- 
standing the fact that the Third Brigade was composed 
entirely of volunteers. Caldwell, turning to his own divi- 
sion, found that Brooke had made a most gallant charge, 



506 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and had advanced far into the woods, but was wounded. 
Sergeant F. C. Jones of the 64th New York, afterwards 
promoted to a captaincy for bravery on the field, says : 
"Brooke went farther to the front than any other troops." 

Proceeding to his right, he found Zook outflanked, and 
the enemy moving rapidly around to get in his rear. That 
compelled him to fall back, and of necessity carried with 
him Ayres' right flank. The. Confederates fought with 
great desperation, while Caldwell and Ayres made a most 
gallant stand. Both sides suff*ered fearful losses. Among 
the number General Zook, a brave and capable officer, was 
killed. The valley fairly ran red with blood from the 
wounded and killed of both armies. 

The Union forces under Ayres and Caldwell, after the 
most desperate fighting and heavy losses, were compelled to 
yield ground. In fact our entire line immediately in front 
of I^ittle Round Top was broken, the troops in rapid re- 
treat, while the enemy had reached the foot of the rocky 
ridge and their columns were advancing in hot pursuit. 
This was a critical juncture in the battle, and led to one of 
the most brilliant and successful charges, for the number 
engaged, which occurred during the battle. 

Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, commanding two brigades 
of the Pennsylvania Reserves, (the First and Third) attached 
to the Fifth Corps, under General Sykes, had arrived on 
the field and were ready for the emergency. These troops 
had been rested and refreshed, after a long, forced march, 
and were prepared to use their greatest effort in assisting to 
drive the invaders from their native State. 

Company K, of Colonel Talley's regiment, was from 
Gettysburg, and, from the summit of Round Top, in sight 
of their homes. This celebrated company had been re- 
cruited and taken to the front by its distinguished captain, 
Hon. Edward McPherson. 



GETTYSBLRG. 507 



CHARGE OF THE FIRST BRIGADE, WRITTEN BY A PARTICIPANT. 

The charge of the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reser^^es at 
Little Round Top is celebrated in history and in song. Its achieve- 
ment is one of the leading topics in the discussion of the battle of 
Gettysburg. 

******* 

The fact that the commands of Ayres and Caldwell gave way 
does not detract from the skill of the officers nor the valor of their 
men. No more determined effort was ever made in the defense of a 
cause or of a country than that by the Union soldiers on the second 
day to hold Little Round Top. Nor does the fact that a brigade of 
fresh, determined Pennsylvanians dashed down the mountain side 
like an avalanche, and swept the advancing rebels before them 
in confusion, prove that the latter were not terribly brave. Both 
of the contending forces were nearly exhausted, their ranks 
thinned, and their ammunition, in some cases, expended. It had 
been a charge and countercharge — an alternate advance and re- 
treat. Along the entire line the fighting was, at times, terrific; 
there was no less bravery displayed on the right and center of the 
line of battle. But I am speaking of our left and the enemy's 
right. 

From the dawn of the second day the only well-grounded hope 
of success entertained by Lee was to break the left center and get 
possession of Little Round Top. The Pickett charge was but a for- 
lorn hope. It was made by a large number of troops, and was an 
exhibition of wonderful desperation and a wanton recklessness. It 
was the last spasmodic struggle in death, nothing more. 

When the advancing enemy came in range with Hancock's 
guns, that gallant officer opened a discharge of shell and canister, 
making havoc through their masses. Yet they advanced to within 
a short distance of the guns, driving away the gunners at the point 
of the bayonet. Just as the hordes were sure of success, two reserve 
batteries that had been placed in position b}' General Warren, of 
Meade's staff, opened a murderous, enfilading fire, and swept them 
from the hill ; at the same time a portion of the infantry of the 
Second Corps sent volleys of musketry into the fleeing foe, recap- 
tured our guns and immediately opened them on the enem\-'s 
lines. Great was the carnage, and 3"et Lee would not abandon 
his effort. ]\Iore men mu.st be slain in the effort. When 
Sickles' corps had cleared the front of the Fifth Corps, Sykes 
ordered a countercharge upon the again advancing enemy. His 
division of Regulars led the charge and drove him back upon the 
center. But on the left the enemy outflanked the Regulars, and in 



508 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

turn drove them back up tlie hill in hot pursuit. It now looked as 
though our little Gibraltar would be taken by storm. This was the 
opportune moment for the regiments of the First Brigade to do 
their work. The brigade was commanded by Col. William McCand- 
less, and consisted of the following five regiments : ist, commanded 
by Col. William Cooper Talley ; 2d, by Lieut. Col. George W. Wood- 
ward ; Gth, Col. Wellington H. Ent ; nth, Col. Samuel ]\I. Jackson, 
and the 13th, or Bucktails, by Col. Charles Frederick Taylor. These 
troops had arrived on the field from a long forced march a sufiicient 
length of time to recuperate, and were ready and anxious to defend 
their native State. General Meade commanded, in a voice clearly 
heard and fully understood : " Bring up the Pennsylvania Reserves, 
double-quick." W^hereupon General Crawford ordered" Colonel ]\Ic- 
Candless to move the First Brigade, which was near at hand, in 
line, ready for an emergenc}'. Colonel McCandless accordingly ex- 
ecuted the order as quickly as it was given. The regiments went 
into position under almost a full run, halted suddenly, fronted, 
aligned at one glance, aimed accurately and delivered two death- 
dealing volleys into the advancing foe, who were struggling to 
reach the crest, and then, with a shout and a yell that rang along 
the hillsides and through the "Valley of Death," with fixed bayonets, 
charged down the rugged declivity, crossed the open marshy space 
in front, cleared the rocky face of the slope beyond and halted not 
until they reached the stone wall bordering the skirt of the woods, 
where the enemy made a last desperate rally. In that charge there 
was a young officer by the name of John Taylor, in command of the 
color company of the 2d Regiment, who distinguished himself by 
charging over the stone wall and planting the colors of his regiment 
some 30 feet beyond it, but the fire from the enemy was too deadl}-, 
and he was compelled to fall back behind it. After the battle he 
served on the staff of Colonel INIcCandless. Since the war he has 
been Quartermaster General of the Grand Army of the Republic. 

The Confederates w^ere driven in confusion and dismay. They 
were never again allowed to recross the historic " stone wall." The 
key to the situation was securely held by the First Brigade. This 
wall, though poorly constructed, became a breastwork for " the five 
regiments of Reserves." No concentration of the enemy's forces 
did or could dislodge them. Any who approached sufficiently near 
received death from behind the wall. Thus ended the first charge 
of the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves in the second 
day's battle of Gettysburg. 

General IMeade, in his official report, speaking of the great 
conflict on the left of our line, says : " Notwithstanding the stub- 
born resistance of the Third Corps, under Major General Bihiey 




GEN. J. H. KIDD. 



GETTYSBURG. 509 

(Major General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), 
the superiority of numbers of the enemy enabling him to outflank 
the corps in its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to 
fall back and reform behind the line originally designed to be held." 

In the mean time, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, 
the Sixth Corps and part of the First Corps, with detachments from 
the Second Corps, succeeded, with the gallant resistance of the Fifth 
Corps, in checking, and finally repulsing, the assault of the enemy, 
who, about sunset, retired in confusion and disorder, and ceased any 
further efforts on our extreme left. 

General Crawford, in his report of the battle of Little Round 
Top, says : " Our troops in front, after a determined resistance, un- 
able to withstand the force of the enemy, fell back, and some finally 
gave way. The plain to my front was covered with fugitives from 
all divisions, who rushed through my lines and along the road to 
the rear. Fragments of regiments came back in disorder, and with- 
out their arms, and for a moment all seemed lost. The enemy's 
skirmishers had reached the front of the rocky ridge ; his columns 
were following rapidly. jNIy command (Pennsylvania Reserves) was 
formed in two lines, the second massed on the first. The 6th Regi- 
ment, Lieutenant Colonel Ent, on the right ; the ist Regiment, Col- 
onel Talley, on the left, and the i ith Regiment, Colonel Jackson, in 
the center. The second line consisted of the ist Rifles (Bucktails), 
Colonel Taylor, and the 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Woodward. Colonel 
McCandless commanded the whole. 

" Not a moment was to be lost. Uncovering our front, I ordered 
an immediate advance. The brigade advanced gallantly with loud 
cheers. Two well-directed volleys were delivered upon the advancing 
masses of the enemy, when the whole column charged at a run 
down the slope, driving the enemy back across the space beyond, 
and across the stone wall, for the possession of which there was a 
short but determined struggle. The enemy retired to the wheat field 
and the woods. * * * * As night was approaching and my 
flanks were unprotected, I directed Colonel McCandless to hold the 
line of the stone wall and the woods on the right. Heavy lines of 
skirmishers were thrown cut, and the ground firml}- and permanently 
held." 

Colonel INIcCandless, in his official report of the Little Round 
Top charge, says : 

" Our first position was naturally .strong, being a rocky, woody 
hillside, with good cover, sloping .steeply down to a plain, which ex- 
tended from the base about seven hundred Aards to a stone wall. 
This plain was marshy and difficult to cross; over it, however, 
the enem}'^ passed his infantry in a disordered mass, driving our 



510 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

forces back on m}' position. I immediately formed my brigade in 
two lines, the first line being composed of the 6th Regiment, lyieu- 
tenant Colonel Ent, on the right ; the ist. Colonel Talley, on the 
left, and the nth, Colonel Jackson, in the center. The second line 
was massed on the first, and was composed of the ist Rifles (Euck- 
tails), Colonel Taylor, and 2d Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Wood- 
ward. As soon as our front was uncovered the brigade advanced in 
gallant stj'le, the first line delivering a vollej^ ; then the whole 
brigade charged at a full run down the hillside and across the plain, 
driving the advancing masses of the enemy back upon the stone 
wall, for the possession of which there was a desperate struggle, we • 
finally carrying it. Prior to reaching the wall, however, my left 
flank being exposed to a galling fire, I deplo3'ed the second line to 
the left, forming a prolongation of my first line, along with which 
they steadily advanced. It was at this time, and when within a 
short distance of the wall, that the brave and lamented Col. Charles 
F. Taylor fell while gallantly leading his regiment. Being ordered 
not to advance beyond the stone wall, I formed a line along it, threw 
a strong line of skirmishers on ni}- front and flankers on my right 
and left. I remained in this position up to six p. m. of the 3d instant, 
the enemy shelling the position without effect." 

The testimony of all the living ofiicers and men who took part 
could be given, corroborative of the importance, brillianc}- and suc- 
cess of " The charge of the First Brigade at Little Round Top." 

While the Union forces had been compelled to yield 
ground under Ayres and Caldwell, yet Law saw that he 
could not get possession of Little Rotmd Top by following 
these two generals, as he wotild have to advance o\-er an 
open space w'here he would be exposed to a fire that would 
greatly deplete his ranks before he could arrive wliere 
Ayres and Caldwell were posted, who would then in turn 
charge him back over the wdieat field, and perhaps break 
his weakened lines. .Before the action began, he wanted 
to take possession of Big Round Top, but was compelled 
to follow up the "Valley of Death" according to Lee's 
orders. He then thought he saw a chance to drive our 
troops from Little Round Top by sending a force up the 
secluded depression between the Rotind Tops, which was 
only a few rods wide and covered with woods, which would 
shield his movements ; but again his efforts were foiled, for 



GETTYSBURG. 511 

Vincent had formed his brigade in a semicircle, with the 
right of the i6th Michigan resting not far from Hazlett's 
batter}-, the 44th New York, on its left, tracing along the 
side of the mountain, the 83d Pennsylvania, on its left, 
stretching down to the depression between the two moun- 
tains, and the 20th Maine, under Colonel Chamberlain, 
was on the left of the brigade, and occupying a position 
between the two mountains. Law attacked vigorously the 
whole front of Vincent. The 44th New York and 83d 
Pennsylvania repulsed several assaults ; when the i6th 
IMichigan on the right was attacked, a part of that regi- 
ment gave way ; but Patrick H. O'Rourke, commanding 
the 140th New York, at once threw his regiment in and 
saved that point. 

General Weed had been mortally wounded and Lieu- 
tenant Hazlett, while stooping over him to receive what he 
supposed was his last command, was shot and died with his 
arms around him. As O'Rourke charged Vincent was 
mortally wounded, and soon Patrick O'Rourke heroically 
surrendered up his life. Thus Weed, Vincent, O'Rourke, 
and Hazlett lay near each other, silent in death, on Little 
Round Top. The battle still waged with great ferocity 
for, as yet, the enemy had not given up the hope of carry- 
ing Little Round Top, the key to the situation. Failing 
in the effort to break through the right and capture Haz- 
lett's guns, and possess the summit, Law moved his troops 
back and again attacked the center and the left. While the 
assault on Vincent's center was made with great determina- 
tion, the left, under Chamberlain, was assailed with des- 
peration. 

Vincent having fallen mortally wounded. Col. James C. 
Rice, of the 44th New York, assumed command of the 
brigade. Of the last attack he says : 

Now occurred the most critical time of the action. For above 
half an hour the struggle was desperate. At length the enemy- 
pressed so strongly upon the left flank of Colonel Chamberlain's 
regiment that he wisely determined to change the order of battle, 



512 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and commanded his left wing to fall back at right angles to his 
right. He then ordered a charge, and repulsed the eneni}- at ever}^ 
point. 

General Crawford having arrived with two brigades of 
the Pennsylvania Reserves, Fisher's brigade was directed 
to support Vincent's brigade on Round Top and was posted 
in the rear. At dusk Colonels Rice, Chamberlain, and 
Fisher held a consultation and decided that it wotild be un- 
wise to permit the enemy to hold the crest of Big Rotind 
Top, as it would be fortified dtiring the night and would 
compel Little Rotuid Top to be evacuated in the morning 
if artillery were posted on it. It was therefore decided that 
Fisher with two of his regiments and Chamberlain with his 
regiment should charge up the mountain at once and dislodge 
Law's force there. Accordingly these two officers, with the 
2oth Maine and 5th and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, 
ascended the mountain and drove the enemy before them, 
capturing some thirty prisoners, including one of General 
Law's staff. Chamberlain in the darkness was tmable to 
tell whether he was near a heavy body of the enemy or not, 
and sent back for the 83d Pennsylvania and 44th New York. 
Fisher had moved to the right of Chamberlain and occtipied 
a position on the side of Big Rotind Top, but in the night 
sent two regiments to Chamberlain's left. Thus ended the 
conffict on the Round Tops, leaving both in possession 
of the Union troops, but which had cost so many precious 
lives. 

Graham, who held the right of Birney's line at the 
peach orchard, was exposed to a fire from two directions. 
Although he had been heavily reenforced, his position w^as 
one of great peril. 

Tlie 141st Pennsylvania was advanced to the road lead- 
ing from Little Round Top to the Emmittsburg road, with 
the 2d New Hampshire on its right, occupying the salient 
with its right wing on the Emmittsburg road, the 68th 
Pennsylvania prolonging the line of the right wing of the 
2d New Hampshire on the Emmittsbtirg road. When Ker- 



GETTYSBURG. 513 

shaw advanced, the 3d Michigan, 3d Maine, 2d New Hamp- 
shire, and 63d Pennsylvania moved forward to the south side 
of the peach orchard, and checked his advance, but when 
Barksdale's movement, from the west, threatened their 
rear, they fell back to the road leading to Little Round 
Top from the Emmittsburg road. Thus Hood, with Ker- 
shaw, and Semmes' divisions from the south, and Barksdale 
and Wofiford's from the west, were attacking Sickles' 
salient at the peach orchard, and melting it away ; Long- 
street had directed his batteries to follow closely the infan- 
try and take a position to enfilade Humphreys' front, along 
the Emmittsburg road, which was receiving a galling fire 
from Barksdale. When the salient gave way the enemy 
was rapidly gaining Carr's rear, who held the right of 
Humphreys' line. In order to meet this new move he 
threw back his left with his right, still holding on to the 
Emmittsburg road. The struggle had been one to the 
death. Semmes and WofFord had pressed forward and had 
greatly aided Kershaw and Barksdale. Graham had been 
wounded, and was a prisoner, the impetuous Barksdale had 
fallen mortally wounded, but on pressed the Confederate 
forces. The losses on both sides were appalling ; it was a 
death grapple ; men fell like the leaves before an autumn 
wind. 

General Patterson, then a captain in the 2d New 
Hampshire, said, that his regiment had 21 out of 23 officers 
wounded or killed. Scarcely had this taken place when 
Carr's right flank was endangered from Anderson, who 
sought to occupy the interval between the right of the 
Third Corps and the left of the Second. Hancock had 
ordered two regiments forward to protect Humphreys' 
right, but they were not strong enough to prevent or im- 
pede Anderson's advance, and Carr retired his right before 
Willard's brigade of Hay's division could arrive. 

R. H. Anderson, of Hill's corps, who was on the left of 
McLaws' was ordered to aid McLaws' attack as the battle 
rolled from Hood's right, around toward the seminary. 

XXXIII 



514 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Anderson had formed liis line connecting with Mclyaws' 
left in the following order, Wilcox, Perry, Wright, and 
Posey. When Barksdale, holding McLaws' left, advanced, 
Wilcox, on Anderson's right, received orders to move. 
Perry, and Wright received the same order, and all three 
brigades advanced on Humphreys ; Carr receiving the 
weight of these three brigades retired his right to a point 
on a line with his left, which he had thrown back when the 
salient at the peach orchard gave way. 

Wilcox kept steadily to the front while Perry halted his 
brigade at the Emmittsburg road. Wright on his left, 
like Wilcox, pushed ahead and attacked the new line of 
battle. Doubleday says, "Wright pierced our line of battle 
more effectually than Lee did with Pickett the following 
day." But Anderson did not support Wilcox and Wright 
with Posey and Mahone, nor did he order Perry forward 
when he halted at the Emmittsburg road. 

Wilcox and Wright made a most gallant charge, and if 
they had been supported, Lee's chance to break the Union 
line at that point would have been far better than on the 
following day, when he ordered the Pickett charge with- 
out any probability of success, although it has passed into 
history with great celebrity and fame. Three of Ander- 
son's brigades, Perry, Posey, and Mahone, were not pressed 
in at the opportune moment ; the divisions of Heth and 
Pender rendered very feeble assistance. But the last-men- 
tioned two divisions had fought the First Corps the day 
before, and were in no condition to make an assault. 
Sickles receiving a severe wound near the Trostle House, 
could no longer command. 

When Sickles fell it was considered advisable to remove 
him from the field at once for fear it might have a demora- 
lizing effect on the men, therefore Capt. M. J. Foote, of 
the 70th New York, Sickles' old regiment, made a detail 
of a sergeant and six men to take hhn back to a place of 
safety. Meade, learning of Sickles' fate, left his headquar- 
ters hastily, and galloped to where the battle was raging 



GETTYSBURG. 515 

with great fury, and at once placed Hancock in com- 
mand. 

The condition of affairs is well portrayed in the follow- 
ing extract from Hancock's report ; he says : 

I directed General Humphreys to form his command on the 
ground from which General Caldwell had moved to the support of 
the Third Corps, which was promptly done. The number of his 
troops collected was, however, very small, scarcely equal to an ordi- 
nary battalion, but with many colors ; this small command being 
composed of the fragments of many shattered regiments. Three 
guns of one of its batteries had been left on the field, owing to the 
losses of horses and men. I established Colonel Willard's brigade 
at the point through which General Birney's division had retired, 
and fronting the approach of the enemy, who were pressing vigor- 
ously on. There were no other troops on the right or left, and the 
brigade soon became engaged, losing its commander, Colonel Wil- 
lard, and many officers and men. 

Hancock had sent a staff officer to Meade for reenforce- 
ments, as it seemed Longstreet was determined to break the 
line of battle on our left, and take possession of the Round 
Tops. Newton, who had been placed in command of the 
First Corps the evening before, directed Doubleday and 
Robinson to report to Hancock. Their divisions had 
suffered severely the day before, yet they quickly responded 
to the command. Doubleday formed his division in lines 
by regiments ready to charge. The left wing of the 13th 
Vermont was supporting a battery. At the head of the 
division was the right of that regiment, under the com- 
mand of Colonel Randall. When Doubleday halted for 
orders, it was observed that the enemy had captured one of 
our regular batteries. Colonel Randall rode up to Han- 
cock and requested permission to charge and retake it. 
Hancock said: "There it is, retake it if you desire to." 
In a moment the Vermont boys were charging on that 
point of the Confederate line retreating with the battery. 
They not only retook four of our guns, but captured two 
from the enemy. 



516 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

In rear of the new line formed by Hancock, General 
Hunt posted several fresh batteries from the reserve artil- 
lery, which greatly aided in repulsing the advance of the 
enemy. The interval between the right of the Third Corps 
and the left of the Second was penetrated by the enemy, 
when Meade in person led two regiments of Lock wood's 
brigade and drove him back. A heavy force of the enemy 
had appeared under cover of some undergrowth, which 
Hancock discovering, directed the ist Minnesota to charge 
it. The order was obeyed in most gallant style, routing 
the enemy and capturing a stand of colors. 

So desperate was the conflict that Meade ordered Wil- 
liams and Geary's divisions, of the Twelfth Corps, except 
Greene's brigade, to reenforce Sickles ; these troops, how- 
ever, did not arrive until the battle was lulling. 

A. P. Hill, who held the center of Lee's army, did not 
vigorously advance against our troops on the left of Long- 
street, or else he might have pierced our lines at Ziegler's 
grove, as Hancock had stripped that part of the line to save 
Sickles. Hill's right division, under Anderson, had aided 
McLaws in his attack on Humphreys. As the two ex- 
hausted lines of battle watched each other, the shades of 
night began to settle down, and the conflict on that part of 
the field ceased. The troops of the Twelfth Corps were 
directed to return to their former position on Culp's Hill. 
It was Lee's intention to have Hill and Ewell attack when 
they heard Longstreet's guns ; but his orders were only 
provisional, not peremptoiy. Johnson, who lay along 
Rock Creek, facing Culp's Hill, directed Major Latimer to 
begin cannonading about four o'clock, but his infantry did 
not advance until' later. Wads worth and Greene were 
alone defending Culp's Hill. Greene seeing great danger 
of having his right flank turned, deployed farther in the 
direction of the Baltimore pike to prevent it. Although 
his line was strengthened with the 14th Brooklyn, 6th 
Wisconsin, and 147th New York, from the First Corps, 
and the 82d Illinois, 45th New York, and 6ist Ohio, from 



GETTYSBURG. 517 

the Eleventh Corps, yet Greene was compelled to yield 
ground on the right, when the Confederates took posses- 
sion of the temporary works which had been evacuated by 
Rusher and Gearv to go to the rescue of Sickles. 

The 6th Wisconsin arrived about eight p.m., while the 
enemy was making a desperate attempt to drive the io2d 
New York from behind the temporary breastworks it occu- 
pied. That regiment held the center of Greene's brigade, 
and had the line been broken there the Union reserve artil- 
lery and supply train would have been in danger of capture, 
and our center pierced. When Colonel Dawes arrived with 
the 6th Wisconsin, Colonel, then Captain Stegman, in 
command of the io2d New York, requested him to support 
his right wing, as that was heavily pressed. Tfie timely 
aid given by the " Badgers^' has been often acknowledged 
by that grand soldier, Lewis R. Stegman, who, to me, has 
frequently praised the 6tli Wisconsin for coming up at a 
time when he most needed help to hold his position. Shortly 
afterwards the 45th New York arrived and supported the 
left wing of the io2d New York. It was said by an officer 
that the Confederate dead were so thick in front of these 
three regiments that the enemy could have made breast- 
works of them. The work done that night on Culp's Hill 
saved the position of Meade's army. 

Ruger rapidly marched to the position where Sickles 
was fighting. Geary being ordered to follow him (Ruger), 
withdrew from his position and moved to the Baltimore 
pike, but, being unable to tell what direction Ruger had 
taken, did not move any farther. Almost as soon as the 
battle had ceased in front of Sickles, Ruger and Geary 
were ordered to move back to their former positions. 
When Colgrove's brigade of Ruger' s division arrived at 
Spangler's Spring the head of his column was right among 
the Confederates, developing the fact that the enemy 
held the position so recently evacuated by Ruger atid 
Geary. Unable to make a successful attack in the night 
Ruger retired to McCallister's Hill, with McDougall's left 



518 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

resting near the Baltimore pike, while Col grove's right 
rested on Rock Creek. Geary, advancing from the Balti- 
more pike, was met by a volley from the enemy occnpying 
his intrenchments ; he therefore placed his two brigades on 
a crest, thus preventing Johnston's force from advancing to 
the Baltimore pike, and reported to Generals Slocum and 
Williams the situation of affairs on the right of the Union 
army on the night of the 2d of July. 

At the same time Early made an attack on Cemetery 
Hill with the brigades of Hays and Avery, supported by 
Gordon ; but the latter did not advance far enough to par- 
ticipate. Early saw the movement was going to fail, as 
he was not being supported on his right by Rodes as he 
expected. Hays and Avery had received their orders 
to attack Cemetery Hill, and they boldly advanced to their 
work about seven o'clock. Hays, on the right, struck Von 
Gilsa at a stone wall at the base of the hill, while Avery 
attacked Ames' brigade. After a stubborn fight these two 
brigades of the Eleventh Corps were forced up the hill 
through Wiedrich's and Ricketts' batteries. 

Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries, which had 
been cut up on the first day, were then brought into action. 
Stevens' battery had an enfilading fire on Avery and greatly 
retarded his progress, but Hays, on the right, gained the 
crest of the hill and captured Wiedrich's battery and two 
guns of Ricketts'. The cannoneers fought with great 
bravery, using their rammers on the enemy ; a desperate 
hand-to-hand conflict took place over the guns. One Con- 
federate was killed with a stone by a gunner. The 33d 
Massachusetts poured in an oblique fire which was very 
destructive. Hancock sent Carroll's brigade to the point 
when the fighting was going on over the guns, for the 
soldiers of these two batteries had decided to die there rather 
than surrender their pieces. Carroll's brigade made a 
charge and drove the Confederates down the hill, which 
virtually ended the conflict for the second day, for Early 
retreated back to his former position, while Rodes, who had 




COL. R. BRUCE RICKETTS. 



GETTYSBURG. 519 

adv9-iiced througli Gett}-sburg and was then close up iu line 
of battle, did not make an attack. 

The night of the 2d was spent on the Round Tops 
by the Union soldiers in building breastworks of loose 
stones that thickly covered both. Longstreet's troops were 
close in front of Big Round Top engaged in the same work. 
A soldier said when they were placing rocks in position he 
could distinctly hear the enemy building his line of works 
in anticipation of the renewal of the battle next day. 

Ewell, seeing that Johnson had occupied the position of 
Geary and Ruger, knew he would be attacked early in the 
morning; he therefore sent Daniel's, O'Neal's, and Smith's 
brigades to him. Walker, who had halted the evening be- 
fore to oppose a force on his right, moved his brigade up 
and joined Johnson's division; so on the morning of the 
3d Johnson had six brigades with which to withstand the 
attack of Ruger and Geary, who had only four brigades 
of old troops; Lock wood's small brigade had arrived from 
Baltimore, but it had never been seasoned in battle. 

The enemy held a stone wall that rendered an attack by 
Geary from the pike decidedly hazardous. At one a.m., 
after the consultation of Slocum, Williams, and Geary, the 
latter took position, with Kane on the left and Candy on 
the right, in double line of battle along a narrow lane 
which ran from the Baltimore pike to the stone wall. 
Geary formed his line of battle with great secrecy within a 
few rods of the enemy. 

Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg, chief of artillery of the 
Twelfth Corps, was directed to place fourteen pieces in \qs\- 
tion about five hundred )-ards west of the pike, while 
Knapp's battery was posted at the headquarters of Slocum. 
LrOckwood's brigade was directed to support jMuhlenberg's 
artillery. Just as day was breaking the artillery opened on 
the Confederates and continued about a quarter of an hour ; 
then Gearv charo^ed with Kane's and Candv's brigades. At 
first the enemy wavered, but soon advanced in three lines 
of battle, which was received with deadly fire from Greene 



520 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and Kane. Again Muhlenberg's artillery was ordered to 
open, Geary personally superintending it. Muhlenberg's 
guns prevented the enemy from turning Ruger's left and 
separating the divisions of Geary and Ruger. When the 
artillery ceased the 147th Pennsylvania charged and drove 
the Confederates from the stone wall. Then the 5th Ohio, 
on Candy's left, received an enfilading fire, but held its 
ground. The 66th Ohio was ordered in perpendicular to 
Greene's position in order to enfilade the enemy. Greene's 
men being out of ammunition, the 28th Pennsylvania, 29th 
and 7th Ohio were ordered into the intrenchments to their 
relief, Lockwood's brigade then came to Geary's assist- 
ance and was posted in the rear of Greene's position and 
relieved the regiments that were out of ammunition. 

About eight o'clock Johnson renewed the attack with 
great determination, when Slocum called for assistance. 
The 14th Brooklyn and the 147th New York of the First 
Corps, and Shaler's brigade of the Sixth were ordered to 
assist Geary. 

Ruger, in order to maintain a connection with Geary's 
right, ordered the 20th Connecticut, of McDougall's bri- 
gade, to occupy the edge of the woods across the swale from 
the Baltimore pike, while the 107th New York, of Col- 
grove's brigade, was placed in reserve to the 20th Connec- 
ticut between the pike and the swale to the left of McDou- 
gall. Colgrove occupied a position on McAllister's Hill, 
between McDougall's right and Rock Creek, with the 3d 
Wisconsin on the left, then the 2d Massachusetts on its 
right, the 27th Indiana, with the 13th New Jersey, under 
Colonel Carman, on the extreme right facing Rock Creek. 
The 20th Connecticut had been hotly engaged from early 
in the morning. About eight o'clock Colgrove charged 
across the swale, made by the water from Spanglcr's Spring, 
which made its way to Rock Creek on Colgrove' s right, 
with the 2d Massachusetts and 27th Indiana. The point of 
attack by Colgrove was the Confederate position at Span- 
glcr's Spring which was surrounded by a forest, in which 



GETTYSBURG. 521 

Johnson's men were well posted, and protected by the 
forest and temporary breastworks. When Colgrove crossed 
the marsh, which was an open space, he was met with a 
deadly fire from the enemy, whom he was unable to harm 
or dislodge. Being compelled to fall back upon McAllis- 
ter's Hill, from which position he had moved, the Confed- 
erates charged his retiring regiments, but at the proper time, 
when they had gained the open space, Colgrove about-faced 
his command, and suddenly delivered such a deadly volley 
into their ranks that they hastily retired back to their 
position. IMcDougall's right did not advance with Col- 
grove, but the 123d New York, on his left, moved ujd on 
the right of the 2otli Connecticut, which, with Geary's 
right, drove the enemy from the stone wall along the lane 
leading to the pike. That position being carried, fully dis- 
sipated Johnson's hopes of seizing the Baltimore pike in 
the rear of Meade's headquarters, and endangering the sup- 
ply trains at Powers' Hill. 

About half past ten, Johnson, with two brigades, made 
another attempt to turn Geary's right, but were met 
and repulsed by Kane. Then Geary charged and retook 
his works, taking many prisoners. Johnson, who had been 
anxiously waiting to hear the guns of Longstreet and Hill 
open along their part of the line, had waited in vain, and 
after several hours of desperate fighting, fell back too much 
exhausted to renew the conflict, but still clung to the base 
of Culp's Hill. That ended the battle on that part of the 
field. Though Johnson had been disappointed at the inaction 
of Hill and Longstreet, yet they had not been idle. Lee 
had visited that part of the line, and made a careful inspec- 
tion of it in company with Longstreet, who again urged the 
propriety of moving around Big Round Top, instead of 
again attacking in front. Lee asked Woffbrd if he could 
not break the Union line again. But he said no, that the 
enemy had had time to strengthen his position, and that it 
could not be done. Woftord held the same opinion that 
Law and Longstreet did, but notwithstanding all the 



522 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

evidence and arguments of the generals on the right, L<ee 
decided to repeat the operations of the day before, and gave 
orders for the artillery to be put in position, preparatory to 
the final assault. 

On the third day it would have been more difficult to 
execute a flank movement around Big Round Top than 
on the 2d, for Kilpatrick had arrived there with Mer- 
ritt's and Farnsworth's brigades, and taken a position 
south of Big Round Top to prevent that move, and, if pos- 
sible, turn Longstreet's right and capture the supply trains 
of the Confederate army. It was a little late in the battle 
to make that move. Besides, the Sixth Corps had been 
well posted to support Kilpatrick' s cavalry. Grant's Ver- 
mont brigade, which was the extreme left of the Union 
army, was so far out in the direction of Emmittsburg 
that Longstreet would have encountered him. If it had 
been attempted, Lee's army would have been in dan- 
ger of being attacked and broken up, for Ewell was in 
a bad position to have been left without a support on 
his right. Gregg's division of cavalry was in his rear, 
and if he had attempted to retire, Slocum's infantry on 
Culp's Hill, v/ith Gregg on his flank, could have dealt 
him a severe blow before he reached Seminary Ridge, while 
in all probability Robinson's division of the First and 
Eleventh Corps could have intervened between him and 
Lee's retiring columns, and compelled him (Ewell) to retreat 
in the direction of Cashtown. With a divided army Lee 
would have been in no condition to have dictated to Meade 
where the battle should be fought to a finish and leave one 
or the other victorious. 

Every moment Lee remained in front of j\Ieade sur- 
rounded him with new difficulties, which he was unable to 
surmount, and, being blinded to the situation, was fully 
resolved to hurl his army on Meade and strike the fatal 
blow. 

While Johnson was attempting to hold his position on 
Culp's Hill Colonel Alexander placed the six reserve bat- 




GEN. H. J. HUNT. 



GETTYSBURG. 523 

teries of Longstreet's corps along the Emmittsburg road. 
Soon Colonel Walton, Longstreet's chief of artillery, posted 
the rest of the batteries, reaching from the peach orchard to 
the Codori House, thus occupying the position which Hum- 
phreys had occupied the day before. ]\Iajor Henry's four 
batteries were posted on the right of the orchard in order to 
have a cross fire. Bearing's artillery was posted where 
Pickett was to make his charge, with the Washington Artil- 
lery on his right and Cabell's battalion on his left. 

The Comte de Paris estimates that Longstreet had 75 
and Hill 63 cannon in that action. General Hunt, chief of 
artiller}' of the Army of the Potomac, made a careful in- 
SDCction just before the fury of these war dogs began, and 
estimated them at 100 to 120; and then says: "To oppose 
these we could not, from our restricted position, bring more 
than 80 to reply effectively." 

General Hunt knew very well that the oppressive silence 
from eleven to one "was only the calm before the storm," 
and accordingly he arranged his artillery to meet the im- 
pending conflict. He directed Colonel Wainwright, in com- 
mand of the artillery of the First Corps, to post it outside 
of the cemetery gate, and north of the Baltimore pike, in 
the following order from right to left : Stevens, Reynolds, 
Ricketts, Wiedrich and Stewart. IMajor Osborn, chief of 
artillery of the Eleventh Corps, was ordered to place Dilger 
on Stewart's left, then Bancroft, Eskin, Wheeler, Hill and 
Taft. Then of the Second Corps came Woodruff, Arnold, 
Cushing, Brown, and Rorty, under command of Captain 
Hazard. Next Thomas, with Major ]\IcGilvery's command, 
consisting of Thompson, Phillips, Hart, Sterling, Rank, 
Dow, and Ames, and Cooper, of the First Corps, with Rit- 
tenhouse and Gibbs on Little Round Top. Rittenhouse was 
then in command of the battery that Warren hurried on Lit- 
tle Round Top the day before when Lieutenant Hazlett, its 
commander, was killed while stooping over the dying form 
of General Weed to receive his last order. General Hunt, 
accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Craig, his assistant 



524 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

adjutant general, had just finished his tour of inspection 
from the right of the line to the left on Little Round 
Top, and was talking to Rittenhouse when two guns, 
a minute apart, were fired by the Washington Artil- 
lery. This was the signal for Lee's batteries to open up 
along the front of Longstreet and Hill. The signal had 
been delayed a considerable time, Longstreet having no 
faith in the success of the movement. He directed Colonel 
Alexander to take a position in the edge of the woods near 
Warfield's, there to observe the effect of the cannonade, and 
apprise Pickett when the moment had arrived to make the 
charge. But in a note to him after he (Alexander) had 
arrived at the place designated, advised him not to give the 
order to Pickett, unless the Union line was sufficiently dis- 
organized by the cannonade to have some show of success. 
Alexander, seeing that he was being made responsible for 
the whole movement, declined to assume the risk. Then 
Longstreet, knowing that Lee was determined to have the 
charge made, directed Colonel Walton to have the signal 
guns fired, which was an order for every gun on the line 
to open. 

General Hunt remained on Little Round Top to observe 
the effect on both armies. He had directed his center to 
remain quiet, while the batteries of both wings imme- 
diately opened and continued firing. The guns in the 
center soon began firing slowly. 

As soon as General Hunt had decided in his mind the 
nature of the attack, he went to the park artillery reserve, 
and ordered all the batteries to be ready at a moment's notice 
to move to the front, after which he went to report to 
the commander-in-chief; but the casualties had been so 
great there that Meade, upon urgent advice, had moved 
his headquarters temporarily over to Slocum's on Powers' 
Hill. Hunt then proceeded along the line to see the 
effects of the cannonade and to replace the disabled bat- 
teries. It was now half-past two, and, according to his 
opinion, the enemy's artillery would soon cease. His own 




COL. JOHN N. CRAIG. 



GETTYSBURG. 525 

ammunition was running low ; several caissons had been 
exploded, and he therefore considered it unsafe to bring 
more up at that time. So he directed the batteries to fire 
slowly, and cool their guns preparatory to rapid firing 
when the charging column moved. About three o'clock 
the enemy's guns ceased firing; then Hunt, seeing where 
the charge was going to be made, ordered the batteries of 
Fitz Hugh, Parsons, Weir and Lowan forward to take 
position in front of the advancing enemy. He then went to 
the left to McGilvery's batteries, and directed him to take 
the enemy in the flank as he approached. When Pickett 
arrived at the Emmittsburg road, he brushed back the Union 
skirmish line, and boldly dashed forward. This brought 
him within full sweep of the Union batteries from Ritten- 
house, on Little Round Top, to the right of the Second 
Corps. Rittenhouse could only use his right section on 
the advancing column ; but with those two guns he cut 
great gaps in Kemper's brigade, which was on the right. 
When the column had advanced a little farther, Garnett, 
in the center, suffered from McGilvery's batteries, as well 
as Kemper. Armistead, on the left, had not kept pace 
with the other two brigades. Hazard's guns were heavily 
loaded with canister, which made great havoc in the ad- 
vancing column ; but their ranks were kept closed up, 
as if nothing had happened, and forward they pressed to 
the stone wall, behind which was Gibbon's division of the 
Second Corps. Pickett had suffered so much from this con- 
centrated fire on his division that he began to look for his 
support. Lang and Wilcox, on the right, had been una- 
ble to get into position in time to render any service to 
him, and his troops could not be seen. On the left Petti- 
grew had put his men in motion ; but, being posted in the 
rear of Pickett, he was unable to keep abreast with him. 
Besides, he had a division that fought the First Corps on 
the first day, and his troops were in no condition to make 
a charge with Pickett's division of fresh troops, that came 
leisurely up in the rear of Lee's army, having remained 



526 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

idle during the battle. But Pettigrew formed his line with 
Archer's brigade on the left of Arinistead, then his old 
brigade under Colonel Marshall, next Davis, with Brock- 
enborough on the left. Trimble supported this line with 
Scales' brigade in rear of Archer's, while Lane on his left 
supported Pettigrew. Of this line of battle. General Hays, 
who commanded the division on the right of Gibbon, said 
in his report : 

Their march was as steady as if impelled by machinery, un- 
broken by our artillery, which played upon them a storm of missiles. 
When within one hundred yards of our line of infantry the fire of 
our men could no longer be restrained. Four lines rose from behind 
our stone wall, and before the smoke of our first volley had cleared 
away the enemy, in dismay and consternation, were seeking safety 
in flight. Every attempt b}^ their officers to ralh' them was vain. 
In less time than I can recount it thej^ were throwing awa}^ their 
arms and appealing most piteously for mercy. The ' ' Angel of 
Death " alone can produce such a field as was presented. The divi- 
sion captured and turned into corps headquarters fifteen battle flags 
or banners. 

Thus, as Pickett's support on the left had been van- 
quished, and on hi.^ right had not been able to appear on 
the field, it was a forlorn hope for him to hurl his division 
on Gibbon, with Doubleday's division on his left to support 
and assist him, but on he pressed with a frenzy. Garnett 
in the center, who, though sick, would not turn his com- 
mand over to another, was mortally wounded when only a 
short distance from the stone wall in front of Gibbon. 
When Garnett fell, his brigade hesitated for a moment, which 
gave Kemper time enough to come up with the center 
brigade. Kemper ordered his men to open fire, which was 
also obe\-ed by Garnett's brigade. Armistead, who had not 
marched quite so fast, was then up, when Pickett ordered a 
charge, as the double-shotted guns of Hazard and INIcGil- 
very with canister were causing great havoc on Pickett's 
men as they advanced in clo.se range, while the infantry of 
Gibbon and Doubleday had both united with the artillery 
and were pouring in heavy volleys. The 151st Pennsyl- 



GETTYSBURG. 527 

vania and the Ulster Guard of New York, under Colonel 
Gates, on Gibbon's immediate left, united with Gibbon's 
men in the conflict. Men were firing at will, while officers 
were unable to be heard. Gibbon had ordered a charge, but 
in the din of battle his voice was not heard and the men 
continued to fire at will. 

Three days before General Stannard's death I took his 
last or dying statement with reference to the part his 
brigade took in that battle. It is given in his own language 
as he dictated it that night, for the reason that he emphat- 
ically said that if he did not complete it then he never 
would. The next day he was brought home sick and in a 
few hours he became delirious. He was very unwell the 
evening before when he made it. A member of Stannard's 
staff was present when he gave it : 

Washington, D. C, Jul}' 26, 1891. 

Dear Sir :— In compliance with your request I have the honor 
to state that I was present at the bedside of General Stannard, a few 
days before his death, when he related to you the details of the 
movements of the three resfiments of the Second Vermont Briarade 
in repelling Pickett's assault upon the Union line on the third day 
of the battle of Gettysburg, and the counter-tharge upon Wilcox's 
supporting column. 

He stated with vehement earnestness that their , movements 
were made upon his own discretion, and that he received no orders 
from any one relative thereto. I was on General Stannard's staff 
while he was in command of the Second Vermont Brigade, and was 
with him at Gettysburg. I have visited the battlefield with him 
many times, and have heard him indignantly complain manv times 
that he had been robbed of his due credit by the official report of 
his superior officer. Respectfully, John R. Thompson. 

To J. H. Stine;. 

stannard's dying statement. 
I was standing almost alone when Pickett's division crossed 
the Emmittsburg road, coming in the direction of my front. The 
i6th was immediately recalled from the skirmish line in front of me, 
and placed in close column by division in my immediate rear. The 
enemy apparentl}' veering off to m^- right, I directed tlie 13th and 
14th Regiments to pour an oblique fire into their advancing cnlnmns. 
The 13th changed front forward on first company; the i6th, after 



528 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

deploying, performed the same, and formed on the left of the 13th, 
at right angles to the main line of our army, bringing them 
in line of battle upon the flank of the charging division of the 
enemy, and immediately opened a destructive fire at short range. 
Unable to return the fire, many surrendered. While I was in 
the act of throwing the 13th and i6th at right angles to the 
regular line of battle, Hancock rode up to me and wanted to 
know what I was going to do ? When I told him, he said I would 
leave a gap in our line of battle for a column on the right of Pickett 
to force its way into and break our line of battle. I assured him I 
could resume my position in the regular line of battle before a sup- 
port to Pickett on his right could advance, as there was none in 
sight. Plancock still insisted that I was making a great mistake, 
but I knew I could handle my regiments with agilit}^ enough to put 
them back on the line of battle before a body of troops could march 
a mile, so I declined to rescind my order. He was soon wounded near 
me, but he was not borne from the field until he saw that my move- 
ment was a complete success, and he afterward promised me to cor- 
rect his report, in which he took the credit of giving me the order 
to throw my regiments on Pickett's right flank, but he died before 
he made the correction. Not only did he not give me the order, but 
at the time was bitterly opposed to it, for the reason that he feared 
that a column of the enemy would be able to wedge itself in there 
before I could make a counter-movement, and bring va.\ regiment 
back into line. When the charge of Pickett had failed, and his men 
were retreating, I was about to order the regiments back into their 
former position, when I saw another rebel column charging imme- 
diately upon our left. I directed the i6th to attack its flank, while 
I ordered lieutenant Colonel Rose, of the 14th, to advance four com- 
panies on the left of the i6th, and pour in an enfilading fire, while 
the six companies of the 14th checked its advance with a deadly fire 
from the front. This column, which proved to be the brigades of 
Lang and Wilcox, soon gave way. The i6th captured the colors of 
the 2d Florida and the colors of two other regiments. That vir- 
tually ended the battle of Gettysburg. 

I received no advice or suggestion from any one with reference 
to these two flank movements, and, as it was vigorousl}- opposed, I 
knew if 1 failed to hold my position in the line of battle, and pre- 
vent its being pierced there, I would be court-martialed. 

I had no fears of the result, as I could easily maneuver my 
troops in face of the enemj^ for I had been able to do that for two 
days under a sev^ere fire. 

As General Hancock was speaking to Stannard, having 
turned his horse to the front, he was struck by a bullet, 




GEN. GKORGli J. STANNARD. 



GETTYSBURG. 629 

which passed through the pommel of his saddle and deep 
into the upper part of his thigh, carrying with it a piece of 
wood and a nail from the saddle. Seeing Hancock reel in 
his saddle, Lieutenants Benedict and Hooker, who were at 
Stannard's side, sprang to the wounded general, caught him 
in their arms as he sank from his horse, and laid him upon 
the ground. He was bleeding profusely, and fearing that 
he might bleed to death before a surgeon could arrive, Gen- 
eral Stannard took his own handkerchief and, with the 
assistance of Lieutenant Benedict, bound it around the 
wound, twisting it tightly with a pistol barrel and stopping 
the flow of blood. General Hancock lay where he fell till 
the fate of Pickett's charge had been decided, and he had 
sent a message to General iMeade announcing the complete 
repulse of the enemy. He was then lifted by General 
Stannard's aids into an ambulance and taken to the rear. 



New York, January 17, 1877. 
Dear Sir: — * * * At the time your book, "Vermont at 
Gettysburg," was published, I read it with great interest, and I have 
since had occasion to consult it with reference to matters connected 
with that battle. I have especial reasons to remember ^-ourself and 
Colonel Hooker on that field, for to j-ou both I am indebted for jour 
kindly aid in assisting me from my horse when I was struck and 
about to fall to the ground, and that incident is, of course, indelibly 
impressed upon my memor\'. I am, truly yours, 

WiNFIELD S. HanXOCK. 

To Col. G. G. Benedict, Burlington, Vt. 

Stannard said to me further, "That there was some 
danger of Hancock's bleeding to death there, right under 
fire, when the Confederate army was making its great effort 
to give the Confederacy a permanency among the nations of 
the earth." 

When Stannard made his attack on the right, the 8th 
Ohio, which had been on the skirmish line, closed in on 
Pickett and fired with such deadly aim that for a moment 
that part of the line wavered. 

XXXIV 



530 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Webb, in front of Armistead with the /ad Pennsylvania 
and a portion of the 71st Pennsylvania behind the fence, 
braveh' met the enemy ; while the 69th Pennsylvania and 
the remainder of the 71st Pennsylvania were posted in a 
copse of trees firing as rapidly as possible. Cushing's Bat- 
tery A, 4th United States Artillery, and Brown's Rhode 
Island Battery, on his left, had been so crippled that they 
were of little nse. Gushing was mortally wounded, being 
shot through both thighs, but he ordered his three remain- 
inof o-uns which were fit for service to be run down to the 
fence and fired into the advancing enemy, even though he 
had reported to General Webb an hour and a half before 
that he was severely wounded, Wlien his last gun was 
fired he fell dead near it. 

When Pickett's line struck the Union forces, Gibbon's 
left brigade, under Harrow, was not heavily pressed, so 
Harrow advanced and partially turned Kemper's right flank. 
Hall, in the center, held his own, but saw Webb on his right 
attacked by Armistead. Turning to the left he (Hall) saw 
two regfiments in reserve. He directed them to move bv 
the right flank, intending to take them to Webb, but in the 
confusion these troops joined Hall's brigade. When Webb 
was forced back Hall was again attacked and compelled to 
yield, slowly retiring and firing every step or two. Hall 
was an artillery officer in Fort Sumter when the war broke 
out, and a clear-headed soldier of splendid nerve. His re- 
port of the final result is given in such a way as to impress 
one with its simplicity and correctness. Part of it is here 
given : 

During this time the isth Massachusetts Volunteers, ist !Minne- 
sota, and 19th Maine Volunteers, from the First Brigade of this 
division, had joined the line, and are entitled to a full share in the 
credit of the final repulse. The line remained ia this wa\' about ten 
minutes, rather giving way than advancing, when, by a simultane- 
ous effort upon the part of all the officers I could instruct, aided by 
the general advance of many of the colors, the line closed with the 
eneni}', and, after a few minutes of desperate, often hand-to hand 



^ m^^ 





GEN. ALEXANDER vS. WEBB. 



GETTYSBURG. 531 

fighting, the crowd — for such had become that part of the enemy's 
column that had passed the fence — threw down their arms and were 
then taken prisoners of war, while the remainder broke and fied in 
great disorder. The Second Brigade had again joined the right of 
my line, which now occupied the position originally held by the 
command. Generals Garnett and Armistead were picked up near 
this point, together with many colonels and officers of their grade. 

General Webb says : 

General Armistead passed over the fence with probably over loo 
of his command and several battle-flags. The 72d renns3-lvania 
Volunteers were ordered up to hold the crest, and advanced to within 
fort3^ paces of the enemy's fire. Colonel Smith, commanding the 
71st Pennsjdvania, threw two companies of his command behind a 
stone wall on the right of Gushing' s battery, fifty paces retired from 
the point of attack. This disposition of his troops was most impor- 
tant. Coloiel Smith showed true military intelligence on the field. 
The 69th Pennsylvania, and most of the 71st Pennsylvania, even 
after the enemy were in the rear, held their position. The 72d 
Pennsylvania fought steadily and persistently, but the enemv would 
probably have succeeded in piercing our lines had not Colonel Hall 
advanced with several regiments to ray support. Defeated, routed, 
the enemy fled in disorder. General Annistead was left mortally 
wounded within my lines, and 42 of the enemy who crossed the 
fence lay dead. 

Armistead was a regular officer before the war, but re- 
signed to enter the service of the Confederacy. Like many 
others, he was in great doubt in his mind to know what to 
do, whether to remain in the United States service or cast 
his lot \vith the Confederacy. I heard Longstreet tell a son 
of Gen. John P. Hatch that his mother begged him to re- 
main in the United States service. As Armistead lav dvinor, 
he said: "Tell Hancock I wronged him and wronged my 
country." It appears that he was aware that Hancock 
connnanded that part of the field. They had been very 
intimate, and when he was breathing his last, iuside of 
Hancock's lines, his remorse was most intense. Pickett, 
seeing that he would suffer the loss of his whole command, 
ordered a retreat. The Union troops realized that a great 



532 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

victory had been won, and were anxious to follow Pickett 
back to the Confederate line. There was great consterna- 
tion in their ranks. Lee rode among them to restore order 
and confidence. Longstreet rearranged his lines as best he 
could, and posted his artillery to the best advantage to re- 
sist the attack, if one was made. Perhaps some batteries 
had a reasonable supply on hand, but there is no evi- 
dence that the Confederate army had enough ammunition 
on hand to have made a stubborn resistance against a 
heavy attack. But Meade was not strongly urged to make 
a countercharge ; before arrangements could be made it was 
too late, and both armies rested on the field during the 
night of the 3d of July, in the position they had occupied 
for two days. That battle was fought much like Chalons, 
which is considered one of the fifteen important battles of 
the world, and its results are similar. 

Aetius, the Roman general, posted his left on a sloping 
hill, which Attila furiously charged, but, like Pickett, was 
repulsed with great loss. He had robbed his center to re- 
enforce his right, which was then in no condition to with- 
stand the victorious cavalry, who forced back his right 
wing, and then turned on his center. 

But the Hunnish general, like Lee, remained on the 
field, and apparently retired at his own pleasure. IMeade, 
like Aetius, permitted Lee to remain in his front, after he 
had mastered him all along the line. 

A standard author says : "It is probable that the crafty 
Aetius was unwilling to be too victorious." The same 
can be said of IMeade ; it was a safe victory. Lee expected 
Longstreet would sustain Pickett in his charge, with Laws' 
and McLaws' divisions. As Longstreet was preparing to 
advance these two divisions, a new danger threatened his 
right and rear, where the reserve trains were parked. Kil- 
patrick had appeared there about one o'clock, when the 
cannonading began, but was not observed for some time. 
Deploying the brigades of Merritt and Farnsworth he at- 
tempted to capture Longstreet' s reserve train. 



GETTYSBURG. 533 

Maj. H. C. Parsons thus graphically describes that 
memorable charge : 

On the morning of the 3d of July, General KilpatricTc was 
ordered to move with his two brigades, from the right to the left of 
Meade's position. By some mistake in the order or direction Custer 
took his brigade to the position held by General Gregg, and when 
the mistake was discovered Merritt was ordered to report to Kilpat- 
rick in his place. We rode with a single brigade into the position 
at the left and rear of Round Top, near the Emmittsburg pike. Kil- 
patrick and Farnsworth rode to the ridge on which the pike is lo- 
cated, and after inspecting the field sent for me. I was that day in 
command of ist Battalion of the ist Vermont and at the right of 
the brigade. A regiment of infantrj- was, at the moment, marching 
through the wheat field from the ridge beyond the turnpike to the 
support of Pickett's charge; it was then about 12 o'clock. I was 
ordered to take one squadron to charge down the turnpike with 
sabers and then ride to the left along their skirmish line, charging 
as foragers, and to cover of a stone house very near their batteries. 
We drove in their line with a loss of two men and three horses, and 
the regiment evidently expected a general advance and fell back to 
its original position. This is the charge referred to in the Confed- 
erate reports as creating the fatal diversion, and sometimes credited 
to INIerritt, but it was made more than an hour before IMerritt came 
to the field, and his command was at no time upon the pike. 

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon we were in position in the woods 
on the low ridge directly in the rear of Big Round Top. When the 
order came for Kilpatrick to attack the Confederate position and 
break their lines or create a diversion, the 5th New York w^as upon 
the skirmish line ; the i8th Pennsylvania was resting with its 
left near the Emmittsburg road; the ist West Virginia in the center, 
and the ist Vermont on the right; except one squadron of the 5th 
New York and one squadron of the i8th Pennsylvania, which were 
directU' in the rear of our batteries. 

The first charge was made by the i8th Penns^dvania upon the 
9th Georgia. The regiment fell back in confusion and without loss ; 
the ist West Virginia was then hurled against the ist Texas, which 
was protected by a rail fence across the open field ; the charge was 
gallantly made but was repulsed with great loss, except at one point, 
where a squadron led by Farnsworth broke through the line and 
charged a battery — which was abandoned for a moment by the gun- 
ners — so closely that an officer, Lieutenant Robinett, fell wounded 
betvi'een their guns; here Farnsworth's horse was shot. The 2d 
Battalion of the ist Vermont was thrown out on the right as skirni- 



534 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ishers ; the 3d Battalion, under Major Wells, was led to the charge 
by Farnsworth ; a few moments afterwards I was ordered b\- Colonel 
Preston to lead my battalion in their support, but in the detour 
through the woods we crossed their course and came first into action. 
We rode across the open field, past the Slider House, and were met 
at the foot of the mountain by the 4th Alabama, which had been 
faced about from its position and at short range, less than 100 yards, 
we received the volley that was referred to in the Confederate report 
as having emptied half our saddles, but it passed over, only one 
horse being shot. 

The first squadron cleared the wall at the right and refonned 
under the protection of the hill ; the second squadron fell back and 
joined Wells, following him in the main charge. Farnsworth's 
horse had been shot in the charge leading the ist West Virginia, but 
Private Ellis, of Company E, leapt from his saddle, giving the gen- 
eral his horse, coolly unstrapped the general's saddle, and escaped 
with his trophy on foot. General Farnsworth was first hit as he 
rode out of the woods in the second charge, but continued to lead 
his men. 

I was ordered forward shortly after his charge and we entered 
the walled field on the hill, from opposite directions ; his command 
swept through the 15th Alabama, and the principal part, iinder Major 
Wells, rode past the Confederate batteries and cut its way out through 
the ist Texas, taking prisoners with them. 

Farnsworth and Lieutenant Cushman and about twenty men, 
turned back near the batteries to cut their way out through the 15th 
Alabama. In their lines he fell with four wounds in his body, two 
of them, at least, mortal ; and Lieutenant Cushman, whose horse 
was shot and who was terribly wounded in the face, fell by hi" side. 

As I charged into the field. Sergeant Duncan, who was at my 
left, flew past me with an exultant shout, with his raised saber, — 
threw up his left arm and fell under my horse. My horse recoiled 
over his dead body and I was surrounded and commanded to sur- 
render. As I raised my saber, however, a ball pierced ni}' right side 
and another grazed my right elbow, paralyzing luy sword arm, — at 
this moment ray horse v,'as struck and franticalh' broke through 
their lines, carr\'ing me out before he fell. Corporal Waller, and an 
aid of Farnsworth's, rode up and supported me on ni}- horse, and 
told me how Farnsworth and Cushman fell together. 

There has been some dispute as to the moment of this charge. 
Lieutenant Cheney, of Company E, was shot through the body, a 
ball striking his watch and falling into his boot ; the watch stopped 
at twenty-six minutes past five, and thus fixed definitely the mo- 
ment of the final charge. In this charge, which rode twice through 



GETTYSBURG. 535 

their lines, drew one regiment out of position, and drew the fire of 
two batteries, there were about 300 men ; the losses were 65, the 
prisoners were reported at 103. They rode more than a mile within 
the enemy's ; lines convinced General Lee that a forward move- 
ment was undertaken, and changed his entire plans. I carried my 
command over four walls — three under fire — but Wells' charge led 
by Farnsworth, was the thunderbolt. The horses flew over rocks, 
walls and fallen timber, under a close enfilading fire, where the 
boldest hunter would not ride to-day. It demonstrated the power of 
cavalr}', if properly hurled. If its results had been followed up by 
a general advance, the line from which we had already drawn three 
regiments could have offered verv little resistance and the victory of 
Gett3'sburg would have been complete. 

Farnsworth's "star" was taken b}' Colonel Gates and afterward 
lost ; his pistol by Lieutenant Adrian, and his gauntlets are now 
held b}' a member of the 15th Alabama, who will return them upon 
my order, to his family. He was the only general officer that fell at 
Gettysburg within the enemy's lines, and yet he has received neither 
mention in Meade's report, in history, nor is any monument erected 
to him. 

This charge, had it occurred on any other part of the field, or at 
an earlier time in the engagement, would have received the attention 
of the army and, perhaps, of the world, The scene as witnessed from 
Elder's farm has been graphically told : The column as it marched 
around the point of the hill and through the broken lines of the 15th 
Alabama, rode over the roughest countrj^ perhaps, ever ridden in 
such an engagement. The enfilading fire gave the appearance of an 
infantry battle, while in its front and through its smoke flew the 
maddened horses with their riders and gleaming sabers. Everything 
gave wa}' before it. They demonstrated, as perhaps in no other en- 
gagement, the perfect power of a small column of horse when car- 
ried under cover close upon infantry lines and hurled with its full 
momentum. 

Meade first prepared an order written in all recognition and 
gratitude, but when it was reported to him that three-fourths of the 
men were killed, he recalled it rather than to take the responsibility 
for the order, which was, however, freely accepted by Pleasonton. 

INIeasured bj'^ results alone, the first charge ordered by Farns- 
worth stopped a brigade on its way to Pickett's support, and drew 
the 1st Texas out of its position on Round Top ; the second charge 
drew the two regiments out of position, broke the entire front of 
Hood's division and so fatally exposed it that a squad of my own 
men rode through the gap left by the ist Texas, into our own lines, 
and did not rejoin the regiment for several days. The loss of horses 



536 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

was greater than of men, but Company L, which went into the ac- 
tion with 65 men, and reported only 17 for duty in the morning, 
really lost only-one fourth of their number. 

As usual, the infantry fired high, and the surprise and the swift 
movement of the troops protected them. 

Such is an account of one of the most desperate cavalry- 
charges in the world's history. While the charge of the Light 
Brigade at Balaklava, led by Lord Cardigan, challenged the 
admiration of the world, and has been crystallized in 
poetry, the prowess of Farnsworth and Adjutant General 
Bstes, of Kilpatrick's staff, will ever be remembered as one 
of the most gallant military feats in the annals of history. 
While Cardigan rode silently at the head of his brigade, 
Farnsworth led his troopers with a determination that 
steeled them against death. While Cardigan rode through 
a battery blazing its missiles of destruction at him, and 
rushed on the Ritssian cavalry and engaged in a hand-to 
hand conflict with a body of Cossacks, Farnsworth scaled 
stone walls and broke three lines of battle before he was 
mortally wounded. Cardigan returned with only a bleed- 
ing wound ; but the troopers of the lamented Farnsworth 
left him dead on the field. But few of Cardigan's men 
returned from that charge, although it lasted only about 
twenty minutes. Farnsworth' s loss was equally as great, but 
it caused the divisions of Law and McLaws to stand still 
while Pickett's men, unsupported, were enveloped in the 
maelstrom of destruction before the Union line, and the last 
hope of the Confederacy died in battle and smoke there on 
that blood-stained field, while the second charge parah-zed 
Lee's right, and came near stampeding the Confederate 
army. The high-water mark of the Confederacy had been 
reached, and it was that day rolled back, sounding down 
the long corridors of time, that there would be one country, 
one flag, one people, and one sentiment, "For the Union, 
one and indivisible, now and forever." 

Merritt, on the left of Farnsworth, advanced on the 
Emmittsburg road to get in Longstreet's rear, but Ander- 




CAPT. MICHAI'X WiaDRICII. 



GETTYSBURG. 537 

son's Georgia Brigade, 7th, Stli, 9th, nth, and SQtli, faced 
to the rear and stubbornly resisted Merritt's advance, for 
if the supply trains were captured they were ruined. Mer- 
ritt seeing it was impossible to charge so heavy a body of 
infantry, dismounted his command and fought as infantry. 
After fighting some time Merritt withdrew, because it was 
impossible for him to seize the trains ; besides, if he had 
overcome Anderson, Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes, and 
Wofford were in easy supporting distance, so it was wisdom 
on his part to withdraw. 

On page 215 of his volume on Gettysburg, the Comte 
de Paris savs of Pickett's chars^e : 

Arniistead, urging his men forward, has reached the front rank 
between Kemper and Garnett — if it be ^-et possible to distinguish 
the regiments- and brigades in this compact mass of human beings, 
which, all covered with blood, seems to be driven by an irresistible 
force superior to the individual will of those composing it — and 
throws himself like a solid body upon the Union line. 

I can find no evidence to sustain the assertion that when 
the Confederate column under Pickett struck the Union 
line Armistead held the central position between Kemper 
and Garnett. On the contrary, all the evidence I have been 
able to collect from those now alive, who were in the 
charge, is decidedly against that statement. It is here 
given that the reader may judge for himself 

General Kemper says, "he was not aware of Arniistead 
coming up in the center." 

Washington, D. C, 
June 4, 1891. 

Dear Sir : — Your favor of this date is just to hand. You wish 
to know of me if Pickett's division, in the charge on Cemetery 
Heights at Gettysburg, maintained the same relative organization 
when it struck the Union forces as when it commenced the charge. 

I was in the charge, the colonel of the 8th Virginia Infmtry, of 
Garnett' s brigade. The relative order of the several brigades when 
the charge began, was Kemper on the right, Garnett in the center, 
and Armistead on the left. This relative order was not changed 
during the entire charge. Respectfully, etc.. 

To J. H. STINE. EpP.A liUNTON. 



538 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



Ayle;tt's p. O., King William County, Va., 
June lo, 189 1. 

Dear Sir : — Yours of the 6th instant has just been received, 
and I reply at once. The assertion of the Comte de Paris in his 
history, that Armistead and Garnett's brigades "exchanged posi- 
tions just before the Pickett charge struck the Union line," is incor- 
rect. I never heard of it before. In the final charge there was much 
blendin^- of the attacking columns, from the terrible losses and gaps 
created by the fire of the Union artillery and infantry, but no swap- 
ping of positions. In the original formation of the line of battle, 
before Pickett's advance, Kemper's brigade held the right, Garnett's 
was on his left, and Armistead's, for which there was not room in 
the extended line of battle, was formed immediately in rear of the 
others. Fences, obstructions, the fire of the enemy in front and 
from Round Top, and the loss of ofiicers, caused the brigades to mix 
before they struck the Union line. Not only is this ra}' personal 
recollection, but Col. Walter Harrison, Pickett's assistant adjutant 
general and inspector general, in his book called "Pickett's Men," 
at pages 90 and 91, sustains me. My regiment, the 53d Virginia, 
was the central and directing regiment of Armistead's brigade, and ' 
he marched right in front of my colors. I did not see either Gar- 
nett or Armistead fall. Yours, very trul}-. 

To J. H. Stine. W.M. R. Aylett 

Williamsburg, Virginia 
June 8, 1891. 
Dear Sir : — Your letter of the 3d instant to hand, and in answer 
allow me to say, the position of the brigades was at start like dia- 
gram below. After our left supports retired, Armistead moved into 
line with Garnett. He was placed as you see in diagram for the 
purpose of taking said position, as before the charge General Pickett 
knew they would be needed to do this. 

Gar)icit. Kemper. 

Armistead. 

I have nothing to guide me as to the farthest point General 
Pickett reached in person. We started in where Armistead's right 
was in diagram, and at the Emiuittsburg road G^nieral Pickett sent 
me to General Longstreet to tell him that he would take the enemy's 
position, but could not hold it without help ; when I returned to 
General Pickett with General Longstreet's answer, I found General 
Pickett between the Emiuittsburg road and Cemetery Heights. 
Then three of us, one directly after the other, were sent to urge 



GETTYSBURG. 539 

General Wilcox to bring his brigade to our assistance. On my re- 
turn I found him near the descent of the last hill, facing the Federal 
works. Then I called his attention to a column of the enemy which 
was moving by head of column around our left flank, which was 
much too short. He sent me at once to Deering s artillery battalion 
to order them to open on the column, and in this way protect his 
flank. Lieutenant Marshall was on left of battalion, and I came to 
him first. He said his battery had only three rounds of shot. He 
opened at once with them, after which I rode to General Pickett, 
who ordered our men back, so as to get out before being inclosed. 
At this time he was near the last valley in front of Cemetery Ridge. 
When I gave Kemper the order to charge, his objective point, by 
order of General Pickett, was a red barn. The only members of the 
general's staff" that went in with him on that day were Maj. Charles 
Pickett, Capt. E. R. Baird, Capt. W. S. Symington, and myself. 
Respectfully, R. A. Bright. 

To J. H. Stine. Late Captain on General Pickett's Staff". 

Norfolk, Va., Jul}- 3, 1S91. 

My Dear Sir : — It singularly happens that your communication 
of June 22, 1891, asking certain questions about the charge of 
Pickett's division at Gettj^sburg, has reached me on the anniversary 
of that memorable day. The facts you ask for in relation to the 
formation, etc , of that division are given you below, according to 
the best of my recollection after such a long lapse of time. Con- 
sidering the magnitude of that battle, its wonderful surroundings 
and effects, I can but think that the impressions that were made on 
even a iwnparticipant, to say nothing of one who was engaged in 
it, could scarcely wear out, even after these many jears. Garnett 
and Kemper's brigades were formed in front ; Armistead, with his 
brigade, slightly in rear and left of same. This formation was, I 
think, fully preserved (although great gaps, during tlie advance, 
were made by the concentrated fire of batteries from front and flank, 
and well-delivered volleys of musketry all along the line, yet con- 
stantly filled up by closing in, as on dress parade) until the division 
got into the works on Cemetery Ridge, after which everything be- 
came a regular melee ; after that, the Deluge. 

Very respectfully, C. Pickett, 

Late Major and Assistant Adjutant General, 

To J. H. Stine. General Pickett's Division. 

Baltimore, July 27, 1891. 
De.\r Sir :— I have your favor of the 25th instant, asking me 
my recollections of General Armistead' s position in the charge at 
Gettysburg on the third day. 



540 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

When we started Garnett and Kemper's brigades were a first 
line, and Armistead's brigade was in the rear, forming a second line. 
After moving forward some distance the troops on our left wavered, 
and finally broke badly. Pickett then ordered Armistead to move 
up and take position on the left of our first line. This movement 
was made promptly, and while we were still moving to the front. 
Almost as soon as Armistead came on line with the other two bri- 
gades, the direction of the charge was changed somewhat to the 
left, and all three brigades were massed somewhere about the point 
where the Federal infantry struck our right flank. 

To the best of my recollection the troops directly in front (if I 
may so call it) did not stand, but those coming in from toward our 
right flank struck us both in front and flank. 

The three brigades being, as I said before, somewhat massed, I 
can not say exactly where in the line Armistead was killed. It was, 
though, across the stone fence, and after we had taken some of the 
Fed&ral guns. I have not read the account written by the Comte de 
Paris, and of course, therefore, do not know where he says that 
Armistead was killed. Yours, very truh^ 

W. Stuart Symington, 
Captain and Aid-de-Camp on Pickett's Staff. 

To J. H. Stink, Esq., 

No. 323 C St., S. E.. Washington, D. C. 

White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., 
August 17, 1 89 1. 

My Dear Sir : — Yours of the 27th ultimo has been forwarded 
to me at this place. In reply to 3'our inquiry I beg to say, that in 
the memorable charge of Pickett's division at Gett^'sburg, there 
were engaged only three of the brigades of the division, which were 
arranged as follows : Kemper's and Garnett's brigades constituted 
the first line, Kemper's beingon the right of Garnett's ; Armistead's 
brigade followed in the rear of Garnett's. This was the order in 
which the charge was made. 

The line of Kemper and Garnett was supported on the left by a 
line of North Carolina troops, which had advanced in line of Kemp- 
er's and Garnett's ; but these North Carolina troops broke and left 
the line of Kemper and Garnett unsupported on the left. 

I was adjutant of tlie 9th Virginia Regiment, which Nvas the 
left regiment of Armistead's brigade. I have the im]>ression, made 
on me at the time, that Garnett's brigade had become so reduced, 
that as it advanced, it appeared to me as a skirmish line. Armis- 
tead's brigade struck the " Bloody Angle," as it was called. I wish 
it were permitted me to speak of the gallant conduct of General 



GETTYSBURG. 541 

Atmistead ; how, holding- his hat on the point of his sword, he 
strode along before his brigade, until within a hundred 3-ards of the 
stone fence, a person on horseback (I have been told that it was 
General Garnett) engaged him in conversation for a few moments, 
when his regiments passed him ; and then when he came up to the 
stone fence, he strode over it, calling on his men to follow, and ad- 
vanced to the abandoned arlillery guns ot the enemy and placed his 
hands upon them as if to turn them upon his foes, and in that act 
was shot down. Very respectfull}^ 

J. F. Crocker. 
To J. H. Stine, Esq., Washington, D. C. 

General Huidekoper was taken to the Catholic Church, 
the belfry of which was used by Bwell and his staff for ob- 
servation. When these officers came down, they talked 
over the situation. It was repeatedly said that Ewell's 
Corps was out of ammunition, and the cartridge boxes of 
the dead were resorted to to replenish their supply. 

Robert I. Patter.son, of the 19th Indiana, was taken 
prisoner on the first day, and was held in the rear of the 
Confederate line. When Pickett's charge was repulsed, 
Lee and his staff rode near him, when he could hear their 
conversation and Lee's orders. Patterson says : 

The utmost consternation prevailed in the Confederate army, 
and arrangements for the immediate removal of their supply trains 
was made, with the army to follow. But as a countercharge was 
not made, their lines were rearranged to hold their position. 

Meade rode to the front to consider the advisability of 
attacking with his left wing, but he feared that in crossing 
the plain where Pickett had just suffered a disaster 
the Union army would in turn meet the same fate, as he 
was not aware of the scanty amount of annnunition of the 
Confederate batteries as given by Pickett's staff, so he de- 
cided to feel Lee's position, and ordered I\IcCandle.ss' 
brigade to advance. 

The enemy's sharp.shooters, with a batter}^ in their im- 
mediate front, were defiant and trotiblcsome, therefore, in 
accordance with orders, IMcCandless, with his First Bri- 



542 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

gade, at once proceeded to silence or capture them. The 
Bucktails, Major Hartshorne ; ist, Colonel Talley ; ad, 
Lieutenant Colonel Woodward; nth, Colonel Jackson, 
crossed the ' ' wall ' ' and advanced through the woods to an 
open field, waving with golden grain ; while Colonel Erit, 
with the 6th Regiment, crept cautiously up to the battery 
which he stormed and captured. While the 6th was fairly 
engaged taking the battery, McCandless, with the afore- 
mentioned regiments of the brigade, which, after attracting 
the attention of the enemy, and drawing his fire, had 
dropped upon the ground, now moved by the right flank, 
and filing left forward in line of battle in a woods at right 
angles with the "stone wall," and deployed skirmishers to 
the front, right, and left, charged on double-quick over the 
field for half a mile, receiving the enemy's fire from the 
woods on three sides. Half wheeling to the right and 
pouring a few volleys into the enemy in the woods, the 
brigade charged up the crest. 

Halting a few moments, it faced about, wheeled a little 
to the right, and, with a shout, charged through the woods 
in their rear, through the meadow, and up over the steep 
acclivity on the opposite side, taking the eneni}- in the 
flank, driving him in confusion, and penetrating far into 
his lines. The trophies of this brilliant movement, besides 
the capture of the battery, were 6,ooo stand of arms; the 
flag of the i5tli Georgia, and three hundred prisoners, in- 
cluding a colonel and several line officers. The Confeder- 
ate colonel surrendered to Colonel Talley, who conducted 
him to the Union lines as one of his prizes. The ground 
of the previous day's fight was retrieved, and with it the 
wounded who had lain where they fell. 

This was the last fighting done along the line of the 
field. The battle of Gettysburg was ended. It was late 
twilight when the First Brigade returned to the main lines 
heavily laden with their trophies of war, physically ex- 
hausted, but mentally happy. Pennsylvania was redeemed, 
the Union cause sustained. It is worthy of note that Gen. 



GETTYSBURG. 543 

Jclm F. Reynolds' first command in the army was the First 
Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, that he opened the fight, 
and that his old brigade closed it. 

Company K of Colonel Talley's regiment sliould have 
special mention in history. It was from Gettysburg, and 
during the three days' terrible fighting at their homes not 
a man asked leave to visit his family. The entire company, 
who were not killed or wounded, followed the retreating 
enemy and remained with the command to the end of their 
term of service. The company was commanded in the 
battle by Capt. Kenry M, Minnigh and Lieut. George E. 
Kitzmiller. It was recruited by Capt. Edward McPher- 
son, from among young men of the best families of that 
now historic town. IMcPherson resigned to take a seat in 
Congress, but his patriotic zeal induced him to volunteer as 
a staff officer, in which capacity he did valuable service for 
his country. 

RIGHT FLANK AT GETTYSBURG. 

The momentous events that occurred at Gettysburg on 
the ist, 2d, and 3d of July, 1863, were so transcendently 
important, and so attracted the attention of the whole 
country and riveted it upon the main battle that ebbed and 
flowed from Seminary Ridge to- and around Cemetery Hill 
and the Round Tops that many minor events occurring 
on both flanks of the contending armies, which exerted an 
important influence on the successful issue of the greatest 
battle of modern times, were forgotten or lost sight of for a 
long time. 

It is not the intention of this history to enter into a de- 
tailed account of the fighting that occurred on this flank, 
therefore much that would be interesting must be omitted, 
and the reader referred to the accounts of ]\Iiller, Carpenter, 
Brooke, and Kidd. Only such events as are necessary to 
connect this brilliant cavalry fight with the main battle are 
narrated. 

The 30th of June found the Army of the Potomac on 



544 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the move on all the roads leading north and northeast from 
Frederick toward Pennsylvania. Buford was at Gettys- 
burg, Kilpatrick at Hanover, where he encountered Stuart, 
and forced him off the direct road to Gettysburg, obliging 
him to make a long detour which carried him to Carlisle, 
Gregg was at Manchester ; from thence on the morning of 
the ist of July, he marched to Hanover Junction, and from 
thence, on the night of the ist, to Hanover, with Mcintosh's 
and Irvin Gregg's brigades. Huey's brigade was sent to 
Westminster. Early on the morning of the 2d the march 
was resumed via the Baughnatown road to Gettysburg, and 
the command marched to the extreme right of our line on 
Cross Creek about twelve m. , having passed Crawford's 
division of Pennsylvania Reserves on the road. At the 
Revere House the command turned to the left and pro- 
ceeded as far as the Baltimore pike at White's Run ; at this 
point it was turned back, again encountering Crawford 
hurrying to the front, and retraced its steps to the Han- 
over road, and took tip a position, about two p.m., on 
the eastern slope of Brinkerhoff's Hill, relieving some 
infantry posted on the left or south of the road. This 
regiment on being relieved immediately withdrew by its 
left, and Irvin Gregg's brigade at once became engaged in 
skirmishing with the enemy occupying the western slope 
of the same hill. During the afternoon the artillery was 
brought into play, and toward nightfall Mcintosh's brigade 
became engaged on the right, and a spirited contest 
occurred along the summit of the ridge between the dis- 
mounted cavalrymen and Walker's infantry brigade of 
Johnson's division for the possession of a stone fence ; but 
the cavalry got and held it. After nightfall the division 
withdrew and bivouacked on the Baltimore pike east of 
White's Run. 

During the forenoon of the 3d Irvin Gregg's brigade was 
ordered to report to the division commander, on the Taney- 
town road in the vicinity of General INIeade's headquarters, 
and on the arrival of the head of the column Colonel Gregg 




Eng^byA^HT-atchii 




I 



GETT YSB UR G . 545 

was informed tliat General Meade was in doubt as to where 
General I^ee was and what he was doing, and desired him 
to move up the road into Gett}'sburg and try to find out ; 
however, before the order could be executed. General Meade 
was advised as to General Lee's position and intentions, the 
order was countermanded, and the brigade was directed to 
resume its position of the day before. 

Before reaching the Hanover road the column was de- 
flected to the left opposite Rhiel's house, and took up a 
position south of Deodorf's house, connecting with Neill's 
brigade of the Sixth Corps. While the Third Brigade was 
moving toward Gettysburg the First Brigade moved to the 
Low Dutch or Salem road, about three-fourths of a mile 
from its junction with the Hanover road. 

Early on the morning of the 3d Custer had been directed 
to report to Kilpatrick on the left of the army, and was, as 
he states, in the act of cofnplying with instructions, when 
an order from Gen. D. McM. Gregg directed him to take 
position across the Hanover road on the extreme right of 
the army. This order he complied with, placing his brigade 
in position facing Gettysburg near the Spangler House. At 
twelve m. Custer received another order, directing him, on 
being relieved by a brigade of the Second Division, to j)ro- 
ceed to join General Kilpatrick, 

On the same morning General Gregg was again directed 
to take up his position on the right of our line, and he 
posted the First and Third Brigades on the right of the 
infantry, but about three-fourths of a mile nearer the Balti- 
more pike, because, as he states in his report, he under- 
stood General Custer was occupying with his brigade his 
position of the previous day, which was the extreme right 
of the cavalry forces. 

At 12 m., General Gregg received an order from Gene- 
ral Pleasonton, commanding the Cavalry Corps, to send 
General Custer to report to General Kilpatrick, and he 
sent the First Brigade of his division to relieve him. This 
change having been made, and the enemy displaying a 



546 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

strong line of skirmishers evidently with a view to attack, 
he determined, notwithstanding his orders, to retain Gene- 
ral Custer's brigade until after the impending attack was 
repulsed, realizing the disastrous consequences that must 
result if the enemy succeeded in driving him from his po- 
sition, 

Durine the forenoon Custer had noticed some move- 
ments of the enemy, and was convinced that an attack 
would be made, and had made his arrangements to meet 
it ; but just as Mcintosh arrived, he received an order to 
report to General Kilpatrick on the left of the army, and 
he informed Mcintosh that some trouble was brewing on 
his right and front. Custer at once took the necessary 
steps to develop the designs of the enemy, by advancing 
his skirmishers and pushing forward a mounted force 
toward the York pike, on the road leading by Stolsmith's 
house. • 

From Stuart's position along Cress Ridge, the slope 
and summit of which were covered with timber, and which 
extended from Rummel's farm to Stolsmith's, the whole 
country to the south and east lay like an open map ex- 
posed to the gaze of the Confederate commander. The 
position and every movement of the Union troops could be 
distinctly seetl, whilst his men were perfectly screened. 

Custer soon found out that he was in the presence of a 
formidable force, and sent word to General Gregg to that 
effect, asking that Col. Irvin Gregg's brigade be brought 
up at once. General Gregg, however, had received a dis- 
patch from General Howard, who, from Cemetery Ridge, 
had observed the movement of Stuart toward our right, 
informing him of that fact ; and coming on the field, he 
averted Custer's movement toward the left, and Col. Irvin 
Gregg was ordered to move as rapidly as possible and mass 
his brigade at the junction of the Plum Creek and Hano- 
ver roads at the Revere House, about a mile directly south 
from Rummel's farm buildings, behind which the right 
center of Stuart's line rested, while his skirmishers were 



GETTYSBURG. 547 

thrown forward to the buildings, which they occupied, as 
well as the fences in advance. 

Mcintosh observing this, and entirely discerning Stuart's 
position, dismounted the ist New Jersey and deployed it in 
the direction of Runiiners, the enemy extending his skir- 
mish line south along the fence, and opened with his bat- 
teries from the summit of the ridge. Two squadrons of the 
3d Pennsylvania and Duvall's troops were moved across the 
fields between" the Lott House and Rummel's in support of 
the left of the ist New Jersey, and two squadrons were 
moved out on the Low Dutch road to protect our right, and 
one squadron was drawn up facing northwest, its right ex- 
tending toward the junction of the Low Dutch road and 
that leading by Stolsmith's to the York pike, the left of 
Stuart's line. Custer ordered Pennington's battery in 
position in front of the Spangler House, north of the Han- 
over road, while Randol was put in position near the Lott 
House west of the Low Dutch road. The ist Maryland was 
in reserve near the Lott House, and Custer was in the act of 
withdrawing, in compliance with his orders to report to 
General Kilpatrick on the extreme left of the army. At 
this junction General Gregg, who had been apprised of the 
formidable force in his front by General Howard's dispatch, 
appeared upon the field, arrested Custer's movement, took 
command, and assumed direction of the battle about to 
ensue. 

The ist Maryland Cavalry, which was stationed near 
Lott's house, was moved to the Low Dutch road to 
strengthen the right, the 5tli Michigan was put in to sup- 
port the left, and under its gallant colonel, Russell A. 
Alger, made one of the most brilliant charges of the war, 
but was finally obliged to fall back for want of ammunition, 
when the enemy charged our right and center. The 7th 
Michigan advanced to meet the charge, but the enemy, 
pushing in fresh troops, that gallant regiment was forced 
back. The charge of the ist Virginia was determined and 
vigorous, but they became scattered by the flank fire of our 



518 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

carbines and the artillery fire, and were in turn compelled 
to retire on their suj)ports. 

While this fighting, charging, and countercharging was 
going on in the fields between the lyOtt House and Rum- 
mel's, Stuart was forming Hampton's and Fitz Lee's bri- 
gades behind the belt of timber near Stolsmith's for a final 
charge to crush the Union forces and drive them from the 
field. Irvin Gregg's brigade began to arrive and was mas- 
sing near the Revere House on the Hanover road on our 
left flank and in plain view of Stuart. Of this part of the 
action, and the end of the fight. Captain Miller, in his arti- 
cle on "Battles and Leaders of the War, No. 21," says: 

The afternoon was passing away, the sun was declining in the 
heavens, and the shadows were beginning to lengthen, when there 
was seen to emerge from behind the screen of woods in front of 
Stolsmith's the head of a column which grew as it advanced into a 
mighty mass until the brigades of Hampton and Lee stood revealed 
to the gaze of the Union commander ; steadily forward they moved 
as if on parade, directing their march on the Spangler House, the 
center of the Union line. For an instant the Union forces were 
mute with admiration at the magnificent spectacle, then the guns 
of Pennington opened with a roar of shot and shell whirled across 
the plain, tearing great gaps through and through the gray mass ; 
but filling the vacant places, on they came. Canister was substi- 
tuted for shell, and the head of the column melted away, but noth- 
ing could stay that mighty mass. Suddenly, at the opportune 
moment, Gregg, who had quietly and intently watched the move- 
ment from its commencement, directed the ist Michigan to charge, 
and with Custer and Town at their head, the gallant Wolverines 
dashed forward with a ringing shout full upon the head of the ad- 
vancing force. The meeting was as the crash of ocean waves break- 
ing on a rock-bound coast, and men and horses rolled and tossed 
like foam upon the crest. Alger with the 8th and part of the 7th 
Michigan, charged the column upon its right flank. Mcintosh's 
squadrons, each acting for itself, charged on the right and left pierc- 
ing it through, whilst Town's charge entered its front like a wedge 
and the mighty engine was broken to pieces, its individual mem- 
bers driven from the field, and the right flank was won. 

General Stuart, in his report of this fight, says that he 
withdrew after this repulse for the reason th:it all his avail- 



GETTYSBURG. 549 

able forces had been put in, and that Gregg had a large 
brigade (Col. Irvin Gregg's) massed upon his left that had 
not been engaged, and that he did not deem it advisable to 
renew the contest. 

Of the commander of the Union forces it is hardly neces- 
sary to speak, but we cannot forbear to quote from the 
address of Gen. James H. Kidd, at the dedication of the 
Michio-an monuments : 



If Custer's presence on the field was opportune, and, as has often 
been said, providential, it is to Gen. D. McM. Gregg to whom, under 
Providence, the credit for keeping him there was due. Gregg was a 
great and a modest soldier, and to him let us pause a moment before 
we enter on a description of the coming battle, to pay the tribute of 
our admiration. In the light of all the official reports put together 
link by link, so as to make one connected chain of evidence, we can 
see that the engagement that took place here almost twent^'-six j-ears 
ago was, from first to last, a well-planned battle, in which the differ- 
ent commands were maneuvered and placed with the sagacity dis- 
played by a skillful chess player in moving the pawns upon a chess 
board ; in which every detail was the fruit of the brain of one man 
who, from the time he turned Custer to the northward until he sent 
the ist Michigan thundering against the brigades of Hampton and 
Fitz-Hugh Lee, made not a single false move ; who was distinguished 
not less for his intuitive foresight than for his quick perceptions at 
critical moments. That man was Gen. D. McM. Gregg. 



As Lee retreated , and our army advanced, T. J. Shannon, 
of the 14th Regulars, saw a Confederate leaning forward on 
a rock at the Devil's Den, while a Union soldier was in the 
same position behind a rock near the base of Little Round 
Top. Both had evidently fired at the same time, and both 
had expired and remained in the position they occupied 
when the fatal btillet ended their lives and sent both souls 
into eternity. 

While Meade advanced in the direction of Gettysburg, 
he was compelled to make his base of supplies at Westmin- 
ster, on the Western IMaryland Railroad. From there the 
army was supplied by wagons. When the battle began. 



550 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Westminster was a great source of anxiety to Meade lest 
J, E. B. Stuart should return there and seize all of the stores. 
So he detailed several picked regiments to protect and 
guard it in case Stuart did attempt it. Looking over the 
regiments, the 15th Vermont, under Col. Redfield Proctor, 
and Lieut. Col. W. W. Grout, was selected. It belonged 
to the brigade of General Stannard, which won such great 
fame in that flank charge on Pickett's division. Time has 
proven that the selection was a wise one, for Redfield Proc- 
tor's executive ability has since elevated him to be Gover- 
nor of Vermont, and Secretary of War under Harrison. In 
the latter position his capacity has ranked him as one of 
the ablest Secretaries since the days of General Knox, and 
the momentum of its force placed him in the United States 
Senate as the successor of Senator Edmunds. Lieutenant 
Colonel Grout, has been brigadier general of militia of 
Vermont, and many years a member of Congress, serving 
on some of the most important committees. He said to me 
that they had resolved if Stuart did attack them at West- 
minster, they would sell their lives as dearly as possible 
and defend it to the last. 

The losses of the Union army at Gettysburg, were as 
follows, in the aggregate for the three days, stated by 
brigades : 

FIRST CORPS. 

Headquarters — Staff 7 

First Division, First Brigade i.i53 

First Division, Second Brigade 1,002 

Second Division, First Brigade 1,041 

Second Division, Second Brigade 648 

Third Division, First Brigade 898 

Third Division, Second Brigade 853 

Third Division, Third Brigade 351 

Light Artillery Brigade lo6 

Total 6,059 



/^si»^ 



r 




COL. REDFIELD PRUCTcjR. 



GETTYSBLRG. 551 

SECOND CORPS. 

Staff and Unassigned l8 

First Division, First Brigade 330 

First Division, Second Brigade ...„ 198 

First Division, Third Brigade 358 

First Division, Fourth Brigade 389 

Second Division, First Brigade 768 

Second Division, Second Brigade 491 

Second Division, Third Brigade 377 

Third Division, First Brigade 211 

Third Division, Second Brigade 366 

Third Division, Third Brigade 714 

Light Artillery Brigade 149 

Total 4.369 

THIRD CORPS. 

Staff 13 

First Division, First Brigade 740 

First Division, Second Brigade 781 

First Division, Third Brigade 490 

Second Division, First Brigade 790 

Second Division, Second Brigade 778 

Second Division, Third Brigade 513 

Light Artillery Brigade 106 

Total 4,211 

FIFTH CORPS. 

Ambulance Corps , i 

First Division, First Brigade 125 

First Division, Second Brigade 427 

First Division, Third Brigade 352 

Second Division, First Brigade 382 

Second Division, Second Brigade 447 

Second Division, Third Brigade 200 

Third Division, First Brigade 155 

Third Division, Second Brigade 55 

Light Artillery Brigade 43 

Total 2,187 

SIXTH CORPS.* 

First Division, First Brigade il 

* Not engaged at Gettysburg. At Funkstown, in pursuit of Lee's army, was 
engaged with slight loss. 



552 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

First Division, Second Brigade 5 

First Division, Third Brigade 2 

Second Division, Second Brigade i 

Second Division, Third Brigade 15 

Third Division, First Brigade 74 

Third Division, Second Brigade 69 

Third Division, Third Brigade 53 

Light Artillery Brigade 12 

Total 242 

ELEVENTH CORPS. 

Staff; 6 

First Division, First Brigade 527 

First Division, Second Brigade 778 

Second Division, First Brigade .. 587 

Second Division, Second Brigade 348 

Third Division, First Brigade 807 

Third Division, Second Brigade 669 

Light Artillery Brigade 69 

Total 3,801 

TWELFTH CORPS. 

First Division, First Brigade 80 

First Division, Second Brigade 174 

First Division, Third Brigade 279 

Second Division, First Brigade 139 

Second Division, Second Brigade , 98 

Second Division, Third Brigade 303 

Light Artillery Brigade 9 

Total 1,082 

ARTILLERY RESERVE. 

First Regular Brigade 68 

First Volunteer Brigade 93 

Second Volunteer Brigade 8 

Third Volunteer Brigade 37 

Fourth Volunteer Brigade 36 

Total 242 

CAVALRY CORPS. 

First Division, First Brigade 99 

First Division, Second Brigade 28 



GETTYSBURG. 553 

First Division, Reserve Brigade 2gi 

Total 418 

Second Division, First Brigade 35 

Second Division, Tiiird Brigade 21 

Total 56 

Third Division, First Brigade 98 

Third Division, Second Brigade 257 

, Total 355 

HORSE ARTILLERY. 

First Brigade 8 

Second Brigade 15 

Total 23 

Total Casualties Cavalry Corps 852 

RECAPITULATION. 

General Headquarters 4 

First Army Corps 6,059 

Second Army Corps 4.369 

Third Army Corps 4,211 

Fifth Army Corps 2,187 

Sixth Army Corps 242 

Eleventh Army Corps , 3,801 

Twelfth Army Corps 1,082 

Cavalry Corps 852 

Artillery Reserves 242 

Total Union Loss 23,049 

The First Corps alone lost 6,059, which was more than 
one-fourth of the loss of Meade's army, where seven infantry 
corps, cavalry and artillery were engaged. This record of 
losses for the First Corps is not surpassed in the history of 
the world. 

The heaviest loss suffered by any brigade was that of 
the First Brigade, First Division, First Corps — the Iron 
Brigade — 1,153, ^'^^^ ^'^^ heaviest loss of any regiment was 
that of the 24th ]\Iichigan of that brigade, 363. The 
largest loss of any brigade by percentage of numbers en- 
gaged was also that of this same Iron Brigade, but of regi- 



554 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ments it was that of the ist Minnesota, 86 per cent., as 
against 8i for the 24th Michigan. 

Other extraordinary regimental losses were, the 151st 
Pennsylvania, 337 ; the 1.49th Pennnsylvania, 336, and the 
157th New York, 307; in each case over 70 per cent, of 
those engaged. 

Excessive losses of light batteries were the following : 

Cushing's (A), 4th Regulars 39 43 

Stewart's (B), 4th Regulars 36 40 

Arnold's (A), ist Rhode Island 32 36 

Sheldon's (B), istNewYork. 26 

Brown's (B), ist Rhode Island 28 

Freeborn's (E), ist Rhode Island 30 33 

Thompson's (C), Pennsylvania Light 28 

Biglow's 9th Massachusetts 28 31 

The figures given in the second column represent state- 
ments of losses other than those of the ' ' revised returns, ' ' 
which include only losses of men borne on the battery rolls. 

The Confederate losses were as follows : 

First Corps (Longstreet's) 7.539 

Second Corps (Ewell's) 5,937 

Third Corps (A. P. Hill's) 6,735 

Stuart's Cavalry Division 240 

Total Confederate Loss 20,451 

Total Union Loss 23,049 

Grand Total (both sides) , 43,500 



CHAPTER XIII. 

FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 

JULY 4 TO OCTOBER 30. 

y\ FTER the grapple of the giants, the Army of the 
-^ -^ Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, at 
Gettysburg, on the ist, 2d, and 3d days of July, 1863, 
which ended with the repulse of Pickett's magnificent 
charge on the Union center on Cemetery Ridge and the foil- 
ing of Stuart's splendid cavalry dash on the right flank, 
General Lee, disappointed in the confident hope and antici- 
pation of crushing the Union army, was obliged to solve 
the problem of successfully withdrawing his shattered army 
from its position in front of Meade's victorious legions. 
For this purpose the weather was most propitious. The 
heav}' cannonading of the previous three days brought on 
violent thunder storms. During the night of the 3d the 
rain fell in torrents, and a darkness like that of Egypt set- 
tled down upon the field of battle, concealing from view all 
movement of troops, while volleys of reverberating thunder 
drowned the rumbling of trains and artiller}'. During the 
4th the rain continued without cessation. Nevertheless, 
reconnoissances, made in all directions, disclosed the fact 
that General Lee had withdrawn his left and taken up a new 
position parallel with the Blue Ridge, covering the roads 
over that range, on which his immense trains, artiller>' and 
wounded, were moving on the night of the 3d and all day 
of the 4th. 

During the night of the 4th the Confederate army with- 
drew, and on the morning of the 5th were discovered to be 

555 



556 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

in full retreat on the Fairfield and Caslitown roads. The 
Sixth Corps being the strongest, was at once pushed for- 
ward in pursuit on the Fairfield road, and Col. Irvin Gregg's 
brigade of Gregg's cavalry division on the Caslitown road. 
General Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Corps, found the 
retreating army strongly posted in the Fairfield Pass, and' 
after closely reconnoitering the position deemed it too strong 
to be successfully attacked. Leaving Neil's brigade of infan- 
try and Mcintosh's cavalry brigade to harass and annoy the 
enemy, the army was put in motion for Middletown, Mary- 
land, and every effort was put forth to head off the retreat- 
ing army, whose line of march must necessarily lead, via 
Hagerstown, to Williamsport on the Potomac. Buford's 
division marched from Westminster on the 4th, via Frede- 
rick, Maryland, across the Catoctin and South Mountain 
Passes, en route for Williamsport, on the Potomac, and at 
five o'clock p.m. on the 6th came up with the enemy's 
pickets near St. James' College, between Boonsboro and 
the Antietam. 

Kilpatrick, marching on the 4th, reached Emmittsburg 
at three o'clock p.m., where he found Huey's (Second) bri- 
gade of Gregg's cavalry division. Pushing forward at once 
on the Monterey pike, he encountered some of Stuart's cav- 
alry, which he brushed aside, and, moving on to Monterey, 
struck, captured, and destroyed Ewell's trains, taking a 
number of prisoners. He then moved by Smithsburg to 
Boonsboro, foiling Stuart's attempt to cut him oif. 

The infantry corps moved promptly on all roads leading 
from Gettysburg through the mountain passes, and were 
concentrated in the vicinity of Boonsboro, west of the Blue 
Ridge, on the evening of the 9th. On the lotli Meade's 
headquarters moved from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek, a 
tributary of the Antietam, between Boonsboro and Williams- 
port. The Second, Third, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps were 
across the Antietam in front of the enemy's right, and the 
First, Sixth, and Eleventh Corps in position in front of 
Hagerstown and Funkstown. On the 9th and lotli the 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 557 

cavalry of the two armies (wliicli covered Lee's retiring 
infantry columns and preceded the advance of Meade's 
corps) had numerous and spirited engagements. 

General Lee, moving steadily in retreat through Hagers- 
town (the head of his columns arrived at Williamsport on the 
evening of the 6th and the rear on the morning of the 7th), 
found the river, swollen by the recent rains, impassable, 
and his pontoons, which had been left there to facilitate his 
crossing, destroyed. Being thus brought to a halt, he took 
up a strong position between the fords at Williamsport and 
Falling Waters, his right resting on the f otomac and his left 
on the Conococheague, near Hagerstown, Maryland. This 
line ran along a range of heights west of Marsh Creek, and 
was strongly intrenched, while the fording places on the 
river were put in condition to cover the crossing of his army. 

To the commander of the Union forces this position ap- 
peared too formidable for successful attack without a full 
examination ; and with this view General Meade determined 
to make a reconnoissance in force, supported by the entire 
army, early on the morning of the 13th ; but his corps com- 
manders were so decidedly averse to an advance that he 
postponed it until the following day. During the night the 
enemy withdrew from this position and crossed the Potomac. 

An examination of the position occupied by the Confed- 
erates showed it to be very strong, quite as much so as 
Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg. To have blindly 
hurled his masses upon this position in the hope that some 
weak point would be found might have been splendid blun- 
dering, but certainly could not be characterized as judicious 
and scientific warfare. From all the facts known at the 
time, and from subsequent light thrown upon the stibject 
by the publication of Confederate records, the calm view of 
all military men capable of forming a correct estimate of 
military operations must be that General Meade was gov- 
erned by sound military principles in refraining from an 
immediate and direct attack. 

What might have been accomplished by a movement 



558 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

acros the Potomac by way of Shepherdstown and Harper's 
Ferry with two corps of infantry and two divisions of 
cavalr}', commenced from Boonsboro on the morning of 
the nth, it is, perhaps, now useless to speculate upon. 
However that may be, one cannot help thinking that great 
results must have followed. 

General Meade, backed by the strong positions afforded 
by the passes through and over the Blue Ridge, with reen- 
forcements (French had already joined with 6,500 fresh 
troops) constantly coming up from his base, and the accu- 
mulating bodies of Northern militia under Couch gathering 
on his right flank, would certainly have been as secure 
against any forward movement, had the enemy been in con- 
dition to make it, as General Lee was behind the Antietam. 
This formidable flanking force, marching from Boonsboro 
on the nth, would have been across General Lee's line of 
retreat, between Williamspott and Martinsburg, some time 
during the night of the 12th or morning of the 13th ; and 
as General Lee's crossing did not commence until the night 
of that day, he would have been in the position of General 
Mack at Ulm, or the Roman Consuls in the Candine Forks. 
But as no movement of this kind seems to have been con- 
templated by anyone having the authority to make or pro- 
pose it, no good purpose can be subserved by discussing it 
further. 

The movement of Gregg's cavalry division across the 
Potomac at Harper's Ferry on the 14th accomplished 
»iothing, although a severe engagement took place between 
Col. Irvin Gregg's (Third) brigade and the bulk of Stuart's 
cavalry near Shepherdstown, which lasted from one o'clock 
until nine p.m. on the i6th, and in which a large number 
of people on both sides were killed and wounded. 

On the morning of the 14th, General INIeade was ap- 
prised that the enemy had slipped away during the night, 
and his army was put in motion with all practicable dis- 
patch, directed upon Williamsport, but was unable to over- 
take him. 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 559 

Buford and Kilpatrick, however, overtook the rear 
guard at Falling Waters, attacked and captured two can- 
non, three flags and many prisoners. On the i5tli, head- 
quarters of the army were moved to Berlin, and the col- 
umns were all put in motion by various roads for that place 
and Harper's Ferry. On the i6th and 17th the army 
crossed the Potomac, and moved along the eastern side of 
the Blue Ridge, keeping pace with the Confederate army 
in its retreat up the valley of Virginia, and preventing it 
from debouching through the various passes of that moun- 
tain barrier into the rich valleys of Loudoun and Fauquier 
Counties, which General Lee designed to occupy, and 
threatened his communications Avith Richmond. 

Longstreet and Hill, moving rapidly on the 20th and 
2 2d, passed safely through Chester Gap ; but Ewell essaying 
to pass through on the 23d, met the heads of the Third, 
Fifth and Second Corps advancing through the gap, and a 
spirited contest ensued, which resulted in forcing him back 
and compelling him to continue his march up the valley as 
far as Luray, and to cross over by way of Thornton's Gap. 
General Lee, having safely passed the Blue Ridge, massed 
his army around Culpeper Court House. 

General ]\Ieade, under instructions from Washington, 
took up a strong and threatening position behind the Rap- 
pahannock, with Gregg's cavalry division thrown forward 
to Amissville, but being directed not to advance against 
Lee's position at Culpeper, all active operations between 
the two armies ceased. 

On the ist of August, Buford' s cavalry division crossed 
the river on a reconnoissance ; and at or near Brandy Sta- 
tion encountered Hampton's and Jones' brigades, com- 
manded by Stuart in person, which they drove back to 
within a mile and a half of Culpeper, and found that place 
occupied by A. P. Hill's corps. They then fell back and 
recrossed the river at Rappahannock Station. After this 
the two armies remained quietly watching each other. 

During the month of August the Anny of the Potomac 



560 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

was considerably reduced in strength by the detachment of 
troops for duty elsewhere, and it was ascertained that Gen- 
eral Ivongstreet's corps had been sent to Tennessee to 
reenforce Bragg, and arrived at its destination in time to 
be present at the great battle of Chickamauga, which was 
fought on the 19th and 20th of September. On the 13th 
of September, Meade directed a reconnoissance in force, 
with the entire Cavalry Corps, supported by the Second 
Corps. Kilpatrick, with his division, crossed at Kelley's 
Ford, and Buford, with his division, at Beverly Ford, fol- 
lowed by the Second Corps, while Gregg moved from his 
camp between Sulphur Springs and Jefferson. 

The enemy were encountered on all the roads converg- 
ing toward Culpeper, and driven through that town — the 
heads of the three cavalry columns meeting at noon in the 
town. The pursuit was continued until nightfall and the 
enemy forced across the Rapidan, but were found to be too 
strongly posted on the opposite bank to be dislodged by a 
direct attack. 

The army crossed the Rappahannock and took up a 
position around Culpeper. Buford made a reconnoissance 
toward the u])per Rapidan and a movement by the right 
was contemplated ; but before it could be put into execu- 
tion two corps, the Eleventh and Twelfth, were withdrawn 
from the army and sent to Tennessee to reenforce Rose- 
crans, whose army was shut up in Chattanooga. 

General Lee's army was at Orange Court House and 
Gordonsville, with strong advanced posts intrenched behind 
the fords along the Rapidan, holding tenaciously the line of 
that river, with uninterrupted communication with Rich- 
mond and Lynchburg from which to draw supplies. In 
these positions the two armies lay until the 9th of October. 

The Army of the Potomac was disposed in the following 
order from right to left : The Second Corps on the Sperr}-- 
yille pike, in the vicinity of Stoue House Mountain ; the 
Third across the roads leading from Culpeper via James 
City, to Madison Court House ; the Fifth and Sixth facing 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. o61 

Cedar INIountain, and the First in the neighborhood of 
Stevensburg. Buford's cavalry division was on the left, 
Kilpatrick's on the right, and Gregg's division north of the 
Rappahannock at Bealton ; and, as was the custom, their 
vedettes encircled the entire army and kept out observation 
parties toward the enemy. 

During the 8tli and 9th of October information from 
various sources reached General Meade that a movement of 
some kind was imminent. The unusual activity observed by 
our signal officers in the Confederate camps on those days, 
and the movement of long trains and columns of infantry 
and artillery on the 9th toward Madison Court House, was 
attributed by some as preliminary to the evacuation of Vir- 
ginia, by others to a direct advance against the Union army 
in its position at Culpeper, and by still others to a movement 
around General Meade's right flank, by the roads leading 
north, along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge. 

Increased vigilance was enjoined upon Kilpatrick, and 
on the evening of the 9th orders were sent to General Buford, 
which he received on the morning of the loth, directing 
him to force a crossing of the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, 
and, sweeping up the river, endeavor to uncover ^Morton's 
Ford in front of General Newton's corps, the First, which 
was then to cross, and, if the movement was successful, to 
be followed by the Fifth and Sixth Corps at the fords higher 
up. This movement was successfully executed by General 
Buford with his usual soldierly promptness. The crossing 
was forced at Germanna, and the enemy rapidly pushed back 
until Morton's Ford was uncovered. But before this was 
accomplished night had fallen, and Buford bivouacked 
within the outer works of the enemy, leaving them in pos- 
session of the works immediately at the ford. Meantime 
the enemy crossed the Robertson River at Madison Court 
House, and forced Kilpatrick's cavalry back to James City, 
where he was supported by Prince's division of the Third 
Corps, and the Second Brigade of Gregg's division of cav- 
alry, under Col. Irvin Gregg. 

XXXVI 



562 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

This movement seemed to be so formidable that General 
Meade changed his orders for the passage of the Rapidan, 
and issued orders for a retrograde movement which carried 
his army to the north bank of the Rappahannock on the 
nth. This movement was covered by Kilpatrick's division 
of cavalry, until it reached Brandy Station, where he was 
joined by Buford, who, finding that our infantry had moved 
during the night, drove the enemy from Morton's Ford, re- 
croesed the Rapidan, and moving via, Stevensburg, reached 
Brandy Station in time to sustain Kilpatrick, who was 
contending against the entire force of the enemy's cavalry. 

In falling back from the positions occupied around Cul- 
'peper, the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps marched along the 
south side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, the 
Second along the north side, and the Third Corps via Well- 
ford's Ford, on the Hazel River, to Freeman's Ford on the 
Hedgeman River. 

Gregg was instructed to take up a position across the 
Sperryville pike until after the withdrawal of the Third 
Corps, and then to move with his division to Sulphur 
Springs, via Rixeyville and Jefferson, with his Second 
Brigade, and with his First Brigade by the most direct route 
from its position on the Rappahannock. This brigade 
reached Sulphur Springs before dark on the evening of the 
nth, while the Second Brigade did not arrive at Jeffersonton 
until eight p. m., and bivouacked between that place and 
the springs. Nightfall of the nth found the Army of the 
Potomac (with the exception of the Second Brigade, Second 
Cavalry Division, Col. Irvin Gregg) north of the Rappa- 
hannock, and its commander master of the situation and in 
a position to foil any attempt against his communications 
by General Lee, and reduced Lee to the necessity of deliver- 
ing battle on ground chosen by his enemy, or the abandon- 
ment of his enterprise. 

General Gregg was instructed that the movement of 
his command, via Jefferson and Sulphur Springs, was to 
watch the roads leading to the Shenandoah Valley by 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 563 

Thornton's and Chester Gaps, and to Warrenton by way 
of Amissville ; that it was information of the movements 
of General Lee's army that was wanted, and that it was 
important that any which might be received should be 
promptly communicated to army headquarters. No indi- 
cation of any movement of troops was observed by General 
Gregg on the march from Culpeper, via Rixeyville, to 
Jefferson. About midnight on the night of the nth, 
General Gregg received a communication from General 
Humphreys, chief of staff, asking him to obtain certain 
and early information of the enemy's movements in the 
direction of Sperryville and Little Washington. As this 
was the route followed by General Jackson in his cele- 
brated and successful march around General Pope's right 
flank in August, 1862, General Meade may be supposed to 
have been naturally somewhat apprehensive of a similar 
attempt on the part of General Lee. To prevent the re- 
currence of such a march, the movement of the previous 
day, which placed his army on the Washington side of the 
Rappahannock, was admirably adapted ; and if the move- 
ment on Warrenton, originally contemplated by General 
Meade, had been carried out, it would have been rendered 
absolutely impossible. The position of General Meade's 
army around Warrenton would have been impregnable to 
any but a vastly superior force. 

General Lee, in his advance report, says he broke up 
his camps at Orange Court House and Gordonsville on the 
9th, with a view to bring on a general engagement with 
General Meade's army at Culpeper Court House ; that he 
reached the vicinity of the court house on the nth, and 
found that the enemy had evacuated the position ; that he 
was obliged to halt for the remainder of the day to pro- 
vision his army ; that he determined to make another 
attempt to strike General Meade's communications north 
of the Rappahannock, and force his army still farther 
toward Washington ; and with tliat view he moved on the 
morning of the 12th in two columns. It was the move- 



564 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ment of these columns that was the source of so much 
anxiety to the Union commander, and the direction of 
which General Gregg had been requested, at midnight on 
the nth, to obtain early and accurate information. 

The duty assigned to General Gregg's division was 
both delicate and arduous. The character of the country 
through w^iich the movement was made not being favor- 
able for distant observation, and the march of the columns 
being veiled behind a cloud of cavalry, commanded by 
Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, upon whom the eyes of the world 
were fixed as the most accomplished and successful cavalry 
leader that up to that time the war had produced, rendered 
the obtaining such definite knowledge as General Meade 
required absolutely impossible except by actual contact,- 
involving a severe and protracted contest. 

The measures taken by General Gregg to procure this 
information were well adapted to the purpose. The 13th 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, on the night of the nth, was 
posted between the village of Jefferson and Rixey's Ford, 
with vedettes thrown forward as far as the crossing; 
and early on the morning of the 12th, the ist IMaine 
Cavalry was sent, via Amissville, Gaines' Crossroads and 
Little Washington, to Sperryville. The other regiments 
of the brigade crossed the river and took up a position 
covering the roads to Fayetteville and Warrenton. About 
nine o'clock a. m., on the 12th, Major Kerwin, com- 
manding the I3tli Pennsylvania, sent a dispatch to General 
Gregg that the enemy's cavalry were pressing his vedettes. 
This dispatch reached him at Sulphur Springs, on the 
north bank of the Hedgeman River, at ten a.m. Col. Irvin 
Gregg, to whose brigade the 13th Pennsylvania and ist 
Maine Cavalry belonged, was ordered to immediately re- 
cross the river, taking with him an additional regiment. 
Selecting for that purpose the 4th Pennsylvania, he pro- 
ceeded to the front to ascertain what was going on. Colonel 
Gregg reached the village of Jefferson about 12:30 p.m., 
where he met the 13th retiring in good order, to get a good 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 565 

defensive position nearer to its support. The movement to 
the rear was arrested, the village reoccupied, and prepara- 
tions made to offer such resistance to the enem}-'s advance 
as would compel him to develop the nature and number of 
his forces. These dispositions were scarcely completed 
when a strong attack on the village was made by Stuart's 
dismounted cavalry, which was repulsed with severe loss. 

General I^ee being present when General Stuart arrived 
upon the ground with Funsten's brigade, he was directed 
by him to send a regiment, the I2th Virginia, to the right, 
and another, the 7th Virginia, to the left, while the nth 
Virginia, which had been repulsed, was remounted and 
sent to the left to attack the right of the Union troops in 
the village. During this time the skirmish firing was con- 
tinuous and rapid. Up to three o'clock p.m. no infantr)^ 
force had made its appearance ; at about that hour j\Iaj. S. 
B. ]\I. Young, commanding the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
on the left, sent word to Colonel Gregg, who had just re- 
turned from the extreme right, from where he had observed 
a movement of the Confederate cavalry to his right rear, 
that it was infantry that were opposing him (men with knap- 
sacks on), and that he could not long maintain his position. 
This was conclusive as to the forces opposing us, and the 
information was at once sent to General Gregg by Lieut. 
Archer N. IMartin, of the i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, one 
of Colonel Gregg's aids ; but it did not reach him, as Lieu- 
tenant Martin ran into Funsten's command, the 12th Vir- 
ginia Cavalry, had his horse killed, and was himself severely 
wounded. Meanwhile Colonel Gregg, having acquired the 
information he was seeking, and ascertained that he had 
the whole, or a large part, of Lee's army on his hands, at- 
tempted to withdraw. But the enem>- pressing on with 
cavalry on both flanks, and infantry on his front, his troops 
became somewhat demoralized. No time being given for 
effecting any organization as the men came in from the 
skirmish line, the broken regiments got across the river 
under cover of the loth New York Cavalry, and almost 



666 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

simultaneous with the crossing the enemy opened upon 
our position on the northern bank of the river, from the 
opposite bhifFs, with two batteries of General Ewell's artil- 
lery ; at the same time the heads of his infantry columns 
appeared in sight. 

It was now between four and five o'clock p.m., and at 
4:50 p.m. the following dispatch was sent to General Pleas- 
onton, whose headquarters were supposed to be with Gen- 
eral Meade : 

Headquarters Second Cavalry Division, 
October 12, 1863 — 450 p. m. 

ColoneIy : — We have been fighting all afternoon. This morn- 
ing at daylight I sent a regiment to make a reconnoissance toward 
Little Washington. I placed a regiment at Jefferson to support the 
reconnoissance. The enemy forced the crossing at Rixeyville, and 
columns of infantry and cavalry crossed and advanced upon Jeffer- 
son. I got the regiments across to resist the advance of the enemy, 
but the force was so overwhelming that after a stubborn resistance 
the regiments were driven back and effected a crossing under my 
guns. A column of infantry is now moving up the right bank. The 
officer commanding my brigade near Warrenton reports columns of 
infantry moving up the west bank toward the mountains. The 
columns of infantry moving in plain sight are large. I am much 
concerned for the regiment sent to Little Washington. The loss in 
the regiment engaged to-day is very heavy ; I cannot give it yet. 
The enemy have opened with twenty pieces of artillery, and are 
driving me from my position at the springs. 
Very respectfully, 

D. McM. Gregg, 
Brigadier General of Volunteers. 

Col. Ross Smith, Chief of Staff. 

Up to the date of this dispatch General Gregg had no 
information of General Lee's army, except that he was en- 
gaged with his cavalry. Col. C. H. Smith, with the 1st 
Maine Cavalry, pushed on through Amissville, pas.sed 
Gaines' Crossroads, to Little Washington, which ]X)int he 
reached before twelve m. without having met with anything 
to indicate any movement of General Lee's army in that 
direction. From Little Washington Lieutenant Harris was 
sent back with twelve men to communicate this information. 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 567 

He passed Ainissville on liis return (no enemy in sight), and 
on his arrival near Jefferson found the enemy's cavalry 
between that place and his party and a fight going on. He 
at once retraced his steps in the attempt to rejoin his regi- 
ment ; but on his arrival at Amissville he found all the roads 
in possession of the enemy. 

Colonel Smith sent Majors Boothby and Brown on to 
Sperryville, from which point they returned to Little Wash- 
ington at sundown, not having seen any enemy. Colonel 
Smith at once commenced his return march toward Jeffer- 
son, and after nightfall ran into Gen. A. P. Hill's corps, 
at Amissville. He was thus cut off from his direct road, 
and in an extremely critical position, from which he extri- 
cated himself and command with signal ability ; and after a 
march of ninety miles reached Bristoe Station, on the 
Orange and Alexandria Railroad, early on the morning of 
the 13th. 

Lieutenant Harris being unable to reach General Gregg, 
and cut off from his regiment by the advance of General 
Hill's corps, concealed his party in a dense thicket of old 
field pines, which everywhere abound in Virginia, until 
nightfall, when he made his way through the Confederate 
outposts, crossed the river, and when near the Bull Run 
Mountains ran into Mosby's command, was captured, and 
while being conducted, via Warrenton, to the south side of 
the Hedgeman River, again made his escape alone, recrossed 
the river, and several days afterwards reported to his regi- 
mental commander near Bealton. 

Moving from his camps on the Sperryville pike, early on 
the morning of the 12th, to head off General Meade's army, 
which had twenty-four hours' start of him and was well con- 
centrated on the north bank of the Rappahannock, General 
Lee, the right wing of whose army had about sixteen or eight- 
een miles to march to reach Sulphur Springs, must have 
moved with the utmo>.t dispatch. He arrived with the advance 
of General EwelTs corps within two miles of Jefferson, 
where Funsten, who moved from Brandy Station early the 



668 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC: 

same morning, said he found the head of Ewell's corps. 
None of these officers give the time of day, but the hour 
could not have been later than eleven or 1 1 :30 a. m. The pace 
at which they were marching would have brought them to 
the Sulphur Springs Crossing of the Hedgeman River at an 
hour certainly not later than one o'clock p. m. 
General Lee, in his report, says : 

After a skirmish with some of the Federal cavalry at Jefferson, 
we reached the Rappahannock in the afternoon, where the passage 
of the river was disputed by cavalry and artillery. Early next 
morning- the march was resumed and the two columns reunited at 
Warrenton in the afternoon. 

Gen. J. E. B. Stuart says, in his very detailed report of 
this skirmish : 

After a hard struggle they retreated rapidly down the roaa ; the 
horse artillery not having come up (General Long commanding), 
the artillery of General Ewell's corps opened fire with eight guns on 
the batteries and supporting squadrons of the enemy on the oppo- 
site side of the river. As it was nearly dark, my first care, after 
crossing, was to have the bridge relaid, so that the infantry might 
cross directly over. 

General Lee's advance was, therefore, delayed by the 
disposition and the resistance made by these two regiments 
of cavalry, the 13th and 4th Pennsylvania, from eleven or 
half-past eleven a. m., until dark, at six or seven o'clock 
p. m, , a period of seven or eight hours, in marching a dis- 
tance of six or seven miles. 

General Meade not receiving such information as he 
wanted up to ten or eleven o'clock a. m., and being inspired 
with the belief, occasioned by the representations made by 
Generals Pleasonton and Sykes, that Lee was in his rear at 
Culpeper, determined, for some reasons not explained at 
the time, nor understood since, to send, at one o'clock 
p. m., the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps, with Buford's 
cavalry division, back across the river on a reconnoissance 
toward Culpeper. The enemy's cavalry were encountered 



GETTYSBURG- TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 5G9 

near Brandy Station, and not being in force were rapidly 
pushed back on Cnlpeper. But the place was unoccupied, 
except by a small body of cavalry. The object of the 
reconnoissance, however, was accomplished and a day 
lost. 

General Buford's report that General Lee's army was 
not at or in the vicinity of Cnlpeper, demonstrated the in- 
correctness of the surmises of the corps commanders before 
mentioned, but did not disclose the position of Lee's army ; 
nor does General Meade appear to have received any infor- 
mation, until, as he says in his report : 

During the night dispatches were received from General Gregg, 
commanding a cavalry division guarding the upper fords of the 
Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, that he had been forced back early 
in the morning from the Hazel River, and in the afternoon from the 
Rappahannock, and that the enemy were crossing at Sulphur Springs 
and Waterloo in heavy force. 

The dispatches here alluded to, we have seen, were 
dated at 4:50 p. m. ; the distance from Sulphur Springs to 
Rappahannock Station did not exceed ten or eleven miles ; 
the roads were good and unobstructed, and there is no reason 
why the distance should not have been covered in an hour 
or an hour and a quarter. It is therefore inexplicable how 
this delay, which came so near being fatal, could have oc- 
curred. Late as the hour was, it gave General ]\Ieade the 
definite information for which he was looking, and revealed 
to him the critical position in which his army had been 
placed by his backward movement of the morning. He 
was, however, prompt in remedying the mistake, and the 
troops were at once recalled. 

Warren's corps, being nearest the river, was directed to 
proceed, via Bealeton, to support General Gregg, and cover 
the Third Army Corps, which was at Freeman's Ford. 
The order for this march was received by General Warren, 
at his position about two and one-half miles from Rappa- 
hannock Station, at eleven o'clock p. m. on the 12th, and 



570 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

he says in his report : "The movement was immediately 
begun. We marched all night, and by one o'clock a.m. 
joined General Gregg at Fayetteville. ' ' 

After sending the 4:50 p. m. dispatch, General Gregg 
continued to hold the crossing at Sulphur Springs, resist-' 
ing every attempt of the enemy to force him from it until 
his accumulating force rendered any further resistance 
hopeless. He then withdrew slowly, followed by the 
enemy' 3 cavalry, and several charges and countercharges 
were made on the Warrenton pike between the First Bri- 
gade, under Colonel Taylor, and the Confederate cavalry. 
Night put an end to the fighting, which had been raging 
with more or less fury since one p. m. , and Gregg withdrew 
to Fayetteville. 

On the morning of the 13th, Lee's right wing crossed 
the river and moved to Warrenton. Hill moved at the 
same time ; and on the afternoon of that day the two wings 
of his army were united at that place. General Meade, 
having lost the day of the 12th in the execution of his rear- 
ward movement and failed to secure the position at War- 
renton, put his army in motion, marching all night to 
regain the time lost, and on the morning of the 13th moved 
on all the roads leading through Auburn, Greenwich, and 
Catlett's Station, to Bristoe and Manassas. 

The First, Fifth and Sixth Corps, the trains, and 
Buford's cavalry moved along the railroad, and by the after- 
noon of the 13th had reached Catlett's Station ; the troops 
were camped, and the trains parked between there and 
Warrenton Junction. 

During the night of the 12th Kilpatrick covered the 
road leading from Fayetteville to Warrenton. The Third 
Corps withdrew from Freeman's Ford, passed through Fay- 
etteville, and marched via Auburn to Greenwich, preceded 
by Kilpatrick, who was relieved by Gregg. After the pas- 
sage of the Third Corps Warren moved to Auburn, on the 
road leading by Three-Mile Station, and bivouacked west 
of Cedar Run after dark. Gregg brought up the rear, and 



GETTYSBURG TO IHE RAPPAHANNOCK. 571 

went into position between the Second Corps and Warren- 
ton long after dark. 

Lee, having arrived at Warrenton during the morning, 
sent Stuart on a reconnoissance toward Catlett's ; that officer, 
taking with him the brigades of Lomax, Gordon, and Fun- 
sten, proceeded at once on the road leading from Warrenton 
to Catlett's, via Auburn ; arriving at the latter j^lace, he left 
Lomax to watch and guard his rear. Pushing on with 
Gordon and Funsten in the direction of Catlett's, as he 
cautiously approached St. Stephen's Church, the whole 
plain around Catlett's, covered by our trains, came under 
his observation, and they were for a time probably at his 
mercy. Carefully concealing his force in a dense thicket of 
old field pine, he sent a report of the situation to General 
Lee at Warrenton. Not hearing from Lomax, who had 
been driven from Auburn by the advance of General Kil- 
patrick and the Third Corps, he determined to remain in 
his position during the night ; meantime the advance of 
the Second Corps and Gregg's cavalry isolated him com- 
pletely from the main army at Warrenton. At early dawn 
on the 14th the perilous position in which he was placed 
was revealed ; but presuming that General Lee had received 
the information sent him the previous day, and would be 
advancinof to the attack from the direction of Warrenton 
with his entire army, he immediately opened fire with his 
guns on Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, which 
was drawn up in line of battle on a hill east of Cedar Run, 
facing toward Warrenton. This unexpected fire, coming 
from the rear, somewhat startled these veteran troops ; but 
they changed front without confusion, and Caldwell's bat- 
teries soon got into position, making the shelter of old field 
pine hot for the daring cavalrymen. 

Ewell, however, advancing from the direction of War- 
renton, attacked General Gregg, and affairs now began to 
look serious for the Union armv. But Warren was on the 
move, and Gen. Alexander Hays' division, marching 
rapidly in the direction of Catlett's, forced Stuart out of 



572 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

his concealed position, from which he withdrew by his left, 
crossing Cedar Run between Auburn and Catlett's, and 
passing around Gregg's rear, between Auburn and the 
Warrenton Railroad. 

The road being now clear, the Second Corps moved 
rapidly in the direction of Bristoe Station, covered by the 
Second Cavalry Division. The advance, General Webb's 
Second Division, reached the station about two p. m., while 
the rear of the Fifth Corps was moving off beyond Cedar 
Run, and the enemy was advancing in line of battle from 
the direction of Greenwich. General Warren, in his re- 
port, says : 

A more inspiring scene could not be imagined. The enemy's 
line of battle boldly moving forward, one part of our own steadily 
awaiting it, and another moving against it at the double quick, 
while the artillery was taking up position at a gallop and going into 
action. 

Webb's division was faced to the left, occupying the 
railroad cut and embankment. Hays' division prolonged 
the line to the left and Caldwell's to his left as it arrived 
on the field. Brown's battery went into action on the 
north side of Broad Run, without support, and Ricketts' 
on the heights south of the bridge. Gregg's cavalry divi- 
sion followed Caldwell. The First Brigade crossed Kettle 
Creek under fire from the troops of E well's corps, which 
was beginning to arrive, and took position on Caldwell's 
left. 

When the advance of Gregg's (Second) brigade ap- 
proached Kettle Creek the road and railroad bridge were 
found to be in possession of the enemy. The way being 
thus blocked, this brigade moved to the right and took up 
a position, covering our hospitals, near the Brentville road. 
The attack was gallantly made and as gallantly repulsed, 
the advantage remaining with the Union forces. Night 
put an end to the fighting, and the Bristoe campaign was 
ended. General Meade issued the following congratulatory 
order : 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 573 

General Orders, ] Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

No. 96. I October 15, 1863. 

The major general commanding announces to the army that the 
rear guard, consisting of the Second Corps, was attacked yesterday- 
while marching by the flank. 

The enemy, after a spirited contest, was repulsed, losing two 
colors, a battery of five gvuis, and 450 prisoners. 

The skill and promptitude of Major General Warren, and the 
gallantry and bearing of the officers and soldiers of the Second 
Corps are entitled to high admiration. 

By command of Major General Meade : 

S. Williams, Assistant Adjutant General. 

This is a very graceful acknowledgment of the services 
of the Second Corps, which was well deserved ; btit it 
brought no rejoicing to the camps of the weary cavalrymen 
whose services were entirely ignored. This disparaging 
order was partially modified by the commanding general, 
in General Orders, No. 97, October 17, 1863; btit it empha- 
sized the fact, evinced on more than one occasion before 
and subsequently, that General Meade's sympathies were 
with his infantry and artillery rather than his cavalry. 

Of this campaign it may be said that it was conducted 
on the part of the Union commander under a misappre- 
hension as to the designs of his opponent not warranted by 
what ought to have been known of his character nor by 
past experiences. First : That the movements of General 
Lee's army were preliminary to evacuating the line of the 
Rapidan. Second : That the apparent movement to turn 
his right had been given up for the less important one of 
occtipying the abandoned position of the F^ederals at Cul- 
peper. Third : That having placed his army in an admir- 
able position on the nth, it was not prudent to abandon it 
on the i2tli without waiting for information as to General 
Lee's movements on the mere stipposition that Lee might, 
after all, have only designed to get possession of the 
town of Culpeper. Lee's object being to attack Meade's 
army at Culpeper, that general might have waited in his 
position, wliich had been prepared for such a contin- 



574 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

gency, for twelve hours, and, if then desired, could have 
withdrawn his army to the north bank of the Rappahan- 
nock during the night of the nth, and had time to reach 
Warrenton in advance of the enemy. Had General lyce 
attacked at Culpeper, he undoubtedly would have been 
repulsed ; and the Union army could have seized the posi- 
tion at Orange Court House and Gordonsville, and inter- 
posed between Lee and Richmond, thus forcing that gen- 
eral back upon Lynchburg. The strategy as well as the 
tactics of the Union commander were faulty in the extreme 
throughout this campaign. 

General Lee, after following the Union army to Bull 
Run, fell back, destroying the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad as he went, and took up a position behind the 
Rappahannock with a strong force of infantry and cavalry 
intrenched on the north or east bank at the railroad cross- 
ing, which he held until the 7th of November, when Gen- 
eral Sedgwick, with the Fifth and Sixth Corps, advanced 
and carried the position by assault, capturing four pieces of 
artillery, 1,600 prisoners and 1,200 small arms. The as- 
sault was made by the Second and Third Brigades of the 
First Division of the Sixth Corps, commanded by Gen. 
David A. Russell. 

On the 8th and 9th the army crossed the river and took 
up a position from Kelley's Ford, through Brandy Station, 
to Welford's Ford on the Hazel River, and at once com- 
menced to repair the railroad. 

The foregoing brief account is taken entirely from the 
official records (Series I, Vol. XXIX, Part I, Bristoe Sta- 
tion and Mine Run, Serial 48), except so much as relates 
to the ist Maine Cavalry. 

I now turn to the account of this day's operations given 
in his " History of the American War," by the Comte de 
Paris, in his chapter on Bristoe Station. The distinguished 
author of this history — usually so fair in his statements, so 
correct in his criticisms, and so just in his conclusions — is 
not only incorrect in his facts, but unwarranted in his de- 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 575 

ductions in reference to the operations of the Second Cav- 
alry Division on the 12th of October, 1863. His account 
is too long to quote in full ; but the substance of it is this : 

That General Meade, on the night of the nth, was 
north of the Rappahannock, and master of the situation ; 
that on the morning of the 12th, not receiving the infor- 
mation from General Gregg that he expected in reference 
to the movements of General Lee's army, he became im- 
patient, and, by an unhappy inspiration, sent General Bu- 
ford's cavalry and three corps of infantry back across the 
river to Culpeper, and lost his power to control affairs ; that 
he waited still, in his position at Rappahannock Station, 
until dark, when he learned from Buford's report that 
General Lee's army was not at Culpeper; that at 10:30 
o'clock that night he received a dispatch from General 
Gregg, dated at Fayetteville, saying that Lee had been 
crossing his army at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo for 
several hours ; that General Gregg, when he discovered the 
advance of Lee's army, was too intent upon fighting to 
think of sending reports to his superior ; that the command- 
ing officer of the 1 3th Pennsylvania forgot to send reports 
to General Gregg, and that the colonel of the ist IVIaine 
Cavalry, driven back from Amissville and unable to reach 
Sulphur Springs, disappeared for several days ; and that it 
would have been better if General Gregg had not fought so 
much and written more. 

Now the Comte de Paris, in all this, ignores the very 
important fact that General Lee was moving rapidly and 
secretly ; that he was veiling the march of his infantry 
columns behind his cavalry, and that that cavalry was led by 
one of the most successful and distinguished cavalry leaders 
of this or any country or age ; and that if any information 
was to be obtained it would have to be fought for, and the 
fight once joined, must be a desperate one. 

It must be obvious to any impartial critic that any in- 
formation sent to General ]\Ieade at any time prior to the 
4:50 p.m. dispatch, before mentioned, could not have con- 



576 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

veyeJ to him any correct intimation of the condition of 
affairs ; nor is it probable that frequent communication of 
such information as General Gregg had, up to four p.m., 
would have exercised any influence upon the commanding 
general's actions. 

The Comte de Paris says that in the interval between 
the two engagements — the respite allowed him by General 
Stuart— General Gregg should have sent a report to Gene- 
ral Meade. There was no interval, no respite, from the 
time the fight was joined, about one o'clock p. m., until 
Gregg was forced across the river at four p. m. There was 
no cessation or let-up ; and the first intimation that Gene- 
ral Gregg had of the presence of the enemy's infantry was 
the almost simultaneous appearance of the heads of Ewell's 
columns and the opening of his guns from the opposite 
bluffs. The crossing of the river was not forced until 
about dark, at least an hour and a half after the 4:50 p. m. 
dispatch was sent. He also says (page 762) : 

All necessary precautions— the leaving of the 13th Pennsylva- 
nia at Jefferson ; the dispatch of the 1st jNIaine to Aniissville and 
the First Brigade, under Taylor, to scout the country toward War- 
renton — seemed to be taken to learn if Lee is endeavoring to turn 
the Federal right wing ; but neither Gregg nor JMeade is promptly 
informed of the fact. These precautions will be of no use, however, 
owing to a singular occurrence of fortuitous circumstances and 
culpable negligence. 

In the first place, the ist INIaine, coming back from Aniissville 
in the night, falls unexpectedl5% near Jefferson, on the outposts 
of the 11th Virginia. Dreading some ambush, the former falls back 
on Little Washington, and thus it cannot give an 3- information to 
Gregg, from whom it will be separated for several days. 

This account, which is entirely incorrect, is suflSciently 
confuted in the relation of the operations of the ist Maine, 
as is also the statement in reference to the 13th Pennsyl- 
vania. Again the comte says (page 764) : 

How could Gregg have left his chief so long without sending 
information as to what was taking place on the right of the army ? 
We have said that Gregg himself, no doubt, did not receive any in- 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 577 

formation from his detachments which he had sent to scout the 
country ; the enemy making his appearance on Hedgeman River, 
the surprise made him neglect that important dutj' ; but he com- 
mitted an inexcusable error in not taking advantage of the respite 
which Stuart gave him after the first engagement. 

In reference to this severe criticism, it is to be said that 
it is not only not just and fair, but that it is extremely unjust 
and unfair, and is not warranted by the facts in the case. 
Neither Gregg nor any of his detachments had anv infor- 
mation of the whereabouts of General Lee's infantr\- columns 
up to three or half-past three o'clock. It was after Colonel 
Gregg had sent information to General Gregg that a laro-e 
body of the enem}-'s cavalry were moving to their left — his 
right — that the position was no longer tenable, and instruc- 
tions had been received to retire, that information came to 
Colonel Gregg, which came not from the observance of any 
infantry columns, but from Capt. (afterward Col.) S. B. M. 
Young, of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, now major of the 
3d United States Cavalry, then in command of the skirmish 
line on his left, to the effect that it was infantry that was 
opposing him — men with knapsacks. This information was 
immediately sent to General Gregg by Lieut. i\rcher N. 
Martin, i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, one of Colonel Gregg's 
aids. 

The time had now arrived when the pressure of the 
enemy could no longer be resisted ; so that, like a weak 
embankment, pressed by the accumulated waters behind it, 
this thin skinnish line began to yield before the tinited 
strength of General Lee's right wing, crumbled and went 
to pieces. 

Colonel Gregg's dispatch to General Gregg, conveying 
the information of the presence of General Lee's infantry, 
did not reach him ; for it was here, with the 7th and nth 
Virginia on his right, the 12th Virginia on his left and 
rear, and the advancing infantry columns pressing upon 
his center, that Colonel Young, pale and bleeding, informed 
Colonel Gregg that he had been shot at close range by an 

XXXVH 



578 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

infantryman. Lieutenant Martin, on foot and covered 
with blood, approached and reported that the enemy were 
holding the road in his rear ; that his horse had been killed 
and himself wounded. And Lieutenant Cutler, ist Maine, 
another aid, rode up wounded in the arm, and reported : 
"We are fast being surrounded." 

Maj. H. H. Gregg, 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, whose 
battalion had been holding the position behind the stone 
wall that surrounded the cemetery, came up from the front 
on foot exhausted, and reported everything in confusion 
and the enemy advancing rapidly. This officer, who was 
furnished a horse, was no sooner mounted than the horse 
was killed and he was himself captured, informed Colonel 
Gregg subsequently, after his return from Libby Prison, 
that fifteen minutes had not intervened between the time 
he reported to him and the arrival of Gen. R. E. Lee on 
the field. 

Colonel Gregg, with the fragments of these broken and 
exhausted regiments, recrossed the river, covered the loth 
New York, which was then forced back and crossed under 
cover of the guns and skirmishers on the north bank. 
General Gregg, riding up the slope to near the summit of 
the hill, observed the advance of the enemy's cavalry and 
infantry columns, and was astounded by the almost simul- 
taneous opening of his batteries from the opposite bluffs. 
It was then that the 4:50 p. m. dispatch was written and 
forwarded to General Meade's headquarters. 

As the distance from General Gregg's position on the 
Fayetteville road to Rappahannock Station would not ex- 
ceed ten or eleven miles, and ought to have been covered 
in an hour, it is unaccountable how the delav in deliverinsf 
this dispatch, which came so near being fatal, could have 
occurred. 

The Comte de Paris goes on to say, same page: "He, 
Gregg, endeavored to retrieve it (this inexcusable error) by 
dispatching several couriers to Meade during the battle of 
Sulphur Springs, but they were killed or lost their way." 



GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 579 

Here the coiiite confuses Colonel Gregg, whose couriers 
were stopped between Jefferson and Sulphur Springs, and 
General Gregg, whose couriers were not killed. There 
was no enemy on the road ; they could not have lost their 
way, because all of General Gregg's staff officers or order- 
lies were familiar with the roads. Finally, there were no 
couriers sent ; for after the 4:50 p. m. dispatch, there was 
no information to comnnmicate ; and General Gregg's plain 
duty was to retard the crossing of Lee's army as long as 
possible, which the comte admits w^as done. He, how- 
ever, deduces from the events which he has so incorrectly 
but so graphically described, this extraordinary conclusion : 

It would have been better for the army had he not given battle, 
and had he done more to communicate with his chief, [and] in fact 
the position of the army is very critical. 

This latter is doubtless a correct inference. The heads 
of Lee's columns massed at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, 
three of General Meade's corps near Culpeper, and the 
other corps strung along the river from Freeman's Ford to 
Kelley's, at dark on the evening of the 12th, might well 
excite apprehension in the mind of any general. But what 
if General Gregg had allowed himself to be forced from 
his position at Sulphur Springs by Stuart's cavalry brigade 
back upon the road to Faj'etteville, without having seen 
Lee's infantry? What if that infantry, uninterrupted in 
its rapid march, had crossed the Hedgeman at three p.m., 
and by nightfall reached Warrenton? What then? It was 
not anything that General Gregg or his cavalry did or 
failed to do that endangered the army. It was the false re- 
ports that were responsible for the days and nights of march- 
ings in retreat, rearguard actions, and general scramble 
for the fortifications around Washington, before an army 
numerically inferior, and certainly not superior in morale., 
to that which Meade commanded. 

It seems necessary, for the truth of history, that the 
foregoing account should receive a place in this work, for 



680 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the reason that General Meade, in his report of operations, 
and General Humphreys, chief of staff, Army of the Poto- 
mac, in his "Gettysburg to the Rapidan, " and the Comte 
de Paris, in his history, appear to have construed General 
Gregg's 4:50 p. m. dispatch as communicating intelligence 
of General Lee's movements which had been obtained early 
on the morning of the 12th, and retained during the whole 
of that eventful day, whereas it is evident from the facts he 
states, the inference was, at the date of the dispatch, that 
General Lee crossed the Hazel River in the morning, be- 
cause at 4:50 p. m. his cavalry, infantry, and artillery- 
appeared simultaneously, with his broken regiments, on the 
south bank of the Hedgeman. 

General Meade's army had present for duty 76,153 effec- 
tive troops, while General Lee's army had present for duty- 
only 56,088. (See "War Records," Vol. XXIX, Part I, 
pages 226 and 823.) 



CHAPTER XIV. 

MINE RUN. 

LEH, having failed to surprise INIeade in his flank move- 
ment which ended with the Bristoe action, fell 
back behind the Rappahannock, with his headquarters at 
Culpeper. 

When the Confederate army retreated from Gettys- 
burg, Longs treet regarded the cause of the Confederacy 
as lost, unless the Army of the Cumberland could be over- 
whelmed or destroyed. He urged Lee to permit him to 
take his corps and reenforce Bragg, who was opposing 
Rosecrans. Lee hesitated to give his consent, but, after 
nearly a month's persuasion on the part of Longstreet, he 
finally yielded under the impression, as Longstreet assured 
him, that both Lee's and Meade's armies would go into 
winter quarters, and he (Longstreet) would not be needed 
there. Longstreet said to me: "That that was the only 
hope of saving the Confederac}^, " and that, "Rosecrans 
was a much abler general than Bragg, and had he been let 
alone, Rosecrans would have driven him into the sea." 
He further stated : "I thought with my corps and Bragg's 
army Rosecrans could be crushed, which would perhaps 
save the waning fortunes of the Confederacy, and counter- 
act the defeat at Gettysburg ; but, as it was, while Rosecrans 
was driven back, I lost 10,000 of my corps, who could not 
be replaced, and left us that much worse off." 

The above statement by Longstreet was made in the fall 
of 1882. We had spent the evening before with Rosecrans, 
when those military operations were all gone over. After 
we left Rosecrans, Longstreet said : " I deeph- regret that I 

581 



582 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ever took part in the battle of Chickamauga against Rose- 
crans, for I did the Confederacy no good, while perhaps I 
marred his fame, as I regard him one of the ablest officers 
of the army, and without my troops against him it would 
have given him great prestige." 

Thus it will be seen that Lee had only the corps of 
Ewell and Hill. It might be estimated that one-third of 
his army was absent with Longstreet. He had placed his 
army on the right bank of the Rappahannock, in much the 
same position he occupied when Burnside assumed com- 
mand, before the battle of Fredericksburg, while the Union 
army held the same relative position. Lee holding the 
fords of the Rappahannock, from Sulphur Springs down to 
Kelley's Ford, hoped to detain ]\Ieade on the north bank 
until the late fall storms set in, when both armies would 
go into winter quarters. If Meade attempted to move 
down the river to Fredericksburg, Lee thought it would be 
the same old race of 1862 over again, when the Confederate 
army, by forced marches, gained the heights back of Fred- 
ericksburg, and held them until after the battle. Meade 
was strongly of the opinion that he could conceal his move- 
ments until he could strike the river at Fredericksburg or 
Banks' Ford, and succeed in crossing and get possession of 
the heights before Lee would be aware of it ; but Halleck 
emphatically declined to have that route considered at all. 
He claimed it would abandon the Alexandria and Orange 
Railroad which crosses the Rappahannock at the station of 
that name. This would not necessarily have been the 
case, for the move, if successful, would have given ]\Ieade 
possession of the road to Culpeper, and had he been able 
to master Lee on the field of battle, he could have com- 
pelled him to retreat. Though Lee had only two-thirds 
of his army to oppose ^leade, it must be remembered that 
the Army of the Potomac had been stripped of three corps, 
Ninth, Eleventh and Twelfth, which had been sent west. 
So Meade had also lost one-third of his corps, and in round 
numbers one-third of his army, which left the two armies 



MINE RUN. 583 

numerically about as before. The movement around Lee's 
right flank having been abandoned, if IMeade had made a for- 
ward movement he would have been compelled to advance 
his army, and make a front attack. The Indian summer, 
the balmiest part of the season, gave hopes that there would 
be ample time for the Army of the Potomac to make a for- 
ward movement, and the battle of Gettysburg had increased 
the confidence of the Union soldiers, who then looked with 
bright hopes to a speedy termination of the war. IMeade 
felt its growing confidence in that respect, and he decided 
to have the railway repaired in his front, toward the Rap- 
pahannock, preparatory to an advance. 

The Confederate forces were posted with Hill on the left 
of the railroad and Ewell on the right. On the 7th of 
November Sedgwick left Warrenton with the Sixth Corps 
and marched to Fayetteville. The Second, Third and 
Fifth Corps moved to Auburn, Catlett's Station and 
Warrenton Junction. Meade then divided his army into 
two wings ; the left one, composed of the First, Second 
and Third Corps, under General French, moved in the 
direction of Kelley's Ford, while the right wing, composed 
of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, with Sedgwick leading, 
marched on to Rappahannock Station. When the left 
wing arrived in rear of the crest opposite Kelley's Ford, an 
examination of the troops on the bank was made ; as yet 
the pickets of the enemy were unaware of the presence of 
the Union army. The Third Corps was then advanced, 
with de Trobriand's brigade making the attack, sending 
forward sharpshooters under Colonel Trepp. The 2d North 
Carolina, under Colonel Stallings, at once opened a rapid 
fire on Trepp' s sharpshooters, but the latter' s telescopic rifles 
soon compelled them to seek shelter in a ditch, when the 
13th North Carolina came to their rescue. The right bank 
of the Rappahannock was low at the ford, and Rodes, who 
was in command, had to keep his artillery and his reserv^e 
back about a mile on the way leading to Stevensburg. 
When de Trobriand advanced to the bank of the river, 



584 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Rodes ordered a battery to the rescue of the North Caroli- 
nians ; but Birney's artillery had been rapidly put in posi- 
tion, and compelled it to retreat. Rodes had formed his 
division to advance to the ford, but suffered so much from 
the Union artillery that he was unable, without fright- 
ful loss, to come to the rescue of his troops there. De 
Trobriand taking advantage of the situation, threw his 
brigade across the river, and captured the 2d South Caro- 
lina. The pontoons were soon laid, and Meade's left wing 
marched over Kelley's Ford without serious opposition. 
Rodes seeing the heavy force opposed to him, fell back 
with his right in the direction of Stevensburg, at the same 
time notifying Ewell of the events which had taken place, 
who ordered Johnson to Rodes' assistance, and to form a 
line of battle closing the angle from the Rappahannock to 
Mountain Run. 

Meade did not attempt to pursue Rodes, consequently 
did not attack the new line of battle formed by Ewell, but 
waited to hear from his right, under Sedgwick, at Rappa- 
hannock Station. At that point it seems that Lee had a 
desire to cling to the north bank of the river, and occupied 
the works there with Hays' brigade of Louisiana troops and 
Green's battery. Early, who had just relieved Johnson, had 
the brigades of Gordon, Hoke and Pegram back near 
Brandy Station. It was certainly a very peculiar idea of 
Lee's to leave a single brigade on the opposite bank of a 
river exposed to the attacks of a heavy force from the 
enemy. But, nevertheless, Hays was occupying these old 
works which had been in turn occupied by both armies. 
They had been reformed and strengthened with a view to 
withstand a heavy siege. Early ordered Hoke's brigade 
forward to assist Hays. Sedgwick had formed his line with 
the Fifth Corps on the left of the railroad, and the Sixth 
Corps on the right. General Wright, who was in command 
of the latter corps, directed the First Division, under Rus- 
sell, to connect with the Fifth Corps at the railroad, and 
Hovv'e's division, on Russell's right, was ordered to advance 



MINE RUN. 685 

and seize a hill some three-quarters of a mile from the 
enemy's works. Upon that hill Waterman and Martin's 
batteries, and four 20-pounder Parrot guns from the artillery 
reserve, were posted. In the mean time Gen. R. O. Tyler, 
of the Fifth, had brought up ten guns to enfilade the re- 
doubts of the enemy from the left. It soon became evident 
to Sedgwick that the enemy was very strongly posted, and 
he continued the artillery firing until dark, when he could 
assault the works with infantry. Russell taking the 5th Wis- 
consin and 6th j\Iaine, closely supported by the 49th and 
iigtli Pennsylvania, advanced as secretly as possible to 
storm the works, upon which the artillery had been un- 
able during the afternoon to make much impression or to 
destroy. When the 5th Wisconsin and 6th Maine scaled 
the parapets there took place a hand-to-hand encounter of 
a most desperate character ; but the Union troops were 
victorious, with a loss of half their number. The 5th 
Maine and 121st New York subsequently carried the rifle- 
pits on the right, capturing a large number of prisoners. 
The 96th Pennsylvania gallantly rushed to the enemy's 
pontoon bridge and prevented the escape of Hoke and 
Hays' soldiers who had not already been taken prisoners. 
The 95th Pennsylvania, seeing the 96th cut off their retreat, 
was prompt in guarding the prisoners and conducting them 
to the rear. General Russell in his report sa\-s : 

INIuch praise is due Captain Morrill of the 20th Regiment Maine 
Volunteers, who commanded a skirmish detail of 75 ]Maine volun- 
teers, and on learninj? their works in the front were to be stormed, 
he called for volunteers to aid their sister regiment. IVIajor Fuller, 
commanding the 6th Maine skirmishers, reports that some 50 men 
responded to the call, and by their valor and dash rendered most 
efficient aid. 

The character of this night's charge is clearly stated in 

the following : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

November 12. 1S63. 

Sir :— I have the honor herewith to transmit, in charge of Brig. 

Gen. D. A. Russell, seven battle-flags and one staff, the flag of 



686 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

which was torn off by the standard-bearers to prevent it being cap- 
tured. These trophies were taken in the recent gallant assault on 
the enemj-'s intrenched position at Rappahannock Station, and 
Brigadier General Russell has been designated by Major General 
Sedgwick to deliver them to you, because of his conspicuous con- 
duct as the leader of the storming party on the occasion. 
Very respectfully, etc., 

George G. INIeade, 
Major General Commanding. 
To Adjutant General of the Arm^^ 

The appreciation of the Government is expressed in the 
foUowingf communication : 

War Department, Adjutant Generai^'s Office, 
Washington, November 19, 1863. 
General : — ^The Secretary of War received with great satisfac- 
tion at the hands of Brig. Gen. D. A. Russell, the seven battle-flags 
and one staff taken in the recent assault on the enemy's intrenched 
position at Rappahannock Station, by the storming party led b}- the 
gallant General Russell. 

The Secretary desires me to conve}- his thanks to the officers and 
men engaged in those operations of the arnij-, which reflect such 
high credit upon the skill which planned and the bravery which 
successfully executed them. 

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

E. D. TOWNSEND, 

Assistant Adjutant General. 
To Major General Meade, U. S. Volunteers, 

Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

Lee seeing that the left wing of tlie Army of the Potomac 
had, without difficulty, cros.sed to the south side of the Rap- 
pahannock, while its right had succeeded in capturing two 
of his (Lee's) brigades at Rappahannock Station, placing 
his army in a most embarrassing dilemma, retreated behind 
the Rapidan, and again bade defiance to his old adversary. 
With Ewell and Hill retreating on dinerent roads, was 
Meade's golden opportunity to strike one or the other of 
these corps a blow, and then, facing the other, attack that 
one. He had surprised Lee at the Rappahannock, cap- 
tured two of his brigades, and crossed the river in his face, 
when both armies were about equal in numbers. Lee mor- 



MINE RUN. 687 

tified at the manner in which he had been outgfeneraled, 
flew to the jungles of the Wilderness behind the Rapidan, 
and there, crouched panther-like in his lair, waited for 
Meade to come up again. If the wings of Meade's army 
had hotly pursued the corps of Ewell and Hill, and not 
permitted time for them to form a line of battle without 
attacking it, the chances were greatly in IMeade's favor. 
But he stopped to repair the railroad as he advanced, which 
gave Lee all the time he desired to select the place and in- 
trench himself where it was not only hazardous but almost 
ruinous to attack him. 

On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac 
moved on the Rappahannock, but not until the 27tli did 
Meade cross the peninsula between the Rappahannock and 
the Rapidan, which he should have accomplished in a single 
day. So desperate was Lee that he moved to Orange 
Court House, then returned to the right bank of the 
Rapidan, finally taking a position on its right bank with 
his right resting on Mine Run. It was e\'en a better posi- 
tion than Chancellorsville, though in the same vicinity, for 
a part of Meade's army had to march over the same ground 
as before in order to reach that ill-fated field. This was the 
only position Lee could take to make a successful stand 
against Meade ; for if he retreated in the direction of Freder- 
icksburg, the moment he passed the confines of the Wilder- 
ness, his rear would be exposed in an open country to a pur- 
suing army, when he would lose many soldiers captured on 
the march by the cavalry. His army would thus be de- 
pleted and his ability to resist would soon be exhausted. 
Besides, the military stores at Gordonsville had to be pro- 
tected if possible. 

When ]\Ieade discovered Lee's position he decided to 
cross at the lower fords, and, seizing the plank road and 
turnpike running from Fredericksburg to Orange Court 
House, turn Lee's right flank or compel him to retreat. 
These two roads separate at Dowdall's Ta\-ern, some two 
miles west of Chancellorsville. The turnpike leads to the 



588 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

right, while the plank road runs almost parallel with it on 
the left. Meade's plan was to concentrate his army in the 
vicinity of Robertson's Tavern orx the turnpike, about two 
miles east of where it is crossed by Mine Run. In accordance 
therewith, General French, commanding the Third Corps, 
was directed to proceed to Jacobs' Mill, cross the Rapidan 
at that point, and continue his march on the road leading to 
Robertson's Tavern, while General Warren, in command 
of the Second Corps, crossed at Germanna Ford, and took 
the turnpike for the same place. General Sykes, who 
with the Fifth Corps crossed at Culpeper Ford, was 
ordered to take the plank road to Parker's Store, and if 
practicable proceed to the crossroad leading to Robertson's 
Tavern. Gregg's division of cavalry crossed the Rapidan 
River to protect the left flank of the army. Custer's divi- 
sion held the upper fords of the Rapidan, while Merritt was 
left at Richardsville to guard the trains. Sedgwick fol- 
lowed the Third Corps, and Newton, in command of the 
First Corps, took two divisions ; the Third Division was 
left on the railroad to follow the Fifth. Warren arrived 
at Robertson's Tavern about ten o'clock and began skir- 
mishing with the enemy, but Meade ordered him to simply 
hold his position until French arrived. An hour later 
French reported that the head of his column was near the 
plank road and he was waiting for Warren. He was 
directed to move promptly to Robertson's Tavern, but in that 
he utterly failed. Prince, who commanded his leading 
division, came to the fork in the road, and French com- 
pelled him to take the right-hand one, which threw him on 
the Raccoon Ford road away from Warren. Then Prince 
was ordered to countermarch and take the other road to 
Robertson's Tavern. 

The enemy followed Prince and attacked his and Carr's 
divisions which had been deployed on his left. One of 
Carr's brigades was driven back, and the others being out 
of ammunition, Birney advanced with his division and re- 
lieved Carr. French had failed to obey or understand 



MINE RUN. 589 

Meade's orders, and toward evening Meade sent for Newton 
with the First Corps to move over from the plank road to 
Warren's support on the turnpike at Robertson's Tavern. 
General Gregg, who was on the plank road, advanced to 
New Hope Church, which is near the intersection of the 
plank road and the crossroad leading to Robertson's Tavern. 
There he (Gregg) met Stuart's cavalry, and had a se- 
vere engagement, driving them back until reenforced with 
infantry, when Sykes relieved Gregg. Meade having 
formed his line of battle, began the examination of the 
enemy's position, which resulted in the officers opposing 
an attack upon that position. Lee occupied the west- 
ern bank of Mine Run, which was loo feet high, back 
perhaps looo yards from the stream. With artillery 
posted on it, our troops would have been cut to pieces before 
they could have reached the summit, and then, exhausted, 
could not have forced the Confederates from their position. 
Warren, who had taken the lead, and had been the inspi- 
ration of that campaign, was directed to take the Second 
Corps, with a division of the Sixth, and move to the left 
and attempt to turn Lee's right. It was Meade's intention to 
support Warren's move with a column in the center, com- 
posed of the First and Third Corps, and another on the right, 
composed of the Fifth and Sixth Corps. But now came 
another unexpected change ; while General French, who had 
commanded the center, reported that he was fearful he could 
not succeed, Warren and other officers reported Warren's 
position so favorably on the left that the enemy was ex- 
pected to retreat during the night. Meade now decided 
to still farther reenforce Warren with two divisions of the 
Third Corps, which gave him six divisions, nearly half of 
the Army of the Potomac. The batteries of the right and 
center were to open at eight o'clock on the 30th. In the 
center, the skirmishers of the First Corps and one division 
of the Third, advanced across Mine Run, and drove back 
the enemy's line of skirmishers. 

About nine o'clock Meade received a dispatch from 



590 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Warren, stating that the position of the enemy in his front 
then was so strongly fortified that he advised against 
making the attack. The Confederates saw onr army 
moving on the plank road, and knew that that point 
would be strongly assaulted early in the morning ; conse- 
quently they worked all night making abattis and in- 
trenchments preparatory to the great struggle that was to 
take place the following day. Warren feared that the 
enemy had divined the real movement, and early next 
morning a critical examination was made of the position 
he was to attack. The more he studied it, the more he 
was convinced that it was almost impossible, without an ex- 
cessive sacrifice of life, to make a successful assault. The 
position was of no importance whatever ; it was the de- 
struction of Lee's army he wished to accomplish. So War- 
ren, ever clear-headed and honest, decided not to attack 
the enemy in the strongest position Lee could have selected, 
and accordingly sent the following dispatch to Meade : 

The position and strength of the enemj^ seem so formidable -in 
my present front that I advise against making the attack here — the 
full light of the sun shows me I cannot succeed. 

General Meade says : 

As Sedgwick's attack was subsidiary to Warren's, and as, owing 
to Warren's confidence of the night before I had given him so large 
a part of the army that I had not the means of supporting Sedg- 
wick in case of a repulse or reenforcing him in the event of success, 
I was obliged to suspend the attack of Sedgwick on the enemy's 
left, which I did just in time ; and immediately proceeded to General 
Warren's column, some four miles distant, in the hope of arranging 
some plan by which the two attacks might yet take place in the 
afternoon. I reached General Warren between lo and ii a. m., and 
found his views were unchangeable, and that it was his decided 
opinion it was hopeless to make any attack. It was too late to move 
the troops back and make an attack on the center that day, and 
General Warren was so far separated from the right that his move- 
ment to turn the enemy's right could not be continued without 
moving up the rest of the arm}' in support, and abandoning the 
Turnpike road, our main line of communications. 



MINE RUN. 591 

After furtiier consuiL.ng with Warren, Meade said : 

Under these circumstances I could see no other course to pursue 
than either to hazard an assault, which I knew to be hopeless, and 
which I believed would be attended with certain disaster, or, ac- 
knowledging the whole movement a failure, withdraw the army to 
the north bank of the Rapidan. 

The rank and file nnderstood quite as well as the generals 
that it was a forlorn hope to attack the position which Lee 
had so carefully selected ; and many of the men pinned 
their names on their coats so they might be identified. 
The Confederate position at ]\Iine Run was still better 
than the Union position at Gettysburg ; the latter was in 
the shape of a fish-hook, while the enemy's position here 
was semicircular, and any threatened point could be reen- 
forced with promptness, and the condition of the coun- 
try was such that either of their wings could be extended 
and a new line fortified in a single night against an 
attack. ]\Ieade and Warren fully realized this fact, and 
resolved not to waste time in front of a position that could 
not be carried. The weather was exceedingly cold, and 
the troops found it necessary to keep in cons'.ant motion in 
order to prevent freezing, and several perished on the re- 
treat. In speaking of Mine Run, Colonel Talley says : 

In accordance with instructions, I marched my command, the 
ist Pennsylvania Reserves, to the right of our line and to the foot 
of that terrible hill, the entire side of which w^as covered with an 
abattis — trees and branches of trees, sharpened and laid with their 
points outward — ditches thinly covered with brush, and other 
death-traps, constructed for the purpose of preventing the assailants 
from ascending. 

It .w^as night — a cold, gloomy night, the coldest that was ex- 
perienced by the army during any other engagement or attempted 
engagement ; everything w^as gloomj- ; the impregnable defenses, 
the frowning forts, the leafless trees, the earth and the heavens, all 
seemed to frown and threaten ; the daring men, generally, even 
amid dangers, so wittv, cheerful and hopeful, could not be heard to 
speak above a whisper. A dreadful silence reigned, but slightly 
broken by the cautious, ghost-like steps of the troops, who trod a 



692 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

few paces to and fro, in order to prevent the blood from congealing, 
so low was the temperature. Silence was important, that our posi- 
tion and intention might not be known by the enemy. 

I was instructed to await the order to charge the works in my 
immediate front, which would be given during the night, when the 
other line was ready. Every man could see the fearful abattis, anti- 
cipate the trenches, see the steep ascent of the hill, and almost meas- 
ure the distance to the summit. Every moment I expected to re- 
ceive the order to charge. Certain death faced us, yet not one of my 
brave, noble men left the ranks. I moved among them frequently 
to quietly encourage them ; they did not seem to need it ; they fully 
understood the situation, and were firm, unflinching and ready 
to meet their fate, though madness they believed it to be, in a gen- 
eral commanding, to require such a sacrifice. I had full confidence 
in ni}' old, tried soldiers, who had fought on many fields, and whom 
I had led in the charges at Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and other 
battles. We remained for hours in this position. The order did not 
arrive. 

Had it come, the charge would have been made, with all the 
force and courage men possess ; yet but few, if an}', would have 
reached the summit. While endeavoring to climb over the trees 
and branches and pass the ditches we would have been raked by 
the rebel grape and canister, and those who might have reached a 
sufficient distance would have received the concentrated fire of their 
musketr\'. And thus would have ended the remainder of the ist 
Reserves. 

Finally we fell back, and marched during the remainder of the 
night toward the place of beginning. No battle was fought. The 
army, perhaps the Union cause, was saved, due to the clear judg- 
ment and military skill of those grand ofiicers, Meade and Warren. 

If officers less cautious and less able had been in command, the 
battle, likely, would have been fought there and then. It is very 
tempting to a commanding officer — after marching far and maneu- 
vering much, with the people at home so anxious and so urging, 
though so ignorant of the surroundings, for forward movements 
and dashing fights —when he has reached the enemy, to attack him, 
however strong his position. 

Had the two armies fought at Mine Rim the result would have 
been the greatest slaughter recorded in the history of the United 
States. It was the part of wisdom to retire in diie season, which 
Meade did ; and the army returned to winter quarters to be reorgan- 
ized under a new commander, that indefatigable soldier, General 
Grant. 



CHAPTER XV. 
THE WILDERNESS. 

"\ ~\ THEN Meade returned to the north side of the 
^ ^ Rapidan after Mine Run he at once proceeded to 
put the^army in winter quarters in the peninsula formed 
by the Rappahannock and Rapidan, with the exception of 
one corps. The First and Third Corps occupied positions 
two miles south of Culpeper Court House, the Second 
Corps near Stevensburg, while the Fifth Corps guarded the 
railroad from the Rappahannock back to Bristoe Station. 
The Sixth Corps was at Wilsford, on the Hazel River. 

Neither army could move, so there was comparative 
quiet until April, when the Ninth Corps was ordered to 
rejoin the Army of the Potomac, and by the 3d of May had 
relieved the Fifth Corps from guard duty north of the 
Rappahannock. The war had raged with unabated fury 
for three years, yet the Southern Confederacy was still in 
existence, and its aiithorities at Richmond were hoping it 
could hold on until the nations of Europe would recognize 
it as an independent and sovereign power. 

Though Lee had been defeated at Gettysburg, yet the 
Army of the Potomac had been unable to strike him a blow 
sufficiently hard on his retreat to cripple him in his future 
movements. Circumstances had conspired to permit him to 
retreat across the Rappahannock with his defeated army ; 
and during the winter he had been able to recruit its ranks 
to such an extent that he had a powerful army ready to take 
the field and fight most desperately. This army, which 
had fought under him from the Peninsular Campaign to 
that time, regarded him as a great general, and were ready 
xxxviii 593 



594 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

to follow his lead in the future the same as in the past. 
The few reverses his army had suffered when attempting 
to invade the North did not weigh heavily with them. 
They still thought on Southern soil — at home — they were 
unconquerable. Lee's life was wrecked unless the Confed- 
eracy succeeded. The game became a more desperate one 
with him as the war neared its close. While Longstreet 
and other officers thought it was hopeless to prolong the 
struggle after Gettysburg, Lee continued firm in his belief 
that he could yet pull the Confederacy through. 

He had resigned his position in the United States Army 
and declined the command of the Army of the Potomac 
when it was tendered to him after Lincoln was inaugurated. 
His valuable possessions of Arlington and other estates, 
which had descended to him through Colonel Ciistis from 
George Washington, would in case of defeat be confiscated, 
and he would be an outcast from society where once he had 
been received with distinguished honor. With a general so 
determined the Confederate army, composed of veterans 
seasoned to the hardships and privations of war, was almost 
invincible. The Union authorities were fully av/are of this, 
as well also of the important fact that the war was lengthen- 
ing out beyond a point of safety to the nation. There had 
been no grand system by which all the armies had worked 
together, while the Confederates could easily reenforce any 
one of their armies liable to attack, and were able, with a 
far less number of soldiers, to throw an overwhelming force 
on any Union general who attempted to advance. 

When McDowell advanced on Beauregard at Bull Run, 
Johnson put his troops on the cars, arrived on the field in 
time to render the latter assistance, and thus turned defeat 
into victory, while the forces under Patterson were stationed 
in his front. Jackson victorious, marched down the Shen- 
andoah, then turning rapidly, returned to Richmond, and 
was soon attacking the Army of the Potomac under Mc- 
Clellan. After the battle of Fredericksburg, Longstreet 
went to lav siecre to Suffolk. When Rosecrans was march- 



THE WILDERNESS. 595 

ing on Chattanooga, Longstreet went to Bragg' s assistance, 
and most stubbornly fought Rosecrans at Chickamauga. 
Then returning, his corps lay near Gordonsville, prepared 
to move at a moment's notice to any point Lee directed. 
Thus having the interior lines, it was an easy matter to re- 
enforce any army in danger. The Administration saw that 
bloody battles were being fought without success ; that time 
was being wasted as well as money with the different armies 
acting independent of each other. Therefore Congress passed 
an act, which was approved on February 29, 1864, reviving 
the grade of lieutenant general in the army. That move 
was made in order to appoint a general who would have 
command of all the armies, and have concert of action, 
which would prevent the Confederate armies reenforcing at 
any one point without suffering at the place from which 
their troops had been taken. On the 9th of March, Gen- 
eral Grant received his commission as lieutenant general. 
It was made quite an occasion at the White House, when 
Lincoln presented his commission to him. The Cabinet 
and Grant's staff in Washington were present, with a few 
other visitors. In presenting the commission the President 
took occasion to make one of those elegant little addresses 
which are living monuments of his goodness and greatness. 
He said : 

General Grant, the Nation's appreciation of what 5'oii have 
done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the 
existing struggle, are now presented, with commission constituting 
you Lieutenant General in the Army of the United States. With 
this high honor, devolves upon you also a corresponding responsi- 
bility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sus- 
tain you. I scarcely need add that, with what I here speak for the 
Nation, goes my own hearty concurrence. 

To which Grant replied : 

Mr. President, I accept the commission, with gratitude for the 
high honor conferred. With the aid of noble armies that have fought 
in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest 
endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight 



596 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they 
are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor 
of that Providence which leads both nations and men. 

The next day Grant visited the Army of the Potomac. 
Meade had his headquarters at Brandy Station. These 
two generals had not met since the Mexican war, when 
they were both subalterns. Grant became attached to 
Meade and retained him in command of the Army of the 
Potomac, notwithstanding he offered to resign, so that 
Grant could put Sherman or some other Western officer in 
command. But Grant held Meade in high respect for his 
work at Gettysburg, and refused to accept his resignation. 

It was some time before Grant finally took up his 
headquarters with the Army of the Potomac at Culpeper 
Court House. He had to return to the West to arrange 
matters there for the grand plan of moving all the armies 
at once as soon as the spring opened. Meeting Sherman 
at St. Louis, he gave him his old command, promoted 
McPherson to the position Sherman had held, and advanced 
lyOgan to the command of McPherson's corps. 

In the mean time Meade determined to reorganize the 
Army of the Potomac. There were more corps in it than 
he desired. Lee's army had been well managed with only 
three corps, while the Army of the Potomac had more 
than double that number ; on various occasions the corps 
commanders had not fully complied with the commander- 
in-chief's wishes, and this, perhaps, had much to do with 
the reorganization. At Gettysburg Sickles moved his corps 
from the line of battle, extending from Little Round Top to 
the seminar}^, forward to the Emmittsburg road, a distance 
of a half mile or more. During that battle and ever since 
there has been an acrimonious discussion carried on in 
regard to the matter ; Meade would have drawn Sickles 
back to the regular line on the second day, but Lougstreet 
was ready to begin the attack on him, and for that reason 
Meade desisted from issuing an order for him to retire, 
and threw half or more of the army in to support him. 




COL. C. M. CONYNGHAM. 



THE WILDERNESS. 597 

The reason assigned by Meade for consolidating- the 
corps was the rednced strength of the regiments. As IMeade 
had served in the First Corps in the battles of second Bull 
Run, South Mountain, Antietam (where he commanded the 
corps after Hooker was wounded) and Fredericksburo-, it 
seemed strange to the officers and men of that corps that it 
should be selected to lose its place among the corps, when it 
had fought so valiantly on so many fields, and had particu- 
larly distinguished itself when Meade had led it into action. 
At Gettysburg it held in check, with the assistance of two 
divisions of the Eleventh Corps, two-thirds of the Confed- 
erate army, until the other corps of the Army of the Poto- 
mac arrived. It had in reality closed the battle of Gettys- 
burg with the charge of General Stannard. No prouder 
record was ever made in the military history of the world 
than the First Corps had. While Meade was popular 
with the officers and men, 3'et there has ever been a sin- 
cere regret in the minds of the gallant soldiers of that 
corps that it was blotted out as a distinctive organization. 
That it was a mistake is manifest from the statement of 
General Humphreys, in his history of " The Virginia Cam- 
paign of 1864 and 1865," in which he sa)'s : 

But it caused some dissatisfaction with both officers and enlisted 
men, owing to the spirit of rivalry between the several corps, the 
divisions of a corps, and the brigades of a division. The history 
and associations of these organizations were different, and when 
they were merged in other organizations their identity was lost and 
their pride and esprit de corps wounded. 

But the old First Corps submitted without a murmur, 
and in the battles until the final surrender at Appomattox 
it maintained its former record on the field. Many valua- 
ble officers were left without commands. General Newton, 
who was in command of the corps then, and after Hancock 
was wounded at Gettysburg was put in connnand of the 
First, Second, and Third Corps until the close of that 
battle, was one of those who had suffered h\ the consolida- 



598 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

tion. The three divisions of the First Corps, coinmanded 
respectively by Gens. James C. Rice, John C. Robinson, 
and John R. Kenly, were consolidated and formed two 
divisions of the Fifth Corps. In the new organization of 
the Fifth Corps, three of the four divisions came from the 
First Corps ; for Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Re- 
serves was one of the original divisions of the First Corps, 
when the corps was so designated under McDowell in the 
spring of 1862. It was detached at Fredericksburg to join 
McClellan on the Peninsula, and there fought in the Fifth 
Corps. When McClellan' s army came to the assistance of 
Pope, it rejoined the First Corps, and fought the battles of 
second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam, and Fred- 
ericksburg in it ; then it was again put in the Fifth Corps. 
Under the reorganization it was the Third Division of the 
Fifth Corps. John C. Robinson was given the Second 
Division, of three brigades. The Third Corps was made 
the Third and Fourth Divisions of the Second Corps. 

When Grant visited Meade on the loth, he informed 
him that Butler was directed to move up the right bank 
of the James at the same time that the Army of the Po- 
tomac would, so as to sever the communications between 
Richmond and the South. This would cut off supplies 
and reenforcements. He also informed IVIeade that General 
Sigel would be directed to move his forces with a view to 
a concentration near Lynchburg. Sigel, who was in the 
Shenandoah Valley, would ascend it, while General Crook, 
commanding the other column under Sigel, was to march 
from the Great Kanawha through Lewisburg, when the 
latter would join the Army of the Potomac by the way of 
Gordonsville and become its right wing. 

Grant had already seen the necessity of remaining with 
the Army of the Potomac. To remain in the West in com- 
mand of all the armies would be to neglect the Army of the 
Potomac, which had the most important work to do; if the 
latter failed what the other armies did would be of no avail. 
Besides, Grant knew that Halleck would still exercise a 



THE WILDERNESS. 599 

great influence over the Army of the Potomac if he (Grant) 
remained in the West. Grant and Halleck had had differ- 
ences in the West, and Halleck had made serious blunders in 
directing the Army of the Potomac. But for his stubborn- 
ness Miles' force would never have been surrendered, and his 
blind folly again came very near stranding the Army of the 
Potomac in its pursuit of Lee, when he was marching on 
Harrisburg and Philadelphia. His refusal to permit Hooker 
to direct French temporarily to abandon Harper's Ferry 
and unite with the Army of the Potomac, caused Hooker 
to ask to be relieved. Grant first settled where his head- 
quarters would be with the Kxvixy of the Potomac ; next the 
route he would take. There were four from which to 
choose. He could turn Lee's left flank and take the Gor- 
donsville line ; that had the advantage of having Sigel's 
command unite with him and swell the size of the Army 
of the Potomac. It w^ould necessarily have to be a short 
campaign to enable the men to carry their rations ; and 
Grant believed that to supply the Army of the Potomac by 
wagons would make such an immense train that it would 
be cumbersome. He could take the line up the south bank of 
the James, but Butler was already there with two corps. 
Then there was the old route up the Peninsula between the 
James and York Rivers, which McClellan had stranded on. 
The two latter routes would not have protected Washington. 
The last and fourth route was to turn Lee's right flank, 
which would prevent a countermovement on Washington, 
and force him back on Richmond and destroy his army as 
soon as possible. 

At midnight on the 3d of May the army was put in 
motion to cross the Rapidan. Warren with the P'iftli 
Corps was directed lo cross at Germanna Ford. Wilson's 
cavalry division had preceded him and taken possession of 
the ford so that a bridge could be thrown across. Warren's 
corps arrived at six a.m. and began crossing at seven. By 
one o'clock the whole corps was across. Wilson's cavalry, 
leading the way for some distance, turned off to the right 



600 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

in the direction of Robertson's Tavern in order to see if 
tlie enemy was advancing. Griffin's division followed 
Wilson's cavalry. Warren kept on to old Wilderness 
Tavern road, with Crawford's, Wadsworth's and Robinson's 
divisions in the order named. Not seeing the enemy Wil- 
son withdrew and moved on to Parker's Store, in front of 
Warren. Hancock, preceded by Gregg's division of cav- 
alry, crossed at Ely's Ford and took the road to Chancel- 
lorsville, where he encamped for the night. Sedgwick was 
ordered to follow Warren, while Torbert's division of cav- 
alry was left to protect the rear. When the troops had 
crossed the Rapidan, Grant sent orders to Burnside to unite 
with the army south of the Rapidan. Making a forced 
march, he arrived there the next day, some of his troops 
having marched forty miles. When Warren crossed Grant 
left his headquarters at Culpeper and proceeded to the front. 
On the 2d of ]\Iay Lee summoned his corps and division 
commanders to him at the signal station on Clark's Moun- 
tain. He then said to them that he thought the enemy 
would cross at the lower fords on the Rapidan and turn his 
right flank. When Warren crossed the Rapidan and moved 
to old Wilderness Tavern, Ewell, who was aware of the 
movement, by reports from the ist North Carolina Cavalr)', 
which he had sent down in the direction of Germanna Ford, 
sent Major Campbell, of his staff, to inform General Lee. 
Ewell received an order to regulate his advance so as to 
keep abreast with A. P. Hill on the plank road, but not to 
bring on an engagement, if possible, until Longstreet could 
come up. Johnson's division was leading, with Jones' brig- 
ade thrown forward to skirmish. Griffin encountered the 
advance of Johnson's division and pushed Jones back, when 
the brigades of Battle and Doles were ordered to his assist- 
ance. As Ewell was ordered to simply hold the Union 
army in check and observe its movements, these three 
brigades slowly fell back, pressed by Griffin, supported by 
Wadsworth on his left with the Third Brigade of Robinson's 
division. Crawford's division was formed on the extreme 




COL. JOS. A. MOESCH. 



THE WILDERNESS. 601 

left of the corps, as it was in the advance. The Fifth 
Corps had pressed back the brigades of Jones, Battle, 
and Doles on Ewell's corps, which then formed in line of 
battle from right to left in the following order: Daniel's, 
Doles', Battle's, Stewart's, Walker's, Stafford's, Pegram's, 
Hay's, and Gordon's brigades. The conflict which ensued 
was most sanguinary. Wright's division of the Sixth 
Corps was ordered up on Griffin's right, as Johnson was 
overlapping his right flank, but was unable to get into 
position on account of the heavy undergrowth which he 
encountered. Getty's division of the Sixth Corps was 
directed to move in the rear of the Fifth Corps and take a 
position at the Brock and Plank roads to arrest the advance 
of A. P. Hill until Hancock, who had marched to Todd's 
Tavern on the Brock road, in the direction of Spottsylvania 
Court House, could get into position. In the mean time the 
battle raged between Ewell's and Warren's corps. A}'res' 
Regulars on the right were compelled to yield ground, 
which • carried the other brigades of Griffin back. Griffin 
lost two guns in that movement, which were captured by the 
enemy. Wadsworth's division formed line of battle with 
Cutler's brigade on the right, Roy Stone in the center, and 
Rice on the left. Advancing against the enemy the right 
wing of Ewell's corps was struck. The woods were so 
thick that alignment could not be maintained, and much 
confusion prevailed. In the advance a gap was made be- 
tween Cutler and Stone, of which the enemy quickly took 
advantage, and forcing his troops into it compelled Stone 
to fall back. Then Rice, Cutler, and the ]\Iaryland Brigade 
suffered from a flank fire, which compelled that part of the 
line under Wadsworth to fall back. McCandless' brigade, 
of Crawford's division, did not move as soon as Wads- 
worth's troops did, and really acted in consequence as an 
independent command. It became enveloped with the 
right of Ewell's corps, under Gordon, and lost many killed 
and wounded, besides some prisoners. Crawford's Third 
on the left meeting with a severe fire. Col. Ira Ayr, 



602 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Jr., commanding the Tenth Regiment fell severely 
wounded. 

Meade and Grant had watched the progress of the battle 
from a rise not far from the Lacy House. Fearing that 
Hill would seize the position of the intersection at the 
Brock and Plank roads, Hancock was hurried back to 
Getty's assistance, who only had three brigades with which 
to impede Hill's advance, as NeilPs brigade had been de- 
tached and was with Wright. Although Heth had arrived 
in front of Getty, he made no attempt to attack him, which 
was evidence to Grant and Meade that Hill, too, had instruc- 
tions not to bring on a general engagement until Long- 
street could arrive. Ewell had fought most desperately on 
the right, but Warren had checked him by driving back 
his advance brigades on the main body of his corps. Ewell 
and Warren had begun throwing up temporary breastworks, 
to await the result of the action on the left, and to let 
Wright get into position. Ricketts was still back at Ger- 
manna Ford waiting to be relieved by the advance of Burn- 
side, who was marching rapidly under the orders of Grant. 
When Hancock received the order to countermarch his 
corps, he at once gave the order and rode back to Getty to get 
an idea where to put in the Second Corps. Getty had formed 
his three brigades with Eustis on the right, Wheaton in the 
center and Grant on the left. Birney's division coming up 
was placed in two lines on Getty's left. When Mott and 
Gibbon arrived they extended the line to the left in the 
same formation. Barlow's division coming up last, formed 
Hancock's extreme left, with the exception of Frank's bri- 
gade, which was posted at the intersection of the road lead- 
ing to tlie Catharpin Furnace and the Brock road. Barlow 
was thrown forward across the Brock road on a farm which 
had some elevated positions in the fields, with his left 
pushed back across the Brock road. This was the only 
point on Hancock's front where artillery could be used, 
the dense forest almost entirely precluding the use of artil- 
lery along the whole line. Hancock posted all his artil- 




COL. S. J. WILLIAMS. 



- THE WILDERNESS, 603 

lery there on his extreme left, with the exception of one 
section of Ricketts' Pennsylvania Battery, and Dow's 6th 
Maine, which was posted on Barlow's right, on a line 
with Mott's reserve force. One section of Ricketts' bat- 
tery was placed by Getty where the line of battle crossed 
the Orange plank road. About" four o'clock Getty at- 
tacked the enemy in pursuance to orders received before 
Hancock's arrival. He had gone but a short distance 
up the Orange plank road when he struck the enemy 
well posted. Hancock, seeing that Getty had met the 
enemy in heavy force, ordered Birney in to assist him, 
which, advancing, he did ; Birney's own division on Get- 
ty's right with Mott's division on Getty's left. The bat- 
tle raged with such sev^erity that Carroll's and Owen's 
brigades, of Gibbon's division, were detached to go to 
the right of Getty to assist at that ■ point. In the action 
two of Barlow's brigades, the Irish and Colonel Brooke's, 
became involved with the enemy and drove the right of 
his line some distance. The section of Ricketts' battery 
which had accompanied Getty and Birney lost so many 
horses and men that the guns were captured, but were 
retaken, under the direction of Captain Butterfield, of 
Carroll's staff, by detachments from the 14th Indiana 
and Stli Ohio, of Carroll's brigade. The action closed 
about eight o'clock without any material advantage to 
either side. That afternoon the Army of the Potomac 
lost one of its most gallant officers, who had been a class- 
mate at West Point with General Grant. When Grant 
learned that General Hays had been killed he was deeply 
affected. Although it was so far a drawn battle, the Union 
forces were in condition to drive Hill from the field and win 
a victory had they had a little more daylight or a Joshua 
commanding the sun to stand still. 

In order to crush Hill before Anderson and Longstreet 
arrived. Grant and Meade decided to throw Wadsworth, with 
Baxter's brigade, on Hill's left and rear; but it was late in 
the afternoon, and these very troo^^s had already had a severe 



604 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

engagement. When Wadsworth received orders to report to 
Hancock, who was then hotly engaged with the enemy at 
the intersection of the Brock road and Orange plank road, 
he at once obeyed. He was then near the Lacy Honse, facing 
west. Changing the direction of his division to face south 
he deployed in line of battle, preceded by a strong line of 
skirmishers, and moved to the support of the Second Corps, 
guided by the musket-firing of the engagement there being 
hotly contested. The troops were soon in the wilderness of 
second growth pine, marching in the direction of the left 
rear of the Confederate troops engaged with the Second 
Corps, and opposed by a strong line of pickets, with strong 
reserves, protecting the Confederate flank. The skirmish 
firing gave the Confederates warning of the approach of 
troops on the rear and flank, probably not unexpected from 
General Warren's position. It being after dark, firing in 
Hancock's front ceased, and the Confederate line withdrew 
to relieve the flank from Wadsworth' s threatened attack. 
General Wadsworth halted when the darkness was so great 
that no alignment could be kept up. Firing having ceased, 
save an occasional shot, that general was unable to judge of 
the distance intervening between his troops and the Second 
Corps, while the Confederate pickets were close in his front. 
The thick branches of the pines kept out the starlight, and 
the night was one of darkness in its fullest sense. 

Wadsworth had not, owing to obstructions and the 
density of the forest, connected with Hancock or struck 
the Confederate left when he halted. The regiments rested 
on their arms in line of battle. The regimental comman- 
ders were called upon to report the number of cartridges in 
possession of the men. At eleven p. m. the reports showed 
that nearly all the cartridges had been expended in tlie en- 
gagement during the day. General Wadsworth' s orders 
were to proceed quietly. The conflict with the Confederate 
pickets, and Col. Roy vStone's enthusiasm, made it a howl- 
ing wilderness. Captain Monteith, aid-de-camp, was sent 
back to report to General Warren the situation, and bring 



THE WILDERNESS. 605 

some ammunition. The captain received orders from Gen- 
eral Warren to move forward and attack at a specified time, 
five a. m., being the earliest dawn. Monteith then proceeded 
to the supply train, where Sergt, J. A. Watrous packed ten 
mules, that had never before been "cinched," each carrying 
2,ooo cartridges. He started to return by two a. m,, and 
reached the line of troops, after much trouble and twisting 
around trees, a few minutes before the time to open the 
morning service in behalf of the United States Government. 
The troops had had no supper, save dry hard tack, and no 
time to prepare breakfast, but were regaled with cartridges. 
At five a. m. Wadsworth ordered the advance, and soon was 
in front of the Second Corps, which was advancing to attack. 
Hancock withdrew to the left of the Orange plank road ; 
General Wadsworth made a half wheel to the right, his left 
resting on the plank road, making a prolongation of the 
Second Corps line, with his right exposed in the Wilder- 
ness, 

Owing to the density of the woods, small pine trees, 
and low long limbs, mounted officers had much trouble at 
times in the saddle. General Wadsworth reined to the road, 
and rode with the line of battle. The Confederate line of 
battle was soon reached, when it stiibbornly resisted the ad- 
vance, but yielded ground. The general's horse was shot 
while riding near the road ; mounting the second horse, he 
rode into the line of troops engaged, when that horse, too, 
was killed. He then mounted the third one. Information 
came to him that the enemy was massing and extending his 
lines on his (Wadsworth's) right. He asked Hancock for a 
brigade, which was promptly sent from the Ninth Corps, 
which he placed in support of the troops near his left, believ- 
ing the commotion on the right to be an attempt to call 
attention that way, and then assault on the Orange plank 
road. Now there was a lull in the battle which had .shivered 
the Wilderness into .splinters. Men had advanced where 
pine trees could not stand, and for a brief space of time a 
silence, ominous and portending, prevailed. The thick 



606 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

smoke that lurked near the ground, raised and hung heavily 
overhead. 

The general had eaten neither supper nor breakfast, but 
opportunely at this lull his cook came with some coffee and 
hardtack. His aids joined him, for they, too, had had thirty 
hours of hard work and compulsory fasting. A commotion 
and a yell at the front announced the fact that lyongstreet 
had arrived, and his men were forming line of battle on 
Hill's right. The Union line again advanced. Soon a mes- 
senger came from Hancock with the information that his 
(Hancock's) left was yielding, and for Wads worth to be 
watchful, and to govern himself according to circumstances 
along his front and on his left. Across the plank road the 
Second Corps was seen to be yielding, the Confederate line 
passing, and exposing General Wadsworth's left flank. 
Directly in front, and only a few yards distant, was an Ala- 
bama brigade lying on the ground. The general wheeled 
a regiment near the plank road to the left to fire into the 
Confederate flank, which was pursuing the Second Corps 
back, when suddenly the Alabama brigade arose with a yell 
and a volley, causing disorder in the Union lines, which 
retired to the Brock road. 

General Wadsworth sat on his horse in the line of battle, 
attended by E. M. Rogers and E. S. Osborne, aids on his 
staff, when the Alabamians fired their volley only a few 
yards distant. The general seemed to be unmindful of the 
perilous position, and, for an instant, held his horse reined 
to the front. His troops were routed, and he faced the 
Confederate line, his aids with him. Wadsworth was 
prancing to the rear when a ball went crashing through 
his head, the blood spattering on Lieutenant Rogers' coat, 
which still stains his uniform. The general fell from his 
horse to the ground upon his back. Lieutenant Rogers' 
horse was shot by the same volley. Seeing the general 
lying with his face upward and mortally wounded. Lieu- 
tenant Rogers attempted to take the general's watch and 
other valuables froui his pockets, but as the Confederate 




GEN. EDWIN S. OSBORNE. 



THE WILDERNESS. 607 

line was pressing so closely, lie was compelled to fly or be 
captured. In making to the rear he found Wadsworth's 
horse, his bridle rein having caught on a snag. Vaulting 
into the saddle, Rogers soon reached the troops of the divi- 
sion, while the brave division commander, hero, patriot, 
and one of nature's finest noblemen lay almost lifeless 
within the enemy's lines. The whole Confederate line was 
shouting with joy, under the impression that Grant had 
been killed, until it was discovered to be Wadsworth. 
Gen. then (Col. )|E. S. Osborne, of Wadsworth's staff, took as 
many of the troops as he could rally to the left of the Brock 
road, and from there to the intersection of the Orange plank 
and Brock roads. At this time the latter road was full of 
troops of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Corps. The con- 
fusion was so great that Osborne had considerable difficulty 
in holding the regiments of Roy Stone's brigade at that 
point. Having restored order, Osborne moved the troops 
along the plank road a short distance, then filed into the 
woods and stacked arms, and then found he had the brigade 
headquarters colors, and the colors of the 121st, I42d, 143d, 
149th, and 150th Pennsylvania Regiments, with small 
detachments of each regiment. On looking at the offi- 
cers, Osborne found that Lieut. Col. John Irvin, of the 
149th, was the ranking officer present. Therefore, Osborne 
and Irvin, after consulting, decided to let the men rest and 
make coffee, as the battle was liable to be renewed at any 
moment. Osborne then placed the headquarters flag near 
the Orange plank road, so it could be seen from the cross- 
ing, and advised Lieut. Col. Irvin to take command of the 
brigade. General Rice, commanding the Second Brigade, 
of Wadsworth's division, had been detailed on special duty 
by Hancock, and Colonel Hofmann, of the 56tli Pennsylva- 
nia, was put in command of the brigade by Rice. Hofmann 
at once proceeded to form the troops of that brigade back 
on the Brock road, near the remnant of Roy Stone's bri- 
gade. When Hancock gave the order for these two brigades 
of the old First Corps to charge the works which had 



608 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

been held by the Second Corps, and were then occupied by 
the Confederates, these two brigades advanced together and 
retook them. Hofmann displayed great coolness and gallan- 
try in this charge, and well earned the rank of major gen- 
eral for his heroic conduct. The brigade under Cutler had 
been forced back in the direction of the Lacy House early 
in the day, and was rallied by Cutler near the old Wilder- 
ness Tavern, and did not participate in the subsequent 
charges of the division that day. There were two pieces 
of artillery near the crossing, and shortly after coffee had 
been taken, this section of the artillery opened on the 
enemy, and there was considerable commotion near one of 
the guns. While waiting for results Osborne saw two offi- 
cers riding toward him from the crossing. They both 
came up at once, when Osborne saw they were Hancock and 
Captain Wilson of his staff. General Hancock said, in a sharp 
tone of voice : ' ' What troops are these? ' ' Osborne answered : 
"They are what is left of the old First Corps." He then 
remarked : "Those are just the troops I want. Take them 
up there and drive the enemy out of our works. ' ' Colonel 
Irvin and Capt. William M. Dalgleish then came up, and 
the order was repeated to them by Captain Wilson ; then 
Hancock and Wilson rode away. Osborne and Irvin got 
the troops in line, and, at double-quick, went to the cross- 
roads, leaving the gun at the road. The enemy had driven 
the troops of the Second Corps out of the works, and were 
using them as shelter against our attack. The command 
moved on the right into line, and with Hofmann' s brigade 
charged the works that had been abandoned by the Second 
Corps, and drove the enemy from them. This was one of 
the most brilliant exploits that was performed during the 
war. Again had the soldiers of the old First Corps added 
another wreath of fame to their accumulated laurels. The 
credit of that work was assumed by others, who, an officer 
in high repute says, "Were not in the engagement at the 
supreme moment at all." The officers entitled to special 
mention for distinguished conduct there, were Gen. E. S. 




CAPT. P. DE LACY. 



THE WILDERNESS. 609 

Osborne, then lientenant colonel and inspector on Wads- 
worth's staff; Lieut. Col. John Irvin, of the 149th Pennsyl- 
vania ; Capt. Vv m. L. Dalgleish ; j\Iaj. C. ]\I. Conyngham, 
of the 143d Pennsylvania; Major Jones, of the 150th Penn- 
sylvania ; and Colonel Hofmann, of the 56tli Penns}-lvania. 
There were many other acts of valor performed on the 
part of officers and men that placed them high on the roll 
of honor that day. Captain Bell, of the I50tli Pennsylva- 
nia, was killed while on the works defending the flag of 
his regiment. Capt. P. De Lacy, of the 143d Pennsylvania, 
captured a Confederate battle-flag. On the morning of the 
6th, Gibbon was placed in command of his own and Bar- 
low's divisions, the latter holding the extreme left of the 
Union line, with Sheridan at Todd's Tavern to guard his 
flanks. Getty's division of the Ninth Corps advanced up 
the Orange plank road, with Grant's brigade on the left of 
the road, Wheaton in the center, and Eustis on the right. 
At five a. m. , the right, under Birney, advanced according 
to orders, and the enemy was driven back, but not without 
a stubborn resistance. After Birney had advanced about a 
mile and a half, he halted to arrange his lines. The troops 
were compelled to lie down in loading, and then partly 
rise and fire, the enemy doing the same. Grant had forged 
ahead with his Vermont Brigade until his right flank was 
endangered, when Wheaton directed his brigade to ad- 
vance, with its right moved back to protect Grant. At 
seven a. m. , Hancock sent an order to Gibbon to advance 
and relieve the heavy pressure on Birney. For some rea- 
son Gibbon did not attack in heavy force, which disap- 
pointed Hancock ; but he supposed Gibbon feared that 
Longstreet was approaching and preparing to turn his left 
and o-ain our rear. Hill had been driven back a mile and 
a half, and the divisions of both Wilcox and Heth were 
almost exhausted, and could no longer withstand the force 
in front of them. Just at this critical moment for the en- 
emy, the head of Longstreet' s force, under Kershaw, came 
up, and, filing to the right of the Orange plank road, took 

XXXIX 



610 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the place of Hetli ; at the same time, Field's divisiou re- 
lieved Wilcox. 

Hancock's plan was a good one to hurl Hill off of the 
field before Longstreet could get his troops in position ; and 
if the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon on the left, under 
Gibbon, had promptly responded to the order of Hancock, 
Longstreet would not have been able, in time, to have 
thrown the brigades of G. T. Anderson, Mahone, and Wof- 
ford on Barlow's left, which came very near rolling Han- 
cock up on Warren, and would have proved a great dis- 
aster. And it likely would have been much worse for our 
troops, but for the wounding of Longstreet, which suspended 
all operations on that part of the field until Lee came up, 
he having been notified that Longstreet had been severely 
wounded. 

The Union line had retired about three-quarters of a 
mile on account of the heavy attack on the left, which also 
endangered Birney. From the fact that Longstreet had 
been wounded by the troops attacking Hancock's left, Lee 
decided to rectify his line. In the mean time Eustis' 
brigade, of Getty's division, and Leasure's brigade, of 
Stevenson's division, had been ordered to the left to assist 
Barlow. 

Near two p. m. the First Brigade of Robinson's division, 
and two regiments of heavy artillery, were ordered to 
Hancock. 

Late in the evening Early made an attack on Wright's 
division. of the Sixth Corps, and by throwing Gordon's and 
Johnson's brigades on Wright's rear and flank, rolled up 
Shaler's brigade with a heavy loss of prisoners, including 
Shaler himself Seymour's brigade did not suffer so much, 
though the general was taken prisoner. This appears to 
have been more the work of Gordon than anyone else. 
He had been urging that movement earlier in the day, but 
Early had been watching Buriiside's movements until 
nearly sunset, when he conceded to the request of Gordon 
to permit him to move around General Shaler's position. 




GEN. h. A. GRANT. 



THE WILDERNESS. 611 

Although it created a great commotion and confusion at 
the time, it was an independent movement of Karly's divi- 
sion and was not ordered by Lee, or his whole line would 
have advanced. Early drew back his line, while Wright 
rectified his, the Sixth Corps being put in touch with the 
Fifth. Thus ended the great battle of the morning of the 
6th. The Confederate army had fallen back, while Grant, 
instead of ordering a forward movement and attacking 
them in the jungles of the Wilderness, decided to move by 
the left flank on Spottsylvania, perhaps to compel Lee to 
fight on more open ground. His order for that movement 
was as follows : 

Headquarters Armies op the United States, 
May 7, 1864- 6:30 a. m. 

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take 
position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one annv corps, at Todd's 
Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney 
Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to old 
Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown 
forward early in the morning to the Ny River. 

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave 
Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then fol- 
low and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move to 
Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chan- 
cellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move on the 
Plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericks- 
burg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination. 

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before 
the troops move, and then move off quietly. It is more than prob- 
able that the enemy concentrated for a heavy attack on Hancock 
this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to resist them, 
and follow up any success we may gain with our whole force. 
Such a result would necessarily modify- these instructions. 

All the hospitals should be moved to-daj' to Chanceliorsville. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 
To Major General INIeade, 

Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

Early on the morning of the 7th, Craig Wadsworth, a 
son of the general, and Lieut. E. M. Rogers induced the 
officers to organize a party of skirmishers to go and try to 



612 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

get tlie body of General Wadsworth. The request was 
granted, but the detachment did not proceed far until the 
major in command was severely wounded with several of his 
men. Seeing that it was impossible to recover the general's 
body, Rogers and young Wadsworth gave it up. However, 
it was sent into our lines under a flag of truce. Wadsworth 
stood high in the South, notwithstanding the fact that he 
was doing all in his power to disconcert their plans to form 
a Southern Confederacy. But few men in the world pos- 
sessing his vast wealth ever used it to so good a purpose. 
He disposed of it as though it were not his own, and had 
carefully to account for all he possessed. He did not seek 
the field for renown, but to assist in the restoration of the 
Union. He cast aside the position of Military Governor of 
the District of Columbia, where he was a central figure at 
the Capital, having untold honors bestowed upon him by 
statesmen, officers of the navy and army, and foreign diplo- 
mats, and where he could have wielded an immense power 
at the White House and War Department, and in time 
could have made for himself a great name over the country. 
He not only resigned as Military Governor of the Dis- 
trict of Columbia, in the face of earnest protests of leading 
men up to the President, but he demanded that he be given 
a position at the front, though ever so humble. Having 
fallen mortally wounded, at the head of his division, he 
sacrificed his life "on the altar of his countr}^," that future 
generations might enjoy the blessings of a united nation — 
the best Government on the globe — erected by the people, 
and defended for the inheritance of the people. 






CHAPTER XVI. 

SPOTTSYLVANIA. 

/"^ RANT and Lee had met and had fought the great 
^-^ battle of the Wilderness. The result of this eng^age- 
ment had not been wholly satisfactory to either. Grant 
had come from the West, where he had steadily risen 
from the rank of colonel to be the most prominent general 
of the Union armies. The siege of Vicksburg had crowned 
his efforts with success, and the country turned to him 
with a full reliance, that, as lieutenant general in command 
of all the armies, he would be able, in a combined move- 
ment, to crush the rebellion. He had taken up his head- 
quarters with the x\rmy of the Potomac in order to direct 
its movements against the most powerful arm}- of the Con- 
federacy ; but he had to cope with a general, who, as- a 
defensive olEficer, had no superior in the annals of military 
history. Lee, as a native of Virginia, knew its strong mil- 
itary positions, and was confident of ultimate success fronj 
that standpoint. Grant hoped to cripple Lee's army or 
destroy it when he moved, but the battle of the Wilderness 
closed with no such results. In fact, Lee thought he had 
so worsted the Army of the Potomac that Grant was ready 
to fall back ; and he ordered Anderson, who had succeeded 
Longstreet when he was wounded, to move his corps to 
Spottsylvania, so as to be in position to fall on Grant's re- 
treating columns in case the latter made an attempt at a 
backward movement. 

The woods being on fire compelled Anderson to move 
sooner than was intended, in order to seek a safe place for 
his troops to rest. His march would have been retarded by 

613 



614 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Sheridan if Meade liad not changed the orders, for Sheridan 
would have taken charge of the bridges over the Po River, 
and prevented his advance until the Fifth Corps could have 
occupied Spottsylvania Court House. Butler had been 
ordered to move on Richmond ; and Grant wanted to hold 
I^ee in his front, so as to give Butler an opportunity to lay 
siege to Richmond, and cut off communication with the 
South by destroying the railroads. Both generals were 
unaware of each other's designs until the two armies met at 
Spottsylvania. Then came another struggle for the mas- 
tery, in which a most desperate battle was fought on the 
same plan as that of the Wilderness. But for the accident 
of Merritt being ordered to relieve Sheridan in his work of 
holding the bridges over the Po River, the Army of the 
Potomac would have marched unopposed into Spottsylvania, 
where Lee would have been crowded off to the right, plac- 
ing the Army of the Potomac between Lee and Richmond. 

Lee had fought but one offensive battle (Gettysburg), 
and in that had signally failed to grasp the situation, even 
when, time and again, he was warned by Longstreet not to 
repeat the blunder of the Union army at Fredericksburg, 
but to move around the left of the Army of the Potomac 
and take a position that would compel Meade to attack the 
Confederate army where it would have a decided advantage. 
Lee's remorse, after that famous battle, led him to resign 
the command of the Confederate army; but Jeff Davis knew 
his great capacity as a defensive general, and declined to 
accept his resignation. 

Lee's movements were shielded by the Wilderness, and 
he took the risk of moving his army by the flank, beginning 
the movement with his right wing under Anderson. 

Grant moved with caution, so as to keep his army in- 
tact in case Lee attempted to attack him. Hancock, on the 
left, remained in his position, while Warren was directed 
to take the advance with the Fifth Corps. This would 
leave the Army of the Potomac intact to repel a movement 
of the Confederate army, with Warren at Todd's Tavern, 



SPOTTSYLVAN lA. 615 

where lie could easily countermarch and form on Hancock's 
left. General Robinson's division had the advance. When 
it arrived at Todd's Tavern, the way was blocked with the 
cavalry escort of General Meade. As the troops advanced, 
with the 1 2th Massachusetts in the lead, Colonel Cook, in 
his history of that regiment, says : 

A solitar}^ horseman rode out from, the forest and reined his 
horse in front of our adjutant. 

" What regiment is this ? " 

"The 1 2th jNIassachusetts." 

" Order them to deploy on the left of the road. What regiment 
comes next ? ' ' 

"Thegth New York." 

" Order them to deploy on the right of the road.'' 

" By whose order ? " 

The figure raised the flapping brim of his felt hat, and answered 
with a single word, " Sheridan." 

By that time Colonel Coulter, in command of the brigade 
(Baxter had been wounded in the Wilderness), rode up and 
received Sheridan's order, which was promptly executed. 
This brigade advanced rapidly some two miles in the direc- 
tion of Spottsylvania, where Merritt's cavalry was over- 
taken. Then Robinson formed the division with Lyle's 
brigade on the left, Dennison's on the right, with Coulter's 
left in the rear to protect Lyle's left flank. The division 
crossed Alsop's farm and a wood, when it suddenly received 
a galling fire from infantry, accompanied by artillery. In 
this fire General Robinson was severely wounded in the leg 
(causing its loss by amputation, which ended his military 
service), when the division fell back to the woods in the 
rear. Grifhn coming up, bore to the right and deployed 
Bartlett's brigade, with Sweitzer and Ay res marching on 
the way that led in the direction of the Po River. As 
Bartlett advanced across the Alsop farm his advance was 
checked bv a heavy fire and his troops forced to retire some 
distance, when the division was quickly formed on Ay res' 
brigade, wliich lay in a low place in the road. The divi- 
sion ao-ain advanced and occupied a position which was held 



616 TITE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

by our troops. Crawford coming up, formed between Coul- 
ter, who had taken command of Robinson's division, and 
Griffin and drove the enemy back out of the woods. 

Colonel McCandless, in command of the First Brigade 
of Pennsylvania Reserves, was wounded after the division 
left Todd's Tavern, when Col. W. Cooper Talley, of the ist 
Regiment, took command of the brigade. When the divi- 
sion arrived at the Alsop farm, Crawford directed Talley to 
charge with his brigade, which he did, but was unable to 
take the Confederate line. Another charge was made by 
that brigade, which also proved unsuccessful. Then Talley 
sent his assistant adjutant general, Rupert, to the rear to 
report to General Crawford, whom he found sitting against 
a tree, suffering from a blow from a limb that had been cut 
off by a cannon ball. Talley sent word to him that he had 
charged twice and had been unable to force the enemy from 
his lines. Crawford told Rupert to tell Talley to go to the 
troops on the left and give the officer in command his com- 
pliments, and ask him to unite in the charge. But Talley 
reminded Crawford that there was a space on his right, about 
a quarter of a mile, that was not occupied by our troops, 
and that he was liable to be flanked. Crawford made some 
inquiry as to what troops were on the right, beyond that in- 
terval. Talley said that he believed it to be Penrose's 
brigade. Crawford then directed him to go and request the 
officer in command to close to the left and unite in the 
charge. Had this request been made by Warren, in com- 
mand of tlie corps, it would have been obeyed with alacrity 
by the Maryland Brigade ; but in the confusion of a repulse, 
with their division commander lying badly wounded, they 
looked to the corps commander for orders, which was correct. 
No brigade on that field fought with greater valor than the 
Maryland brigade, and Col. Charles E. Phelp's gallantry on 
that as on every occasion was most admirable. He was 
taken prisoner. 

It would have made no difference if the brigades on the 
left and right had united in the third charge of the Pennsyl- 




COIv. CHARLES E. PHELPS. 



SPOTTSYLVA NIA . 617 

vania Reserves, for General Ewell had arrived with two 
divisions of his corps to strengthen Anderson, so the Fifth 
Corps and the New Jersey Brigade of the Sixth Corps alone 
faced nearly two-thirds of Lee's army, then in line of battle ; 
and it was well that no fnrther attempt was made to storm 
their position with so slender a force. Talley made the 
third charge, and was again compelled to fall back. He 
then decided to go to the troops on his right, beyond the 
interval, and see what arrangement conld be perfected for 
another attack. On his way to the right he was captnred 
by a company of Confederates who had concealed them- 
selves in the dense woods where he had to pass. Seeing 
that he was completely snrrounded, with no chance to 
escape, he surrendered. As he passed over the line of 
breastworks held by the enemy, he scanned them closely 
and observed their strength, as he had just made three 
charges against them. Being taken to General Ewell, he 
was asked his name and what troops he commanded. On 
his replying that he commanded the First Brigade of the 
Pennsylvania Reserves, Ewell said: "Yes, we have met 
them frequently on the field." He then paid them a very 
high compliment, and said that he was pleased to meet one 
of them ; that he was stationed at Carlisle before the war, 
where he had formed the acquaintance of many people whom 
he highly esteemed ; and that he did not order the barracks 
burned there, and was sorry that it had been done. Talley 
said to him that there were two companies from Cumber- 
land County in the brigade. Ewell wondered if any of them 
knew Judge Graham. Upon being told that Judge Graham's 
son was a captain in]the brigade, he was greatly pleased and 
offered to parole him, but Talley thanked him with a decli- 
nation. He with other prisoners was started for Richmond, 
but Sheridan, in his raid, recaptured them a few days after- 
wards, when Talley again resinned command of his brigade. 
He said when he crossed their line of works, on his way 
to Ewell, he saw the uselessness of attempting to storm them 
with the troops then present. Instead of Longstreet's 



618 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

corps, then under Anderson, Ewell was present with two 
divisions in line of battle behind formidable breastworks. 

Wadsworth's division, then commanded by Cutler, 
came up and formed on Griffin's right. That division 
made a vigorous attack on the enemy, and drove him 
back quite a distance; but Field's division of Anderson's 
corps had arrived, and, meeting the troops of Cutler and 
Griffin, the battle became stubborn without Warren being 
able to advance, as Sedgwick, who had been ordered to 
follow him, had not yet arrived ; and the day wore away, 
with only his advance coming up in time for Penrose's 
brigade to get into action. 

An incident of this day's encounter is related by Capt. 
P. De Lacy, of the 143d Pennsylvania, now of Scranton, 
Pennsylvania. He says : 

A little incident of the fight at Laurel Hill, after the Wilderness 
battle, on the 8th of May, 1864, occurred, which I will relate. I 
was at the time a member of the 143d Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
Third Brigade, Fourth Division (Wadsworth's), then, I think, com- 
manded by General Cutler, and formed a part of the Fifth Corps. 
We went into action that morning, soon after passing the cavalry, 
in a woods where they had evidentl}' been hotly engaged. We 
emerged into a large clearing, and soon formed line ; we then moved 
forward about a quarter of a mile, when we received quite a brisk 
fire from a ridge ntnning nearly parallel with our line of battle, and 
nearly in the middle of the clearing. The ridge was partly wooded 
and formed like a hog's back, with considerable of an elevation, 
and quite an extensive clearing be3ond. The position was a good 
one to hold our advance or to check us ; for the enemy's main line 
was not very far distant, and this ridge, for a few hours at least, 
became the scene of a v&xy spirited contest. We took the ridge ; 
the enemy rallied and drove us back ; we rallied and retook it ; the 
enemy again rallied and pushed us back a short distance ; but we 
went for them again, and drove them away bej'ond the ridge. This 
time we held it ; but the enemy again charged and made one more 
attempt to retake it, and it is at this point the incident which I 
have alluded to occurred, which I will relate as I remember it. 

I was. at the time, sergeant in Compan}' A, 143d Pennsylvania 
Volunteers, and we were the right company and connected with the 
left of the 19th Indiana ; or, in other words, the 19th was on our right. 

The force of the last charge fell heavily on the 19th, and pushed 



SPOTTSYL VA NJA . 619 

the men of that regiment back up the slope of the ridge a short dis- 
tance, probably 30 or 40 paces, although the}' continued their lire ; 
but the color-bearer of the 19th did not move back, but manfully 
held up his colors, although the Confederates had reached to within 
33 or 40 steps of him. At that critical moment, the writer and 
George W. Engle, of Company A, 143d Penns\-lvania, by permis- 
sion of Major Charles M. Conyngham, then commanding the 143d, 
went to the rescue of the colors of the 19th. 

The position of the lines at the time was almost at right angles, 
and we reached the color-bearer in less than one minute ; he was 
alone and down on one knee holding up his flag. I went to his 
right, and George W. Engle to his left. He was at the side of an 
old rail fence which was partly broken down, along which the regi- 
ment had been in line. Soon after we had reached him, he ran his 
arm high up, supporting the flag, when a ball struck the staff and 
shattered his arm. He partially fell back with his flag against the 
writer, who was on one knee by his side, at the same time the flag 
falling over both of us. I assisted in raising him up to his knees ; 
then he dropped his wounded arm to the ground, and ran up his 
good arm and grasped the colors firmly, while he fairly groaned 
with pain, but called out to us: "Stay with me, boys." We 
told him to keep up the flag, we wonld stay with him ; and we did, 
and used our guns the very best we could. 

It was one of the hottest locations I ever got into ; the enemy 
not thirt}' steps in our front, lying down in a little depression in the 
field. We could see their ramrods glisten every time they turned 
them to load their guns. For fifteen or twenty minutes this was the 
actual condition, though the regiment continued to fire, and other 
troops that had been rallied and brought up took part and made it 
so hot that the enemy made a break for the woods. Very many of 
them were killed or wounded. 

At about this time the men of the 19th closed in on their colors 
and we started for the 143d Pennsylvania, which was not over fifty 
yards to the left. As we moved back from their colors, the officer in 
command of the 19th asked us what company we belonged to (evi- 
dently thinking we belonged to the 19th). George W. Engle re- 
mained a short time, and, I think, gave our names, company, and 
regiment ; at all events, a short time after, I noticed that officer and 
Maj. Chas. Conyngham, of the 143d Pennsylvania, talking together. 

No braver man than that color-bearer ever lived. I would like 
to know if he still lives. 

Investigation shows that the colors of the 19th Indiana 
were carried that day by Corp. Andrew J. Wood, 



620 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Ill the morning Wilson's cavalry had driven a brigade 
out of Spottsjdvania ; but it seems Sheridan needed his 
assistance, and ordered him (Wilson) to retire. Later in the 
day Wilson again attempted to occupy it, but Woflford's, 
Brian's, and a brigade of Fitz-Hugh Lee arrived, which again 
compelled Wilson to retire. When Sedg-^Adck arrived he 
was posted on Warren's left, while Burnside, still later, ex- 
tended the line in that direction. Hancock was the last to 
leave the Wilderness, and when he arrived at Todd's Tavern 
he was halted to watch the movements of the enemy. As 
Grant and Lee were moving on parallel roads, not over two 
miles apart, it was easy for Hancock to make a reconnois- 
sance to observe the enemy's movements. Ascertaining 
that Lee's arnty were all concentrating at Spottsylvania, 
Hancock moved up on Warren's right. Thus the Union 
line, from right to left, was Hancock, Warren, Sedgwick, 
and Burnside. 

The following day was occupied in rearranging the lines 
and intrenching. The sharpshooters kept up a constant 
fire, and early in the morning General Sedgwick was killed 
by one of them. His death was a great shock to the army 
and to the country. 

The skirmish lines of the Fifth and Sixth Corps were 
pressed forward to develop the enemy's position, and ascer- 
tain, if possible, a weak place to attack. 

Colonel Coulter, wdio assumed command of the Second 
Division after General Robinson was wounded, pays him 
the following compliment in his official report. He says : 

During the advance General Robinson was severely wonnded 
and taken from the field. His being disabled at this juncture was a 
severe blow to the division, and certainly influenced the fortunes of 
the day. The want of our commanding officer prevented that con- 
cert of action which alone could have overcome the enemy in front. 

On the evening of the 9th the division was temporarily 
disbanded, mainly, it was supposed, because it became so 
reduced in strength, and of the loss of its commanding 



SPOTTSYL VA NIA . 621 

officer, Gen. John C. Robinson. The First Brigade, under 
Colonel Lyle, was temporarily assigned to the Fourth Divi- 
sion, commanded by Cutler ; the Second Brigade, com- 
manded by Colonel Coulter, was assigned to the Third 
Division, under Crawford, while the Third Brigade was 
made independent, to report direct to Warren. 

Lee's army, from left to right, was Anderson, Ewell, 
and Early. The latter had been placed in command of 
Hill's corps during the march from the Wilderness to Spott- 
sylvania. The Confederate army lay in a new-moon shape, 
v/ith the disk open to the southeast. 

Spottsylvania is situated on the ridge between the Ny 
and Po Rivers of the historical Mattapony, composed of the 
Mat, Ta, Po, and Ny. The last named rises in the Wilder- 
ness, flowing southeasterly around and north of Spottsyl- 
vania, and unites with the Po some distance from that 
place. The Po rises also in the Wilderness, near Todd's 
Tavern, courses its way eastwardly, but winds around to 
the south of Spottsylvania Court House. Near Anderson's 
left it changes its course, running almost due south, and 
then again resumes its eastwardly course. 

When Hancock, on the evening of the 9th, arrived with 
Barlow's, Gibbon's, and Birney's divisions (Mott's division 
being left at Todd's Tavern), he crossed the Posoas to turn 
Anderson's left. Lee seeing that movement, drew troops 
from Early on the right, and posted them on Anderson's 
left, covering the front of the Po where it runs south. 
While the stream is small, yet the bluffs are steep, and 
Early held a position which Hancock could not take by 
assault. Mott had been ordered up from Todd's Tavern, 
and had been posted on Wright's left, as there was a big 
gap between the left of Wright and Burnside's right. 
Grant seeing that the movement to turn Anderson's left 
had been foiled by Lee posting a part of Early's corps 
along the east side of the Po, determined to advance the 
left under Burnside, and the center under Wright and 
Warren. But before bringing on the engagement Warren 



622 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

and Wiiglit were ordered to feel tlieir fronts, to test its 
advisability. Warren, after he made two reconnoissances, 
reported in favor of the movement. The advance was 
ordered, when Warren directed Cutler and Crawford to 
attack, while Griffin was held in reserve. In order to assist 
this movement, Hancock was given command of that part 
of the field, and directed to bring the divisions of Gibbon 
and Birney across the Po, Gibbon being placed on the right 
of Warren, with Birney in reserve. The enemy observing 
the withdrawal of Gibbon and Birney, attacked Barlow, 
who was isolated from the Army of the Potomac across the 
Po, but they were repulsed with heavy loss. 

Wright, on Warren's left, had advanced a force (a division 
under Upton) and carried the works in his front in most 
gallant style, pressing the enemy back both right and left, 
at the same time capturing some cannon ; but Mott, on his 
left, failing to come up, and Warren, on his right, being 
repulsed. Grant ordered him to retire. The troops under 
Upton grumbling at the order, Grant countermanded it ; 
but as a sufficient force could not be sent to that part of the 
field in time, Upton was compelled to retire. 

As Early's line in front of Burnside had been weak- 
ened to reenforce Anderson's left, Burnside advanced 
nearly to the courthouse, but was drawn back to connect 
with Mott's left. If Burnside had been rushed forward, 
his movement would have aided Upton and Lee's right 
flank been turned, when he would have been placed in a 
very precarious condition. As it was. Grant and Meade 
had paid so little attention to the left that they were -una- 
ware of Burnside' s success until it was too late to take 
advantage of it ; though had Burnside made a report to 
Grant, the situation would have been understood and recti- 
fied. Grant says in his work, that he ought to have had a 
staff officer with Burnside to report to him, for Burnside, 
though with the Army of the Potomac, was not included 
in it, because he outranked IMeade. 

Barlow, on the right, had again been attacked, but 




HON. W. H. HARRIES, M. C. 



■ 



SPOTTS VL VA NIA . 623 

repulsed the enemy the second time, inflicting severe loss 
on him. Hancock fearing for his safety, then went to his 
support, and ordered him to cross the Po. 

When the work of the day was closed, and the examina- 
tion made of the situation, it was learned that Barlow, on 
the right, had successfully withstood two heavy assaults, and 
Burnside, on the left, had turned the enemy's left flank. 
This was the Union success. On the other hand, the 
enemy had repulsed our center, where, as a matter of 
course, our loss had been heavy, so that, with Burnside fall- 
ing back to connect with Mott, and Barlow giving up his 
position across the Po, it would seem that it was a drawn 
battle. 

Among the casualties. General Stevenson, of B'urnside's 
corps, was killed ; the gallant Upton, who was promoted on 
the field by Grant, was severely wounded, while General 
Rice, of the Fifth Corps, was killed. 

h. most gallant act was performed by Lieut. \Vm. H. 
Harries, of the Second Wisconsin, who was afterwards 
elected to the Fifty-second Congress. Seeing the lifeless form 
of Capt. Robert Hughes, of that regiment, in danger of the 
approaching fire in the grass, he gallantly rescued his body 
from the flames. 

The nth was passed without any forward movement, 
except a reconnoissance by Mott, who moved close enough 
to the enemy's works to see a salient point, which Grant 
decided to assault, and issued the following order in accord- 
nace with that purpose : 

Headquarters Armies Untied States., 
May II, 1S64 — 3 p. m. 
Move three divisions of the vSecond Corps by the rear of the 
Fifth and Sixth Corps, under cover of night, so as to join the Ninth 
Corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to- 
morrow. I will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay 
with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt 
and vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps 
as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion 
caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents 



624 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last 
evening would have been entirely successful if it had commenced 
one hour earlier, and had been heartily entered into by Mott's divi- 
sion and the Ninth Corps. U. S. Grant, 
Major General Meade, Lieutenant General. 
Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

On the night of the nth Hancock began the movement 
of the divisions of Barlow, Birney, and Gibbon, in the 
rear of the army, under the guidance of Major Mendell of 
the Engineers, in a drenching rain. The head of the 
column arrived about midnight near the Brown House, 
where it was proposed to prepare for the attack. Earlow 
was formed on the left, with Brooke's and Miles' brigades in 
front, supported by Brown's and Smith's. Birney deployed 
in two lines on the right of Barlow, with Mott's division 
formed in rear. Gibbon was held in reserve. 

Hancock's orders were to begin the assault at four o'clock, 
but the fog was so dense, after the heavy rain, that he 
delayed it abotit half an hour, until day began to dawn, so 
the troops could see where to march. When Hancock gave 
the order, both divisions moved promptly, and kept a per- 
fect alignment, notwithstanding the fact that Birney had to 
move over a marsh. As they advanced, the Confederate 
pickets retreated back on their reserve, which had already 
begun to fire on the Union line, but not a shot was fired by 
Hancock's men. As the reserve retired, the advancing 
line broke out in a hearty cheer, when both divisions 
rushed forward to the works of the enemy at the salient. 
The Confederates attempted to prevent them from crossing 
over, but in a moment Barlow's and Birney's divisions had 
scaled the breastworks, or had torn them away ; men were 
bayoneted, muskets were used over the lieads of each other, 
sabers performed their deadly work ; in fact it was a hand- 
to-hand conflict. The Confederates were surrounded, and 
Hancock says that he took 4000 prisoners of Johnson's 
division of Ewell's corps, 20 pieces of artillery, and 30 
stands of colors. Those who were not captured fled in the 



SPOTTS YL VA NIA . 625 

direction of Spottsylvania, hotly pursued by the boj's in 
bhie, who thought they had broken Lee's center and routed 
his army. About half a mile farther on they came upon 
another line of works which was well defended. In the 
mean time Hancock had ordered Mott and Gibbon to take 
possession of the works which Barlow and Birney had cap- 
tured but had left to pursue the enemy. 

Lee's army lay in a semicircle, so he could rapidly reen- 
force any given point, especially the center. He at once 
ordered heavy reenforcements to E well's assistance, who was 
trying to force Barlow and Birney to retire outside of the 
works which they had so recently captured. But the Union 
boys held the opposite side, and when the Confederates 
attempted to retake them they were hurled back with great 
slaughter. Time and again did they come with fresh troops 
to charge on the works which had been built by them, and 
which, until recently, they had occupied ; but each time 
they were repulsed with heavy loss. 

About six a. m. General Wright's corps moved up on 
the right of Hancock and took possession of the works to 
the right of the salient. IMott joined him on the left, with 
Birney next, and Barlow on the extreme left. At eight a. m. 
Wright called on Hancock for reenforcements, when Brooke's 
brigade was sent to him. Marching to the relief of Wright 
he relieved a part of Wheaton's division, and fought in the 
front line of battle until his ammunition was exhausted, 
when he returned to Hancock. 

Hancock directed artillery to be posted to the right of the 
Landrum House, some 300 yards in rear of the works. One 
section of Gilliss' battery was taken up to the salient, and 
fired canister into the advancing columns of the enemy. A 
section of Brown's battery (B, ist Rhode Island Artillery), 
was posted to the left of the salient, close to their fortifica- 
tions, where it did most effective work. On the left, Burn- 
side's effort was not strong enough to achieve success. He 
failed to crush Lee's right, and, as a consequence, added bul 
little assistance to the assault made by Hancock. 

XL 



626 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

t 
Warren, on the right, was unable to advance as far as 
the Sixth Corps on his left. In his report he says : 

May 12. — At daybreak General Hancock surprised Johnson's 
division in his lines, and captured nearly all of it, with i8 pieces of 
artillery. The enemy fought furiously to regain them. General 
Wright attacked near the Second Corps with two divisions. I also 
again assailed the enemy's intrenchments, suffering heavy loss, but 
failed to get in. The enemy's direct and flank fire was too destruc- 
tive, lyost very heavily. The enemy continuing to fire [on] the 
Second and Sixth Corps, [I was] compelled to withdraw Grifiin's and 
Cutler's divisions and send [them] to the left to their support, where 
they again became engaged. My whole front was held b}^ Crawford's 
division and Colonel Kitching and the Maryland Brigade, presenting 
a line of battle not as strong as a single rank. The enemy made no 
serious effort to force it. My divisions on the left were relieved 
during the night from their position, and returned to the right in 
the morning, having been kept awake nearly all night, which was 
rainy. 

Warren's report is quoted from in order to give his ver- 
sion of the battle that day, as Grant became dissatisfied with 
his movements, and took the divisions of Griffin and Cutler 
from him, and left Humphreys with him to superintend 
Crawford's division, which alone remained under Warren. 

General Cutler, commanding the Fourth Division of 
General Warren' s corps, says : 

On the i2tli we were underarms at daylight, and again assaulted 
the enemy's works without success. After being under fire four 
hours, I was ordered to report with my command to Major-General 
Wright. Colonel L3de, with his brigade (which was serving tem- 
porarily with me), was ordered to hold the works on the right of the 
Sixth Corps. My Third Brigade (Colonel Bragg) was sent to hold 
the works captured that morning from the enemj^, and my First and 
Second Brigades were sent to the assistance of the Sixth Corps, who 
were endeavoring to carry the enemy's works in front of the Sixth 
Coi-ps, where they remained under fire until two a. m. of the 13th, 
having been constantly under fire for twenty-two hours, when they 
were relieved and moved back to the right, going into positicm again 
in the trenches, the line having been held during my absence by a 
skirmish line. 



SPOTTSYLVANIA. 627 

The enemy retired to the second line of works, about 
half a mile in rear of the first which Hancock had captured 
from Johnson. This was one of the bloodiest conflicts of 
the war ; and the Union army there gained its first valuable 
victory in that campaign, fighting from early dawn until 
midnight. 

There was no movement of the army on the 13th ; but 
that night Warren and Wright were moved to the left of 
Burnside, in a heavy rain. Warren's corps led the march, 
in intense darkness, over muddy roads, sometimes having 
to corduroy them in order to pass. They crossed the Ny 
River, which was swollen from the rains. j\Iany of the 
troops gave out from exhaustion and lost their way. 
INIounted men were posted as guides ; but even this precau- 
tion could not keep the troops on the proper line of march 
through the dense forests and swamps. But Warren suc- 
ceeded in getting to the designated place with a part of his 
command, while those who had given out came up the 
next day, when they were able to see their way and gain a 
little strength. 

Wright's movement was detected, and Upton was at- 
tacked ; but with the aid of Ayres' brigade the enemy was 
repulsed. The next night, Lee moved in front of Warren 
and Wright, which left Hancock with no enemy in his 
front. He therefore moved his position to the rear of 
Warren and Wright. 

On the 15th both armies remained quiet, except a dem- 
onstration in front of Burnside, which was not carried into 
execution, perhaps on account of the rain. 

The ground was so .soft from the continued heavy rains 
that the infantry could scarcely march, while it was impos- 
sible to move the artiller}'. On the i8th Wright and Han- 
cock were moved back to the right of Burnside, to strike 
Lee on his left flank ; but he was advised of the movement 
in tiine to check it. 

Warren had been ordered to open with his artillery so 
as to deceive Lee as to the movements of Warren and Han- 



628 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

cock. Colonel Coulter, commanding a brigade under War- 
ren, was severely wounded. Warren remained stationary 
while the army marched past him and took a position on 
his left. This movement induced Ewell to attack War- 
ren's right flank, which would give him possession of the 
road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg, over which the 
supplies of the army were received. Kitching's and 
the Maryland Brigades, with Tyler's division of new troops, 
just arriving from Fredericksburg, met the attack of Ewell, 
and repulsed him with considerable loss. Crawford's, Bir- 
ney's, and Gibbon's divisions came to the support of War- 
ren's right. Grant, seeing the movement, ordered Warren 
to advance and prevent Ewell from returning to his in- 
trench ments. But he (Warren) was unable to do that. A 
division of colored troops, under General Ferrero, guarded 
the road to Fredericksburg. It was evident that Lee was 
attempting to get possession of that road to cut off Grant's 
supplies. Ferrero was ordered to throw forward his cavalry, 
and, if he was defeated, to fall back toward Fredericksburg, 
When Ferrero' s division was attacked, his colored troops 
fought most gallantly, and retook some twenty -five or thirty 
wagons which had been captured by the enemy by a sudden 
dash at the commencement of the action. This division 
belonged to the Ninth Corps, but had been detached for that 
special duty. 

Thus ended the battle of Spottsylvania ; for Grant, see- 
ing that Lee held a position naturally very strong, which 
would cost many lives to take, resolved to move again by 
the left, in the direction of Richmond, with the hope of 
meeting him on an open field. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

SHERIDAN'S GREAT RAID FROM SPOTTSYI^VANIA TO 

THE JAMES. 

MAY 9 TO MAY 24, 1 864. 

\^ FTER the successful passage of tlie Rapidan, on 
■^ ^ ]\Iay 4, 1864, and the subsequent terrific fighting 
on the 5 th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, in the Wilderness, in which the 
cavalry bore its full share, Sheridan, in obedience to orders 
from General Grant, concentrated his divisions in the 
vicinity of Aldrich's, on the plank road ; and, on the 
morning of the 9th, moved out on his famous expedition 
around the right flank of General Lee's army, with the 
view of cutting his communications with his base, destroy- 
ing the lines of railroad by wdiich his army was supplied, 
and with the expectation and hope of drawing after him the 
enemy's cavalry, which he thought he could, if opportu- 
nity offered, defeat and destroy, and thus inflict irreparable 
loss upon the Confederacy. 

Worn out and exhausted as the men v/ere by four days 
of constant fighting, there was not much rest for them dur- 
ing the night of the 8th. Horses were to be shod, forage and 
rations drawn, and the numberless little things to be at- 
tended to on the eve of a protracted march looked after ; 
besides all this, a constant succession of ambulances, 
filled with wounded men, were passing over the plank road 
along which, on either side, our bivouacs were stretched for 
miles ; and this evidence of the tremendous fighting that 
had been going on beneath the somber shadows of the 
dense thickets of the Wilderness, filled the minds of all 

629 



630 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

with sadness, for many of our comrades were among tliese 
sufferers. 

The night passed, and with the first faint streaks of the 
dawning day the camps were instinct with life and motion. 
"Reveille," "Boots and Saddles," and "To Horse" fol- 
lowed each other in rapid succession, and the first rays of 
the rising sun saw the heads of columns, divisions, and 
brigades moving from their several camps ; along the plank 
road they moved in the direction of Fredericksburg as 
far as Tabernacle Church, thence crossed over to the Tele- 
graph road by Childsburg to Anderson's Crossing of the 
North Anna River. The First Division, Gen. Wesley 
Merritt commanding, was in advance, followed by the 
Third Division, Gen. James H. Wilson, and the Second 
Division, Gen. D. McM. Gregg, bringing up the rear. 

The march was without incident until the rear-guard, 
consisting of the 6th Ohio Cavalry, which arrived about 
four o'clock p. m. near a small place called Davenport, 
was rather fiercely attacked, and a stubborn little fight oc- 
curred, resulting in the repulse of the Confederates, after a 
loss of one officer, Captain Abell, of the 6th Ohio, killed, 
and 47 men killed and wounded from the 6th Ohio and 
ist Massachusetts. The advance brigade of General Mer- 
ritt' s division, commanded by General Custer, forced the 
crossing of the North Anna at Anderson's Mills, and be- 
fore reaching Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central 
Railroad, he recaptured a train of ambulances and about 
400 of our men, who had been taken during the fights in 
the Wilderness ; among these were a large number of 
officers, one of them being Gen. W. C. Talley, of the ist 
Pennsylvania Reserves, commanding brigade, also Colonel 
Phelps, of the 7th Maryland Regiment, and Capt. George 
Michaels, of one of the Pennsylvania regiments. 

Pushing on, Custer got possession of Beaver Dam Sta- 
tion, together with three large trains heavily laden with 
supplies for Lee's army, two new locomotives, and a large 
amount of stores of various kinds, including hospital tents 



SHERIDAN'S GREAT RAID. 631 

and several hundred stand of arms ; all of these, except so 
much as was required to supply the immediate wants of 
our own troops, were burned or otherwise destroyed, while 
a happier set of fellows than the 400 recaptured pris- 
oners, it would be a difficult matter to imagine. 

The Second and Third Divisions bivouacked in line of bat- 
tle on the north side of the river where they were feebly at- 
tacked on the morning of the loth. The attack was soon 
repulsed, the divisions crossed the ford, and on reaching the 
station the Second Brigade, Second Division, took the 
advance, the ist Maine Cavalry leading ; the command 
had proceeded but a short distance until the enemy were 
encountered in some force, and quite a brisk skirmish oc- 
curred, in which Major Boothby, ist Maine Cavalry, re- 
ceived a wound in the shoulder, from the effects of which 
he died in a few days. 

Notwithstanding this opposition, the march of the col- 
umn was not delayed or retarded, but moved steadily on, 
crossed the South Anna at Ground Squirrel Bridge, and 
went into camp near an old church of that name, about one 
mile south of the river. The entire corps crossed the South 
Anna on the evening of the loth ; during the night the 
First and Third Divisions, and the First Brigade of the 
Second Division, moved in the direction of Richmond, 
crossing the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad at 
Negro Foot Station, destroying the road for a distance on 
both sides of the station. General Davies proceeded to 
Ashland, where he encountered the enemy, captured and 
destroyed a train of supplies for Lee's army, and a locomo- 
tive, and, after destroying the railroad for some distance, 
rejoined the main force at Allen's Station, on the Richmond 
and Fredericksburg Railroad. 

From this point the entire command moved on Yellow 
Tavern, where Stuart, with his main force in a strong posi- 
tion, which he had gained after an exhausting march round 
our left during the day and night of the loth, awaited our 
attack. The First Division had the advance, followed by 



632 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the Third, and Davies' brigade of the Second Division 
brought up the rear. Immediately on coming in sight of 
the enemy Merritt attacked and got possession of the 
Brooks pike and the tavern, while Stuart reformed his line 
some distance to the eastward of the pike, which he enfila- 
ded with his guns, making the position of Devin and 
Gibbs at the tavern somewhat hot ; but supported by the 
artillery they held on. Meantime Custer, supported by 
Chapman's brigade, charged and broke the Confederate 
line, capturing two of his guns, and driving the separate 
parts of his divided force, the one in the direction of Rich- 
mond, the other toward Ashland. Davies' brigade was 
held in reserve. 

In this brilliant action General Stuart, commanding the 
enemy's cav^alry, was mortally wounded, and died a few 
days after ; the prestige and the fruits of victory remained 
with the Union forces. 

While these operations were going on in front, Col. 
Irvin Gregg's brigade, which had been left at Ground 
Squirrel Church to bring up the rear, was impetuously 
attacked by Gordon' s Confederate brigade. The i st Maine 
Cavalry was on picket in the direction of the bridge across 
the South Anna. The loth New York had been directed 
to report to the colonel of the ist Maine, as the enemy was 
making some demonstrations ; and a section of artillery 
was left at the church for the colonel of the ist Maine to 
pick up as his command fell back. The other regiments of 
the Second Brigade had already moved on in the direction 
of Richmond, except one squadron of the i6th Pennsyl- 
vania, which was returning from the left with forage. 

Colonel Gregg and staff were with the section of artil- 
lery at the church, waiting for the ist Maine and loth 
New York, before proceeding to the head of the connnand, 
when suddenly, like a clap of thunder from a clear sky, 
several volleys were heard, a wild Confederate yell, and a 
crashing of branches, as the broken and routed ist Maine 
and I oth New York came tearing back along the road and 



SHERIDAN'S GREAT RAID. 633 

through the woods, with the victorious enemy close upon 
their heels ; clouds of dust filled the woods and the road ; 
the artillerymen were excited and lamenting the loss of 
their guns, brass 12-pounders; everything seemed to be 
lost. The Second Brigade, struck in rear by the exulting 
Confederates, would be most likely rolled up and sent pell- 
mell on the rear of the troops contending with Stuart at 
Yellow Tavern ; Colonel Gregg, on whom rested the respon- 
sibility for this part of the field, did not feel disposed to let 
the enemy have everything his own way, but quietly 
directed the officer in command of the guns to fill them 
to the muzzle with canister ; the command was obeyed with 
a will, and the men, as soon as they found there was a 
chance to fight, became calm and collected. On came the 
maddened and exultant enemy, imagining \'ictory within 
their grasp. The dust lifted. The deadly Napoleons 
belched forth their fearful and fatal contents into the very 
faces of the foe. The squadron of the i6th before men- 
tioned, Capt. xAl. J. Snyder commanding, charged with a 
shout. Captain Gleason's two squadrons of the ist Massa- 
chusetts, a few paces in rear of the guns, wheeled about by 
fours, drevvT saber and awaited orders to charge ; but the 
guns had done their work — had stopped in mid-career this 
impetuous charge. They then quietly and leisurely lim- 
bered up and withdrew, greatly pleased with their brilliant 
success. The brigade was not again molested during the 
day ; although the enemy made his appearance once or 
twice, he did not attempt another charge or attack. 

General Sheridan, in his final report, says: "Gregg, 
about the same time — while the contest was in progress at 
Yellow Tavern — charged the force in rear with equal suc- 
cess, and ended the engagement." 

It was, as has been seen, the other way ; Stuart, in send- 
inor Gordon's briQ;ade to harass the rear of Sheridan's 
column, hoped to distract his attention from his front where 
he meditated his main attack ; but, whatever may have been 
Stuart's object, this impetuous charge, made at the critical 



634 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

period when a position was about to be abandoned, came 
near being successful, and possibly would have been en- 
tirely so, but for the fact that these Napoleon guns were in 
position where they were, and the brigade commander with 
them, awaiting the arrival of his rear guard. 

This episode serves to illustrate the power of these guns 
at short range, and the necessity for coolness and self- 
possession in sudden emergencies or great dangers. Doubt- 
less all the disastrous consequences of this sudden and reso- 
lute attack, if successful, flashed through Colonel Gregg's 
mind when he saw his advance regiments struck in the rear, 
rolled up like a scroll, broken and scattered as were his 
rear guard, and realized the importance of so utilizing his 
guns as to gain the time required for putting the remainder 
of his troops in position to cope with this apparently victo- 
rious foe ; so, dispatching his aids to the front with orders 
to his regimental commanders to get into line, face to the 
rear, and the commanding officer of his rear guard to get 
his men rallied in rear of the other regiments, he calmly 
waited for developments, and was rewarded by success be- 
yond his most sanguine expectations — indeed, contrary to 
ajiy expectations, for the case seemed utterly hopeless, and 
only death or capture appeared possible. 

At eleven o'clock on the night of the nth, after 
caring for the wounded and burying the dead, the entire 
command moved south toward Richmond, Wilson's Third 
Division in advance, followed by Merritt's First, and Gregg's 
Second bringing up the rear. 

Daylight on the morning of the 12th found the entire 
command inside the outer line of fortifications, massed upon 
a plateau which overlooked the Meadow Bridges over the 
Chickahominy, which were destroyed, and the opposite, or 
Mechanicsville, side held in strong force by the enemy. 
Wilson's advance on the direct road to Mechanicsville was 
opposed by the enemy's batteries so formidably that he 
could not pass them, and Custer's brigade was directed to 
cross the Meadow Bridges ; but they were so strongly de- 



SHERIDAN'S GREAT RAID. 635 

fended that Merritt's entire division was directed to force 
the crossing at all hazards. 

While this was going on in front of the bridges, the 
enemy advanced from his works and attacked Wilson and 
Gregg. Wilson was at first obliged to fall back, so fierce 
was the Confederate onset, but Davies' brigade, of Gregg's 
division, being advantageously posted in a wooded ravine, 
checked the advance of the enemy, and held them. Mean- 
while a strong force coming up the Brook turnpike, attacked 
Col. Irvin Gregg's Second Brigade, and the battle raged 
from right to left, until late in the afternoon, when the 
bridge war. completed, the command safely crossed to the 
south side of the river, and, brushing the enemy out of 
the wa}-, went into camp between Walnut Grove Church 
and Gaines' jNIill. On the morning of the 13th the march 
was resumed, and the command reached Haxall's without 
further incident, except that when the Confederates were 
massed on the summit of Malvern Hill, in full view of the 
James River, our gunboats opened on them with their big 
guns, and compelled their cavalry to beat a hasty retreat. 
There the weary troopers found grateful rest, with rations 
and forage. After resting for three days, the return march 
was commenced, and on the 24th, after sixteen days and 
nights of marching and fighting, the Cavalry Corps rejoined 
the main army at or near Chesterfield, on the north side of 
the North Anna. 

This raid demonstrated what could be accomplished by 
a well organized cavalry force, under a competent leader, 
ably seconded by his subordinate ofiicers and men. Of these, 
General Sheridan, in closing his report, which comprises 
all the operations in which the cavalry were engaged, 
to August I, 1864, says: "To Generals D. McM. Gregg, 
Torbert, Wilson, Merritt, Custer, Devin, T. Irvin Greo-o-. 
Davies, and Gibbs, to the gallant officers and men of their 
commands, I return my sincere thanks." Thus the cavalry 
of the Army of the Potomac, which (from the time Hooker 
is alleged to have said he would give one hundred dol- 



636 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

lars for a dead cavalryman), through the cavalry fights at 
Kelley's Ford, on St Patrick's Day, in 1863, Brandy Sta- 
tion, Aldie, Middleburg, Upperville, Gettysburg, Monte- 
rey, Falling Waters, Shepherdstown, Culpeper Court 
House, Bristoe Station, and Mine Run, became fused in 
the fire of innumerable combats, was, under Sheridan, 
welded in a homogeneous whole, to be launched, like a 
thunderbolt, splintering and tearing to pieces whatever 
stood in its way. It was 10,000 wills subordinated by dis- 
cipline to the control of one master mind, the force of 
10,000 men controlling 10,000 horses hurled by one arm 
against our country's foes, its blows were relentless, destruc- 
tive, deadly. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 
PREPARING TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF RICHMOND. 

1 ^EFORE Grant issued the order to move from his 

-* — position in front of Lee at Spottsylvania, he di- 
rected that over loo pieces of artillery be sent back to 
Washington. From the time the army had crossed the 
Rapidan, but few batteries had been used ; and Grant did 
not believe that artillery would play a prominent part in 
that campaign. He, at the same time, took a retrospective 
view of the movements of the different armies. While 
Sherman was advancing to suit him, Sigel had been de- 
feated in the Slienandoah, which gave the Confederates a 
chance to reenforce Lee. 

He at once resolved to relieve Sigel, and General Hun- 
ter's name being mentioned, Grant consented to his being 
placed in command. Hunter was then directed by Grant 
to push forward his column up the Shenandoah and unite 
with Averell and Crook near Staunton, from which place he 
was to move, by way of Lexington, to Lynchburg, and in 
that manner draw from Lee's forces, or else unite with the 
Army of the Potomac, in case he was not opposed, and 
become its right wing. 

Appearing before that Gibraltar, Hunter found it too 
strongly defended for him to storm ; so he withdrew down 
the Kanawha, fearing to follow the line of the Virginia 
Central Railway, lest he would be overtaken. This pre- 
vented his army from assisting Grant for weeks, until it 
emerged from the mountain fastnesses of West Virginia. 

Turning his e}-e on General Butler, who was south of 
the James River, Grant found that he was shut up ir 

637 



638 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Bermuda Hundred by Beauregard, and that reenforce- 
ments were coming from the South to again assist in the 
defense of Richmond. When General Butler landed at 
Bermuda Hundred there were but few troops in that 
vicinity ; but when he sent an expedition, on the yth of 
May, to destroy the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, 
he found it guarded by a strong force. Brooks, who was 
in command of this expedition, attacked the enemy, and 
drove him back ; but he, rallying, charged Brooks. Finally 
both parties withdrew. 

On the 9th another advance was made, when the troops 
got within three miles of Petersburg. Butler had two 
corps, one under Gilmore and the other under General W. 
F. Smith. The latter was on the right. On the morning 
of the 1 6th, under cover of a dense fog, Beauregard ad- 
vanced a column on Smith's right, which was a mile and 
a half from the James River, and guarded only by a small 
squadron of colored cavalry on his right. When Heckman 
was struck, on Smith's right, his troops were thrown into 
confusion; but the 9th Maine and the 112th New York 
coming up, led Beauregard to believe that Smith's line lay 
further to the right, eii echelon. When his troops charged 
in front, they were tripped by wires which Smith had had 
stretched there to protect his front. When the Confeder- 
ates fell, they were fired on by the Union troops. 

Being repulsed, Beauregard made an examination, and 
resolved to make another attack, but this time to move his 
flanking column closer to the James. Smith, seeing that 
Beauregard was attempting to gain his rear and seize Ber- 
muda Hundred, where Butler's de|)ot of supplies was 
located, fell back in that direction. 

General Gilmore, who was on Smith's left, had not been 
pressed by the enemy. Whiting's division at Petersburg 
had been ordered by Beauregard to assault Gilmore when 
Smith was attacked. If Gilmore had swept forward, he 
could have turned the flank of the troops attacking Smith, 
and forced them to retire. But when Smith fell back on 



ON TO RICHMOND. 639 

his riglit, lie ordered his corps to retire ; and soon both 
corps were shut up in Bermuda Hundred. 

Thus, when Grant was ready to move the Army of the 
Potomac south on Richmond, the armies of Hunter and 
Butler were both powerless to assist in the siege of that 
place. 

Hancock was ordered to move at two o'clock, on the 
night of the 20th, in the direction of Guinea Station ; but 
he requested to be permitted to move at dark, so as to pass 
the enemy's signal stations unobserved. Torbert's cavalry' 
moved in his advance. When Guinea Station was reached, 
earl}- in the morning, a small force of troops was encoun- 
tered, but it did not delay the march. 

At IMilford Station a part of Kemper's brigade was en- 
countered, but was repulsed by Torbert before the infantry 
came up, and the bridge over the Mattapou)' was saved 
from destruction. Hancock's troops began to cross as soon 
as the head of the column arrived. 

Kemper appeared to be the advance of Pickett's division, 
on its way to reenforce Lee, and he was evidently sur- 
prised by the sudden appearance of Torbert at that place, 
for the right bank of the ]Mattapon}- was a very strong posi- 
tion from which to dispute its passage. As Pickett was on 
his way to join Le?, he had no expectation that any Union 
force was in that vicinity, and perhaps he doubted the 
propriety of attacking a force of whose strength he knew 
nothing. 

Crossing his command to the south side of the INIatta- 
pony, Hancock took a strong position until Warren, Wright, 
and Burnside came up. On the 21st, at half past ten a.m., 
the artillery of the Fifth Corps started to follow Hancock, 
with Crawford's division moving closely in its rear. At 
noon Warren started, with Griffin's and Cutler's divisions. 
The Fifth Corps arrived at Guinea Station at half past five 
that afternoon. 

Next morning Warren sent the Iron Brigade to the west 
of the Telegraph road, to learn if the enemy was also mov- 



640 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ing south. The information gained was to the effect that 
Ewell's and Longstreet's corps had marched south all night 
on the Telegraph road. About the time that this informa- 
tion was received, an order came fromWarren to move to 
Harris' Store. In the morning Cutler's division, which 
was given the lead, started promptly at five o'clock. 

By one o'clock Warren had reached the North Anna 
River, and began to cross at Jericho Ford about three 
o'clock in the afternoon. Griffin's division, wading, 
crossed over without opposition, and formed line of battle. 
Cutler was directed to cross and form on his right. The 
Iron Brigade, being in the advance, was ordered to the 
right of Griffin, while Colonel Bragg, in command of Roy 
Stone's Bucktail Brigade, was to take position on the right 
of the Iron Brigade. Colonel Hofmann, in command of 
the Second Brigade, which was Cutler's old brigade, was 
ordered to support them, while Lyle was held in reserve. 

Crawford had taken position on the left of Griffin, so 
that Warren's line, from left to right, was Crawford, Grif- 
fin, and Cutler. Griffin had scarcely taken his position 
when he was furiously assaulted ; but he repulsed the 
enemy. 

While Hancock's passage of the North Anna was stub- 
bornly resisted, Warren, several miles above, crossed un- 
opposed ; but as soon as he had crossed his center was 
attacked. Failing to drive Griffin, the Confederate force 
moved to the right just as Cutler, with Captain Mink, was 
riding on the line that he was to occupy to select a posi- 
tion for iSIink's battery. 

As the Iron Brigade was moving into position it was 
struck by the force that had assaulted Griffin. Not yet 
in position, the brigade was unable to withstand so heavy 
a force, the a?saulting troops being Wilcox's division, com- 
posed of Brown's, Scales', Gordon's, and Thomas's bri- 
gades, followed by Hetli's division. ]\Iink hurriedly threw 
his battery into position, and the Iron Brigade, falling back, 
reformed in its rear. 



ON TO RICHMOND. 641 

This movement uncovered Griffin's right. At the same 
time Bartlett's brigade was sent to assist in restoring the 
lines. As the troops were rushing to their positions, the 
83d Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel McCoy, came 
in contact with one of Brown's regiments, while both were 
marching. McCoy instantly formed line and fired the first 
volley, which wounded and killed many, and paralyzed the 
enem\'. Seeing an officer of rank, the 83d boys sprang for- 
ward and caught him. It proved to be Colonel Brown, in 
command of the brigade. Colonel Bates reported to Cutler 
with his brigade ; two of his regiments were sent to the 
right, where the enemy was repulsed with heavy loss. 

Hancock was on the Chesterfield road, which crosses the 
North Anna, about a mile west of the railroad bridge. And 
here occurred another blunder on the part of the enemy — 
that of leaving troops in an intrenched position on the side 
of a river which had been evacuated by the main portion of 
his army, only to be overpowered by the Army of the 
Potomac when it came up. The same thing was done at 
Rappahannock Station, when Lee was retreating south, 
after the battle of Fredericksburg. General Mahone said 
to me that it was Early's work at Rappahannock Station. 

It was, indeed, a strange performance on the part of the 
Confederates ; for all night Hancock's soldiers had to keep 
a vigilant watch to prevent the bridge from being burned. 
It was late in the afternoon when Hancock began his move- 
ment to take it ; so no attempt was made to cross the river 
that night. 

The Confederate troops on the north bank of the North 
Anna were protected with strong intrenchments ; but when 
the order to assault was given, the veterans of Pierce's and 
Egan's brigades, of Birney's division, made short work of 
it, and all were made prisoners who did not escape, or were 
pushed off the bridge and drowned. 

In the morning, when the Second Corps was put in 
motion, it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated the 
south bank. 

XLI 



642 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Lee had fouglit many of his battles with his army formed 
in a semicircle. This gave him an opportunity to quickly 
reenforce any given point he desired. He had formed his 
line of battle at the North Anna on the same plan. His 
right was thrown back and rested on a swamp, while his 
left, being refused back, rested on lyittle River ; with a 
small front he clung to, and occupied, the North Anna, 
thus preventing Grant from uniting the wings of his army 
under Hancock and Warren. Burnside coming up in the 
center, and attempting to cross the river, first felt the position 
in which Lee had placed his army. Crittenden's division, 
advancing to cross, received a heavy rebuff from Mahone. 

Grant, ascertaining the strong position that Lee occupied, 
and knowing that he had been reenforced by Pickett's and 
Breckinridge's divisions, and Hoke's brigade from North 
Carolina, saw that Lee was able to make a stubborn de- 
fense ; so he decided to withdraw his army to the north 
side of the river. 

In order to do that, he directed Wilson to move with his 
division of cavalry on Lee's left flank, near Little River, as 
if to turn it. This gave Lee the impression that an attack 
would be made with the right wing of the Army of the 
Potomac. During the night of the 26th Warren and Wright 
recrossed the North Anna. Then the Sixth, followed by 
the Fifth and Ninth Corps, marched down the left bank of 
the North Anna, then turning south crossed the Pammike}', 
formed by the North and South Anna Rivers. Hancock 
remained until the following day, and then took up the line 
of march in the wake of the other corps. Grant was in a 
most critical if not dangerous position when he crossed the 
North Anna and attempted to attack, with his army sepa- 
rated by several miles ; and it is strange that Lee did not 
take advantage of the situation and hurl his army on Han- 
cock, or attack Warren and Wright. Perhaps he was wait- 
ing for a favorable opportunity, which Grant evidently feared, 
for he retired across the North Anna as soon as he could 
deceive Lee as to his purpose. 



ON TO RICHMOND. 643 

Grant then gave orders to change the base of snpplies 
from Port Royal, on the Rappahannock, to the White 
House, on the Pamunkey, as steamers could traverse the 
Chesapeake and ascend the York and the Pamunkey, the 
latter with the Mattapony forming the York River. 

On the 25th, Grant gave orders for General Smith's 
corps to unite with the Army of the Potomac on the 
Pamunkey. This made five corps of infantry in Grant's 
army. 

Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, preceded the 
Sixth Corps, and on the morning of the 27th crossed the 
Pamunkey at Hanovertown. There Wright halted to let 
the Fifth and Ninth Corps come up, for it was well known 
that Lee would make a retrograde movement so as to place 
himself again between Grant and Richmond ; it was, there- 
fore, unsafe for Wright to advance without having other 
corps within supporting distance. 

Hancock crossed the Pamunkey four miles above Han- 
overtov/n. This placed the entire Army of the Potomac 
south of the Pamunkey, except Wilson's cavalry division, 
which brought up the rear. 

Lee, who moved on an interior line, had again placed 
his army across Grant's line of march, and taken a posi- 
tion in front of the Chickahominy, at the crossing of the 
Virginia Central and Fredericksburg and Richmond Rail- 
roads. The Union cavalry was ordered to advance in the 
direction of Hanover to feel the position of the enemy. 
When it reached Hawe's Shop, the Confederate cavalry, 
under Hampton and Fitz-Hugh Lee, were encountered, and, 
on the afternoon of the 28th, the brigades of Custer, Gregg, 
and Davies had a stubborn fight with them which lasted 
for several hours. Sheridan ordered the troopers to dis- 
mount and fight as infantry. 

The Union cavalry holding the position, the infantry of 
the Army of the Potomac advanced and took a position in 
advance of the cavalry, when the Confederates fell back 
behind the Tolopotomoy. 



644 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The next day a reconnoissance in force was made with 
three corps to ascertain Lee's position. Wright was 
directed to proceed to Hanover Court House, while Han- 
cock moved toward Tolopotomoy Creek, with Warren on 
the left, who moved on the Shady Grove Church road. 
Burnside was held in reserve. 

Wright advanced to Hanover Court House without seri- 
ous opposition ; but Hancock, on his left, found the enemy 
in strong force at Tolopotomoy Creek. Burnside was moved 
up on the left of Hancock so as to fill the gap between 
him and Warren. When Warren arrived near Huntley 
Corners, on the Shady Grove Church road. Early attempted 
to turn his left flank, attacking Crawford's division, and 
Colonel Hardin's brigade was driven back in confusion. 

In order to relieve Warren, Hancock was ordered to 
attack the enemy who were in his front, which he did, 
taking and holding the rifle-pits occupied by the Confeder- 
ates. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, had come up 
on the right of the Sixth Corps, after having destroyed all 
that he could of the Virginia Central Railroad. 

Sheridan was on the left of Warren and pressing in the 
direction of Cold Harbor, where he arrived on the 31st and 
found the enemy intrenched. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

COLD HARBOR. 

^ I ^HE Army of the Potomac was now on historic mili- 
-^ tary ground ; in its rear was Yorktown, where the 
famous battle was fought which ended the war of the 
Revolution, while it occupied the position held by the 
right of ]\IcClellan's army in the Peninsular Campaign of 
1862. 

As the Confederates had always feared that the Penin- 
sula would again be the route of the Union army to cap- 
ture Richmond, they had been constantly preparing lines 
of fortifications to checkmate a movement in that direction ; 
the Arm}' of the Potomac had therefore bloody work be- 
fore it, whether it succeeded or not. Lee was again in 
Grant and Meade's front to assume the defensive and pre- 
vent the crossing of the Chickahominy, which empties into 
the James, by the Army of the Potomac, which, then onh- ten 
miles distant from Richmond, had to meet the impenetrable 
barriers behind which was Lee's army ; consequently Grant 
and INIeade made another flank movement to the left, with 
Cold Harbor as the objective, as Sheridan had reported that 
position weakly defended. Wright, with the Sixth Corps, 
was ordered from the right of the army to pass in rear of 
the other corps and proceed hastily to Cold Harbor, while 
General Smith was directed to follow and take up a position 
on the right of the Sixth Corps. Hancock, who held the 
right after Wright had been withdrawn, was ordered to 
march in rear of Burnside and Warren and form on Wright's 
left, when it was discovered that there was a wide interval 

645 



646 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

between Warren's left and Smith's right, which Warren 
was directed to occupy ; but, as he already had a front of 
over three miles, it was quite difficult for him to connect 
with Smith. 

The Union line of battle, as then formed at Cold Harbor, 
from left to right, was Hancock, Wright, Smith, Warren, 
and Burnside. Grant and Meade knew they were in the 
enemy's country, where at least a majority of the people 
were loyal to the Confederate cause ; hence they presumed 
that the newly-formed lines had been quickly reported to 
Lee. This made it necessary to support the weak line of 
Warren, and Burnside was directed to withdraw from his 
(Warren's) right and mass the Ninth Corps in the rear and 
right of the Fifth, to sustain Warren in case he was 
attacked. When Burnside began to execute the order, on 
the afternoon of the ad of June, he was attacked and a part 
of his forces driven through a swamp, the enemy capturing 
many prisoners. Warren's front was at the same time 
assailed, when Grifiin was thrown forward with his division 
to assist Burnside. Griffin hastily formed his division, with 
Ayres on the left, Bartlett in the center, and Sweitzer on 
the right and rapidly advanced to meet the enemy, as a 
dense cloud of dust indicated that a heavy force was ap- 
proaching. 

Bartlett' s advance was on the north side of the Mechanics- 
ville road, and when his skirmish line encountered the 
enemy, Griffin ordered Stewart, with Battery B, 4th United 
States Artillery, to take a position on the front line, which 
he promptly did. He soon silenced a battery of the enemy, 
which was abandoned, and with short fuses he checked the 
advance of Rodes' division. Cutler, on the left of Grifiin, 
not being heavily attacked, sent Hofmann's brigade to 
Griffin's assistance; while Crawford, on Cutler's left, was 
expected to join Devens' right of Smith's corps. 

On the morning of the 3d of June, Grant gave orders 
for Hancock, Wright, and Smith to make an attack at half 
past four. 



COLD HARBOR. 647 

The Second Corps was formed with Barlow on the left 
and Gibbon on the right, Birney supporting. 

R. H. Anderson, who commanded Longstreet's corps, 
had been moved to the right to meet the movements of 
Hancock, Wright, and Smith, Hoke coming up first. On 
the i3t and 2d Anderson had been fighting Sheridan and 
Wright ; but on the 3d Kershaw formed on his left, with 
Pickett and Field, extending the line to meet Early's right. 

On the morning of the 3d, Barlow formed his division 
in two. lines of battle, the brigades of Brooke and Miles in 
the front line, with ]\IcDougall and Byrnes supporting. 
Gibbon did the same, placing Smith and Tyler in front, 
with Owen and McKeon supporting in close column by 
regiments. Barlow's first line captured the salient on the 
road from Dispatch Station ; but INIcDougall and Byrnes, 
not getting up immediately, they were forced out by Hill 
and Breckinridge, though Barlow only fell back a short 
distance, where he took up a position behind a small eleva- 
tion, which he held. Barlow's loss was very heavy. 
Among the killed were Colonel Morris, of the 68tli New 
York, and Colonel Byrnes, of the 28th Massachusetts, and 
Colonel Brooke fell severely wounded as the troops entered 
the enemy's works. 

When Gibbon advanced, INIcKeon supported Tyler ; but 
the latter fell almost immediately. ]\IcKeon then came up 
on the right of Tyler's brigade, but he, too, soon fell, mor- 
tally wounded, under the severe fire. By this time ]\Ic- 
Keon's brigade, then commanded by Colonel Haskell, of the 
32d W^isconsin, but which was only a mere skirmish line, it 
having suffered so heavily, was ordered by Haskell to again 
advance, when he was fatally wounded. Gibbon encoun- 
tered a swamp in his front. Tyler and ]McKeon had gone to 
the right of it, with the exception of Colonel McMahon, of 
the 164th New York, who was on the left of McKeon' s 
brigade. McMahon in the advance got separated from his 
brigade and went to the left of the swamp. He there gal- 
lantly charged over the enemy's works, but fell by the side 



648 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 

of liis colors, pierced by several bullets. Dying in the 
lines of the Confederates, his colors were captured, and 
scarcely a man of his regiment escaped being taken prisoner. 

Owen was to support Smith ; but as soon as Smith 
became hotly engaged, Owen moved up on his left flank, 
and thus became unable to support Smith when he carried 
the works in his front, which he did at the same time Mc- 
Mahon stormed them. Owen is to be commended for his 
valor ; but his judgment was at fault in not remaining in 
Smith's rear, to aid him when he drove the enemy from his 
position. Gibbon was then compelled to retire. 

Wright formed his corps with Russell on the left, Rick- 
etts in the center, and Neill (Getty's) on the right. Russell 
and Ricketts advanced close to the enemy's position; 
Neill on the right carried the rifle-pits in his front, but was 
unable to successfully advance any farther ; yet Wright 
maintained himself within forty or fifty yards in some 
places. 

Smith formed his line with Brooks on the left, Martin- 
dale in the center, and Devens on the right. Smith dis- 
covered a ravine in front of his left and center, deep enough 
to shelter the troops. He conceived the idea that he could 
suddenly make a charge from that ravine at an opportune 
moment, and dash on the enemy's works and succeed in 
forcing him back. Accordingly he ordered Martindale, 
when he heard the fire from Brooks' division, to advance. 

When Wright advanced, ]\Iartindale supposed it was 
Brooks, and ordered Stannard to charge, which he did three 
times. Stannard in relating this occurrence to me, said: 

I begged ]\Iartindale to go to Smith and have the order counter- 
manded, for I knew my brigade would be nearl)^ destro\-ed without 
effecting anything ; Martindale went to Smith and gave Stannard's 
message, saying: " lie will lose his brigade;" but Smith said to 
Martindale that Grant had ordered the enemy's works to be assaulted, 
and would not yield in his purpose. When Martindale returned and 
told me what Smith said, I pulled my hat down over my 65-68, and, 
advancing, ordered the brigade to follow me. When I arrived near 
the enemy's position every staff officer and orderly had been killed 



I 



COLD HARBOR. 649 

or wounded, and I was compelled to get the brigade back myself as 
best I could. Grant was at my headquarters, as he was riding the 
line of battle. After listening to the roar of the battle on Hancock's 
and Wright's front, he said: " Stannard, this is a heavj^ .battle ;" 
with that he galloped to the left, not giving me time to express my 
opinion, and for that reason I asked Martindale to go to General 
Smith to try to persuade him to countermand the order to charge. 

Anderson held a position where all his artillery coiild 
be brought to bear on our advancing columns, and that, 
too, with an enfilading fire from either right or left, which 
plowed great gaps in our advancing lines. Hancock, 
Wright, and Smith all suffered alike from it, while our 
artillery was unable to aid the infantry, because there were 
no prominences upon which to get positions. 

Warren and Burnside were ordered to watch the move- 
ments of the enemy closely, and if there was an oppor- 
tunity to turn Ivce's left flank, they were to embrace it ; 
but it seemed never to come. 

Grant and Meade seeing there was no hope of breaking 
through at any point, ordered the corps commanders to in- 
trench their positions, until a new plan of action could be 
conceived ; for it was evident that Lee was fully able to 
prevent the Army of the Potomac from entering Rich- 
mond, with his troops behind formidable breastworks. 
Grant was the commander-in-chief of all the armies, and 
if he turned back then it would have cast a heavy gloom 
over the country and chilled the hopes of the armies ; so 
he at once boldly resolved to cross the James, and cut off 
the supplies for Richmond and Lee's army. This would 
give Lee an opportunity to march on Washington ; but 
Grant decided to risk it, and at once gave orders to prepare 
to cross the James River. 



CHAPTER XX. 

CAVALRY TRANSACTIONS FROM THE NORTH ANNA TO 
THE JAMES. 

T" TPON the return of the Cavalry Corps from its expedi- 
^—^ tion around Lee's right flank to the army at Ches- 
terfield, north of the Anna, on the Fredericksburg and 
Richmond Railroad, on the 25th of May, 1864, it moved 
again, on the evening of the 26th, in advance of the army 
on the road to Hanover Ferry on the Pamunkey. 

Arriving there early on the morning of the 27th, the 
crossing of the run was speedily effected by Custer's brigade 
of Torbert's division, which had the advance. The oppo- 
site, or southern bank of the run was held by a small force 
of the enemy, who were soon driven away by Custer's lead- 
ing regiments, under cover of the fire from which two can- 
vas pontoons were launched and two squadrons ferried 
over to hold the approaches to the ferry until the bridge 
could be laid. In an hour this was accomplished, under 
charge of Captain Howell, of the 50th New York Engineers, 
and the whole of Torbert's division crossed over. 

Custer, still in the advance, met the enemy about one 
mile from the ferr}-, near Dr. Brockenborough's house, 
where the road to Hanover Court House branches from the 
road leading from the ferry to Haws' Shop. Two of his 
regiments were sent on each road. Devin's brigade fol- 
lowed on the Hanover Court House road in support, in 
that direction, and IMerritt's brigade on the Haws' vShop 
road. The enemy being in strong force on the Hanover 
Court House road, Custer's two regiments and Devin's entire 
brigade soon became emjaged. Custer, with the other two 
650 



CA VALRY TR A NSA CTIO NS. 651 

regiments of his brigade, followed by Merritt, proceeded to 
Haws' Shop, and, as directed, took the road leading from 
there to Hanover Conrt House, and came into the road 
on which Devin was engaged in rear of the enemy in his 
front. Immediately on the appearance of ]\Ierritt on this 
road, the enemy abandoned his position and retired pre- 
cipitately in the direction of Hanover Court House. Mer- 
ritt went into position midway between Crump Creek bridge 
and Haws' Sho]3, Devin and Custer occupied the ground 
abandoned by the enemy. The road leading from the 
town of Hanover to the White House and Richmond road 
enters it at Haws' Shop. This road crosses the Tolopoto- 
moy about one and a half or two miles east of the shop, and 
runs parallel to it until it enters the road leading from 
Hanover Court House to Mechanicsville, about the same 
distance to the west of the shop, at or near Pollv Hunt- 
ley's Corners or Crossroads, through which the road lead- 
ing from ]\Iechanicsville to Hanover Court House passes. 

The Second Division (Gregg's), encamped for the night 
about one mile north of the shop. Russell's division of the 
Sixth Corps'came up during the day, somewhat nearer the 
shop than the cavalr}", and went into camp. 

Early on the morning of the 28th, the Second Division 
moved out on the road from White House to Richmond, at 
Haws' Shop, and, after marching a short distance in the 
direction of IMechanicsville, encountered the enemy in 
strong force, advantageously posted near ^non Church, at 
which point a road leading from Hanover Court House 
via Cash Corners enters the Richmond and White House 
road, and soon became engaged. The Confederates were 
stubborn, and regiment after regiment was put in mitil the 
entire brigade were in battle array and heavy fighting 
going on along the entire front. 

The Second Brigade, Irvin Gregg's, was moved up, and 
the i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry was put in on the right 
of Davies' line and the 13th on the left ; but even as 
thus reenforced, this officer was barely able to hold his posi- 



652 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

tion. The fire of the enemy was heavy and continuous ; 
his batteries enfiladed all the ground in rear of the line of 
battle and did some damage to the regiments of the Second 
Brigade, which was in reserve, and to our hospitals. About 
three p. m. Custer's brigade, of Torbert's division, came 
up, dismounted, and crossed the open field in rear of the 
center of General Davies' line, deploying to the right and 
left of the road : their advance was irresistible, and the 
wearied troops of the Second Division being inspired by 
this timely aid, advanced along the entire line with a cheer, 
while the enemy abandoned the field, leaving his dead and 
wounded and many prisoners in our possession. These 
consisted mainly of Butler's South Carolinians, which had 
just joined Lee's army. 

Merritt's and Devin's brigades of Torbert's division 
were on the road leading from Haws' Shop to Hanover 
Court House, holding the line of Crump's Creek, a small 
but swift stream which has its source in the vicinity of 
^non Church, and flows northeasterly, emptying in the 
Pamunkey near Hanovertown, and affording a good defen- 
sive line. 

During the day of the aSth, while the cavalry fight- 
ing was going on, the army crossed the Pamunkey at 
Hanovertown without molestation. On the same night, 
after the battle in front of Haws' Shop, the cavalry with- 
drew and went into camp on the Tolopotomoy, between 
Hanovertown and New Castle Ferry, where it remained 
during the 29th and 30th. The First Division having some 
severe fighting on the road leading from Old Church to 
Cold Harbor, and drawing the enemy to within a mile and 
a half of the latter place, on the following morning Torbert 
advanced and drew the enemy from Cold Harbor, and held 
the position against very determined efforts on his part to 
regain it, until the arrival of our own infantry, on the ist 
of June. On the morning of the 31st the Second Brigade 
of the Second Cavalry Division (Irvin Gregg's), was sent 
to White House to report to Gen. William F. Smith, whose 



CAVALRY TR A NSA CTIO NS. 653 

corps of 16,000 men had just arrived at that point from 
Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Gregg's command arrived at 
White House about three p. m. , and, upon reporting to Gen- 
eral Smith, he was directed to so post his brigade as to cover 
his left flank on his march to join the anny, as his orders 
directed, at New Castle Ferry on the Pamunkey. This 
order was a mistake, "New Castle" being substituted, in 
the order directing the march, for ' ' Cold Harbor. ' ' 

General Smith's corps moved on the afternoon of the 
31st, and early the following morning, June i. Colonel 
Gregg's command moved on the Cold Harbor road, and 
arrived in the vicinity of that place in the evening of the 
same da}'. 

On the 2d, the ist and 2d Cavalry made reconnois- 
sances to Sumner's Upper Bridge, and Bottom Bridge, 
and held the left of the line until the arrival of Hancock's 
corps, after which they withdrew and took up a position 
further down the Chickahominy, opposite Bottom Bridge, 
the enemy's cavalry occupying the northern bank, and 
shelling our camps at long range. IMeanwhiie Wilson's 
Third Division was operating 'on the right of the army, 
burning bridges, destroying railroads, and being en- 
gaged with the enemy around the sources of the Tolopo- 
tonioy. 

On the 4th, the First Division moved to Old Church, 
and on the 6th, Gregg's Second Division, being relieved by 
one of Wilson's brigades, marched to the same place : from 
thence both divisions moved to New Castle Ferry, where 
they met the trains from the White House with supplies 
for an extended march, known in history as the "Trevil- 
ian Raid." This expedition had for its objective, first, 
the destruction of the railroad between Richmond and 
Lynchburg; second, a junction with the forces under 
General Hunter, supposed to be at or in the vicinity of 
Charlottesville ; and third, the withdrawal of the enemy's 
cavalry from the front of our army, wliose presence would 
have interfered seriously with any movement for its with- 



654 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

drawal from its position at Cold Harbor across the Chicka- 
hominy and White Oak Swamp toward the James. 

Everything being in readiness, horses shod, rations, 
forage, and ammunition being distributed, everything to last, 
with what could be picked up in the country, for an indefi- 
nite period, the command, in high spirits, crossed the 
Pamunkey, and after a march of i6 or i8 miles went into 
camp between Aylett's and Dunkirk. 

The march continued along the north bank of the Anna 
during the 8th, 9th, rmd loth, without incident, and on 
the evening of the latter date the entire command went 
into camp on the south bank of the North Anna, about 
four or five miles north of Trevilian Station, where, for the 
first time during the march, they encountered the enemy's 
scouts, who attacked the head of their column. 

On the morning of the nth the march was resumed in 
the direction of Trevilian Station. Torbert had the ad- 
vance, but had not proceeded far until the enemy were en- 
countered in full force. Devin and Merritt were at once 
engaged in a fierce contest, Custer having been detached 
and sent to the left to get to the station or in the rear of 
the enemy. Following a wood road which leads from the 
Ivouisa Court House road to Trevilian, Custer passed be- 
tween Hampton's division, which had passed the station and 
was engaging Torbert, and Fitz I^ee's division, which was 
still on the road leading from I^ouisa Court House to Char- 
lottesville ; and thus, meeting no opposition, reached and 
took possession of the station. 

Sheridan, having received information that Custer had 
posssession of the station, dismounted the brigades of De- 
vin and Merritt, and, forming in line, drove Hampton 
back upon Custer. But Fitz-Hugh Lee coming up, Custer 
was obliged to form liis command to face in two direc- 
tions, and was being hard pressed ; meantime, Merritt and 
Devin drove back Hampton, and Irvin Gregg's brigade, 
being brought up and put in on Fitz Lee's right flank, 
attacked vigorously, and drove him from the road and 



CA VA LRY TEA NSA C T! O N S. 655 

back in the direction of Louisa Court House. Night put 
an end to the fio^htiuQ^. 

Hampton moved toward Gordonsville, and Fitz Lee, 
during the night, joined him by a detour westward. Da- 
vies' brigade of Gregg's division guarded the trains. 

On the morning of the 12th the work of destroying the 
railroad commenced, and Sheridan, having learned that 
Hunter was moving away from Charlottesville instead of 
toward that place, concluded to return ; and with a view 
to secure a byroad leading to Mallory's Ford, which led 
to the Catharpin road, sent Torbert to make a reconnois- 
sance on the Gordonsville road, which movement brought 
on a fight in which his entire force became engaged with- 
out being able to drive the enemy from his strong position. 

On the night of the 12th, as soon as darkness set in, 
all the wounded being provided for in ambulances, wagons, 
and vehicles picked up in the country, and such of their 
wounded (about 100) as could not be transported being 
left in hospitals near the station, the command was put in 
motion, and reached the North Anna at Carpenter's Ford 
during the night, and in the morning crossed over arid 
moved, via Troy man's Store, to the Catharpin road, and 
encamped at Shady Grove Church ; next day passed over 
the Spottsylvania Court House battlefield, and so on along 
the north bank of the INIattapony, until, on the i8th, the 
command arrived at and encamped in the vicinity of King 
and Queen Court House ; here, learning that the depot at 
White House was not broken up, General Sheridan sent 
his wounded on to West Point under an escort of two regi- 
ments, and with the remainder of his command returned 
to Dunkirk, at which point he crossed the Mattapony 
on the pontoons which had been carried with the expe- 
dition. 

On the 20th the march was resumed at an early hour ; 
the sound of artillery firing was heard from the direc- 
tion of White House, and dispatches were received from 
General Abercrombie that that place was attacked ; but 



656 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

learning from an advance party, which had been sent for- 
ward on hearing the firing, that there was no danger, the 
command moved leisurely to the Pamunkey, and went 
into camp on the north side, opposite White House, the 
enemy holding the bluff about one mile back from the 
river, and surrounding the plain in the form of a semi- 
circle. 

During the night Col. Irvin Gregg, who had become 
familiar with the topography of the country around the 
White House during the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, was 
sent for, and received instructions to cross his brigade early 
on the following morning, dismounted, and make a recon- 
noissance toward Black Creek and Tunstall's Station, on 
the York River and Richmond Railroad, as soon as it was 
light enough to see. The brigade crossed over, and pro- 
ceeded to Dr. Macon's farm, about two miles west from 
the White House, the house being situated on the bluff 
and overlooking the plain from Black Creek to White 
House. From Dr. IVIacon's house several roads lead toward 
Tunstall's Station, which is concealed from view by the 
dense woods that cover the hill which slopes from the 
house to Black Creek. Halting the main force here, strong 
parties were sent out on these several roads ; but no enemy 
was encountered until they reached the vicinity of Tun- 
stall's Station, where the enemy were discovered in strong 
force on the opposite side of Black Creek. During the 
afternoon the Confederates advanced a strong skirmish 
line ; but being unable to make any impression upon 
Gregg's lines, retired about sunset. 

At White House, Sheridan found a train of 900 wagons, 
which, after breaking up the depot at that place, he was 
directed to bring over to the James River, directing his 
march on Bermuda Hundred, where General Butler had a 
pontoon bridge. This involved a flank march of three 
days, in the face of a vigilant and daring enemy ; and as 
the trains would occupy more than ten miles of road, was 
an extremely hazardous undertaking. However, Sheridan 



CAVALJiV TRA NSA C TIONS. 657 

and liis troopers were equal to the task imposed upon 
them. 

On the morning of the 2 2d, Torbert was sent in advance 
of the trains to secure the crossing at Jones' Bridge, whilst 
Gregg moved on a parallel road on the right flank of the 
long line of wagons. The march was undisturbed, and on 
the evening of the 23d the trains were all safely parked on 
the south side of the Chickahominy ; the night passed 
quietly, aud on the morning of the 24th Torbert again 
moved in advance on the Charles City Court House road, as 
escort to the trains. When Torbert' s advance reached the 
courthouse it encountered the enemy and drew him across 
Herring Creek, on the western or Harrison's Landing road. 
Torbert pushed his entire division to the front, and the 
trains, which had passed beyond the courthouse, were all 
parked, and their direction changed to Wilcox Landing, on 
the James, instead of Bermuda Hundred, their original 
destination. Gregg moved on the road leading by St. 
Mary's Church to Haxall's Landing, covering, as on the 
previous day, the right flank of the trains. 

The Second Division, with the Second Brigade (Col. 
Irvin Gregg's) in the advance, reached the vicinity of St. 
Mary's Church about noon, where it encountered a small 
mounted force of the enemy, which it drove away. Gregg 
having received intelligence of the change of affairs in 
front, and being directed to hold on to his position near the 
church, took up a strong position across the St. Mary's 
Church and Haxall's Lauding road, the right and left of his 
line resting on a swamp, and his artillery posted upon com- 
manding ground in the center, Randol on the right near 
the road, and Dennison on the left. It was known that a 
large force of the enemy were in his front across the Haxall 
road, and the sound of axes could be distinctly heard in the 
intervals between the firing, showing that they were obstruct- 
ing the road. The morning passed, and through the after- 
noon, hot and sultry, until the shadows begau to leugthen, 
the sharp reports of the carbiues rolled from right to left, 

XLII 



658 THE ARMY OF THE POTflMAC. 

and back again ; the woods became hazy from the smoke, 
and as the pressure of the enemy's skirmishers became 
heavier, one after another of the regiments of the Second 
Brigade were dismounted and placed in Hue in front of the 
guns. 

At four o'clock p. m. , the enemy being apprised by 
a captured dispatch from Sheridan to Gregg that we were 
acting on the defensive, massed his troops for an attack. 
Their onset struck the ist Maine and 13th Pennsylvania 
on the right, and was repulsed. Swinging to the right, it 
struck the 2d, 4th, and 8th Pennsylvania ; was again re- 
pulsed. Swinging still further around to the right, and 
under cover of the woods, the left of the Second Brigade 
was pushed back, and the enemy gained the edge of the 
woods midway between Randol's and Dennison's batteries. 
Then those guns began to thunder. Shot and shell, case 
and canister were poured in rapid succession into the ad- 
vancing enemy. Attempt after attempt was made to 
debouch from the woods ; but for more than an hour did 
those heroic cannoneers sweep the plain in front of their 
guns. On the right the dismounted men of the Second Bri- 
gade poured in incessant volleys ; on the left the mounted 
troopers of the First held the open fields in their front. 
And so the fight raged around the center. The horses of 
Randol and Dennison were falling rapidly under the v/ith- 
ering fire from the woods. Dust and smoke obscured the 
field ; the sun was already sunken behind the trees ; but 
the fight still went on around the center, where the enemy 
seemed to have massed his forces, determined to break 
through. 

At this juncture an order came to Colonel Oregg to 
withdraw from the right and form his brigade at Hopewell 
Church, on the Charles City road. It being impracticable to 
comply with this order. Colonel Gregg sent the i6tli Penn- 
sylvania Cavalry, which had remained mounted and in sup- 
port of Randol's battery, to take up this position, while the 
dismounted regiments withdrew, disputing every inch of 



CA VA L R V TR A NSA CTIO NS. 659 

the ground. Near Hopewell Church they found their led 
horses, and mounting and returning, formed a formidable 
line behind the i6th, in which position they repulsed the 
last attack, long after dark, and then withdrew to Charles 
City without molestation. 

The above order to Colonel Gregg, directing him to 
withdraw from the right and form his brigade at Hopewell 
Church, at the same time informed him that General 
Davies' brigade, being mounted, would cover the crossing 
of the swamp ; and the dismounted regiments prepared to 
withdraw. General Davies, being under the impression 
that the Second Brigade had, in compliance with orders, 
fallen back to the new position, withdrew, and thus un- 
covered the left of the Second Brigade before its leading 
regiments had reached the swamp over which we had to 
pass. The enemy, finding the opposition on his right 
withdrawn, debouched from the woods and moved rapidly 
across the field of battle toward the road on which we had 
advanced in the morning, and along which the dismounted 
men of the 2d, 4th, 8th, and 13th Pennsylvania and ist 
Maine Cavalry were in the act of retiring. 

This road being sunk several feet below the level of the 
surrounding fields, these advancing and retiring troops 
were not aware of their proximity to each other, until Col- 
onel Covode of the 4th Pennsylvania, who had mounted to 
the summit of the bank, supposing the advancing lines to 
be friends, called out to know who they were, when he was 
immediately shot and fell, mortally wounded. The retir- 
ing regiments promptly faced to the right and poured in a 
volley which checked momentarily the advance of the 
enemy ; and, under cover of the increasing darkness, tliese 
regiments crossed the swamp, slowly and sullenly disput- 
ing every inch of the ground. 

Of this affair, Sheridan says : "This \'Q.xy creditable en- 
gagement saved the train, which never should have been 
left for the cavalry to escort. ' ' 



CHAPTER XXL 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 

/\ FTER several days of desperate fighting at Cold Har- 
-^- ^ bor, in wliich the Army of the Potomac lost heavily, 
Grant decided against Halleck's suggestion of attempting 
to take Richmond by the Peninsular route, and at once laid 
his plans to cross to the south side of the James and cut off 
the enemy's communications with the southeast by tapping 
the railroads. In the mean time he had sent Sheridan with 
two divisions of cavalry to more effectually tear up and 
destroy the railroads north of Richmond ; also to take 
orders to Hunter, who had met Jones at Piedmont and 
defeated him — taking some 1500 prisoners. Lee, learning 
of Sheridan' s movements, directed Hampton and Fitz-Hugh 
Lee to pursue him with their divisions of cavalry, while 
Breckinridge's division of infantry was directed to return to 
the valley. Also, seeing the gravity of the situation from a 
junction of the forces under Hunter, he ordered Early to 
follow Breckinridge and take command of the forces 
threatening Washington, which would relieve Lynchburg. 
Thus the two commanders were playing a desperate game 
for success — Grant to save the nation established by the 
heroes of the Revolution, Lee to destroy it. Grant, in his 
proposition to transfer the Army of the Potomac to the 
south side of the James River, uncovered Washington, but 
Lee could not afford to leave Grant so near Richmond, while 
trying to capture Washington, for two corps could have 
taken Richmond with Lee's army marching on Washington, 
and the other corps of the Army of the Potomac could 
have taken steamers and been in the fortifications in front 
6G0 



,^f^ 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 661 

of Washington before the Confederates could have arrived 
there. As Grant could not weave a net around Richmond 
while he remained on the north side of the James, and 
the Peninsula had been fortified almost to perfection, 
and it would have cost thousands of lives for the x-lrmy of 
the Potomac to have forced its way through tliem, while 
the enemy could have retired to another line of works if 
driven, he gave orders for the army to prepare to cross the 
James River. General Smith, known as "Old Baldy," 
was directed to return by the way of the White House, 
thence by steamer around to Butler at Bermuda Hundred, 
where upon landing he was to rapidly march on Peters- 
burg and capture it before Lee was aware of the new 
movement. 

The heights four miles out of Petersburg had been forti- 
fied by the Confederates, it being the highest point, and 
readily commanded the front with artillery. Their line of 
works extended around from the Appomattox in a semi- 
circular form until it reached Rives' house, near the Jeru- 
salem plank road ; there it abruptly turned west, crossing 
the road, and continued in the direction of the Weldon 
Railroad. It was these works on the east of the Cockade 
City that Smith was expected to attack and take. Smith 
arrived at Bermuda Hundred on the evening of the 14th, 
and immediately prepared to advance on Petersburg and 
attack the fortifications, then occupied by Wise with his 
brigade and what militia could be secured in the vicinity. 
Martindale's division moved on the right, and was expected 
to strike the City Point Railroad ; Brooks, on his left, with 
the division of colored troops was to follow up and support 
Kautz's cavalry, which was to cover the left flank of Smith's 
forces. Kautz was to move so as to threaten the fortifica- 
tions at the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. Some two 
miles from Bermuda Hundred Kautz struck some intrench- 
ments, when he veered to the left, which let up the colored 
troops, who spiritedly advanced and took them, capturing 
one ofnn. 



662 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

When Smitli came up to the line of fortifications they 
appeared so formidable, and the artillery was so active that 
"Old Baldy" feared a sufficient force of infantry was 
at hand to support the artillery, and desisted from attacking 
until he could make an examination and be sure that he 
would not suffer a repulse before the Army of the Potomac 
arrived to sustain him. His belief was sustained perhaps 
by the fact that Lee had been able to divine the proposed 
movements of Grant, and place himself in his front in time 
to thwart the Union commander's intentions. But in this 
case Lee had been deceived by Warren's movement on the 
night of the 12th, as if he intended to turn Lee's right by 
the White Oak Swamp road. Crossing the Chickahominy 
at Long Br'dge, Warren advanced two divisions in the 
direction of Richmond to support Wilson's cavalry. Late 
in the day the enemy apj)eared in Warren's front, but find- 
ing him in line of battle, did not attack him, but began 
throwing up intrenchments which expressed a fear that 
Grant would attempt to force his way to Richmond by the 
river route. In the mean time the different corps were 
marched to the James River to be crossed to the south side. 
The trains were moved across the Peninsula at Windsor 
Shades and Cole's Ferry, while the Army of the Potomac 
crossed above. Thus the whole army was transferred to 
the soLith side of the James by noon of the i6th ; Hancock 
had crossed the river on the morning of the 15th, and it was 
Grant's intention for him to press forward and assist Smith 
in the assault on Petersburg. It seems that no one except 
Grant understood that, and Hancock waited for rations un- 
til half past ten, when he received orders to march without 
them. This so delayed him that the Second Corps did not 
arrive near Smith's position until late in the evening, when 
Hancock reported to Smith in advance of his columns. 

In the mean time Smith had ordered a heavy line of 
skirmishers to advance on the works, instead of a line of 
battle, as the enemy's artillery would do less damage to the 
skirmish line. The colored troops on the left under 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. G63 

Hicks, and Brooks' soldiers in the center, carried over a mile 
and a half front of the enemy's works with sixteen cannon. 
Then Smith's line of battle advanced and occnpied the for- 
tifications. Hoke's division had been sent to Petersburg 
on Beauregard's urgent request to Lee to reenforce him. 
Lee was ready to cross his army above Drury's Bluff, but 
he seemed uncertain as to Grant's movements. It is true 
if Grant could have induced Lee to throw his whole army 
into Petersburg he (Grant) could then have marched up the 
peninsular route and taken Richmond, so Lee's tardiness in 
reenforcing Beauregard was not without its value. His 
troops were there in ample time to prevent the fall of the 
Cockade City. There was certainly a great mistake in not 
hurrying forward the troops after the James was crossed. 
Grant had delayed one day on account of his trains from 
the White House which crossed the Peninsula lower down. 
If Hancock had been aware of the urgent necessity of his 
presence at Petersburg he could have arrived there four hours 
earlier, which would have been half past two. As it was, 
the head of Birney's column came in sight about half past 
six ; even then, if Birney's and Gibbon's divisions had been 
put in, the intrenchments and fortifications between the 
Appomattox River and City Point Railroad could have been 
easily carried, and occupied before Hagood's brigade of 
Hoke's division could have taken its position there. With 
the whole of their front in possession of the Union forces, 
Petersburg would have fallen an easy prey, and saved the 
long and desperate siege, with its heavy list of killed and 
wounded ; for the Confederate forces could not have held on 
to their works on the left with our troops marching on 
their base from the right. No attempt was made to ad- 
vance that night, but Smith requested Hancock to relieve 
his troops, which he did about eleven o'clock. Hancock, 
who ranked Smith, icceived a dispatch from Grant to hold 
his position until che other corps could come up, as Lee had 
forwarded reenforcements to Beauregard. 

General Burnside was ordered to cross the James on the 



664 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

morning of the 15th and follow Hancock, and take a posi- 
tion between him and Smith. Warren followed Burnside, 
and at midnight on the i6th halted a few miles in the rear. 
Wright, with the Sixth Corps, bronght up the rear, and 
crossed over after he called in the cavalry, and had them 
precede him. 

On the evening of the 15th Beauregard saw his lines 
partially in possession of the Union forces, but so far Lee 
had received his urgent appeals in silence, with the excep- 
tion of returning Hoke's division to him. On the arrival of 
Hancock two corps were facing him (Beauregard) and his 
right center for nearly two miles had been captured and held. 
He could not cling to his position on the extreme right, be- 
tween the Appomattox River and the City Point Railroad, 
and on the left, unless he could be reenforced and retake that 
position of the line occupied by Smith and Hancock. So 
during the night of the 15th he withdrew Johnson's divi- 
sion, posted near the James above Bermuda Hundred. At 
the same time he notified Lee of his action about two o'clock 
on the morning of the i6th. This compelled Lee to occupy 
the position which Johnson had vacated on the order of 
Beauregard. Just before day Lee moved Pickett's division 
to Drury's Bluff, on the James, to cross and occupy the po- 
sition Johnson had, for only Grade's brigade had been left 
to occupy a long line, and, if Beauregard's statement in 
his telegram to Lee was correct, that Grant was crossing his 
army to the south side of the James, which Lee answered 
by telegraph that he (Lee) was not aware of it. Grant could 
send a force against Oracle and brush him away ; so Lee 
at once decided to put Pickett on the south side of the river, 
and ordered Field to follow him, while Hill remained at 
Riddell's Shop and Kershaw at Malvern Hill. At that 
very time Wright was preparing to have Wilson's cavalry 
march over before the Peninsula was evacuated b\^ the last 
corps of the Army of the Potomac. Butler had directed 
Terry to move on the position occupied by Gracie, but he 
encountered Pickett and Field and withdrew. 




GEN. JAMES A. BEAVER. 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 665 

On the morning of the i6th Plancock directed Egan to 
assault Redan No. 12, which he carried in the most gaUant 
manner. The two forces rested in close proximity to each 
other until late in the afternoon, when Meade arrived and, 
after examining the enemy's position, directed Hancock to 
make an attack, which he did about six o'clock p. m. He 
was supported by two brigades on his left of the Ninth 
Corps, and on his right by two of Smith's. On the left 
Redans 13 and 14 were carried, while No. 4, on the right, 
fell into our hands. Our losses were very heavy in that as- 
sault. Among the dead was numbered Col. Patrick Kelly, 
of the 8Sth New York, wh6 fell gallantly leading his 
brigade. Colonel Beaver, of the 148th Penns\-lvania, was 
severely wounded. He has since been Governor of the 
Keystone State and a prominent man in national affairs. 
That evening orders were given to advance at early dawn 
on the 17th. This important work was assigned to Griffin, 
who worked all night getting his command ready for the 
attack. It was executed in a most skillful manner. He 
says : 

I then spent the entire night moving my troops through the 
felled timber, getting them in proper position, and preparing for 
attack. I placed my brigade on the left of the Second Corps in a 
ravine immediately in front of the Shade House, which the enemy 
held, and within one hundred yards of their lines, with Curtin on 
my left and a little further to the rear on account of the conforma- 
tion of the ground. We were so near the enemy that all our move- 
ments had to be made with the utmost care and caution ; canteens 
were placed in knapsacks to prevent rattling, and all commands 
were given in whispers. I formed my brigade in tvvo lines * * * 
Colonel Curtin formed in the same way. * * * ]\Iy orders were 
not to fire a shot, but to depend wholly on the bayonet in carrying 
the lines. 

Just as the dawn began to light up in the east, I gave the com- 
mand, "Forward." It pas.sed along the lines in a whisper, the men 
sprang to their feet and both brigades moved forward at once in 
well formed lines, sweeping directly over the enemy's works, taking 
them completely by surprise, and carrying all before us. 

One gunner saw vis approaching and fired his piece. That was 
all we heard from them, and almost the only shot fired on eilher 



666 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

side. The Confederates were asleep with their arms in their hands, 
and man}' of them sprang up and ran away as we came over, others 
surrendered without resistance. We swept their lines for a mile 
from where my right rested, gathering in prisoners and abandoned 
arms and equipments all the way. Four pieces of artillery, with 
caissons and horses, a stand of colors, six hundred prisoners, fifteen 
hundred stand of arms, and some ammunition fell into our hands. 

The enemy was pursued by Potter to Harrison's Creek, 
where he was found strongly posted on its west bank. Wil- 
cox then made an attack on that part of the line, but was 
unable to carry it, althotigh he was supported by Barlow on 
the right, who always fought with great intrepidity. Late 
in the day Colonel Gould, of the 59th Massachusetts, com- 
manding Ledlie's division, was ordered to attack where Wil- 
cox failed. Gould was supported on the left by Crawford and 
Barlow, and on the right with the assistance of all our artil- 
lery, while the advance of Gibbon and Birney to Harri- 
son's Creek aided this movement. This effort of Gould's 
was partly successftil. After a fearftil loss he carried 
a part of the enemy's works, but his men being out of am- 
munition, were driven back by Grade's brigade. That 
ended the conflict for the day, with Beatiregard cling- 
ing to the west side of Harrison's Creek to the Norfolk 
Railroad, and on the extreme right from the Appomattox 
to Redan No. 3. 

Beatiregard had been fighting heavily all day, and had 
stubbornly resisted the advance of the Union army o\'er 
Harrison's Creek, yet Lee was not certain that Grant had 
crossed the James, so he sent his son, W. H. F. Lee, with 
a division of cavalry, to ascertain if it was a feint on Grant's 
part to induce him to vacate the Peninsula, and then march 
up the left bank of the James and capture Richmond. 
Beauregard was uncertain whether Lee would recuforce 
him or not, as he had practically turned a deaf ear to him 
for two days. It was evident that he could not long hold 
the line on the west side of Harrison's Creek, for he had 
been strained to the last extremity to withstand the attacks 







GKN. Cx. T. liKAURKOARI) 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 667 

of that day, and night did not come too soon for his safety, 
for the Fifth Corps had arrived and took a position to assist 
the Ninth Corps, and particij)ated in the night attack on 
his lines. His line was too long for the troops he had, 
and Lee was astride of the James, not knowing until late 
in the afternoon of the 17th where Grant's army was, and 
then he did not telegraph Beauregard, but ordered Kershaw 
and Field, about three o'clock on the morning of the i8th, 
to march from in front of Bermuda Hundred to Petersburg. 

In the mean time Beauregard had removed back to a 
position in advance of the Jerusalem plank road, which in 
all probability had been selected before in case of neces- 
sity. This line was much shorter, and as a consequence 
could be better defended with the same number of troops. 
It intersected the first line at Rives' house near the Jeru- 
salem plank road where it turned west across the road. Lee 
had decided to transfer his headquarters to Petersburg, and 
arrived there with Kershaw and Field. Kershaw relieved 
Johnson's division while Field took position on the right of 
Kershaw. Hill coming up during the day extended the 
Confederate line still farther to the right. While the night 
attack of the 17th was not successful, yet it warranted 
Meade in the belief that the next morning with the Second, 
Ninth, and Fifth Corps, in line from right to left in the 
order named, he could successfully break Beauregard's line; 
but this movement was delayed until about noon. When 
the advance was made, it was discovered that only a strong 
skirmish line held Harrison's Creek, which rapidly retreated 
back on Beauregard's new position. 

The Second Corps, on the right, under Birney (Han- 
cock's wound having broken out, he was compelled to 
yield up the command of the Second), had a shorter distance 
to march, and were first to arrive in front of the new 
position. The Ninth Corps, in the center, struck the enemv 
at the Norfolk Railroad cut, which he was holdiug concealed 
in a ravine. Here Burnside met stubborn resistance. 
Warren, on his left, attempted to relieve him, but having 



668 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMA C. 

to march over a mile came under the same galling fire that 
Burnside had been subjected to from the railroad cut, and 
from ravines in his front. Finally that part of the Confed- 
erate line was forced into the works when Burnside got 
within loo yards of them. Warren swung around and 
placed his line only a few feet from them, when Col, Joshua 
ly. Chamberlain, in command of a newly organized brigade 
composed of Roy Stone's old brigade, the i2ist Pennsylva- 
nia, and the i42d Pennsylvania of Rowley's brigade, with 
the iS7th Pennsylvania, was severely wounded, or else it 
was quite probable that that brigade of seven regiments 
would have carried the works at that point. General 
Grant, learning of Chamberlain's great gallantry there, 
promoted him to brigadier general on the field, and re- 
qnested his nomination to be sent immediately to the 
United States Senate for confirmation. Colonel Tilden of 
the i6tli Maine assumed command of the brigade when 
Colonel Chamberlain fell. 

Smith had returned to the Bermuda Hundred j^art of the 
line under Butler, with the exception of Martindale's divi- 
sion, which was temporarily detained to assist in the assault 
on the i8th. Advancing on the right of the Second Corps 
he succeeded in taking some rifle-pits immediately in front 
of the main line, but was unable to advance any farther. 

A most gallant and persistent assault had been made all 
along the line by Martindale, Birney, Burnside, and War- 
ren, but the enemy had been able to hold his j^osition in 
the works, which had been made hastily in a few hours. 
General Grant studied over the situation, and deeming it 
wise to desist from further attack, directed .the troops to be 
put under shelter, and given a much needed rest in a cam- 
paign which began at the Rapidan on the 4th of May 
and ended at Petersburg on the i8th of June. 

The First Maine Heavy Artillery made a charge at five 
o'clock which was as distinguished as the Light Brigade 
at Balaklava. Although Colonel Chaplin carried the colors 
off the field, yet, in less than twenty minutes, he left 603 




GEN. JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN. 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 669 

men out of 900, wlio were either killed or wounded. The 
regiment lost 423 killed during its term of service. 

That night the Union army made a line of works from 
the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank road, in front of 
the Confederate line, again hugging the last position of 
Beauregard, so when day appeared the enemy saw that a 
regular line of fortifications was well under way, and that it 
could be completed under cover from sharpshooters and the 
fire of infantry. Both armies began perfecting their intrench- 
nients, and nothing occurred for a few days except the con- 
stant firing of the sharpshooters, with now and then an artil- 
lery duel. Capt. A. M. Judson, of the 83d Pennsylvania, 
in Baitlett's brigade, thus describes the works of our line: 

The breastworks were from ten to twelve feet in thickness, and 
under them bombproofs were constructed for shelter in case of a 
shelling from the mortar batteries of the enemy. 

Bombproofs were also made for the officers, whose quarters 
were not so close to the breastworks, and who were in danger of 
being blown into the air at an 3- moment the Confederates should see 
proper to drop a bombshell over into our midst. The proofs were 
constructed as follows : 

A hole was dug in the ground in the shape of a cellar, say four 
feet deep, and eight or ten feet square. Blocks, cut from pine trees, 
a foot in thickness, were placed as uprights at the corners of the 
excavations, and upon these pine logs were laid, completely cover- 
ing the cellar. Dirt was then thrown upon them and packed down 
until there was a covering of several feet of solid earth In this 
manner thousands of bombproofs were built along the whole line 
of both armies. They were much cooler than tents, and sheltered us 
from the hot raj'S of the sun as well as from the shells of the enemy. 

The line of works from the Appomattox to the Jerusa- 
lem plank road was so well completed that all the troops 
were not needed on that front, so preparations were made 
to extend our line to the left beyond that road. Wright, 
who had been ordered to go to Butler's assistance with two 
divisions, had then joined the Army of the Potomac. Bir- 
ney was directed to withdraw from the intrenchments, and 
the Ninth Corps stretched to the right, occupying the po- 



670 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

sition vacated by the Second Corps. Thus the front from 
the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank road was occupied 
by the Ninth and Fifth Corps. 

Birney was directed to cross the Jerusalem road near 
where Fort Hell was afterwards built. Griffin's division of 
the Fifth Corps rested on that road. Gibbon formed on Grif- 
fin's left, while Mott moved past Gibbon, with Barlow form- 
ing the left of the Second, and the extreme left of our army. 
Wright's corps marched in the rear of Birney quite a distance, 
and was expected to move on and strike the Weldon Rail- 
road. Lee anticipated the movement, and directed Wilcox 
to move out and form across Wright's front, which would 
take him in flank. But Wilcox returned that evening with 
his division, and reported that he found no enemy. On the 
2 2d, when the Second Corps had moved out beyond the 
Jerusalem road in front of Fort ]Mahone, called by our troops 
Fort Damnation, Lee, Hill, and Mahone stood observing the 
movements of the Second Corps. In the mean time, Wil- 
cox had been sent again to intercept the advance of Wright. 
Lee said those trooops ought to be prevented from ex- 
tending in the direction of the Weldon Railroad. Mahone 
said to him, "If you desire me to attack them, I will." 
"Well," said Lee, "I wish you would." Mahone then 
gave orders to his brigade commanders to move the troops 
back into the ravine, then proceed westerly nearly a mile, 
when the direction was changed south, gaining a piece of 
woods. There Mahone formed line of battle facing east, 
and advancing struck Barlow while his men had their arms 
stacked. It was impossible for Barlow to get his men in 
line to resist the impetuous charge of the fiery Mahone. 

Mott's division at once yielded to the onward advance of 
the Confederate force which struck Gibbon's left. vSeveral 
of Gibbon's regiments lost their colors and many prisoners 
Mahone says he captured over i,6oo prisoners and four guns. 
Mahone' s right flank marched close to the Sixth Corps, 
but the movement was so rapid that Wright was unable to 
assist Birney, as Wilcox had again appeared in his front 




GEN. I). B. BIRNEY. 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 



671 



with a heavy skirmish line. Wilcox did not attempt to 
attack Wright, but merely impeded his advance to the 
Weldon Railroad. It was a brilliant and successful charge 
on the part of ^lahone, though unassisted by the artillery 
which had been ordered to open fire as he advanced. Birney 
reformed his corps in the evening, and prepared to resume 
the position from which he had been driven early the next 
morning. IMahone retired with his prisoners, cannon, and 
other things he had captured, while Wilcox retired in the rear 
of ^^lahone, which movement gave Wright the opportunity 
of forming on the left of Birney with his left refused back 
and his pfckets thrown out in the direction of the Weldon 
Railroad. Our line then being established from the Appo- 
mattox to near the Weldon Railroad, the troops again began 
intrenching and building fortifications. Lyle's brigade, of 
Crawford's division, composed of the i6th Maine, 13th 
Massachusetts, 39th :\Iassachusetts, 104th New York, 90th 
Pennsylvania, and 107th Pennsylvania, constructed Fort 
Davis, in memory of Colonel Davis, of the 39th Massachu- 
setts, who was mortally wounded there. At the Jerusalem 
plank road Fort Sedgwick, better known as Fort Hell, was 
built. It received the latter name from the Confederates 
who suffered from the artillery in the fort. It was uni- 
versally known in both armies as Fort Hell, and should be 
so recorded in history. The Jerusalem road runs in a 
southerly direction at that point, and the fort was mainly 
built on the east side of it. Its outlines are still well pre- 
served to this day ; being in the edge of a wood it has never 
been disturbed. It was finished and occupied about the 

loth of July. 

No one more fully understood that Grant was weaving 
a web around him than Lee. Hunter was approaching 
Lynchburg, and with the Confederate force there it was 
sure to fall into Hunter's hands ; then his communications 
with the southwest would be cut off, and, as Wilson had 
just destroyed the routes south, Lee was compelled to act 
at once or be shut up in the fortifications around Richmond 



672 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

without the hope of any new supplies, which would compel 
him to surrender in a very short time. He occupied the 
interior line at Petersburg, which was then so well in- 
trenched that, with a comparatively small number of troops, 
he could keep the Army of the Potomac at bay ; so he de- 
tached Early with his corps, to go to the relief of Lynch- 
burg, where he arrived just in time to prevent its capture. 
Hunter's ammunition giving out, he retired by the Gauley 
and Kanawha Rivers, which left the route of the Shenan- 
doah open to Early to march on Washington, as it was im- 
possible for Hunter to gain the Ohio River and transport 
his army there in time to intercept him. Early had ample 
time. Grant was fully aware of Early's movements, and 
directed Ricketts to be sent to the aid of Lew Wallace, to 
assist in impeding Early's advance on Washington. 

When Early crossed the Potomac Lew Wallace left Bal- 
timore to meet him. When Ricketts arrived and found 
Gen. Lew Wallace gone, he at once followed and overtook 
him on the left bank of the Monocac)'. There a stubborn 
battle was fought, in which Wallace and Ricketts disj^layed 
great generalship ; and, although overpowered, yet they 
delayed Early long enough for Wright to get to Washing- 
ton with Russell's and Getty's divisions, which advanced 
out beyond Brightwood, and formed line of battle in time 
to confront Early there. Wright v/as reenforced by General 
Emory with the Nineteenth Corps. With these two corps an 
extended line of battle was formed in a semicircle around 
the city ; and the clerks and employees from the different 
departments were formed into battalions. Early, seeing that 
the city was guarded b}- a heavy force, did not press his suit, 
but retreated in the direction from which he had come. 

It is alleged on apparently good authority — although 
stoutly denied by General Early — that his delay was partly 
caused by some of his officers getting into the wine cellar 
at the country residence of Montgomery Blair, and getting 
so "funny" that they put on the dresses left there by the 
ladies of the Blair family, and had a dance in the door-yard. 




GEN. H. G. WRIGHT. 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 673 

While the Union army lay in front of Petersburg, 
stretched from the Jerusalem plank road to the James River, 
many plans to break through the enemy's works were sug- 
gested, for it was known that Lee could be easily routed if 
only a breach in his fortifications could be made. Gen. 
(then Maj.) Hollon Richardson, of the Iron Brigade, went 
to Warren and offered to carry a point in Lee's line if he 
(Warren) would give him looo tried men. 

Warren agreed to it, and the men were selected, but the 
assault was never made by Richardson. In the mean time, 
Colonel Pleasants induced Burnside to mine up to the 
enemy's works and blow up one of their forts. About the 
25th of July the different approaches, or mines, were under 
way. It was a most ingenious scheme on a gigantic scale, 
well planned and admirably executed. 

The only failure consisted in our forces not advancing 
when the mine was blown up on the morning of the 30th 
of July, for Lee had weakened his line by sending Wilcox, 
Kershaw, and Heth to checkmate Hancock's movement on 
Richmond, for, on the 26th, four days before the mine was 
to be exploded, Grant had sent Hancock and Sheridan 
across the James to draw as much of Lee's force away as 
possible, as in case he did not do that, Richmond was at 
their mercy. But Lee was too wily to permit Richmond 
to be taken ; so he reduced his forces in front of Petersburg 
so much that when the mine was exploded, just at dawn 
on the morning of the 3otli, his troops would have been 
unable to hold their fortifications if Hollon Richardson 
had been permitted to lead his proposed charge with his 
picked and drilled men. Some picked officer, like Sheri- 
dan, should have led that charge. I have carefully exam- 
ined the lines and the Crater, in company with General 
Mahone, and I so fully believe that he clearly and correctly 
states the situation that I invited him to write the history 
of that action. The following is his statement of the 
work there that day : 



674 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The; Crater, Petersburg, Va., July 30, 1864. 

After the first battle of Manassas the Confederates and much of 
their press ridiculed the Federal army for " shooting too high," till 
that army learned to shoot to kill. So, likewise, they laughed at 
the plans of the Federal generals for the capture of the Confederate 
capital, insisting that the consummation of that object could only 
be accomplished by an approach from the south. So, after all the 
terrific efforts which had been made from the North and General 
McClellan's inglorious failure on the Peninsula, General Grant, by 
the sliding yet costly process from the Wilderness, landed, as the 
last resort, on the south bankof the James and marched upon Peters- 
burg — the back door to the Confederate capital — making Cit}^ Point 
on the James, only nine miles away, the base of his operations. 

Petersburg, twenty-two miles south of Richmond, had been en- 
circled with a cordon of forts and connecting curtains far too elabo- 
rate and extensive for occupation by an army of .the proportions to 
which General Lee's had never really reached, when it had also to 
cover Richmond and the intervening space between the two rivers — • 
the James and Appomattox. At Petersbvtrg General Beauregard was 
in command. When General Burnside's corps advanced upon the 
works of the city, General I^ee had not j-et crossed the James. Gen- 
eral Beauregard's force at this moment consisted of General Hooke's 
division and General Wise's brigade, with the usual complement of 
artillery. 

This force, wholly inadequate to the efficient occupancy even of 
that very limited portion of the line of works established for the 
defense of the city, against which the Federals advanced, was quickly 
overrun and compelled to retire nearer the city ; just where they 
halted and refaced the enemy, now nigh. The future line of defense 
was now taken up haphazard, and extended to a junction with the 
permanent line of fortifications, at a point commonly called on the 
Confederate side, the " Rives Salient," about three miles from and 
south of the Appomattox River. The Federals now occupied that 
portion of the permanent works which had been established for the 
defense of Petersburg, opposite this haphazard new line of the Con- 
federates. Thus General Lee found the situation when he reached 
Petersburg on the i8th. 

Presuming, as he always did, that I knew the country' around 
Petersburg, and restive under the idea of being pent u]), he came 
upon the field near the Rives Salient, and, after having taken in the 
situation, the Federal army now rapidly occup^'ing our line, asked 
me what had best be done. M3' division w'as not then in line, nor 
was any part of Hill's corps. 

My advice was that he abandon the line of permanent works and 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 675 

extend the newly adopted line from the Rives Saltent aloni^ the Je- 
rusalem plank road to Second Swamp — some three miles away — using 
that barrier for protection to his right flank, thus reducing, immense- 
ly, the length of the line he would have to cover, and leaving him 
in better shape for meeting any attempt to turn his right, or for re- 
pelling a direct attack. But he said, "No, we cannot afford to sit 
down and become invested." He was alwa3'S for battle. 

General L,ee subsequently asked me to examine the line carefully 
between the Rives Salient and the river — the haphazard portion of 
the line. I did, and reported it — the haphazard line — as untenable, 
and could bs taken at almost any point whenever a vigorous assault 
should be made. The weaker points, after the battle of the Crater, 
were reinforced by supplemental works. For some time it was 
known in all the army— certainly that around Petersburg — that the 
enemy were mining, and if not at other points, certainly at the de- 
fenseless silient known as the Elliott Salient, or Pegram's battery. 
General Beauregard's command was known to cover this part of the 
line, and his reputation as an engineer officer went largely to com- 
po,se the fears of all, when it was tinderstood that undv-T his direction 
a " countermine " was underway. Unfortunately the countermine 
was not a success. It was made above the enemy's mine. On the 
night of the 29th of July General Lee had reason to anticipate that 
the enem;/ designed somewhere an assault the next morning, and so 
sent around an order that all should be under arms at daylight on 
the morning of the 30th of July. No such order was issued to hold 
myself in readiness to move at a moment's notice, in such emergen- 
cy ; and this is verified by Colonels Ta3dor and Venable, of General 
Lee's staff. Field's division and Gen. Bushrod Johnson's, embracing 
the Elliott Salient (shortly to become the Crater), were in the trenches 
between my division and it. The left of my division rested at the 
terrible Rives Salient, and thence for about one mile toward the 
Weldon Railroad ; and along this portion of ni}' front the enemy's 
line, only here and there observable, was quite half a mile away. 

An inspection of the map, which gives the position of the two 
armies at this time, leaves the imagination ho play as to the peril 
to which General Lee's army was exposed. If the mine — itself a 
siiccess, making an immense breach in General Lee's works, unsup- 
ported by any reserve force, and consternation all around the breach 
rampant — had been followed up by a vigorous attacking column, and 
the force was there, it may not be too much to say that the retreat to 
which he was compelled nine raonth» later, would then have been 
unavoidable and most likely in the order of the d 1 take the hind- 
most. After the explosion there was nothing on the Confederate 
side to prevent the ord^irly projection of any column through the 



676 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

breach which had been effected, cutting the Confederate army in 
twain, rendering the rescue of the larger portion of its artillery quite 
impossible, the retirement of its infantry, now in the trenches, to 
chance, and opening wide the gates to the rear of the Confederate 
capital. 

On the Federal side the troops for a column of 45,000 muskets, 
according to accounts, was there— right at the spot. The corps of 
Burnside, Ord and Warren were at hand, but the directing general 
was too far away, and the attacking corps seemed to have been lack- 
ing the requisite presence and direction of integral commanders who 
knew the plan and the thing to do. 

I was near the middle of my division and quickly realized that 
elsewhere than my front the fight was to be, and the first I knew of 
the Crater, beyond the tremendous report of the explosion, came 
from a soldier, who, from thereabouts, hatless and shoeless, passed 
me, still going, and only time to say, " H—1 has busted." About 
this time. Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, rode up and said : 
' ' General Lee requests that you send two of the brigades of your 
division to the support of Gen. Bushrod Johnson." Subsequently, 
and while on the way, I said to Colonel Venable : " I can't send my 
brigades to General Johnson. I will go with them myself." The 
Virginia and Georgia lirigades were on the right and were ordered 
to drop back in such order to the ravine in the rear as to avoid pos- 
sible disclosure of this denuding of my front. They were so con- 
ducted by ravines in the general direction of the Crater as to conceal 
the march of the limited column from the enemy. The morning 
was warm and sultry. Before reaching the covered way which led 
up to the rear of General Johnson's line covering the Crater the 
brigades were halted and ordered to strip. 

Reachingtheentranceof the covered way, the head of the column 
was turned into it, and I rode over to General Johnson's headquarters, 
which were on the Ice or north side of Blandford Heights, ir.terv^en- 
ing his headquarters and the scene of the disaster which had oc- 
curred on his front, full one mile awa3^ The primary object cf my 
visit to General Johnson's headquarters was to see General Hill, my 
corps commander, whom I had been informed was there. I, of course, 
did not expect to find General Johnson anywhere else- than on the 
ground where his front had been pierced. General Hill was not at 
General Johnson's headquarters, but General Beauregard was. Sa- 
luting him, I said : " General, I have, by direction cf General Lee, 
two brig.idco of my division on the way, near at hand, for the reen- 
forcemcnt of General Johnson." General Beauregard, calling up 
General Johnson, whom I did not personally know, nnd who ap- 
peared to be about ready to take his breakfast, said : " General, you 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 677 

had better turn over any outlying- troops you may have to General 
Mahone, and let him make the attack," to which General John- 
son cheerfully replied in the aflirmative. 

Th^n I asked General Johnson what frontage on his line the 
enemy occupied. "The retrenched cavalier," he answered, and I 
rejoined : " In feet I want to know. General Johnson, that, as you 
may imagine, I may determine the face of my attacking force," and 
then he said about one hundred yards. I then asked General John- 
son to show me the way to the Crater. Whereupon, calling to some 
lieuteniiit of his staff, he said to him : " Show General Mahone the 
way to the Elliott Salient, or Pegram's battery." 

Leaving General Johnson and his headquarters and with the 
lieutenant I proceeded hurriedly along the Jerusalem plank road 
till I reached the point at which it crossed the covered way up 
which ni}^ two brigades were moving, the head of the leading or 
Virginia brigade having just reached that point. I dismounted, 
entered the covered way with the lieutenant and hurried on in the 
direction of the disaster. 

The covered way debouched into a ravine or gulch from which 
there made up a depression to the right quite parallel to that por- 
tion of General Johnson's line, where the blow-up had taken place, 
and about two hundred yards away. At this point where the cov- 
ered way debouched the lieutenant said to me : "If you will go up 
that slope there you can see the Yankees." Moving quickly to the 
high ground next to the Cratt-r I found mj-self suddenly in full view 
of General Johnson's "retrenched cavalier," now crammed with Fed- 
eral soldiers and thickly studded with Federal flags. For the mo- 
ment I could scarce!}' take in the reality, and the very danger to 
which I was for the moment exposed came to my relief and bade 
me stand still as the surest course for personal safety-, and so I stood 
where I could keep one ej-e on the adversary while I directed my 
own command, every moment in fearful peril if the enemy should 
advance while my two brigades were 5et in the covered way so 
deep and narrow as to render defense ineffectual. 

A moment's survey of the situation impressed me with the be- 
lief, so crowded were the enemy and his flags — eleven flags in less 
than one hundred j-ards — ^that he was greatly disordered, but there 
in larg2 force. 

At once and the first thing I did was to send back to my line in 
the trenches — full two miles awaj- — for the Alabama Brigade to be 
brought me quickly by the route the two brigades had come, then 
indicating to Captain Girardy, a volunteer staff" officer, the ground on 
wdiich I desired the Virginia Brigade formed — facing General John- 
son's " retrenched cavalier." That brigade, under Girardv's imme- 



678 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

diate superintendence had but shortly come to an order, bayonets 
fixed — the Georgia Brigade now debouching from the covered way, 
when he sang out to me " General, they are coming." The left of 
the Virginia Brigade was not more than eighty feet from my po- 
sition, and Girardy about midway. Turning my head to the left — 
for at that moment I was instructing the Georgia Brigade as it was 
filing up the depression — I saw the Federals jumping out of Gene- 
ral Johnson's "retrenched cavalier," and coming on desultory line, 
as if to charge us. In a tone of voice, so raised that the whole of 
the Virginia Brigade might hear, I said to Girardy : ' ' Tell Weisiger 
to forward." Captain Girardy, like the brilliant officer he was, 
never failing to do precisely the right thing at the right time, 
rushed with uplifted sword to the front of the brigade himself, re- 
peated the command " forward," and led the brigade, which, as if 
on dress parade, and with the steadiness and resolution of regulars, 
and regulars they were in that every sense which makes the soldier 
effective, moved forward to meet the desultory advance of the Fede- 
ral host. Reserving their fire they pushed on, when the enemy 
turning, the Virginia Brigade, with a plunging fire, went into the 
works pell-mell with them. Here and now the fight was hand to 
hand, and the work of death by the bayonet and the butt of the 
musket went on till all of General Johnson's line was retaken, to 
the left of the traverse which flanked his " retrenched cavalier " on 
the south and to the right of which the enemy occupied some fifty 
feet of his line, leaving it and the pit yet occupied by him. 

This heroic charge of the Virginia Brigade, which the enemy 
had precipitated was made about 9:15 a. m. 

First getting the Georgia Brigade in position to meet any possi- 
ble reverse to which the Virginia Brigade might be subjected, I hur- 
ried up to the works which the Virginia Brigade had retaken, and 
after making a thorough examination of the situation so disposed 
the same as to increase the ability of the brigade to hold the works 
retaken, at the same time causing sharpshooters to be so posted as to 
make death the penalty to those of the enemy who were attempting 
to escape and get back to their lines. At 9:15 a. m.. General War- 
ren, who, with his corps, besides General Ords, had been placed in 
position to support or follow up the success of the mine adventure, 
telegraphed General Meade (perhaps too far away for one directing 
the operations of such a scheme) : "Just before receiving yovir dis- 
patch to assault the battery on tiie left (south) of the Crater, occii- 
pied by General Burnside, the enemy drove his troops out of the 
place and I think now hold it." And again at 9:45 a. m., General 
Warren telegraphed General Meade: "I find that the flag I saw 
was the enemy's and that they have reoccupied all the line we drove 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 679 

them from, except a little around the Crater, which a small force of 
ours still hold." The small force here referred to was that occupy- 
ing still some fifty feet of our main line to the south of the traverse, 
butting up against it at the junction of the main line and the Cra- 
ter, for the Crater was yet cram full of the enemy and from wliich 
there was subsequently taken eleven hundred and one prisoners. 

It was now to clean up the job and to restore the full integrity of 
our line and to remove absolutely the peril to which General Lee's 
army had been fearfully exposed by the success of the mine, (for as 
General Warren says in his dispatch to General Meade, at 6 a. m., 
" the enemy has been running from his first line in front of General 
Burnside's right for some minutes," and at the same time General 
Meade notified General Burnside "that prisoners taken say that 
there is no line in their rear and that their men are falling back 
when ours advanced") that the Georgia Brigade, after having ex- 
plained to it thoroughly the duties before it was ordered to charge 
and retake that small part of our main line still occupied by the 
enemy to the left of the traverse. 

The terrific fire of the enemy to which this brigade was subject- 
ed while passing over the intervening open ground caused it to 
slide to the north and fail of the object the charge was designed 
to accomplish. 

A general of the Federal artillery (C. W. S.) overlooking the 
scene at this moment sa3-s : "The canister, pieces of shell and 
other missiles striking the slope (over which this charge was made) 
produced an effect upon it similar to the heavy drops of rain in a 
thunder shower falling upon a placid sheet of water." 

Still I realized that we were masters of the situation, while eager 
to remove any lingering danger to it, which might come from a re- 
enforced effort by the enemy to regain the breach in our lines, which 
he had so successfully effected. 

At this juncture Gen. Bushrod Johnson came upon the ground 
in the depression on which ni}' brigades had formed for the charge, 
and agreed that he would have his men in the main line to the 
south of the traverse to push down upon the enemy occup3dng the 
fifty feet, between them and the traverse when I should renew 
the assault upon it b^'the Alabama Brigade, now arriving, and fixed 
one o'clock as the hour when he would be ready so to coi3perate. 
Meanwhile Colonel Ilaskill, a brilliant officer of our artillery', always 
hunting the place where he could strike a blow at our adversary, 
presented himself for any service I could advise. There were two 
Cohorn mortars which had been located in the bottom on which my 
brigades formed for the charge, and I suggested that if he could 
serve them I would have them taken up to the outside of the Crater, 



680 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

where he could amuse himself till one o'clock, and perhaps no such 
opportunity had ever occurred or would likely occur for the effective 
employment of these juvenile implements of death. 

Quickly Colonel Haskill was emptying the contents of the two 
Cohorns upon the crowded mass which had been left in and confined 
to the horrible pit, which I estimated was, at this time, in the shape 
of a goose &^^, cut half in two — 120 feet long, 80 feet wide and 60 
feet deep. While this deadly work of the Cohorns was going on, 
sharpshooters sent back to the pit, dead or wounded, ever}' man who 
attempted to scale its sides and get away, and bayoneted muskets 
of the dead, were, like javelins, hurled into the pit by those who 
could do nothing more to hasten the completion of the work all were 
anxious to close out. 

Meanwhile, the Alabama Brigade having been formed on the 
line from which the Georgia Brigade had proceeded to retake that 
portion of our main line south of the traverse, yet occupied by the 
enemy, and the hour of one having come, that brigade, commanded 
by Colonel Saunders, imitating the steady and resolute step of the 
Virginia Brigade, and its magnificent alignment all the way, com- 
pleted the restoration of General Johnson's line to the control of 
General Lee's army, leaving the enemy now occupjdng only the 
Crater, or pit, and because he could not safely retreat. 

At this moment I called for one hundred volunteers to go into 
the pit, not content that any of the enemy should remain so near, 
subordinated though I felt he was to our control, when a white flag 
or handkerchief was raised in the pit, and upon the response to come 
in, eleven hundred and one, like swallows out of a chimney, came 
pouring over the crest, and in passing to our rear, over the dreadful 
slope, were hurried on— many to the grave — by the mistaken fire 
from the guns of the Federal batteries that had previously so fear- 
fully blistered all the ground in our rear. 

The Federal loss in this well-conceived undertaking to cut in 
twain General Lees army may be fairly stated at not less than 5,640 
in killed, wounded and missing, with many flags, and the loss in 
my brigade was 250, and the larger share of the loss fell to the lot 
of the Georgia Brigade. Among the large number of officers that 
came out of the Crater was General Bartlett, of Massachusetts, who, 
while in the dreadful pit had his wooden leg exploded by a bomb 
from the Cohorns, and his perilous trip to the rear was made hy the 
support of one of his comrades on either side. I gave him my horse to 
ride out and away from the field, which I left later in the day and only 
after I had seen that every proper disposition of ni}- two brigades 
had been made and to make certain their ability to hold against 
any force, that portion of General Johnson's line which they had 



THE SIEGE OF PETERSBbRG. 681 

gallantly reclaimed. During the night my ambulance corps, with 
a detail of the prisoners taken, was employed in removing the 
wounded and in burjing the dead of their respective sides — all 
that were within reach. Although General L,ee had directed that my 
brigades should be relieved that night, they were not till the 
second night thereafter. 

Taking the average estimate given by several authorities on the 
Federal side, the troops congregated for this assault upon General 
Lee's lines may be safely stated at not less than 45,000, while that 
of my brigades did not exceed 1,800. 

It was fortunate for General Lee's army that the Federal assault, 
after the mine had proved a signal success, did not receive that 
polarity and energy of action to which immediate presence and 
supreme direction are essential, for through the ample breach, which 
had been so suddenly made in his main line and the consternation 
which for the moment followed, there was nothing to arrest the 
steady projection of the Federal column fully and destructively into 
his rear, exposing to capture fairly that of his army from the 
breach to the Appomattox on the one side, and on the other to cap- 
ture and rout that part of his army from it to his right flank, and 
by the capture of Petersburg compel the hasty withdrawal of his 
forces more directly covering the Confederate Capital. 

Mahone. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

WILSON'S RAID ON THE SOUTH SIDE AND WELDON 
RAILROADS AND BATTLE AT REAM'S STATION. 

^ "\ THILE Hampton and Fitz Lee were fighting Sheri- 
^ ^ dan, it was thought desirable that a raid be 
made by Wilson and Kautz to cut the Weldon and South 
Side Railroads. 

Mahone was the president of the railroad, and he had 
directed his superintendent to run some cars loaded with 
cotton to a station on the South Side Road, about midway 
between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as he heard 
of the raid he directed the cars to be returned to Peters- 
burg, which was barely done in time to escape capture ; in 
fact, the car with Mahone' s personal effects was captured. 
Being deeply interested in the movements of our cavalry, 
he at once began planning to intercept their return, while 
Gen. W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry was directed in 
pursuit. Wilson going to Ream's Station, on the Weldon 
Railroad, destroyed it ; thence to a point on the South Side 
Road about fourteen miles from Petersburg. Kautz's divi- 
sion reached Ford's Station about four p. m. and at once 
began burning the depot buildings, water tanks, ties, wood, 
and other property. The advance was so sudden that two 
locomotives and sixteen cars were still at the station. 
Wilson's division moved more slowly to complete its work. 
Coming to a large sawmill used by the road to prepare ties 
it was burned. 

It was near midnight when Wilson's division completed 
its work at that point. Chapman's brigade, constituting the 
rear guard, was attacked by Lee, but repulsed him. At two 
682 



WILSON'S RAID. 683 

a. m. on the 23d Kaiitz proceeded to Burkes ville Junction, 
where he arrived that afternoon, and at once proceeded to 
destroy the depots, water tanks, and other property. It 
seems that Kautz was misled in approaching this place, 
which caused Wilson's division to leave the direct road and 
cross the Nottaway River. This gave Lee a chance to inter- 
pose between Kautz and Wilson, when a most stubborn 
battle began. Chapman's brigade was at once deployed 
and ordered to attack the enemy. 

With his usual gallantry he forced Lee back and got 
possession of a battery, but was compelled to retire and 
leave it. Wilson, in his report, says the conflict lasted ' ' from 
one p. m. until nearly nine p. m." Chapman stood the 
brunt of it. He was an able and courageous officer, j^os- 
sessed of a natural genius for that arm of the service, and 
he divided the laurels with officers of a higher rank as a 
cavalry leader. Wilson directed Captain Whitaker to take 
a squadron and find Kautz so the two divisions could unite. 
Finding that Kautz had already destroyed Burkesville 
Junction and was ready to move on the Danville road, he 
was directed to wait until the two divisions could be united, 
as Lee might interpose between them again and perhaps 
fall on Kautz, who had a weak division of two small 
brigades, which would seriously cripple the command and 
destroy its further progress. 

When Wilson's division came up, the march on the 
Danville line was resumed on the 25th, destroying the road 
and burning the sawmills along its line, to prevent new 
ties being sawed by which to rebuild the track. The iron 
was heated by rail fires, then bent so it could not be used 
again. At six o'clock in the evening of the 25th the ad- 
vance of Kautz's division arrived at Roanoke Station, and 
attempted to reach the north end of the bridge across 
Staunton River so as to fire it, but the enemy had a battery 
of six guns posted in fortifications on the south side, sup- 
ported by militia from eight counties, with a small force 
from Danville. Kautz continued his attack on the bridge 



684 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

witli great spirit until after dark. While the Union forces 
were assaulting the bridge, W. H. F. Lee came up and 
attacked Wilson's rear under Chapman, who faced his bri- 
gade to the rear and met the enemy with such boldness that 
the Confederate cavalry retired. It was then determined to 
get to the bridge under cover of the darkness, and a com- 
pany of the ist Connecticut Cavalry under command of 
Captain Morehouse was ordered to fire it, and had nearly 
reached it when the burning of buildings at the station 
revealed the movement to the enemy intrenched on the 
southern side of the river, when a heavy fire v/as at once 
opened upon Captain Morehouse's company by the artillery 
and infantry, which compelled him to retreat. General 
Wilson, in his report, says : 

Finding that the bridge could not be carried without severe loss, 
if at all, the enemy being again upon our rear, the Staunton too 
deep for fording, and unprovided with bridges or steam ferries, I 
determined to push no farther south, but endeavor to reach the army 
by retreating toward Petersburg. 

So at midnight the line of march was taken up, with 
Mcintosh's brigade in the advance, followed by the train, 
while Kautz's division and Chapman's brigade moved in 
the rear, ready to repel an attack from Lee's cavalry. Ar- 
riving at Wyliesburg by daylight the next morning, the 
command was halted two hours to rest the horses and allow 
the men to make coffee. Then the march was resumed 
through Christiansburg and Greensboro, to Buckhorn 
Creek, in Mecklenburg County, where Wilson halted for 
the night. In the forenoon of the 27th the Meherrin was 
crossed at Safford Bridge, thence east to Great Creek, on the 
Boydtown plank road, from there through Greenville 
County to the Nottaway, striking it at the Double Bridges 
about noon on the 28th. At the same time Wilson arrived 
at the Nottaway, Hampton reached Stony Creek Depot 
on the WeLlon Railroad, v/hicli placed him between Wilson 
and the left of the iVrmy of the Potomac. 

Fitz Lee, with his division, had halted at Ream's Station, 




GEN. GEORGE H. CHAPMAN. 



WILSON'S RAID. . 685 

whicli is about ten miles north of Stony Creek Depot, and 
about midway between Petersburg and that station. When 
this expedition was being organized and studied with refer- 
ence to all the contingencies that might arise to embarrass 
it, Meade said to Captain Whitaker, of Wilson's staff, 
"Tell the general that the left of the Army of the Poto- 
mac will, on his return, be occupying the Weldon Rail- 
road at Ream's Station." 

When Wilson reached the Nottaway and crossed it, he 
considered himself back safe from one of the most success- 
ful raids that had been made by the cavalry of either army. 
He little dreamed of the maelstrom he was just entering. 
Wilson had learned that there was a Confederate force at 
Stony Creek Depot, but was led to believe that it was a 
small part of W. H. F. Lee's command that could not or 
did not follow Wilson. 

The road Wilson was on passed two miles to the west- 
ward of Stony Creek Depot. He knew that the force 
posted there would attempt to impede his advance at the 
crossing of the road from Double Bridges to Prince George 
Court House and the one from Stony Creek Depot to Din- 
widdle Court House. As the advance neared the cross- 
roads he directed Captain Whitaker to move forward and 
clear the way for the main column. That order Wilson 
says, "was handsomely executed." But soon the advance 
was attacked by a strong force of dismounted cavalry, when 
Mcintosh's brigade was deployed and forced the enemy 
back to Sappony Church. From the prisoners taken Wil- 
son learned that it was Hampton in his front. The stub- 
born fight made by Hampton made it evident that he 
intended to prevent Wilson's advance at all hazards, for the 
fiofht had lasted into the night imtil ten o'clock, and Wilson 
then decided to make a detour to the west around Hamp- 
ton, and accordingly ordered Kautz at once "to take a 
road to the westward leading to the old stage road to Peters- 
burg." That road intersected the stage road to Petersburg 
at Ream's Station. At the latter place, as I have stated, 



686 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Fitz Lee was posted, also the infantry division of Mahone. 
Wilson thought from the understanding when he set out 
on his raid, that Ream's Station would be held by Wright 
on his return, and if he reached there in safety his men and 
horses would get a much needed rest. He knew that his 
position at Sappony Church was a perilous one, for all the 
cavalry of the Confederate army was in that vicinity, which 
was too heavy a body for him to withstand, especially after 
a raid of ten days, when his men had scarcely been out of 
the saddle. 

Wilson had a long train to protect, which moved in 
Kautz's rear while Wilson's division still faced Hampton. 
It was not until daylight that the road was clear in Wil- 
son's front for him to begin to withdraw Mcintosh and 
Chapman. Hampton, knowmg that Wilson was in a snare, 
had been strengthening his line all night to do well his 
part of the work. Wilson withdrew his first line without 
serious opposition, but by the time the second commenced 
a retrograde movement a heavy attack was made from 
front and flank. The latter movement crowded Chapman 
back on the road to Double Bridges, and he was unable to 
join the main command until later in the day. About 
eight o'clock Kautz's advance came in sight of Ream's Sta- 
tion, which was heavily guarded with Fitz Lee's division 
of cavalry and IMahone's division of infantry. Mahone, 
who was in command there, had ordered a section of artil- 
lery to be concealed near the station, which was not to be 
fired until Kautz came near enough to give also the infan- 
try which had been posted on either side of the road, a 
chance to get a concentrating fire on the Union cavalry. 
Mahone had placed a brigade on each side of the road, 
somewhat in the shape of a V with the apex just in the rear 
of the artillery, then each brigade was stretched along and 
close enongh to get a deadly fire on our cavalry as it ad- 
vanced. The artillery was prematurely fired, which warned 
Kautz of the impending danger, when he at once prepared 
for action. 



WILSON'S RAID. 687 

Seeing that Kautz had given back, Mahone took his 
Third Brigade and made a detour through the woods to the 
right, and gave orders that when he had had sufficient time 
to get on Kautz' s flank his other two brigades and the sec- 
tion of artillery were to advance. Wilson coming up, was 
not long in taking in the situation, and knowing his peri- 
lous position, directed Captain Whitaker of his staff to 
take 40 men, charge through the Confederate lines, and 
carry the news to Grant or Meade. Whitaker was suc- 
cessful in getting through, but he lost 23 men. Taking 
the highest rate of speed he could, he reached Meade's 
headquarters twenty minutes after ten o'clock. Whitaker 
was unable to make Meade realize the great peril Wilson 
was in, so no attempt was made to innnediately move a 
heavy body to his relief, and Wilson was compelled to fight 
it out "on that line" without help, although he had been 
promised aid at Ream's Station on his return. 

Mahone told me when we went over the field recently, 
that Wright was not over three miles distant, and had he 
moved at once could have crushed him between his (Wright's) 
forces and Wilson's cavalry, so he attacked Kautz without 
delay. Moving in the woods, he was entirely concealed from 
view ; and bringing the Third Brigade into line, he began 
the attack in front and flank. Wilson could not retire on the 
road, for Hampton was close in his rear. His only way to 
save his command was to leave the road in the woods, which 
compelled him to abandon his artillery and train, and that 
had to be done without hesitation or he could not have 
saved his troopers, who were so worn out that they fell 
asleep in their saddles. 

Some 16 pieces of artillery and an immense train fell 
into Mahone's hands, but Wilson brought his command off", 
and taking a circuitous route gained the Union lines in 
safety. It was one of the most brilliant cavalry expedi- 
tions which had been conducted by either army, and but 
for the unfortunate disaster which closed it, the Capital of 
the Confederacy would have quaked with fear. Captain 



688 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Whitaker, wlio had so faithfully executed Wilson's orders, 
and had cut his way through the enemy's lines at Ream's 
Station to inform Meade of Wilson's peril, was promoted 
to major for gallantry. Wilson highly praises him for his 
services during all the expedition, and Whitaker seems to 
have been the staff officer he constantly relied on. His 
charge through the enemy's lines near Ream's Station and 
takinof the news to Meade was one of the most brilliant 
and successful acts that a cavalry officer ever did in the war 
with a small command. 

It seems to me when Wilson was fighting so desperately 
near Ream's Station, the sound of battle could have been 
distinctly heard by Meade, and should have induced an 
immediate attempt for his relief. The cavalry had by 
that time raised the standard of valor to such a height that 
the other two arms of the service, artillery and infantry 
looked on with admiration, and welcomed Wilson back 
with joy. 

Grant said of that expedition that though the losses 
were heavy it was fully compensated for by the destruction 
of the enemy's communications and demoralization. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 
DEEP BOTTOM AND WELDON RAII.ROAD. 

ON the 13th of August Hancock was directed to take 
the Second and Tenth Corps, the latter under D. B. 
Birney, with Gregg's cavalry division, and proceed to the 
north bank of the James River and then move in the direc- 
tion of Richmond. Grant wanted to make that movement 
for three purposes : to prevent Lee from reenforcing Early 
in the Shenandoah Valley ; to give Warren a chance to seize 
and tear up the Weldon Railroad ; and thirdly, if Hancock 
could take them unawares, he might capture Richmond, or 
if found too weak, to oppose him. 

Lee felt himself so well intrenched around Peters- 
burg that he could spare a part of his forces to re- 
enforce other armies, and as Early was most convenient, 
and could with a large army threaten Washington and 
Baltimore, Kershaw had been sent to him. Parties had in- 
formed Grant that three divisions of infantry and one 
of cavalry had been sent to Early ; if such were the 
case Hancock with two corps could have captured Rich- 
mond and produced consternation in all the Southern 
armies. 

Hancock advanced, with Birney on the left, close to the 
James, Mott was on his right ; then Barlow, in command 
of two divisions of Hancock's corps. Barlow's right was 
to be protected and assisted by Gregg's cavalr)^ division. 
Barlow was to bring on the engagement, and if successful 
was to move to the left and assist Mott, while Gregg was to 
watch his opportunity and, if he could, make a dash on 
Richmond. When Barlow moved forward he found Fields' 
XLiv 689 



690 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

division at Deep Bottom, which was soon reenforced by Wil- 
cox from Chapin's Bluff, while Mahone had been ordered 
from Petersburg with W. H. F. Lee's and Hampton's divi- 
sions of cavalry. As a result, the enemy was found too 
strongly posted to be forced out of his works ; but the 
information thus obtained was that Early had not been 
heavily reenforced. Birney alone had been able to make 
any progress, for when Wilcox weakened his lines to assist 
Fields, Birney took four of his guns, though unable to carry 
his works. During the night Birney was directed to move 
in the rear of Mott and Barlow and endeavor to turn the 
enemy's left, but he took such a wide circuit that he did 
not reach the enemy's front until late the next afternoon. 

The next morning, the i6th, he was directed to attack, 
while Miles was to move up the Charles City road to make 
a diversion in his favor. Terry and William Birney, the 
latter commanding colored troops, advanced against the 
enemy's works above Fassett's Mill and carried them, but 
was unable to hold them, only retaining possession of the 
advanced line of rifle-pits. Hancock remained on the north 
side of the James until dark of the 20th, when he recrossed 
and took his old position in front of Petersburg. In the 
mean time, Warren, on the i8th, had been directed to move 
to the left and take possession of the Weldon Railroad. He 
was to move at four o'clock in the morning and strike the 
railroad near the Gurley House, which was not over two 
miles from the enemy's lines. Grifhn struck the railroad 
at the Globe Tavern and began tearing it up. Ayres' divi- 
sion moved up the railroad a mile or more from Griffin in 
the direction of Petersburg, with Dushaue's IMaryland Bri- 
gade on the left and Hays on the right. Crawford came 
up on the right of Ayres, with his right resting in dense 
pine woods, while in front of his left and Ayres' right a 
field of corn shut out onh' a short view ; thus Warren's 
position was very precarious. I have recently visited the 
field in company with General Mahone, who followed this 
track when he crept up on Bragg the second day. But to 



DEEP BOTTOM AND WELD ON R. R. 691 

go on with the narrative. Cutler's division was held as a 
support on the iSth, when Warren moved out. In the 
mean time, Deering, in command of a brigade of cavalry, 
was holding the railroad when WaiTen approached. Retir- 
ing in the direction of Petersburg, he notified Beauregard, 
who directed Heth, with the brigades of Walker and Davis, 
to go to Deering' s assistance. Heth struck the ]\Iar}-land 
Brigade with such force that it was compelled to yield 
ground. Ay res drew back his line of battle some distance, 
then he attacked Heth and drove him from the field. 
Only Lyle's brigade, on Crawford's left, assisted Ayres. 
Warren's move in capturing the Weldon Railroad greatly 
discomfited the Confederates, and that night arrangements 
were made to dislodge him on the following day. In order 
to protect Crawford's right, for Warren was some distance 
from the left of the Ninth Corps, Bragg' s brigade, of Cut- 
ler's division, was ordered to form a skirmish line to connect 
with the Ninth Corps, but it seems the connection was not 
well made, for ]Mahone, who had been returned to Peters- 
burg, marched up a ravine until he reached a dense growth 
of young pine, thence south until he pierced Bragg's right, 
then faced west, rushed on the gritty little Badger, and 
knocked him from the field, struck Crawford's right, rolled 
it up on its left, and captured some i,6oo prisoners. 

When IMahone went over this field he pointed out to me 
where he marched to strike Bragg. You cannot see one 
hundred feet in the thick pine undergrowth. This was in 
IMahone's favor, for he knew well the ground. 

Our lines were rectified and prepared to meet him, so he 
knew he could not surprise us again at that point. That 
closed the battle for the second day. IMahone then suggested 
to Lee that he could withdraw his division, pass near enough 
to Petersburg to be unobserved by the Union forces, from 
there march west until after he had passed Warren's left, 
then turning south could reach a point where by facing 
east he could fall on Warren's left, surprise it, and roll it 
up as he had the right two days before. While doing 



692 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

that Heth was to attack in front, while W. H. F. Lee's 
cavalry division was to take a road running, east, ad- 
vance on it until he arrived in Warren's rear, then he was 
to charge him from that direction, making an attack from 
front, left flank, and rear all at the same time. It was 
Mahone's idea that Warren could thus be driven from the 
Weldon Railroad. Whether to conceal the movements of 
Mahone or not, A. P. Hill, with his own corps, part of 
Hoke's division, and five batteries had attacked Warren in 
the forenoon, but was repulsed. When Mahone advanced 
later in the day, our artillery opened such a deadly fire on 
his infantry that the charge was broken so near our works 
that the Confederate troops were greatly confused, and 
Hagood's South Carolina Brigade was in the act of surren- 
dering to Col. D. B. Dailey, when Hagood rushed up to 
Dailey, who sat on his horse, and demanded that he (Dailey) 
should give up the Confederate colors and return to his 
own lines. 

But a moment more and Hagood's whole brigade would 
have surrendered. Dailey told Hagood it was no use to 
hold out as the brigade was nearly surrounded. As Dailey 
declined to give him a positive answer, Hagood shot him 
through the body. Dailey falling from his horse on one side, 
Hagood vaulted into the saddle from the other, and by that 
daring act saved a part of his brigade. Since the war these 
two officers have been devoted friends ;. Dailey urged me to 
have Hagood's portrait in my work. I forwarded his letter 
to General Hagood, and would have complied with it cheer- 
fully had Hagood responded. 

It was a hard fought battle, and skillfully managed on 
both sides ; but Warren ' ' held the fort. ' ' There were many 
gallant acts performed which I would be glad to mention, 
but I must content myself by noticing an aid on Bragg' s 
staff, who did faithful work there when IMahone was 
driving back our people, J. Newport Potts ; he had served 
on Wadsworth's and Warren's staffs, and later on for a 
brief period on Grant's. 




COL- D. B. DAILKY 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

CAVALRY OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

From the Crossing of the James River, June 25-27, 1S64, to 
Hatcher's Run, February, 1865. 

ON the night of the 24th and morning of the 25th, the 
trains were moved back through Charles City 
Court House to Douthat's Landing, and ferried across the 
James, followed by the cavalry on the 26th and 27th. 

Before this crossing was completed. General Sheridan 
received orders from General Meade to hasten to the sup- 
port of General Wilson, who, during the absence of the 
First and Second Divisions, had, with Kautz' small cavalry 
brigade, been sent on an expedition to destroy the South 
Side and Richmond and Danville Railroads, in which he 
was successful, having done great damage to those tho- 
roughfares over which the supplies for General Lee's army 
in and around Petersburg had to be transported. 

Having reached, however, the left of our army, near 
Ream's Station, his march was intercepted by a large in- 
fantry force moving down the Weldon Railroad from 
Petersburg, and, at the same time was attacked on his 
flank by their cavalry. His command was defeated and 
forced south across the Nottoway River, in the vicinity of 
Poplar Hill ; here he was comparatively safe, but obliged 
to march by a roundabout way to reach the army. 

Sheridan, immediately on receipt of the order, moved 
rapidly, with Torbert's and Gregg's divisions, by way of 
Prince George Court House and Lee's Mills to Ream's 
Station, where he found the Sixth Corps ; but both forces 

693 



694 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

were too late to render Wilson any assistance. Wilson's 
failure to return in triumph to the army was probably due 
to General Meade's inability to carry out his plans in refer- 
ence to the occupation of the Weldon and South Side Rail- 
road. After this move the cavalry returned to the vicinity 
of Light-House Point to rest and refit, after marching and 
fighting for fifty-six consecutive days ; here it remained 
comparatively at rest, except the picket duty required of it, 
until the 26th of July. 

On the afternoon of that day, Sheridan, with Torbert's 
and Gregg's divisions, crossed the Appomattox, and, 
marching all night, crossed the James River at Deep Bot- 
tom, in rear of the Second Corps ; here, Kautz' cavalry 
division, of the Army of the James, joined us, and thus re- 
enforced, Sheridan proceeded to the right of the Second 
Corps, where he found the enemy strongly intrenched 
across the New Market and Central roads leading to Rich- 
mond. 

Torbert's division was immediately deployed on the 
high ground in front of Rufiin's house, whilst Gregg con- 
tinued the line to the right across the road leading from 
Malvern Hill to Richmond. The enemy advanced across 
the open fields in magnificent line of battle, on a front of 
two divisions ; but was unable to dislodge the First Divi- 
sion and Davies' brigade of the Second. The ground in 
front of the Second Brigade being open, and favorable to a 
mounted charge, its commander was directed to make it. 

The pioneers advanced and leveled the fences ; the bri- 
gade formed in three lines, on a front of two regiments, and 
were in the act of moving to the charge, when, for some 
reason, the order was countermanded, and the division 
moved off in the direction of INIalvern Hill. 

During the 28th and 29th, the cavalry remained in po- 
sition on the right of the Second Corps, their line extend- 
ing across Strawberry Plain to Malvern Hill, Kautz skir- 
mishing lightly on the extreme right. On the night of the 
29th, as soon as it was dark, the Second Corps recrossed 



CAVALRY OPERA TIONS. 695 

the river, and was followed by the cavalry ; moving contin- 
uously during the night, the entire command was across 
the river early on the morning of the 30th, 

The object of this movement was to induce General Lee 
to detach largely from his force around Petersburg, so that 
they might be out of the wa)^ when the mine in front of the 
Ninth Corps was sprung, from which so much was expect- 
ed, and so little accomplished. 

This movement to the north of the James was a success ; 
but the mine was badly managed, not yielding the result 
anticipated. As the long line of cavalry moved from the 
James to the Appomattox a dull, heavy sound reached their 
ears, and they knew the supreme moment had come. The 
most intense anxiety filled their minds. Would it be a suc- 
cess, and the rebellion be ended? Or would it be a failure, 
and long months of campaigning remain? The suspense 
was not protracted ; it was not long before they realized that 
it was a failure. 

The cavalry passed in rear of the army and proceeded 
to Lee's Mills, on the Black Water, where, a month before, 
they had found a beautiful sheet of water. Everything was 
changed. The water all gone, and in its place a broad ex- 
panse of mud, through which flowed a shallow, sluggish 
stream ; the opposite bank, which was lined with woods, 
was in possession of the enemy in some force, preventing 
their access to the water, and they were compelled to dis- 
lodge him before their thirsty horses could be watered ; this 
was speedily accomplished by sending one regiment, 
mounted, to cross the stream a mile below the mill, dis- 
mounting and deploying one regiment as skirmishers, and 
another to move in column across the breast of the dam. 

Here, on the ist of August, 1864, General Sheridan was 
relieved from the command of the Cavalry Corps, and or- 
dered to the Valley of the Shenandoah. Torbert's and 
Wilson's divisions were detached from the Army of the 
Potomac and directed to join General Sheridan in the val- 
ley ; and thus this formidable organization was broken up 



696 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

for the time. From this time on until the closing cam- 
paign began, all of the cavalry operations of the Army of 
the Potomac were directed by that consummate cavalry 
soldier, Gen, D. McM. Gregg ; how faithfully, conscien- 
tiously and skillfully they were performed, history abun- 
dantly testifies. 

After the assignment of General Sheridan to the com- 
mand of the Army of the Shenandoah, and the detachment 
of Torbert's and Wilson's divisions from the Army of the 
Potomac, its cavalry, consisting of the Second Cavalry 
Division, was composed as follows : 

Brig. Gen. Henry E. Davies, First Brigade. 

ist Massachusetts Maj. Lucius M. Sargent. 

1st New Jersey , Lieut. Col. John W. Kester. 

6th Ohio Col. William Stedman. 

ist Penns3lvania Col. John P. Taylor. 

loth New York Maj. Henry M. Avery. 

Colonel J. Irvin Gregg, Second Brigade. 

ist Maine Cavalry Col. Charles H. Smith. 

2d Pennsylvania Cavalry Lieut. Col. Joseph P. Brinton. 

4th Pennsylvania Cavalry Lieut. Col. George H. Covode, 

8th Pennsylvania Cavalry Col. Pennock Huey. 

13th Pennsylvania Cavalrj^ Col. INIichael Kenion. 

i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry Lieut. Col. John K. Robinson. 

Henceforth, until the closing scene in the tragedy 
begins, this Second Division of the Cavalry Corps is to be 
the eyes, ears and fingers of the Army of the Potomac. 
There are to be no more formidable expeditions around the 
flank, or in the rear of the enemy, but constant watchful- 
ness, bold tactics and desperate fighting. Always on the 
alert, marching and fighting by day, picketing by night, it 
took the hard knocks and wearisome duties with a philo- 
sophic composure and a steadfast devotion to duty that 
entitle its members to rank amongst the best soldiers the 
world has produced. 

PVom the ist of Augu.st until the 13th, the Second 
Cavalry Division lay in camp, resting and recuperating 



CAVALRY OPERATIONS. 697 

from its severe labors, and getting ready for future service, 
having a regular cordon of pickets surrounding the army 
from the Jerusalem plank road to the north of the Peters- 
burg and Norfolk Railroad. 

On the 13th, it broke up its camp, crossed the Appo- 
mattox, and marched to and crossed the James at the pon- 
toon bridge at Curl's Neck, opposite Deep Bottom, during 
the night of the 13th and 14th. The infantry, which had 
been conveyed by boat from City Point, had not completed 
its debarkation when the cavalry and artillery crossed to 
the north bank. 

The cavalry at once took up a position near the junction 
of the River and Long Bridge roads, to cover the right of 
the infantry. 

On the 15th, reconnoissances were made on various 
roads, with some skirmishing in the evening. On the 
night of the 15th the entire division bivouacked near Wil- 
liams' house, on the Charles City road ; early on the morn- 
ing of the 1 6th it advanced up the road in the direction of 
Richmond, in connection with General Miles' brigade of 
Barlow's division — the cavalry on the road and the infantry 
movino- through the woods on the left. The advance was 
without opposition until it arrived at Deep Creek, a small 
but difficult stream, with marshy banks, flowing north 
into White Oak Creek ; the enemy's skirmishers were en- 
countered on the opposite side of this stream ; on the north 
side of the road the country was cleared and open fields ex- 
tended for a distance of, perhaps, three hundred yards in 
front and farther to the north ; the country to the south of 
the road was covered with timber. 

The advance regiment of the Second Brigade was dis- 
mounted and pushed across the creek, deployed and rapidly 
advanced across the open ground, gaining the woods be- 
yond. Just at this point the timber had been cut off from 
the south side of the road, and an open field extended in 
front of the infantry. Beyond this field the enemy were in 
force, prepared to dispute our advance ; but Miles push- 



698 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

ing forward on the left, and the dismounted cavalry on the 
right, compelled them to fall back ; at the same time their 
cavalry appearing in the road, they were charged by the i6th 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, and General Chambliss was killed. 
Meantime Col. Irvin Gregg was severely wounded in the 
right wrist and obliged to leave the field. 

The enemy were rapidly driven back until our advance 
reached White's Tavern ; but the infantry, not being 
able to hold the enemy's works near Fussel's Mill, from 
which they had driven them in the morning, they were 
enabled to turn their forces against Gregg and Miles at the 
tavern, which they did promptly, and drove them back in 
some confusion and with considerable loss beyond Deep 
Creek. 

While these operations were going on north of the 
James, Kautz's cavalry division operated on the left of the 
army. Hancock and Gregg remained north of the James 
River during the 17th, i8th, 19th and 20th, and during 
the night of the 20th they withdrew and took up their for- 
mer position. 

Genera.1 Grant, having determined to break up the Wel- 
don Railroad and render it useless as a means of supply to 
Lee's army, sent Hancock, with Miles' and Gibbons' divi- 
sions of his corps, and Gregg's cavalry division, to Ream's 
Station, on Warren's left, to complete the destruction of 
the road as far as Rowanty Creek ; but before this could be 
accomplished Hill, with a large force, attacked Hancock at 
the station and forced him to retire ; and Hampton com- 
ing on his left, with the rebel yell, threatened to sweep him 
from the field, when he was checked by the fire from 
Gregg's dismounted men, holding the return of the works. 
General Beaver, commanding one of the brigades of 
Gibbon's division, who had just rejoined his command, had 
his leg shot off near the hip and was carried from the field 
by Chief Bugler Rohme, of the i6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
just as he was about to fall into the hands of the enemy. 



o 



CHAPTER XXV. 

FIVE FORKS, APRIL i, 1865. 

.N the morning of April i the Confederate lines ex- 
- tended from Appomattox to Hatcher's Run, a dis- 
tance so great that to cover them they only averaged one 
man to every five yards of front. Opposed to and facing 
them was the Union line, formed by the Second, Sixth 
and Ninth Corps, Army of the Potomac, and the Army of 
the James under Major General Ord, 

To Lee, however, the point of vital importance seemed 
to be an isolated position about four miles to the west of 
his main works, at what was known as the "Five Forks," 
and at this place he had massed all the troops he could 
spare from his main body, and placed them under the com- 
mand of Major General Pickett, who here intrenched his 
infantry east and west of the forks for about a mile in 
each direction, refusing his line about 100 yards on his left. 
W. H. F. Lee's cavalry was on his right, then followed in 
order Corse's, Terry's, Stewart's, Ransom's and Wallace's 
brigades, with Pegram's battery (three guns on Corse's 
right and three guns at Five Forks), and McGregor's bat- 
tery (on the left of the line), while ^lunford's dismounted 
cavalry division covered the left, from Wallace's position to 
Hatcher's Run. Such was the Confederate position when 
at noon, April i, Sheridan determined to attack at this 
point, with the view of isolating Pickett from the main 
body of Lee's army, and either capture his forces or drive 
him westward. 

At one o'clock p. m. Sheridan ordered Warren to bring 
up his (Fifth) corps and form line to the right of Devin's 

699 



700 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

division, about six hundred yards south of the White Oak 
road, on tlie Gravelly Run Church road. Crawford's divi- 
sion was in the advance, and took position on the right of 
this road in such manner that the center of his line would 
strike the angle of the Confederate line (as was supposed), 
and be first to encounter their works. Griffin's division 
took position in the rear of Crawford, while Ayres' division 
was placed on the left of the road to engage the enemy in 
their front and prevent reenforcements being sent to the 
angle, which Warren believed (from the information re- 
ceived from, and the instructions given by Sheridan), that 
Crawford's center would assail and, with Griffin's assistance, 
carry, and take advantage of any success they might have. 

Mackenzie's cavalry (Twenty-fifth Corps), which had 
marched from Dinwiddle Court House to get possession of 
the White Oak road, about three miles distant from Five 
Forks, having accomplished this object after a sharp skir- 
mish with the enemy, moved to the right of, and formed a 
junction with the Fifth Corps, and were directed to move 
and cooperate with them so as to come on the flank and rear 
of the enemy, and hold the Ford road crossing of Gravelly 
Run tq intercept their retreat in that direction. 

About four p. m., the Union line being formed as above 
described, the order to advance and attack was given. Ad- 
vancing, and meeting with only a slight resistance from a 
thin skirmish line in his front on crossing White Oak road, 
Warren came to the conclusion that the enemy's line of 
battle was in the edge of a dense wood some three hundred 
yards north of the road, and so continued his advance in 
the direction the line had started ; but soon after crossing 
the road, Ayres (who had the smallest and weakest division 
in the corps) received a heavy musketry and artillery fire on 
his left, which at once showed that the enemy's intrench- 
ments did not, as had been supposed, extend to anywhere 
near the Gravelly Run Church road, but were, in fact, about 
eight hundred yards west of it. Ayres immediately changed 
front, facing the return, bringing up Wiuthrop's brigade 



FIVE FORKS. 701 

(which had been in reserve) double-quick on the left of the 
new line, and advanced against the return under a heavy fire, 
his right overlapping it, and finally, after a desperate efibrt, 
carried the works — the enemy stubbornly contesting every 
inch of ground with the energy of men who felt that this 
was their last hope — this being the key to the position — 
and capturing many prisoners and battle-flags. 

Warren, seeing that Ayres was heavily engaged with the 
enemy, that his information as to their position was incor- 
rect, and that the heavy fighting would fall on Ayres', in- 
stead of on Crawford's center, at once directed Winthrop to 
form on Ayres' left and fill the gap between him and Devin, 
sent orders to Griffin to bring in his troops to support Ayres 
on the right, and to Crawford to change direction to the left 
and move at right angles to his then line. By this time, 
however, a large portion of both these divisions had entered 
the woods north of the open space along the White Oak 
road. 

When Warren had sent these orders to Crawford and 
Griffin he ordered Kellogg' s brigade to form at right angles 
to its former direction and hold it there for Crawford's divi- 
sion to fonn on, and then ordered Coulter's brigade to form 
on Kellogg' s. 

General Kellogg, who was in command of the old Iron 
Brigade, now consisting of the 6th and 7th Wisconsin and 
91st New York, says : 

The right of my line connected with Baxter's brigade, the left 
with the Second Division, Fifth Corps. Receiving orders, I ad- 
vanced to a road half a mile in my front, at which point we exe- 
cuted a left wheel, and here became engaged with the enemy, the 
command moving forward and firing as it advanced, driving the 
enemy. In moving through a dense thicket the connection was 
broken between my line and the Second Division, causing a large 
gap, which was taken advantage of by the enemy, who threw a 
force on my left flank and opened fire, evidently with the desire of 
arresting the forward movement of the line of battle. I ordered my 
front line (6th and 7th Wisconsin) to keep advancing, and one bat- 
talion of the 91st New York to deploy on the left flank of the bri- 



702 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

gade, covering that flank, then advance and engage the enemy at 
short range. This order was promptly executed, and held the 
enemy at bay until Coulter's brigade came up and filled the gap. 
My brigade now held the center of the line, with Baxter and Coul- 
ter on either side, and continued in that position until we reached 
the enemy's works. We drove them from their intrenchments 
across an open field, pursuing them closely for three-quarters of a 
mile, killing and wounding many, until, in compliance with orders, 
the brigade was moved into camp for the night. 

During this figlit Captain Palmer, of the 91st New 
York (now commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the 
Republic), was severely injured, from the effects of which he 
is still suffering, though nearly thirty years have elapsed. 

On returning to where he had left Kellogg, Warren 
found the position vacated, one of Sheridan's staff having 
taken the brigade to the rear of the enemy's intrenchments. 
By this time every member of Warren's staff and many of 
Sheridan's aids had been sent to hunt Crawford and Grif- 
fin, and bring them to the rear of the Confederate position ; 
and soon both of them entered the open ground about eight 
hundred yards from the enemy's works, near the return. 
Here Warren fotmd GrifiEin moving southwest against the 
rear of the enemy's intrenchments, and at once directed 
him to attack the new line of breastworks (Ransom's and 
Wallace's brigades) which had been hastily thrown up, and 
were connected with and at right angles to their main line 
of works, in order to oppose the farther advance of the 
Fifth Corps, for at this time Ayres had taken the return. 
Griffin at once started to carry out his orders, and was finally 
successful, being reenforced by Coulter's brigade of Craw- 
ford's, and Gwyn's brigade of Ayres' divisions, though for 
half an hour he met with great resistance, the enemy keep- 
ing up a steady and murderous fire. 

At the same time Crawford's division, which was moving 
farther to the right, advanced steadily in rear of the Confed- 
erate line, driving Munford's dismounted cavalry division 
westward before them and continually turning the left of the 
forces which were opposing Ayres and Griffin until they 




GEN. JOHN A. KELLOGG. 



FIVE FORKS. 703 

finally gained possession of the Ford road, wliicli ran di- 
rectly north from the center of the Confederate rear and 
thence across Hatcher's Run, where Warren found him, 
with his command facing westward in good order, and com- 
pletely closing the outlet for the escape of the enemy to- 
ward the north ; changing the division to face south, War- 
ren, in person, led it on the Ford road toward the rear of 
the rebel works, meeting, at the edge of the woods, a sharp 
fire from the enem}', who had here formed a line across the 
road. Devin's cavalry division was formed in front of the 
Confederate works, with its left on the road from Dinwiddle 
Court House to Five Forks ; and when the Fifth Corps ad- 
vanced to the attack they dismounted and moved against 
the works, keeping up a constant fire upon them and re- 
ceiving the fire of the infantry and the three guns at the 
Five Forks battery. Pennington's brigade (dismounted) of 
Custer's division, on the Union left of the Five Forks bat- 
tery, kept up a constant fire on the works held by Corse's 
and Terry's (Confederate) brigades, while with the re- 
mainder of his division Custer made a charge on W. H. F. 
Lee's right. Lee advanced to meet him, and after a bril- 
liant encounter, repelled the Union cavalry and maintained 
his position. 

William Swinton, the war correspondent of the New 
York TribitJie^ and the most brilliant writer in the Army 
of the Potomac, says, in describing the closing scenes of 
this engagement : 

The Confederates were now completelj^ entrapped. Held as in 
a vise by the cavalry which enveloped their whole front and right, 
stung them with a biting fire, and charged at the signal of the mus- 
ketry of the infantry, they now found a line of battle sweeping 
down on their rear. Thus placed, they did all that men may. 
Forming front both north and south, they met, with a desperate 
valor, this double onset. But all in vain. From the rear Warren 
swept down toward the White Oak road, Crawford taking four guns ; 
and simvJtaneously, the cavalry from the front charged upon this 
road with resistless impetuosity. The whole center was now car- 
ried, as the left had been before, and the Confederates, pressed front, 



704 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

flank and rear, mostly threw down their arms. Having gained the 
White Oak road, Warren changed front again and advanced west- 
ward to continuously take in flank and rear whatever hostile force 
still continued to hold the right of the Confederate line. This 
had originally been about three miles in extent, but above two-thirds 
of it were now carried. Yet, vital in all its parts, what of the two 
divisions remained still continued the combat with unyielding met- 
tle. Parrying the thrusts of the cavalry from the front, this poor 
scratch of a force threw back its left in a new and short crotchet, so 
as to meet the advance of Warren, who continued to press in at 
right angles with the White Oak road. When the infantry, greatly 
elated at their success, but somewhat disorganized by marching and 
fighting so long in the woods, arrived before his new line, they 
halted and opened an untimely fusilade, though there had been 
orders not to halt ; the ofiicers, indeed, urged their men forward, 
but they continued to fire without advancing. Seeing this hesita- 
tion Warren dashed forward, calling to those near him to follow. 
Inspired by his example, the color-bearers and ofiicers all along the 
front sprang out, and, without more firing, the men charged at the 
pas de course, capturing all that remained of the enemy. The his- 
tory of the war presents no equally splendid illustration of personal 
magnetism. Warren led the van of the rushing lines ; his horse 
was fatally shot within a few feet of the breastworks, and he him- 
self was in imminent peril, when a gallant ofiicer, Colonel Richard- 
son, of the yth Wisconsin (old Iron Brigade), sprang between him 
and the enemy, receiving a severe wound, but shielding from hurt 
the person of his loved commander. 

A charge of the cavalry completed the rout, and the remnants 
of the divisions of Pickett and Johnson filed westward from Five 
Forks, pursued for many miles by the mounted divisions of Merritt 
and McKenzie. The trophies of the day included many colors and 
guns, and above 5000 prisoners, of which number 3244 were taken 
by the Fifth Corps. Brilliant as the victory was, it was won with- 
out great sacrifice of life, the losses of the cavalry being but a few 
hundred, and those of the infantry, 634 killed and wounded. 

There has always seemed to be one grave blot upon this 
otherwise great victory, and that is the removal of Warren, 
by Sheridan, from the command of the Fifth Corps at the 
close of this battle. The order is very short, and is conclied 
in an order to Sheridan from Grant, "to relieve General 
Warren if, in his jndgment, it was for the best interests of 
the service to do so. ' ' 



FIVE FORKS. 705 

During the campaign beginning in May, 1864, there 
had been misunderstandings between Meade and Warren, 
the latter sometimes modifying the plans of operations 
prescribed by the orders of the day for the Fifth Corps, so 
as to make them accord with his own judgment as the day 
went on ; modifications which Meade sometimes did not 
approve, and, therefore, something like controversy grew 
up occasionally in the dispatches that passed between them. 
It appears probable that Grant apprehended that something 
of this kind might occur between Sheridan and Warren, 
and, considering the time to be a critical one, sent the mes- 
sage to Sheridan. 

On the 1 6th of May, 1865, Sheridan makes a report of 
this battle, and in it states that, in bringing up and forming 
his corps at Gravelly Run Church — 

General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as 
rapidly as he might have done ; and his manner gave me the impres- 
sion that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the 
attack could be completed. 

Further on, he says : 

During this attack (that of the Fifth Corps and the cavalry upon 
Pickett's intrenched position) I again became dissatisfied with Gen- 
eral Warren. During the engagement portions of his line gave way 
when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply for want of confidence 
on the part of his troops, which General Warren did not exert him- 
self to inspire. I therefore relieved him from the command of the 
Fifth Corps, authority for the action having been sent to me, before 
the battle, unsolicited. 

How different was the action of Logan when ordered to 
relieve General Thomas ! But comparisons are odious. 

Warren grew very restive under these imptitations, and 
repeatedly demanded a court of inquiry, which was at length 
ordered by the President, and the cotirt, composed of officers 
of high rank, after having a host of witnesses before them, 
Sheridan among the number, who gave at great length his 
reasons for believing and acting as he did, made a report to 



706 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

the President completely exonerating General Warren, 
stating there was no unnecessary delay, and that Warren 
took the usual methods of a corps commander to prevent 
delay ; as to the imputation that he wished "the sun to go 
down before dispositions for the attack could be completed," 
they say : ' ' His actions, as shown by the evidence, do not 
appear to have corresponded with such a wish, if ever he 
entertained it." 

And so the Court went on and decided against Sheri- 
dan's charges in every instance, and in the end brought in 
a report completely justifying Warren in his every action, 
and to-day, nearly thirty years after the events we have re- 
lated transpired, there is no man who fought under Warren 
but will say he possessed the love and esteem and confi- 
dence of the rank and file of the Fifth Corps. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

LEE'S FINAL STRUGGLE AT PETERSBURG AND FLIGHT. 
SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX. 

ON the 2d of April Lee saw that he could not hold 
his lines any longer, so he notified Jeff Davis, who 
was at church, of that fact. Davis immediately left the 
church to prepare for his flight, with the Confederate 
archives and what specie there was in Richmond. 

In order to deceive Grant as to his real movements he 
ordered a vigorous assault on Fort Stedman as if he wanted 
to break through Grant's right ; in fact it was a most desper- 
ate attack on the part of the Confederates which was re- 
pulsed by Parke. It was one of the most brilliant efforts 
of General Parke's during the whole war. 

When Wright broke through the Confederate lines at 
Hatcher's Run, his troops moved to the right in the direc- 
tion of Petersburg. Parke had forced the enemy back to the 
Jerusalem plank road. Gordon made several strong efforts 
to force Parke back but failed. Humphrey directed Miles, 
Hays and Mott to attack Heth, who had the brigades of 
Cook, Scales, McRae, and McGowan, and had been cut off 
from Petersburg by Wright. 

Miles, being in command, attacked Cook, who was then 
in command, as Heth had gone to Petersburg, and was re- 
pulsed. Another attack shared the same fate. A third time 
Miles threw his skirmishers around Cook's right and at- 
tacked his left with Ramsey's brigade, by which he gained 
Cook's rear and took several hundred prisoners, a section of 
artillery, and a battle flag. The fortifications around 
Petersburg having been carried, Anderson retreated up the 

707 



708 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Appomattox to be reenforced by Cook's command, and 
Pickett. At eight o'clock all of the Confederate army be- 
gan its retreat up the Appomattox River. Ewell who was in 
front of Richmond on the left of the James in command of 
the divisions of Kershaw and Cnstis Lee, R. E. Lee's eldest 
son, crossed the James at and below Richmond. General 
Fitz Lee with his cavalry brought up the rear. It was 
Lee's intention to fly to Johnson, crush Sherman before 
Grant could reach there, and then he hoped with the two 
armies to again be able to fight Grant. While Lee was 
moving westwardly to strike the Danville Railroad, where 
he expected rations to feed his half famished army, which 
he had ordered to meet him at Amelia Court House, Sheri- 
don with the cavalry and Fifth Corps was keeping pace 
with him and moving with great celerity. While Meade with 
the Second and Sixth Corps were following Sheridan, 
Parke with the Ninth Corps was moving along the South 
Side Railroad, followed by Ord with the Army of the James. 
In the mean time Weitzel marched into Richmond, which 
had been fired by some parties before our troops arrived. 
Pandemonium reigned supreme in the city which had just 
been evacuated by the Confederate officials. Our troops 
at once began to control the fire and save as much of 
the city as possible. On the 4th Lee arrived at Amelia 
Court House, where he had ordered rations for his ami}', 
only to find that the conductor had taken the whole train 
to Richmond where it had been consumed in the conflagra- 
tion. His troops were exhausted, and he was compelled to 
rest there and endeavor to secure something by foraging 
parties over the country. Sheridan having learned that 
Lee was there pressed on to tap the Danville Railroad to 
intercept his flight. Crook was ordered to strike the Dan- 
ville road between Burke's Junction and Jetersville, with 
orders for the troops to concentrate at the latter place. 
Sheridan sent Meade word of the situation at the front, when 
the Second and Sixth Corps were ordered to Jetersville. 
On the morning of the 5tli Sheridan sent Davies north 



LEE'S SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX. 709 

to see if Lee was attempting to escape, when he (Davies) 
struck a heavy train moving in the direction of Lynchburg, 
which he captured and burned. It is said that Lee's papers 
were in that train and burned up. Beyond doubt other 
vahiable papers were consumed there. 

Lee having fed his army as best he could, continued the 
retreat on the night of the 5th. On the morning of the 
6th Sheridan ordered Crook to move to Deatonsville, with 
Merritt to follow him, but the enemy was passing through 
there when Crook arrived. 

Crook, Merritt, and Custer moved on the flank of the 
enemy to impede its progress and to strike it a blow when 
opportunity presented. Finally Custer struck a train in the 
column, which he destroyed, capturing twelve guns from 
Huger's batteries. In the afternoon of the 6th Hum'phre)'S 
and Gordon had a running fight for several miles, which 
night put an end to. General Wright attacked the ene- 
my at Sailor's Creek, and with the aid of the cavalry cut 
Ewell off and captured his whole force ; xA.nderson, who had 
attempted to assist him, retreated. Longstreet had waited 
all day at Rice's Station for Ewell, Gordon, and x\nderson, 
only to learn that disaster had befallen Ewell, while An- 
derson and Gordon had greatly suffered in loss of prisoners. 
That evening Longstreet, with Wilcox, Heth, and Field 
proceeded to Farmville, where they crossed to the north 
bank of the Appomattox, and the next morning attempted 
to escape to Lynchburg. At Farmville rations were given 
to the Confederate army. Crook and Ord moved on Farm- 
ville, while Merritt marched to Prince Edward's Court 
House, with GriflEin to follow him. Wright followed Ord 
to Farmville. Humphreys moved tc the Lynchburg stage 
road to prevent Lee from escaping in that direction, when 
he suddenly came up on the whole of Lee's army. It was 
then resolved to attack him with all of our forces, but it 
was soon learned that those in Farmville under Wright 
and Gibbon could not get across the Appomattox, as the 
enemy had destroyed the bridges. 



710 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

On the evening of the 7th Grant began negotiations 
for the surrender of Lee's army by sending him the fol- 
lowing : 

April 7, 1865. 

General : — The result of the last week must convince you of 
the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of 
Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard 
it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further 
effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of 
the Confederate States Army known as the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia. U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant General. 

To General R. K- LEE. 

April 7, 1865. 
General : — I have received your note of this date. Though not 
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further 
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I recipro- 
cate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, 
before considering your proposition, ask the terms 3-ou will offer on 
condition of its surrender. R. E. Lee, 

General. 
To Lieut. Gen. U. S. Grant. 

As yet Lee hoped to escape. Grant sent the following 

reply : 

April 8, 1865. 

General :— Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same 
date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of 
the Army of Northern Virginia is just received. In reph', I would say 
that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would 
insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be 
disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the 
United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will 
designate officers to meet any officers you ma}' name for the same 
purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging 
definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of 
Northern Virginia will be received. U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant General. 

To General R. E LEE. 

To which Lee replied : 

April 8, 1865. 

General : — I received at a late hour j^our note of to-da}- In 
mine yesterday I did not intend to prop:.S2 the surrender of the 



LEE'S SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX. 711 

Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposi- 
tion. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call 
for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should 
be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposal 
would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view 
to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your pro- 
posal may affect the Confederate States forces under mj- command, 
and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you 
at ten a. m. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between 
the picket lines of the two armies. R. E. Lee, 

General. 
To Lieut. Gen. U. S. Grant. 

The next morning Lee directed Gordon to attack the 
cavalry which Sheridan had placed across his front, and 
drove it back quite a distance, but as Sheridan ordered in- 
fantry up to support the cavalry, Gordon desisted from 
further efforts to force a way by which Lee's troops could 
escape. Then began the preparation in earnest for the sur- 
render. Before, Lee was only endeavoring to gain time for 
a chance to get away. On the afternoon of the 9th the final 
arrangements were made. The Union boys fed the Con- 
federates. The officers of both armies mingled together 
and had a splendid time. Grant asked Heth and others 
whom he had known in the service before the war to smoke 
with him. It was a strange thing to see these two hostile 
armies lying together without pickets. The Army of the 
Potomac marched to Richmond. From there it was sent 
to Washington, where it remained until Sherman's army 
arrived, when both were reviewed by the President, Cabi- 
net, Generals Grant, Sherman and other officers, after which 
the Army of the Potomac was disbanded, its troops mustered 
out of the service, to again become civilians, leaving a 
name to live in American history for all time. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 
MISCEIvIvANEOUS. 

T N the written accounts of the various transactions that 
-^ comprise the history of the late war, more than their 
proportionate share of credit for acts of valor that distin- 
guished all ranks and grades of our volunteer soldiers, in 
both the Union and Confederate armies, has been accorded 
to those who bore high rank. 

In describing skirmishes, battles and campaigns, the 
part that has been borne by those in command has always 
been particularly described, while the acts of devotion to 
the principles by which the rank and file of our armies were 
impelled to perform those deeds of valor and heroism so 
necessary to success, were rarely, if ever, referred to in the 
official reports. This, perhaps, was the result of the con- 
ditions that surrounded transactions at the front. Partic- 
ular movements of divisions, brigades, regiments, or 
detachments of troops, and the apparent, or actual necessity 
for them and their results, can only be described in a gen- 
eral way on account of the many hundreds or thousands of 
men engaged in them ; and thus, individual examples of 
heroism and conspicuous bravery and patriotism are passed 
over. 

No army, or detachment of an army in the world's 
history, ever furnished a greater proportionate number of 
individual examples of heroic bravery than were to be 
found in the ranks of every regiment and brigade, not only 
of the First Army Corps, but of each corps comprising the 
entire army. Not that blind, stoical, mechanical kind of 
bravery which comes from military discipline, which com- 
712 



MISCELLANEOUS. 713 

pels obedience to the commands of officers, and impels men 
to march up to the cannon's mouth in the face of certain 
death ; but the bravery that is born of intelligent, disinter- 
ested patriotism and heroic devotion to principle, so many- 
conspicuous examples of which were to be found in every 
command. 

Greer N. Williams. 

Among the many enlisted men who earned the right to 
honorable and particular mention for their gallautry and 
faithfulness, is Greer N. Williams, who enlisted under the 
first call for three years' men, under Capt. W. W. Dudley, 
in Company B, 19th Indiana Volunteers. He was present 
with this company when it was first organized in 1861, and 
in every march, raid, skirmish or battle, in which the reg- 
iment was engaged until its final muster out in July, 1865, 
he was present and participated with the exception of about 
three months, during which time he was in hospital at Phil- 
adelphia on account of severe wounds received at the battle 
of Gettysburg, where he was hit seven times ; and except- 
ing, also, his absence on veteran furlough at the time the 
regiment veteranized. No officer or comrade ever heard 
him complain at any necessary duty, however arduous or 
danoferous. He resides near Fountain Citv, Indiana, on a 
farm, and still has the musket and accouterments which he 
carried through the war, together with quite an extensive 
museum of trophies and souvenirs of the war of which he 
is pardonably proud. 

Norm G. Cooper 

Was a native of Waterloo, N. Y., and born in 1838. He 
enlisted under the first call for troops in April, 1861, in 
Company E, Twenty-fourth New York Infantry, as a pri- 
vate. 

Descended from Revolutionary stock, he thought that 
he ought to sustain a Government which was made impact 
by the assistance of Colonel Cooper of the Re\-olutiouary 



714 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

war. On August 29, 1862, at Groveton, Virginia (Second 
Bull Run), he was wounded in his right arm and captured 
by the Confederates, but was soon exchanged, however, and 
promoted to sergeant and second lieutenant in the marches 
and battles following. He was at the "front," was a great 
favorite in his company and regiment, and was mustered 
out with them at the expiration of their term of service. 
He now publishes "Cooper's Coffee Cooler," of Sturgis, 
Mich., a rollicking soldier monthly paper. 

He has been commander of his post, department inspector, 
and is now assistant inspector general G. A. R. Has been 
twice sent to the Sons of Veterans National Encampment 
as delegate at large from Michigan; is aid to Commander 
in Chief Yoder, U. V. U. ; President of the New York So- 
ciety of Soldiers and Sailors residing in Michigan, and 
Secretary of the State Prisoners of War Association. 

Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln. 

By A. D. Shaw, Company D, Nineteenth Indiana. 

The name of Abraham Lincoln is with us a very precious 
one. It recalls to us scenes in our past lives that are graven 
deeply in our hearts. The first time I had the pleasure 
of seeing Mr. Lincoln was, when on his way to Wash- 
ington to take his seat as President of the United States. 
Indianapolis, by previous arrangements, was designated as 
one of the cities where he would stop for a brief period, 
while en route. I can see him now as the people, in their 
love and admiration for him, carry him up the Bates House 
steps on their shoulders. I saw him on the balcony as he 
spoke his words of comfort and words of promise to the as- 
sembled thousands. How cheering and full of inspiration 
was every sentence! I remember how he introduced his son 
Robert, to the people, calling him "my son Bob." I re- 
member his farewell words as he again turned his face to 
the east, and how every ear was strained to lose not a word 
which he might say. 




COL. NORM. G. COOPER. 



MISCELLANEOUS. 715 

It was not very long — onl\- a few months — until I had 
the pleasure of again seeing this remarkable man, but, oh, 
what a change those few months had made ! The war was 
on, and I, with the old Nineteenth Indiana, eleven hundred 
strong, marched up Pennsylvania Avenue, past the White 
House, one hot morning in August. There in the door, 
with head uncovered, stood "that man of the people," and 
watched our noble regiment pass by. I could even at that 
distance recognize the sympathetic expression on his homely 
face. No doubt he felt in his great heart pity for the loved 
ones at home and pride in the men passing by. 

About the ist of September, 1861, fifty thousand troops 
passed in review before him, in which our regiment partic- 
ipated. The review took place about four miles from the 
city, near the Chain Bridge, on the Virginia side of the 
river, and General IMcClellan was in command. General 
Mansfield and other distinguished officers were there, proud 
in their bearing and able in their work ; but there was one 
who towered above them all. On him all eyes were fixed, 
and in him all hopes seemed centered, and as he looked with 
pride over that vast army before him, his face beaming with 
joy, there seemed tocome a strength and courage and de- 
termination to every heart. It was Mr. Lincoln. 

Just previous to the review, as our regiment was drawn 
up in line and at rest, I heard the clatter of hoofs in the 
rear, and naturally, as soldiers will do, especially raw men 
like us, I looked around to see what and who it was. It 
was Mr. Lincoln and General IMcClellan. They halted 
their horses directly in my rear. Their object was this : 
General AlcClellan was very much dissatisfied with our 
arms — the old Springfield muskets — and he had discovered 
that the igtli, like quite a number of others, had them, 
and he wished to have Mr. Lincoln give them a per- 
sonal inspection. I happened to be the person who was 
singled out to have my gun inspected. Great heavens, how 
I did shake ! Of course I was not aware just then what 
their object was. My gun was so conspicuously dirty that 



716 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

I presumed that was the reason it was asked for. General 
McClellan handed it to Mr. Lincoln who examined it and 
remarked that it would not answer — "must have better 
ones." After they were through examining it, General 
McClellan returned it to me, saying, "Thank you." How 
relieved I was ; and I do believe it was the first, and per- 
haps, only instance on record where an officer thanked a 
jDrivate for carrying a dirty gun. The next time I saw Mr. 
Lincoln was at the funeral of General Baker, who was 
killed at Ball's Bluff". I can see him now as he stood there 
that day. Well might he feel sad, for he had lost a true 
and tried friend, who with his life had sealed his devotion 
to his country. 

Again I remember him as I saw him at the funeral of Gen- 
eral Gibson, Commissary General United States Army, who 
died in Washington the following winter. I was on detached 
duty at headquarters, and having some little leisure, as ' ' all 
was quiet on the Potomac" just at that season, I went 
around to the residence of the deceased general. There I 
saw, standing on the large flat flag-step of the residence, 
with his back against the wall of the house, his eye wan- 
dering up and down the line of soldiers that were drawn up 
in front, that form which was familiar to all though they 
had never seen him, the sturdy old patriot. Gen. Winfield 
Scott. Though old and infirm, this illustrious soldier was 
true as steel. Presently, there came out of the house two 
other persons whose names will be handed down from gen- 
eration to generation as great and good men. One was 
Mr. Lincoln and the other Mr. Seward. Just as the service 
closed they came out arm in arm. It was raining at the 
time and Mr. Lincoln carried an umbrella, and I recollect 
how amused I was, even though sad the occasion, to see 
how Mr. Lincoln had to stoop to hold the umbrella over 
Mr. Seward, as Mr. Seward, you will remember, was a 
very small man. 

Later on I had a severe attack of camp fever. ]\Iy life 
had been despaired of, and my wife had been advised to 



MISCELLANEOUS. 717 

come and see me. She came, bringing with her our only 
child, a little boy two years of age. Under her watchful 
care I improved, and in course of time was permitted to go 
out for a little exercise. One morning we walked in the 
direction of the White House, and when directly opposite 
it we crossed the street. About the middle of the crossing 
we met Mr. Lincoln, and it being very muddy, he stepped 
aside and stood in the mud until we passed. Of course I 
saluted him and he returned it ; but his eyes, seemed to see 
only our little boy walking by my side, with his little mil- 
itary cap and the letters and figures ' ' igtli Regt. Ind. Vol. ' ' 
on the front. I have often thought of what he might have 
been thinking, and I doubt not that one thought was "God 
grant that the father may be spared to his little one." 

Again, I saw him come out of the White House, to 
cross the street on his way to McClellan's headquarters, 
when an old gentleman — a farmer I should say, b}' his 
dress — hailed him. Lincoln stopped, and, seeing who it 
was, turned and almost ran to meet him. It was an old 
neighbor from home, I am sure, from the familiar w^ay in 
which they talked. He asked ]\Ir. Lincoln how he was 
getting along, about the health of the family, etc., and 
to all Mr. Lincoln replied in a verry happy mood, and as 
he grasped the hand of the old farmer to say good-by, 
it was the shake of an old friend. They seemed loath to 
part. 

This was the last time I saw Mr, Lincoln alive. At 
last the lowering clouds of war beran to rise and the blessed 
rays of peace came struggling through the rifts. In the 
midst of rejoicing such as, I believe, was never known on 
earth before, the light of this great man's life went out, 
and a pall of sorrow covered every loyal heart. Oh what a 
sad time this was to us, my comrades ! Not all the sorrow- 
ful events of the war seemed worthy of remembrance in 
this, our greater grief. Stout hearts that had never 
quailed in the presence of what seemed certain death gave 
way beneath this stroke of an assassin. I was at home, 



718 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

at Indianapolis, when all that was left in the visible form of 
our martyred President lay in state in our old capitol build- 
ing, and with a heart bowed with grief I looked for the last 
time on his face. To me it seemed still troubled, yet re- 
signed. I need not say that I wept as for a father or 
brother, for he was both to every man who stood up to de- 
fend his country. 

At the dead hour of midnight, with the rain falling and 
the bells tolling, his remains were taken to the depot, and, 
as the multitude stood with uncovered heads until the 
hearse passed by, I heard the expressions of many blessing 
his memory. 

Corp. Cyrus Macy 

Was a member of Company A, 6th Wisconsin Veteran Vol- 
unteer Infantry. He w^as wounded in the left knee at the 
battle of the Wilderness ; he was also wounded in the head 
at Hatcher's Run, Virginia, February 7, 1865, causing loss 
of the siq:ht of the left eve and total deafness of the left ear. 

This soldier was conspicuous for his bravery, which 
amoimted almost to recklessness, as the following incident 
will show : 

About sunrise July 30, 1864, at the "Mine explosion" in 
front of Petersburg, Virginia, while all eyes were turned to 
the mine, the order came for a special detail of 60 select men 
from the " Iron Brigade" to double a picket force between 
the Union and Confederate breastworks. Corporal Macy 
became one of this detail. When the detail was made, 
each man was shown the picket pit in which he was to find 
shelter from the enemy's bullets; the picket holes were 
about two rods apart, and about 30 rods from the foe's 
breastworks, in front of the Confederate army. 

At a given signal each man jumped the Union breast- 
works and made for his pit. It being a very warm day, the 
men could hardly stay in their pits, and it soon became 
a]- parent that without water their suffering from thirst and 
the heat would be unendurable ; it could only be obtained 



MISCELLANEOUS. 719 

back of the Union breastworks. To attempt to get it 
wonld expose anyone making the attempt to ahnost certain 
destruction, as the ground that must be crossed was exposed 
to the bullets from the Confederate rifle-pits. But water 
was a necessit}-, and in this extremity, Corporal JMacy pro- 
posed to his comrades that if they would throw him some 
of their canteens he would try to procure the water. This 
they did ; and taking off all his clothing except pantaloons 
and shirt, and strapping eight or ten canteens to his back, 
he started for the Union lines, which fortunately, he reached 
in safety. 

When he reached his regimxcnt, his officers upbraided 
him soundly for the needless exposure, as they thought, and 
tried to dissuade him from returning ; but he replied that 
without water the men in the pits would perish from thirst. 
So, filling the canteens with fresh water and strapping them, 
as before, upon his back, he again jumped the breastworks 
and made a dash for the pit from which he had come, which 
he reached amidst a dizzy shower of Confederate bullets, 
but without injury. Thus the men were, in a measure, 
relieved from their thirst ; and they remained in the pits 
until they could be removed under cover of the night. 

Benjamin B. Duke 

Enlisted as a private in Company B, 19th Regiment 
Indiana Volunteers, and was mustered into the service of 
the United States on the 29th of July, 1861. December 
31, 1863, he reenlisted as a veteran and served until the 
close of the war, and was finally mustered out with the 
regiment on the 27th day of July, 1865. 

He was present with and participated in all the move- 
ments of his regiment from first to last, except during a 
time while he was a prisoner of war, and excepting, also, a 
short time he was with Sherman's army, which he and his 
prison comrades joined at or near Columbia, S. C, having 
escaped from a prison pen situated a few miles north of 



720 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

that place, the approach of that army affording them an 
excellent opportunity for escape. 

He was twice a prisoner of war. He was first captured 
July I, 1863, at Gettysburg, while on the skirmish line, 
together with Lieut. G. W. Bunch, Comrades William 
Lock, John Markle, William Castater of Company B, and 
John Gump, I. S. Pruitt, R. I. Patterson, and Wesley 
Galyean of Company E, and Sergeant Henderson, Jack 
Oliver, and Jet. Darah of Company D. Henderson and 
Galyean were wounded at the time. Companies B, D and 
E had been deployed on the skirmish line in the wheat 
field, on the left front of the regiment, with orders to hold, 
this point as long as possible ; but the Confederate charge 
upon the line at this point was so sudden and vigorous that 
these comrades were soon overpowered and captured. They 
were taken to the provost headquarters of Lee's army, situ- 
ated just west of the seminary, where they were kept until 
late on the evening of the 3d, when they were paroled. They 
were sent to West Chester, Pennsylvania, where they re- 
mained until September, when they were returned to the 
regiment for duty without exchange, it having been discov- 
ered that their parol was not regular and was therefore void. 

At the battle of the Wilderness, INIay 5, 1864, Com- 
rade Duke was again captured, together with Robert G. 
Conley and William Sykes of the same company. Sergeant 
Hiatt, Sergeant McGee, John Pitman and George Banner of 
Company A, Benjamin Turner of Company G, and Lieut. 
G. E. Finney, adjutant. 

They were taken to Andersonville prison, where, for 
several months, they experienced the horrors of that pen, 
which they characterize as "a veritable hell on earth." 
Here the robust constitution, the vigorous temperament 
and active habits of Comrade Duke, together with his kind- 
ness of heart and comradeship of feeling were utilized to 
the benefit, not only of those of his own regiment, but of 
other regiments who, reduced by woimds or disease and 
confinement in that horrible place, would never have re- 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 721 

turned to home and friends but for his kindly offices. It 
is asserted by tliose who were with him during this trying 
time, that his kind and cheering words, his gentle nursing, 
his trading and trafficking and many times dividing his 
last ration, although scant, with a sick and weak com- 
rade, and his general activity in their behalf, saved the 
life of many a disheartened and discouraged comrade. W. 
A. W. Daly and Calvin Engle, of the 5tli Indiana Cav- 
alry, who live in Randolph County, Indiana, will verify 
this statement. After their confinement at Andersonville 
for several months they were moved about from one prison 
pen to another, and finally to a prison near Columbia, S. C, 
where they were at the time Sherman's army passed that 
way on its "]\Iarch to the sea." The appearance of such 
an enemy in their vicinity compelled the withdrawal of 
most of the guards from the prison to assist in repelling his 
advance. Many of the prisoners, among whom were Com- 
rade Duke and his comrades, as before stated, took ad- 
vantage of the opportunity and escaped to Sherman's lines. 

Captain Lee Yaryan, 

of Richmond, Indiana, enlisted as first lieutenant in Com- 
pany G, 19th Indiana, July, 1861. He served with this 
regiment until January, 1862, when he was transferred to 
and became adjutant of the 58th Indiana Volunteers, which 
at that time was at Bardstown, Kentucky, with the Army 
of the Cumberland. 

In x^pril, 1862, at Shiloh, he was promoted to captain 
and assistant division commander on the staff of Maj. Gen. 
Thomas J. Wood, then commanding First Division of the 
Twenty-first Corps. He served with distinction, and was 
in all the battles the Army of the Cumberland engaged in 
under Buell, Rosecrans, Thomas and Grant; at Shiloh, 
Stone River, Chickamauga, Mission Ridge, Perryville, re- 
lief of Burnside at Knoxville, etc. 



XLVI 



722 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Abram J. Buckles, 
Company E, 19th Indiana, was born al Muncie, Indiana, 
enlisted July, 1861, as a private, and served until May 15, 
1865. He was color-bearer of the regiment at the battle 
of the Wilderness May 5, 1864. He had been wounded 
through the right thigh at second Bull Run and through 
the shoulder at Gettysburg, and although he was suffering 
severely at the time of the battle of the Wilderness from his 
Gettysburg wound, which had not yet healed, he had no 
thought of remaining back ; and when the order came to 
move forward into the woods and make the attack, he took 
his place, with the flag over his left shoulder, the right be- 
ing disabled, as above stated. 

The enemy's line w^as soon struck and pushed back, the 
woods in many places being so thick with undergrowth 
that the men had to crawl through it on their hands and 
knees. 

The line soon came to a cleared place, through and be- 
yond which the retreating enemy had gone and reformed 
their line on the opposite side. As soon as the Union line 
could be straightened out it started across the open field, 
with the colors in the lead, when almost immediately Com- 
rade Buckles received a Confederate bullet through the 
body. Staggering, but not falling, he supported himself 
by the flag-staff until relieved by young Divelbuss, one of 
the color-guard, who was killed a short time afterwards. 
Comrade Buckles, having been carried a mile to the rear, 
found himself completely exhausted. The men who had 
been carrying him on a stretcher, believing him to be dead, 
let him down, but finding him still alive, carried him to 
the hospital, where the doctor told him that his wound was 
fatal and that he must soon die. The chaplain was sent in 
to impart the same information and to prepare the wounded 
man for his approaching dissolution. Being of a very 
strong constitution, and temperate in his habits, however, 
he was able to pull through. 




LIEUT. A. J. BUCKLES. 



M ISC ELLA NE O US. 723 

Altlioiigli his wound was not healed, and did not, until 
1 870, he sufficiently recovered to return to his regiment in 
November, 1864. He was connnissioned a second lieuten- 
ant, and on March 25, 1865, in an engagement on Hatcher's 
Run, on the left of the line at Petersburg, he lost his right 
leg above the knee. 

Returning to Indiana, he studied law, and in 1875 emi- 
grated to California, of which State he is now a resident 
and honored citizen. He was elected district attorney of 
Solano County in 1879, reelected in 1882, and in 1884 was 
elected superior judge, and reelected Nov. 1890, a position 
he now holds. He has also been department commander, 
G. A. R., of the Department of California and Nevada. 

Capt. Lon. Makepeace. 

On the evening of July i, 1863, Capt. Lon. IMakepeace 
of Company A, Capt. G. W. Green of Company E, Capt. 
P. Hart of Company H, and Lieut. Harley Richardson of 
Company D, all of the 19th Indiana Volunteer Infantry, were 
captured at Gettysburg, near the close of the first day of that 
memorable contest. They were taken to the rear of the 
Confederate army, where they were kept until early on the 
morning of the 4th, when they moved, in front of the re- 
treating Confederr.te forces, toward the Potomac River, 
which they crossed at Williamsport, from whence the^• were 
marched to Staunton, Virginia, where they were put on 
board of the cars and taken to Richmond, and thence to 
Libby prison, where they arrived on or about July 18, where 
they remained until the following Ma}'. 

They were then taken to Danville, Virginia, thence to 
Salisbury, South Carolina, and afterwards to ]^Iacon, Georgia, 
and finally to Charleston, South Carolina, where they re- 
mained for some time. They were afterward removed to 
Columbia, where Captain ^lakcpeace, together with Captain 
Kendall of tlie 73d Indiana, and a lieutenant of an Indiana 
battery, managed to make their escape. They wandered 
about through the swamps and thickets of the Confederate 



724 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

country for forty-eight days, traveling more than 400 miles, 
several times chased by bloodhounds through swamps and 
canebrakes. But they were finally recaptured and taken back 
to Columbia, South Carolina. Here they remained until 
finally exchanged, which occurred on the ist day of March, 
1865, at which time they were sent through the lines at Wil- 
mington, North Carolina, twenty months after their first 
capture. 

Lieut. George W. Bunch. 

This comrade enlisted into the service of the United 
States in September, 1861, as a recruit in Company B, 
19th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. He was mustered out as 
senior officer of that company, as first lieutenant in Com- 
pany C, 20th Indiana (consolidated), July 12, 1865. He 
was in all the marches and battles of his regiment from the 
date of his enlistment until his final muster-out. 

An Incident of Gainesville. 

On the evening of the 29th of August, 1862, an incident 
occurred, which we mention to illustrate the necessity, at 
times, of a quick grasp of a situation, and how the reputa- 
tion of a body of men may be made or marred in a 
moment. 

King's division late in the afternoon were slowly mak- 
ing their way along the Gainesville turnpike, marching in 
column, when suddenly a Confederate battery posted in a bit 
of timber only a few hmidred yards to the left of the road, 
opened fire, and the report of the guns was followed so quickly 
by the explosion of the shells, that it seemed as if the troops 
had stumbled upon the very guns themselves. The cavalry 
column immediately sought shelter in a piece of timber to 
the right of the pike ; the infantry were ordered to lie down 
on the roadside, protected somewhat by the ditches, while 
Batteiy B, of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, hauled out into the 
field through openings made in the fences, and in the short- 
est possible time brought all of their Napoleon guns into 
action. 



MIS CELL A NE O US. lib 

Before, howe\-er, they got a single piece unlimbered, a 
projectile from one of the Confederate gnns had struck one of 
their caissons, exploding all the ammunition in it, with a re- 
port that could be heard for miles. The 30tli New York In- 
fantr}' Regiment being on the left of the famous Iron Brigade 
(then consisting of the iQtli Indiana, and the 2d, 6th, and /tli 
Regiments of Wisconsin Volunteers), was marching in the 
column immediately in front of the artillery and directly 
abreast of the Confederate battery when it opened fire. 

The first shot carried away the head of a private in the 
ranks and hurled his body in the ditch. Other casualties 
followed, and the suddenness of the onslaught was creat- 
ing a panic in the regiment ; but as the first soldier started 
to the rear, Lieutenant Andrews, jumping to his feet, placed 
his revolver at the man's breast and ordered him back to 
his place in the ranks. 

The man did not dare hesitate, but obe\-ed the order at 
once, returning to his post, and a score of others who were 
about to follow his example, which must have stampeded 
the regiment, regained their senses, and never afterwards 
flinched, no matter how trying the circumstances. 

Thus began the battle of Gainesville. The following 
day Col. Edward Frisby complimented this officer in orders 
for his gallantry, but even more for the alertness with 
which he carried out his command of the situation. . 

Lieutenant, afterwards Captain, Andrews was attending 
a military school at the breaking out of the rebellion ; but 
on the istof May, 1861, left his books and entered the serv- 
ice, as an enlisted man, at 17 years of age; but he was 
immediately afterwaid made a lieutenant, and it is claimed 
by man}' that he was the youngest commissioned officer in 
the service. In the autumn of 1861, while foraging near 
Fairfax Court House, Virginia, some Federal troops were cap- 
tured after a skirmish. Lieutenant Andrews among them ; 
and for man}' months he was confined in Libby Prison, in 
Richmond, his i8th birthday being passed there before his 
exchansfe. 



726 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Captain Andrews came of a soldierly stock. His two 
great-grandfathers having served in the Revolution, one of 
them in Colonel Walcott's Connecticut Militia Regiment 
in the campaign in the defense of Boston in 1775 and 1776, 
the other serving in three different campaigns in 1776, 
1777, and i78o-'8i. His grandfather, although only a boy, 
served as a volunteer aid on the staff of General Sulli- 
van in the camj)aign at Saratoga. An uncle attained the 
rank of major in the war of 1812 ; and now he has a son, 
Lieut. J. M. Andrews, Jr., who graduated at West Point in 
the class of 1890, and in the same year went through the 
late campaign against the Sioux Indians with his regiment, 
the ist Cavalr}', United States Army. 

Gen, E. Dumont 

Was born at Vevay, Indiana, April 21, 1821. He was 
lieutenant colonel of the 4th Indiana Regiment during the 
Mexican war. 

When the first war meeting was called, at Indianapo- 
lis, after Fort Sumter was fired upon, several speeches 
were made to encourage the enlistment of soldiers. Three 
prominent farmers were present and made s]3eeches, and 
closed with the offer of a horse each to any soldier who 
would go and ride it. Dumont, being called out for a 
speech, in response, said, he, too, would give a horse and 
ride it himself Thus began enlistments in that city. 

The 7th Regiment Indiana Volunteers was organized, 
and mustered into the service for three months, with 
Dumont as its colonel. Proceeding immediately to the 
front, they soon became engaged in the conflict that en- 
sued and won' distinction in their short term of service. In 
August, 1861, the 7th Indiana reenlisted for three years, 
with Dumont as colonel 

On September 3, 1861, he was promoted to brigadier 
general of volunteers, and in the following month was 
transferred to Kentucky, where he commanded a brigade 
in the Army of the Cumberland until Alarch, 1862, when 




GEN. EBENEZER DUMONT. 



M IS CELL A NE O US. 727 

he was assigned to the command of the post at Nashville, 
Tennessee. While General Dumont was in command at 
this post, Gen. John Morgan, of Confederate fame, was con- 
stantly destroying onr lines of communication. General 
Dumont asked, and obtained an order to organize a force 
sufficient to drive Morgan from his lines of operation. On 
the 3d of May, 1862, a Federal force of 1000 men was or- 
ganized at Murfreesboro, and pursuit of Morgan immediately 
began ; Morgan, in the • mean time, with 1500 cavalry was 
heading for Gallatin, Tennessee, with the intention of des- 
troying the Louisville and Nashville Railroad at various 
points. On the 5tli of ]\Iay the Federal cavalry overtook 
IMorgan's command at Lebanon, Tennessee, where a severe 
battle took place, lasting several hours, in which Morgan was 
defeated with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. 
This was Morgan's first defeat, and it was so overwhelming 
that General Buell, the department commander, congratu- 
lated Dumont and his little army over their brilliant vic- 
tory. 

After this spirited campaign of a few days the Federal 
troops returned to Nashville. When Kirby Smith, with 
the advance of Bragg' s army, invaded Kentucky, General 
Dumont was assigned to the command of the Twelfth Divi- 
sion of the Army of the Cumberland, and moved from 
Louisville, by way of Shelby ville and Frankfort, Kentucky, 
and succeeded in driving out of Kentucky various bands of 
Confederate cavalry which were very troublesome as bush- 
whackers. 

During the month of December, 1862, Dumont's divi- 
sion reached Gallatin, Tenn, where, on account of ill health, 
he resigned. 

The day after the capture of Nashville, General Dumont 
ordered an officer of his staff, Capt. David Bradcn, A. A. G., 
to proceed out on the Murfreesboro pike and post some 
pickets ; while engaged in executing this order, he was cap- 
tured by some of Morgan's command. The captain was 
at the time riding a very fine horse belonging to General 



728 



THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



Dumont, which he also was poHtely, but firmly, requested 
to o-ive up to Morgan. Having no discretion in the mat- 
terrthe captain very gracefully yielded to the inevitable, 
and was given in exchange a unique specimen of a worn- 
out Confederate cavalry horse, without flesh or hair. The 
captain's graceful manner in accepting the situation had 
the effect to throw his captors temporarily off their guard ; 
and, while studying the mettle of his new horse, he con- 
cluded to make an attempt to regain his liberty. So, 
making a sudden dash from his captors, he was soon out 
of their reach, and was borne safely back to camp, a dis- 
tance of 20 miles. When General Dumont saw him, after 
his return to camp, he remarked: "Captain Braden, lam 

d d glad to see you back, but you played li l^m 

swapping horses with Morgan." 

In October, 1862, General Dumont was elected to Con- 

crress by the Republicans of the (then) Sixth Congressional 

District of Indiana, by 1500 majority ; he was reelected in 

1864, by 7000 majority. . 

On the day previous to his death he was appointed 

governor of Idaho. 

John V. HadlEY (Danville, Indiana.) 
Was born October 31, 1839, in Hendricks Count)', Indiana, 
and was raised on a farm in that county. He left Butler 
University, Indianapolis, to enlist into the service of his 
country, and was mustered into the United States serv- 
ice as a member of the 7th Indiana Volunteers, Septeinber 
1 3 1861 • was severely wounded at the second battle of Bull 
Run, August 30, 1862, and again at the battle of the 
Wilderness, May 5, 1864. He was promoted from the 
ranks to be first lieutenant, October i, 1862, and shortl)- 
afterwards detailed as a member of the staff of Gen. J.^. 
Rice where he did service until the 5th day of Alay, 1864, 
when, being severely wounded and left upon the battlefield, 
he was captured and sent South as a prisoner of war. He 
was confined at Macon, Savannah, Charleston, and Colum- 




CAPT. J. V. HADIvEY. 




HON. C. U. COON. 



MIS CEL L A NE O US. 729 

bia, from which latter place he escaped on the 4tli day of 
November, 1864, and on the i8th day of December of that 
year he entered the Union lines at Knoxville, Tennessee, 
.and was mnstered out of the service on the 28th day of 
January, 1865. He subsequently published a book of 180 
pages, giving an account of his imprisonment and final 
escape, one edition of which was exhausted in the first year 
of its publication. 

On his return to civil life he studied law, was admitted 
to the bar in June, 1866, locating and entering upon tlie prac- 
tice of his profession at Danville, Indiana, and was suc- 
cessful. He was married to Mary J. Hill, IMarch 15, 1865; 
was elected to the State Senate in 1868, and served in that 
body three sessions ; was a delegate to the National Con- 
vention that nominated General Harrison for President in 
1888, and was, in the same year, elected as Judge of the 
19th Judicial Circuit, which circuit then embraced the city 
of Indianapolis. 

Charles Edward Coon 

Was born in Friendship, Allegany County, New York, 
IMarch 15, 1842, being descended from New England Rev- 
olutionary stock. He enlisted innnediately after the firing 
upon Sumter, in April, 1861, and was mustered into the 
service of the United States as a corporal of Company B, 
23d New York Volunteer Infantry, ]\Iay 16, 1861. In Feb- 
ruary, 1863, he was discharged on account of sickness, but 
he continued to perform service as chief clerk and deputy 
provost marshal, 27th District, New York, until March, 
1864. July 24, 1864, he entered the Treasury Department 
as a clerk, and served through all the grades. He was en- 
gaged in Europe in funding the national debt, almost con- 
tinuously from 1 87 1 to 1 88 1, both as assistant and as chief 
funding agent of the Treasury Department. He became 
assistant Secretary of the Treasury in April, 1884, and was 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury the greater part of the time 
until the close of the Administration of President Arthur. 



730 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

November lo, 1885, he resigned. He now resides in New 
York City. He is a member of the Society of the Army 
of the Potomac, of the Society of the First Corps, of the 
Grand Army of the Republic, and of the Sons of the 
Revolution. 

E. R. Reed (Co. H, 2d Wisconsin). 

Among those who responded to their country's call for 
troops to defttnd its unity, were the "Randall Guards," 
recruited at Madison, Wisconsin, by Capt. J. F. Randolph, 
early in 1861. 

This organization was mustered into the service of the 
United States as Company H, 2d Wisconsin Regiment, and 
among its members was Private E. R. Reed, who has given 
a very graphic description of the services of that regiment at 
Gettysburg, together with some very interesting incidents, 
from which the following extracts are taken: "On the 
morning of the ist of July, 1863, the Iron Brigade, which was 
the First Brigade, First Division, First Corps, came in on 
the Emmittsburg road with the 2d Wisconsin in the lead. 
We soon came to elevated ground, which afforded a long 
look ahead ; here information given by citizens by the 
roadside indicated that we should soon have some hot work, 
as on the day previous Lee and his whole army had been 
encamped some six miles to the west of north. We moved 
on in the direction indicated, where we soon came up with 
the enemy and became sharply engaged. (This encounter 
and its results, casualties, etc., are elsewhere related.) 

"An incident is here worthy of mention: One R. E. 
Davidson, who had been with the regiment through the 
first Bull Run, Pope's retreat, Gainesville, the second Bull 
Run, South Mountain, Antietam, Chancellorsville, and 
several skirmishes, had become surfeited with fighting, and 
had sworn that he would never go into another fight if he 
could find any honorable way of dodging it. He would not 
desert in the face of the enemy, nor do any dishonorable 
thing ; but any honorable thing he could do to dodge a fight, 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 731 

lie would do. But the color-sergeant was killed at the 
first volley from the enemy, that day, and Davidson grasped 
the colors from the ground and rushed to the front and kept 
ten or fifteen yards in front of the line all the way through the 
woods, shouting to us to come on. This struck me as being 
a very singular way to "dodge a fight ;" but it shows how 
little a man knows of how he is going to act when he goes 
into a fight. He was a private soldier, but was made a ser- 
geant there on the field. He continued to carry those colors 
through to the end, and brought them home and deposited 
them in our Capitol. Many had been killed and wounded 
while carrying the flag, but he seems to have borne a 
charmed life. 

" In the afternoon the enemy came on again, in strong 
force, three lines of battle in our front and three on our 
left flank, and, after another desperate encounter, we were 
forced to fall back. 

"In this engagement I was severely wounded in both 
legs, and, with many others who were disabled, took refuge 
in the Lutheran Theological Seminary. The First Army 
Corps swept past, closely followed by the Confederates, on 
through the town and up to Cemetery Hill ; then the ene- 
my had possession of the town and we were prisoners. 

"We had lost heavily. General Reynolds, our corps 
commander, was killed ; Gen. Sol. Meredith, our brigade 
commander, was wounded ; our colonel, Lucius Fairchild, 
lost his arm and was a prisoner ; Lieutenant Colonel Ste- 
vens was mortally wounded and in the hands of the enemy ; 
Major Mansfield was wounded and a prisoner; Captain 
Rollins, of Company H was a prisoner ; the first lieutenant 
was a prisoner and the second lieutenant killed, and many 
others were killed, wounded and prisoners ; and out of tlie 
thirty-three men of Company H who went into the charge 
in the morning, only one man escaped injury, and that 
man was Sergt. R. E. Davidson, with his flag. 

"The 2d went in with 302 men, rank and file ; we had 
27 killed, 153 wounded and 53 missing— total, 233; this 



732 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

left 69 men in line, less than seven, of all ranks, to the 
company. The brigade, out of 1883 men, lost 189 killed, 
774 wounded, 249 missing (prisoners), a total of 12 12 men. 
Thus ended the first day at Gettysburg. The second 
day was full of horrors to those of us who were at the 
seminary as prisoners ; the surrounding grounds being 
elevated, were occupied by about 140 pieces of Confederate 
artillery, the music of which, together with the effects of 
shots from the Union artillery upon the building and sur- 
rounding grounds, occasioned the most extreme anguish to 
us all. The noise, resounding through the building, was 
worse than ordinary artillery. 

'"The third day was worse than the second. By the 
fourth day the Confederate batteries were silenced, and 
only the 'distant and random gun' of the pickets could be 
heard. The morning of the fifth day dawned, beautiful 
and bright, and the last Confederate had disappeared. The 
wounded prisoners were now all free; but those not wounded 
were marched off to Richmond. My lieutenant, however, 
escaped and returned to his company, but Capt. Nat. Rol- 
lins was held for many months before he was released." 

Losses in the Hartsuff-Coulter-Taylor-Baxter 

Brigade.* 

The following statement is furnished by Capt. George A. 
Hussey, of No. 61 Pine Street, New York, late a member 
of the 9th Regiment New York State Militia (83d New 
York Volunteers) : 



*This statement is taken from " Regimental Losses in the Civil War," by Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Wm. F. Fox : 

The losses — killed or died of wounds — of " famous " brigades was as follows: 
Iron Brigade (5 regiments), 113 1 ; Vermont (6 regiments), 1172; Irish 
(5 regiments), 961; Philadelphia (4 regiments), 636; HarlsnJJ's (7 regi- 
ments), 1099; N'eiu Jersey (6 regiments), 900; Excelsior (6 regiments), 
?)T(>; lozua f4 regiments), 443 ; Hecknian^s ($ regiments), 686; Sledinav's 
(10 regiments), 1 192; JVillich's {9 regiments), 1115 ; JIarAers {g regiments), 
H07; Michigan Cavalry (4 regiments), 525. 



MIS CEL L A NE O US. 733 

Killed or Died 
REGIMENTS. of Wounds. Died of Disease. Total. 

nth Penna. Vols.* , 236 181 417 

I2tli Mass. Vols 193 83 276 

97tli N. Y. Vols,* 181 157 338 

83d N. Y. Vols.f 156 88 244 

13th Mass. Vols 121 40 161 

8Sth Penna. Vols. * 109 72 iSi 

90tli Penna. Vols 103 127 230 

Total 1099 74S 1847 

ist N. Hanip. Vols., (3 mos. men) 5 5 

1 2tli Indiana Vols., ( I year men) 24 24 

i6th Indiana Vols., (i year men) i 15 ' 16 

29tli Penna. Vols.* 102 85 1S7 

i6th Maine Vols 181 259 440 

Total 1383 1136 2519 

All tliese regiments were in this brigade ; J but only the 
first seven served in it at a battle, and should be noted as 
the "fifth" of those "famous seven,'' because of excessive 
losses. 

The following address by the author is here in.serted by 
request : 

A quarter of a century after the desperate conflict on this part 
of the field, where the brave troops under the gallant Reynolds, 
who surrendered his life here to protect his State and save his cotin- 
try from perishing from among the nations of the earth, were wait- 
ing for night or the Army of the Potomac, the veterans of the two 
armies assemble to-day under the same flag that was unfurled at 
Bunker Hill, and vouchsafed to us by lo3-al hands. With solemn 
vows we declare our full belief in a united country. The death of 
General Reynolds inspired his soldiers with a valor, which was 
never excelled on the fields of battle, and this ridge was not surren- 
dered until the commands of A. P. Hill and Ewell turned the flanks 
of the First and Eleventh Corps. So great was the danger on the 
left that General Buford threw his cavalrj- into column, threatening 

* These regiments reenlisted. 
* t This regiment was also known as the '' Ninth New York State Militia," by 
which number it was mustered into the United States service. 

J The Brigade was in the First Corps during 1S62 and 1863, and until March 
1864, when it was transfeiTcd to the P"ifth Corps. 



734 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

a charge, thereby compelling the enemy to form squares, which de- 
lay enabled General Robinson to extricate his division on the extreme 
right from the maelstrom that heavilj- threatened his destruction. 
These movements made it possible for General Doubleday, the grand 
hero who fired the first gun froin Sumter to retire the First Corps to 
a new position on Cemetery Hill. 

The First Corps went into action here at ten o'clock on the ist 
of July, with 820D men, and held its position until four, in an open 
field, with a loss of 6,059. It is not too much to say that but 
for the desperate fighting of the First Corps on this field, the posi- 
tion of Cemetery Hdl could not have been secured, and the great 
battle of Gettysburg would not have been fought. If any one asks 
by what magic General Reynolds was possessed that he imbued his 
soldiers with such heroism on the field, we answer that he received 
it at Monterey, Buena Vista, Peninsular Campaign, second Bull Rim, 
Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. This battle was fought greatly 
like Chalons, which is considered one of the fifteen important bat- 
tles of the world, and its results are similar. Aetius, the Roman 
general, posted his left on a sloping hill which Attila furiously 
charged, but like Pickett was repulsed with great loss. He had 
robbed his center to reenforce his right, which was then in no con- 
dition to withstand the victorious cava'iy of the Visigoths, who 
forced back his right wing, and then turned on the center. But the 
Hunnish general, like Lee, remained on the field, and apparently 
retired at his own pleasure. Meade, like Aetius, permitted Ivce to 
remain in his front, after he had mastered him along the line. 
A standard author says : " It is probable that the crafty Aetius was 
unwilling to be too victorious." The same can be said of INIeade — 
it was a safe victory. The results of that battle were felt for cen- 
turies ; the result of this we fervently hope will continue to the end 
of time. The value of the victory of this great battle will never be 
fully estimated. 

If we had failed here, then the efforts of the Pilgrim Fathers, 
who came to this country to establish a government on an equal 
basis to all, would have been futile. The battles of the Revolution 
would have been fought in vain ; the solid fabric of liberty' reared by 
the armies of the colonists, and the corner stone of this great Repub-. 
lie, planted by them would have been crumbled to dust. The dial hand 
of time would have been turned back toward the dnrk ages ; indi- 
vidual prosperitv would have been crushed out ; civilization would 
have received a .shock, and Christian progress been paralyzed. 
From the beginning of time, the history of the world is filled with 
vain attempts to establish a government on an equal basis to 
all, and we are egotistical enough to believe ours is the model 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 735 

one to stand the test. Edmund Burke said that " The slain in bat- 
tle have been many times greater than the present population of the 
whole earth." In my humble judgment, the result of this field has 
more significance than any battle of the eighty-eight prominent 
military campaigns recorded in histor3^ Does Sparta now enjoy 
any of the fruits of Marathon? Did Hannibal at Cannae preserve 
Carthage, or Scipio at Zama save the Roman Empire, only for the 
time being? Charlemagne established a vast empire on the ruins of 
Rome, after a thirty-two years war of great ferocity. He had scarce- 
ly died when it dissolved like the morning mist. The Eastern em- 
pire rose to power and magnificence, only to be destro3'ed. The 
Persian Eaipire, which received such great impulse under C3TUS the 
Great, who conquered and reigned from the ^gean Sea to the Eu- 
phrates, is now a sickh' dynasty of no importance, and Herat, where 
a million and six hundred tliousand lives were sacrificed, is only the 
key of the road from Russia to the East Indies. I admire Marlbor- 
ough, at Romilies ; Ferdinand at Minden ; Frederick the Great at 
Leuthen ; Joan of Arc at Orleans ; Henry V at Agincourt ; Gustav- 
us Adolphus at Lutzen, and Prince Eugene at Cassano and Turin — 
they won great fame. The generals who fought on this and other 
fields of the late war, were struggling to save a nation established 
by the people and for the people, where its huniblcst citizen may be 
its chief executive. 

On 3-onder hill, a rail-splitter delivered the most memorable 
speech in the history of the nation. It will live in the hearts of the 
people, and be respected times innumerable, long after other great 
speeches are forgotten. How fully it reveals the fact that his heart 
was constantly with the armies that must save the nation, and when 
this great battle was fought here, he sought relief in a spontaneous 
speech that crowned him prince of orators. Let every hamlet in the 
land have Lincoln's statue if desired, but here is the place above all 
others to erect one to his memory, where he stood that day. INIake 
it towering, and let there be clustered around it the statues of the 
war governors who so faithfully aided him in his great work. Then 
will "the picture of this field be complete, with its marble statues, 
and not till then. 

Organization of thh Society of the First Corps, 
Army of the Poto:viac. 

HARTFORD, 1881. 

President Qi^rv. J. C. 'Robinson. 

Vice President Gen. J. Wm. Hofmann. 

Secretary and Treasurer Capt. I. N. Burritt. 



736 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

DETROIT, 1SS2. 

President Gen. Edward S. Bragg. 

Vice President Col. A. M. Edwards. 

Secretary and Treasurer Capt. I. N. Burritt. 

WASHINGTON, 1883. 

President Col. G. G. Benedict, Burlington, Vt. 

First Vice President.... Col. Isaac S. Tichenor, Washington, D. C. 

Second Vice President Maj. E. P. Halstead, Washington, D. C. 

Recording Secretary Capt. I. N. Burritt, Washington, D. C. 

Cor. Secretary J. W. KirklEY, Georgetown, D. C. 

Treasurer Thomas M. Exley, Washington, D. C. 

Historian J. H. Stine, Washington, D. C. 

BROOKLYN, 1884. 

President Gen. Abner Doubled ay, New York City. 

First Vice President Gen. Edward B. Fowler. 

Second Vice President Capt. Ira N. Burritt. 

Corresponding Secretary Jos. W. KirklEy, Georgetown, D. C. 

Recording Secretary Wm. H. RilEy, Brooklyn, N. Y. 

Treasurer Thos. M. ExlEy, Washington, D. C. 

Historian James H. Stine, Washington, D. C. 

Vice President, Society of Army of the Potomac, 

representing First Corps Col. Isaac S. Tichenor. 

BALTIMORE, 1885. 

President ,. Abner Doubleday, New York QXty. 

Vice President, First Division. ..Chas. E. Coon, Washington, D. C. 
Vice President, Second Divison...CHAS, E. Phelps, Baltimore, Md. 

Vice President, Third Division Pat'k DeLacy, Scranton, Pa. 

Vice President, Artiller}^ Corps... J. A. Reynolds, Rochester, N. Y. 
Corresponding Secretary. ..Joseph W. Kirkley, Georgetown, D. C. 

Recording Secretary Wm. H. RilEY, Brooklyn, N. Y. 

Treasurer Thos. M. Exley, Washington, D. C. 

Historian .J. H. Stine, Washington, D. C. 

Vice Pres., vSociety Army of Potomac, E. B. Fowler, Brooklyn, N. Y. 

SAN FRANCISCO, 1886. 

President Abner Doubleday, New York Cit}-. 

Vice President, First Division... Ch.\s. B. Coon, Washington, D. C. 
Vice President, Second Division. ...Ch.\s. E. Phelps, Baltimore, Md. 

Vice President, Third Division Pat'k De Lacy, vScranton, Pa. 

Vice President, Artillery Corps. ...J. A. Reynolds, Rochester, N. Y. 

Corresponding Secretary .Jos. W. KirklEY, Georgetown, D. C. 

Recording Secretary Wm. H. RilEy, Brooklyn, N. Y. 

Treasurer Thomas M. Exley, Washington, D. C. 



i 




GEN. HORATIO C. KING. 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 737 

SARATOGA SPRINGS, 1887. 

President Maj. E. P. Halstead. 

Vice President, First Division Charles E. Coox. 

Vice President, Second Division Charles E. Phelps. 

Vice President, Third Division Lieut. Pat'k De Lacy. 

Vice President, Artillery Corps Col. Jno. A. Reynolds. 

Corresponding Secretary Lieut. Abram Merritt. 

Recording Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr. 

Treasurer Walter J. Gibson. 

Historian j. h. Stine. 

GETTYSBURG, 1S88. 

President Maj. E. P. Halstead. 

Vice President. First Division Capt. L. E. Pond. 

Vice President, Second Division Sergt. J. W. Kirkly. 

Vice President, Third Division Capt. P. DeLacy. 

Vice President, Artillery Corps Gen. James A. Hall. 

Corresponding Secretary F. DonohuE. 

Recording Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr. 

Treasurer Walter J. Gibson. 

Historian j. h. Stine. 

ORANGE, 1889. 

President Gen. R. R. Dawes. 

Vice President, First Division Charles E. Coon. 

Vice President, Second Division Col. Redfield Proctor. 

Vice President, Third Division Charles J. Chatfield. 

Vice President, Artillery Corps C. S. Wainright. 

Corresponding Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr. 

Recording Secretary Capt. H. O. Clark. 

Treasurer Florence Donohue. 

Historian j. h. Stine. 

PORTLAND, 1890. 

President Col. Redfield Proctor. 

Vice President, First Division Capt. C. E. Stubbs. 

Vice President, Second Division Maj. D. B, Ricker. 

Vice President, Third Division Capt. H. O. Clark. 

Vice President, Artillery Corps Capt. J. H. Chase. 

Recording Secretary Capt. J. ]\L Andrews, Jr. 

Corresponding Secretary H O. Clark. 

Treasurer A. H. Van Dusen. 

Historian J. H. Stine. 

XLVII 



738 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

BUFFALO, 1891. 

President Ira M. Hedges. 

Vice President, First Division E. B. Wright. 

Vice President, Second Division W. F. Rogers. 

Vice President, Third Division H. O. Clark. 

Vice President, Artillery Corps Lieut. Benj. \V. Wilber. 

Recording Secretary Capt. J. M. Andrews, Jr. 

Corresponding Secretary C. F. Pierce. 

Treasurer Capt. A. H. Van Dusen. 

Historian J. H. Stine. 

Society of the Army of the Potomac. 
Officers, 1869 I'o 1892. 

PRESIDENTS. 

Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. A 1869 

Major General GEORGE G. Meade, U. S. A 1870 

Major General Joseph Hooker, U. S. A 1871 

Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. V 1872 

Major General Irwin McDowell, U. S. A 1873 

Major General Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. A 1874 

Major General John F. Hartranft, U. S. V * 1876 

Major General Henry W. Slocum, U. S. A 1877 

Major General William B. pRANKLiisf, U. S. V ,1878 

Major General Daniel E. Sickles, U. S. V 1879 

Major General Horatio G. Wright, U. S. A 1880 

Brevet Major General Charles Devens, Jr 1881 

Major General A. A Humphreys, U. S. A 1882 

Brevet Major General John Newton, U. S. A .1883 

General Ulysses S. Grant, U. S. A 1884-1885 

Brevet Major General Martin T. McMahon, U. S. \ 1886 

Major General John C. Robinson, U. S. V 1887 

Major General Joshua L. Chamberlain, U. S. V 1888 

Major General John G. Parke, U. S. V., (Colonel U. S. A.) 1889 

Brigadier General Selden Connor, U. S. V 1890 

Major General Daniel BuTTERFiELD, U. S. V 1891 

RECORDING SECRETARIES. 

Brevet Major General Geo. H. Sharpe, U. S. V 1S69-1876 

Brevet Colonel Horatio C. King, U. S. V 1877-1891 

CORRESPONDING SECRETARIES. 
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel William C. Church, U. S. V. .1869-1876 

Brevet Brigadier General T. F. Rodenbough, U. S. A 1877-1878 

Brevet Major General Geo. H. Siiarpe, U. S. V 1879-1891 

*No meeting was held in 1875. 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 739 



BIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER PERRY MORTON. 

[War Governor of Indiana]. 
By Colonel Holloway, his Private Secretary. 

In the little village of Saulsbury, Wayne County, In- 
diana, on the 4th day of August, 1823, Oliver Perry Morton 
was born. He was of English descent, his grandfather 
having emigrated from England about the beginning of the 
Revolutionary war, and settled in New Jersey. His mother 
died when he was quite young. After the death of his 
mother the most of his bo>-hood days were spent with his 
grandparents in Ohio and with his widowed aunts in Cen- 
treville, Ind. His opportunities for education were rather 
limited, and at the age of 15 he was put to learn the hat- 
ter's trade with his half-brother, William T. Morton. At 
this occupation he worked for years, employing all his 
spare time in study. Early in 1843 he entered Miami 
University, at Oxford, Ohio. He remained there two 
years in hard study. While there he was counted the best 
debater in the university, and displayed the powers of pre- 
sentingf an aro-ument that afterwards made him famous. 

On leaving college he entered the office of Hon. John S. 
Newman, at Centre ville, and began the study of law. He 
was then nearly 22 years of age. On the 15th of INIay, 
1845, he married Miss Lucinda M. Burbank, daughter of 
Isaac Burbank of that place. Thi;> marriage proved a most 
happy one, his chosen companion holding and exercising 
over him, from their marriage until his death, an influence 
that did much to advance his fame. 

Mr. Morton was a Democrat in politics in his earlier 
years, and always took a deep interest in political affliirs. 
In 1S54, when the IMissouri Compromise was repealed, Mr. 
Morton was one of the vast army who left the Democratic 
party and united to stem the tide of slavery aggression, and 
he became the leader of the new party in his section of the 



740 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

State. He attended the Pittsburg Convention in 1856, and 
actively participated in its discussions. On the ist of JMay 
of that year the new party met at Indianapolis to nominate 
a State ticket. Mr. Morton was elected unanimously to 
the head of the ticket. His opponent was Hon. A. P. Wil- 
lard, the idol of his party, and who was regarded as the 
ablest stump speaker in the State. A joint canvass was ar- 
ranged, and the champion of the new party soon proved 
himself more than a match for his opponent in debate. His 
strong logical arguments utterly drove his antagonist from 
all his defenses. The election resulted in favor of the 
Democrats, and Mr. Morton thought his political career 
was ended. The Republican party grew very rapidly be- 
tween 1856 and i860. In the latter year he accepted the 
second place on the ticket with Hon. Henry S. Lane at its 
head. He threw himself, heart and soul, into the canvass, 
and was everywhere recognized as the most powerful de- 
bater in either party. This time his party was successful. 

The anticipated election of Mr. Lincoln as President 
had brought about threats of secession, and his success was 
no sooner heralded than South Carolina made haste to take 
herself, as she thought, out of the Union. It was a crit- 
ical time. All hearts feared the Union was gone. The 
prevailing sentiment seemed to be that there was no rem- 
edy for secession. The Democrats held that there was no 
power to coerce a State, and the leading Republicans were 
advocating that the "wayward sister " should be permitted 
to depart in peace. There were stormy forebodings on all 
sides. The idea of civil war was abhorrent, yet the loyal 
people did not like the idea of having the Union dismem- 
bered. In the midst of this general gloom, there came a 
liehtninof flash which electrified the North and startled the 
South. On the 2 2d of November a monster meeting was 
held in Indianapolis to ratify the election. The newly- 
elected Governor Lane and others spoke. Their speeches 
were of a conciliatory nature. At length Lieutenant Gov- 
ernor Morton arose, and in his very first words the vast 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 741 

audience saw that the man had come with the hour. There 
was no uncertainty with him. He announced at the very 
outset that if the issue was to be disunion and war, he was for 
war. It was a momentous occasion, and he felt that he was 
speaking for the Republican party, and not alone for it, but 
for the whole loyal element of the country, and his measured 
words fell upon the air like the notes of a bugle calling men 
to action. He discussed the right of secession, and the right 
to coerce, and gave to the acts of South Carolina an inter- 
pretation none before had been clear-sighted enough to see. 
In concluding, he struck the keynote of the whole situation 
in declaring and emphasizing that we area nation and not a 
combination of States. Upon this point he said : 

We must then cling to the idea that we are a nation, one and 
indivisible, and that, although subdivided by State lines for local 
and domestic purposes, we are but one people, the citizens of a 
common country, having like institutions and manners, and pos- 
sessing a common interest in that inheritance of glory so richly 
provided bv our fathers. We must, therefore, do no act, we must 
tolerate no act, we must concede no idea or theor}^ that looks to or 
involves the dismemberment of the nation. * * * Seven years is 
but a day in the life of a nation, and I would rather come out of a 
struggle at the end of that time, defeated in arms, and conceding 
independence to successful revolution, than to purchase present 
peace by the concession of a principle that must inevitably explode 
this nation into small and dishonored fragments. * * * The 
whole question is summed up in this proposition : " Are we one na- 
tion, one people, or thirty-three nations, or thirty-three independ- 
ent and petty States ? " The statement of the proposition furnishes 
the answer. If we are one nation, then no State has a right to se- 
cede. Secession can only be the result of successful revolution. I 
answer the question for you, and I know that my answer will find 
a true response in every true American heart, that we are one peo- 
ple, one nation, undivided and indivisible. 

This was the first time that resistance on the part of the 
North had been advocated. It touched the popular chord 
everywhere. From that time on there was no hesitanc>- upon 
the part of the loyal masses. Air. Lincoln, when he read 
it, said "it covers the whole ground, and declares the 



742 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

policy of the Government." That speech made Mr. Morton 
a leader in national politics. 

On the 14th day of January, 1861, he took the oath of 
ofBce as president of the Senate. Two days afterwards 
Governor Lane resigned to take his seat in the United 
States Senate, and Mr. Morton became Governor of the 
State. The history of his administration of the affairs of 
the State for six years has become the foundation stone of 
his fame. He everywhere became known as the great War 
Governor. When the war came in April, as he had been 
the first to predict that it would come, and the first to crys- 
tallize the loyal sentiment of the North, so he was the first 
to respond to the call of the President for troops. At his 
word Indiana sprang to arms, and thousands of her loyal 
sons answered the call of the President for six regiments. 
Here was a chance for his wonderful executive ability. 
Indiana, like the other Northern States, was unprepared for 
war. She had but few men in her borders who were pos- 
sessed of any military training. Volunteers were plenty, 
but how to arm and equip them was the trouble. Governor 
Morton was equal to the emergency. He grasped the situ- 
ation at a glance, and seemed to be everywhere present, 
stirring and animating the citizens, bringing order out of 
chaos, and reducing all to system, so that in comparatively 
few days Indiana was a vast military camp, and troops were 
ready for the field. 

An agent was sent to the leading manufacturers of the 
East and Canada to purchase arms. He gave but few hours 
to sleep in those days, but wore out his secretaries in 
continuous labors. During the four years of the war this 
intense strain was continued. A large number of people 
of his State were opposed to war, and thousands of them 
actively sympathized with the rebellion. These things 
added to his labors. He was the youngest of all the loyal 
governors, but so manifest was his ability, so lofty his 
patriotism, so hopeful was he in the darkest hours, that all 
turned to him for counsel. President lyhicoln and his great 



MISCELLANEOUS. 743 

War Secretary trusted him and leaned upon him as they did 
upon no one else. He was often consulted by the generals 
in the field, especially those in the West, in regard to the 
movements of the army, and he was always the first one 
appealed to for help and reenforcements. No such appeal 
was ever made in vain. Of the high opinion entertained 
of him and his labors by the members of Mr, Lincoln's 
Cabinet, the following extract from a letter written by Hon. 
S. P. Chase to Governor Morton in 1865 will evidence. 
Mr. Chase wrote him a letter stating that, in a conversa- 
tion with Secretary Stanton the night before. 

We naturally, turning our minds to the past, fell to talking of 
you. We agreed that no Governor rendered such services, or dis- 
pla3-ed such courage or more ability in administration ; and we 
agreed that your recent services were most meritorious of all, 
because rendered under circumstances of greatest personal risk of 
health and life, and which would have been by almost any man 
regarded, and by all accepted, as good reasons for total inaction. I 
have seldom heard Stanton express himself so warmly. 

As we said before, the war found the North unprepared. 
In the autumn of 1861 he found that the General Govern- 
ment would be unable to supply the men with overcoats in 
time to prevent suffering from the cold. He went to New 
York and purchased twenty-nine thousand overcoats for the 
use of the Indiana troops. The soldiers were his first care. 
To relieve the sick and wounded he organized a sanitary 
commission, which afterwards was adopted by the other 
States. To show his deep interest in the soldiers, and the 
care he took of their interests, it may be mentioned that 
during the siege of Vicksburg, when the army hospitals 
were full of sick and wounded, he applied to the Secretary 
of War for permission to remove the Indiana sick and 
wounded to the North. The Secretar}^ declined to grant 
the permission. Governor IVIorton declared his intention to 
take the matter before the President, He did so, and the 
result was a general order permitting not only Indiana, but 
any other State to remove the sick and wounded and care 



744 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

for them. Under the system of relief inaugurated by him, 
Indiana collected and disbursed over ;^6oo,ooo in money 
and supplies. 

In this short sketch we can do no more than glance at 
his work as Governor. In 1862 the Democrats elected a 
Legislature hostile to the war, and efforts were made to 
cripple the Governor in discharge of his duties. They re- 
fused to make appropriations to carry on the State govern- 
ment and to meet the interest on the public debt. Governor 
Morton was undismayed. He went to New York, and 
through the banking firm of Winslow, Lanier & Co., and 
some of the counties of the State, and a few of the patriotic 
citizens, arranged for money for the use of the State. He 
established a financial bureau without authority of the law, 
and in one year and nine months he raised and paid out over 
a million dollars. Every dollar of this was paid out upon 
his own check, and not a dollar was lost or misappropriated. 

His extraordinary activity was well demonstrated in 
1862, during the invasion of Kentucky by Generals Bragg 
and Kirby Smith. These two active Confederate generals 
had slipped around General Buell and invaded Kentucky, 
threatening both Louisville and Cincinnati. On the 17th 
of August, late at night, he received a telegram that Ken- 
tucky had been invaded at several points. Before night of 
the 1 8th one regiment was mustered in, armed, and started 
for the scene of action. During the night of the i8th four 
more regiments were forwarded. On the morning of the 
19th some of the patriotic banks and citizens advanced half 
a million dollars, and during the day and night four more 
regiments were paid and sent forward. By the 31st of 
August more than 30,000 troops had been armed and sent 
to the relief of Kentucky. All this time the arsenal of the 
State was employed day and night in the manufacture of 
ammunition, making 300,000 rounds daily, and all the 
river towns of the State were occupied by the State militia. 
Ohio as well as Kentucky wanted help. Cincinnati was 
threatened. Governor Morton was called upon, and Indi- 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 745 

ana troops rushed to the defense of her sister State. Am- 
munition was wanted for the heavy guns placed in position. 
The Mayor of Cincinnati and Committee of Defense tele- 
graphed to Columbus for a supply. They were instructed 
to make out a requisition in due form and have it approved 
by the commanding officer and forward it, and the ammu- 
nition would be supplied. They then applied to Governor 
Morton. No requisition was asked for, but the telegraph 
flashed back the answer that in an hour a train would start, 
and the train did so, bearing about 4000 rounds of artillery 
and 720,000 rounds for small arms. In eight days Indiana 
supplied 33,000 rounds for artillery and 3,365,000 for small 
arms, the entire amount having been made at the State ar- 
senal. For his services the Cincinnati Common Council 
ordered his portrait painted and placed in the City Hall, 
which was done with imposing ceremonies. 

In 1864, in the midst of a heated presidential canvass, 
the exposure came of the organization known as the 
Knights of the Golden Circle, or Sons of Liberty. This 
organization numbered fifty thousand members in the State, 
and an uprising was planned. The Governor had possessed 
himself of all their secrets, and before they knew that they 
were even suspected, he dealt them a terrible blow and 
crushed them. He ordered the arrest of the prominent lead- 
ers of the movement, and so alarmed were the members to 
find that their plots were known, and that they were in the 
power of a man whose hatred of treason was so intense, and 
who was so unrelenting in his efforts to crush all disloyalty, 
that dismay seized upon them and they stood bewildered, 
not knowing what to expect. The trial and conviction of 
the leaders is a part of the general history of the country. 

Governor INIorton was triumphantly elected to the office 
of Governor in 1864, and the people placed a loyal Legisla- 
ture to help him. It was the grandest political triumph 
ever achieved in this State. 

Oliver P. Morton was twice elected a member of the 
United States Senate by the Republicans, his first term 



746 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

commencing on the 4th day of March, 1867, and his second 
on the 4th day of March, 1873. The limits of this sketch 
forbid anything like an attempt at a history of his senator- 
ial labors. During his ten years of service, he was foremost 
in all things — in debates, in party counsels, in labors. It 
is not invidious to say of him that in labors he was more 
abundant than any other, notwithstanding his physical dis- 
ability. He entered the Senate at a stirring time. The 
war was ended, but the South was in a state of chaos. 
What was to be done, and how to do it, were the two ques- 
tions uppermost in the minds of all. There was an irrecon- 
cilable quarrel between Congress and the President. At 
the very outset of his senatorial career, although it was his 
first legislative experience, he was given three important 
places. He was made chairman of the Committee on Man- 
ufactures, and a member of the Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations and that of Military Affairs. The first great ques- 
tion in which he took part was that of reconstruction. 
He went into the Senate with well-settled views upon this 
question. He had held tenaciously to the idea that the 
United States was a nation, and he insisted upon that on 
all occasions. He looked upon treason as a crime deserv- 
ing punishment. He could not be led to believe that those 
who had laid down their arms after a four years' struggle to 
overthrow the Government could safely be intrusted with 
power until, at least, they had given evidence of having 
renewed their allegiance. He was inspired by no hatred of 
the people of the South ; it was their treason he hated. 

To Senator Morton more than any other man is due the 
credit of the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. He 
was bold and aggressive in his advocacy of this important 
measure, designed as it was to secure to the colored man the 
right of suffrage. It was opposed by Senator Sumner and 
some other Republican members, but Mr. Morton led in the 
debate and carried the measure triumphantly through. He 
met all arguments, repelled all assaults, and held the friends 
of the amendment together until the final vote was taken. 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 747 

Nor did his labors end with its adoption by Congress. It 
had to be ratified by the States. The Democratic members 
of the Indiana Legislature resigned to defeat its ratification. 
Senator Morton reached Indianapolis the morning the 
resignations were handed in. He sent word to the Repub- 
lican members not to adjourn, but take a recess and meet 
him. He then showed them the resignations did not break 
a quorum, and demonstrated that they had the power to 
ratify the amendment. 

They acted in accordance with his wishes, and the work 
was done, to the amazement of the Democrats. Still States 
were wanted. Senator Morton was equal to the emergency. 
A bill was introduced providing for the reconstruction of 
Mississippi, Texas and Virginia. He seized the opportunity, 
and offered an amendment providing that before these States 
should be admitted to representation in Congress they 
should ratify the proposed Fifteenth Amendment. The 
amendment was referred to the Committee on Judiciary. 
An adverse report was made by Senator Trumbull, chairman 
of the committee. Senator Morton still adhered to his 
amendment, and, after a debate lasting three da}'s, w'as suc- 
cessful. This was one of the most remarkable debates of 
the Senate. Still another State was wanted, and Senator 
Morton led in the work of securing it. He introduced a 
bill authorizing the military commander of Georgia to call 
the Legislature of that State together, including the colored 
members, who had been expelled the year before, and em- 
powering the Legislature to reconstruct that State, by elect- 
ing two United States Senators after ratifying the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Again the Judiciary Committee antagonized 
him, but again he triumphed, and the Fifteenth Amendment 
became a part of the Constitution, and stands to-day as a 
monument of his love of justice and his powers as a leader, 
more enduring than brass or marble. 

Space will not permit the dwelling upon his labors in 
the great Kuklux debates and other similar measures, but 
in all he took a leading part, and upon all he left the im- 



748 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

press of liis lofty and unyielding patriotism. As chairman 
of the Committee on Elections and Privileges he rendered 
signal service. All questions that came before him were 
treated with the utmost fairness, and stern justice ruled in 
the decisions of his committee. One notable instance of 
this kind was his action in regard to the election of Cald- 
well as Senator from Kansas. It was evident that his elec- 
tion had been procured by corrupt means. Senator Morton 
held that he should be expelled from the Senate as un- 
worthy a seat in that body. The friends of Caldwell plead 
to have the election simply declared void. ]\Ir. Morton 
would not listen. His sense of justice had been outraged, 
and he felt that American politics needed purifying, and 
insisted upon expulsion, and to save himself from that the 
Kansas Senator resigned. With fraud, force, or corrup- 
tion, he had no patience, and he would neither listen to the 
pleading of friends of the accused, nor pay heed to their 
threats- He believed in the right, and had the courage 
at all times and under all circumstances to maintain his 
beliefs. 

In 1873 he delivered a speech in the Senate, which in 
the light of later events looks almost like prophecy. The 
question under discussion was a resolution instructing the 
Committee on Privileges and Elections to report upon the 
best and most practicable mode of electing a President and 
Vice-President, and providing a tribunal to adjust and de- 
cide all contested elections therewith. Senator Morton took 
strong grounds in favor of doing away with the Electoral 
College, and electing a President by the direct vote of the 
people. 

It was Mr. Morton that gave to us the civil rights bill, 
which was intended to make good the ptumises of the nation 
to the colored men that they should have equal and exact 
justice with all races. That they have since foiled is no 
fault of his. 

In the Senate he left the stamp of his individuality 
upon all legislation. He was the moving spirit, the leader, 



MIS CELL A NE O US. 7-19 

Upon whom all relied. There was no question of public 
moment too small for his attention ; but his mind grasped 
all, his wisdom foresaw all, and as far as possible he 
attempted to warn and guide the country, that it might 
avoid the danger he foresaw before it. He spoke often in 
the Senate, but always with effect, and was listened to with 
the utmost attention, for it soon became recognized that 
when he summed up the arguments there was little or noth- 
ing left to be said. When defeated, as he sometimes was, 
he at once accepted the situation, but never despaired. His 
fertility of resource was wonderful, his industry was pro- 
digious. 

The last stroke which ended eventually his life, came 
while in the discharge of his senatorial duties, and 
though not in his place at the Capitol, yet like John 
Quincy Adams, he died in the harness. 

In 1877 the Senate ordered an investigation into the 
case of Senator Grover, of Oregon, who was charged with 
having secured his election to the Senate with corrupt 
means. This duty devolved upon the Committee on Privi- 
leges and Elections, of which Senator Morton was chair- 
man. It was necessary to go across the continent to Oregon. 
Senator IMorton, though physically feeble and worn out by 
his incessant labors, did not hesitate to take the long and 
tiresome journey, in company with Senators Saulsbury of 
Delaware, and McMillan of Minnesota. 

During the entire trip to San Francisco he was much 
prostrated, but the sea voyage to Portland, Oregon, seemed 
to do him good. This investigation lasted eighteen days, 
during which he labored incessantly, and the sessions of the 
committee were sometimes prolonged late into the night. 
This labor nearly broke down the other members of the 
committee, but it seemed the iron wall of Senator Morton 
rose above every trial, for, in addition to his work on the 
committee, he prepared an elaborate political speech to be 
used in the approaching Ohio campaign. At the conclusion 
of the investigation he addressed the people at Salem in a 



750 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

speech of considerable length, which was pronounced the 
ablest speech ever heard in the State. 

He arrived in San Francisco upon his return home early 
in August, and on the sixth day received his second stroke 
of paralysis. 

It would not be proper or just to close this short sketch 
without referring, at least in a brief way, to the political 
services of Morton other than those directly connected with 
his labors in the Senate and as Governor of Indiana, and to 
touch upon the general characteristics. 

Great as was his work in both of the high offices to 
which the people elevated him, his labors in the general 
field of politics were no less prodigious. From 1856, when 
he first entered politics, until death claimed him, his voice 
and pen were never idle. In every political contest he was 
foremost in the fight, and the downtrodden and oppressed 
were always his care. Not only did he engage in the po- 
litical battles of his own State, but in almost every State of 
the North he sent forth the bugle-call which rallied the 
forces of Republicanism. Few men made more stump 
speeches than he, and none ever carried such weight. In 
Indiana, during each campaign, he spoke incessantly, and 
he always knew how to touch the popular chord of 
patriotism. 

He not only spoke, but hundreds of editorials from 
his pen found their way into the columns of the leading 
papers. His political speeches, if collected and published, 
would make a political history of the country in its great 
struggle, unequaled. He was always ready to answer the 
calls of his party. His devotion to his party was witnessed 
by his declining the English mission. President Grant was 
desirous of concluding a treaty with Great Britain on the 
subject of the depredations of the rebel cruisers, and urged 
Senator Morton to undertake the mission. He was inclined 
to accept it, but the Legislature of Indiana was controlled 
by the Democrats, and he declined. President Grant wrote 
to him as follows : 



MIS CELL A NE O US . 751 

Executive Mansiox, 
Washington, D. C, October 21. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of the 19th inst., declining the English 
mission, with reasons therefor, is received. I full\- concur with 3'ou 
in all the reasons which you give for the course you find it your 
duty to pursue in the matter, but regret that the country is not to 
have 3'our valuable sei^nces at the English Court at this important 
juncture. Your course, however, I deem wise, and it will be highl}- 
appreciated by your constituents in Indiana and throughout the 
country. 

With assurances of my highest regard, I remain, very truly, 
your obedient servant, U. S. Grant. 

Hon. O. P. Morton, United States Senate. 

It is difficult to justly sum up the character of such a 
man. He was a born leader, and no sooner did he enter 
political life than he took the leadership of his party and 
maintained it until his death. He was a man of strong 
will, indomitable energy, and untiring industr}-, and was 
possessed of moral and physical courage which approached 
the stiblime. As a party leader and organizer he has had 
no equal. The universal testimony of those who were with 
him in the Senate is to the effect that America has never 
produced a party leader who could even lay claim to rival 
him. He was strong because he was always in earnest ; 
because, he never forgot a friend ; because he was ever ready 
to meet a foe. He always mastered his subject, and never 
undertook to discuss it until he had thoroughly mastered 
every phase of it. It was this that gave him such great 
power with an audience. His mind was of an anah'tical 
turn, and when he spoke his sentences were terse, logical, and 
oftentimes eloquent. There was little or no fancy about 
him, and he rather despised those fancy flights of oratory by 
which some men endeavor to capture their atidiences. He 
dealt with facts, and dealt with them as living things. 
While he was often severe, and even terrible, in his denun- 
ciation or arraignment of his opponents, he never was per- 
sonal, but always calm, dignified, urbane. 

Mr. Morton was simple in his tastes ; honest in the 



762 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

strictest sense of tlie word. No taint of corruption ever 
lingered near him. He loved his home, his family, his 
friends, and they clung to him with a devotion equal to his 
love. His nature was kind and sympathetic. The cry of 
the suffering or sorrowing always found an echo in his 
heart. The State often absorbed him to such a degree that 
he forgot himself, his own physical weakness, his own 
wants, but never so that he forgot his home or family, and 
he always turned to them for rest. When in the bosom of 
his family he was as simple as a child. 

There was no love of pomp in his nature, and he was 
always accessible to the people, the poor equally with the 
rich. He gave to the country seventeen years of his life, 
and wore himself out and died a poor man, as he had lived. 
His last audible words expressed it all, "I am worn out." 
Yes, he had worn himself out. 

The people of Indiana have raised in the Circle Park of 
Indianapolis a bronze statue of the great War Governor and 
Senator, but his greatest monument lives in the pages of 
the Constitution and laws of his country, and in the doc- 
trines of patriotism he inculcated and enforced. 



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